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LEE AT APPOMATTOX, AND OTHER PAPERS. 
Crown 8vo, 1 1.50, net. 

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. 
In American Statesmen Series. i6mo, $1.25. 

RICHARD HENRY DANA. 
A Biography. With Portraits. 2 vols, crown 8vo, $4.00. 

MASSACHUSETTS: 
Its Historians and its History, An Object Lesson. 
Crown 8vo, ^1.00. 

THREE EPISODES OF MASSACHUSETTS HISTORY. 
1. The Settlement of Boston Bay. II. The Antino- 
mian Controversy. III. A Study of Church and Town 
Government. With two Maps. 2 vols, crown 8vo, 

$4.00. 



HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY. 



LEE AT APPOMATTOX 

AND OTHEE PAPERS 



BY 



CHAELES FRANCIS ADAMS 




BOSTON AND NEW YORK 

HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY 

<^f)e iMMex^t ^tt^^y Camliribge 

1902 



THE LIBRARY OF 

CONGRESS, 
Two Copies Received 

my, IS 1902 

COPVRIGKT ENTRY 

CLASS ci/ xXc. No, 

i 2> o T--^ 

COPY 8. 






Copyright, 1902, 
By CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. 

All rights reserved. 



Published May, igo2 



CONTENTS 

Chap. Page 

I. LEE AT APPOMATTOX 1 

II. THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON: BEFORE AND 

AFTER 31 

III. THE BRITISH "CHANGE OF HEART". . . 256 

IV. AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION .... 274 
V. A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY ... 339 

INDEX 377 



LEE AT APPOMATTOX 

AND OTHER PAPERS 



LEE AT APPOMATTOX 1 

The present seems a sufficiently proper occasion, 
and this an appropriate place, to call attention to a 
matter perhaps only germane to the purpose of this 
Society, because as yet hardly antiquarian. None the 
less, historical in character, it conveys a lesson of grave 
present import. 

One of the most unhappy, and, to those concerned 
in it, disastrous wars since the fall of Napoleon, is, in 
South Africa, now working itself to a close appar- 
ently still remote, and in every way unsatisfactory. 
There is reason to think that the conflict was unne- 
cessary in its inception ; that by timely and judicious 
action it might long since have been brought to a 
close ; and that it now continues simply because the 
parties to it cannot be brought together to discuss and 
arrive at a sensible basis of adjustment, — a basis 
upon which both in reality would be not unwilling 
to agree. Nevertheless, as the cable despatches daily 

^ A paper read before the American Antiquarian Society at its 
annual meeting in Worcester, Mass., Wednesday, October 80, 1901. 



2 LEE AT APPOMATTOX 

show, the contest drags wearily along, to the probable 
destruction of one of the combatants, to the great loss 
of the other, and, so far as can be seen, in utter dis- 
regard of the best interests of both. 

My immediate purpose, however, is to draw atten- 
tion to the hairbreadth escape we ourselves had from 
a similar experience, now thirty-six years ago, and to 
assign to whom it belongs the credit for that escape. 
In one word, in the strong light of passing events, I 
think it now opportune to set forth the debt of grati- 
tude this reunited country of ours — Union and Con- 
federate, North and South — owes to Robert E. Lee, 
of Virginia. 

Most of those here — for this is not a body of young 
men — remember the state of affairs which existed in 
the United States, especially in what was then known 
as the Confederate States, or the rebellious portion of 
the United States, in April, 1865. Such as are not 
yet as mature as that memory implies have read and 
heard thereof. It was in every respect almost the 
identical state of affairs which existed in South Africa 
at the time of the capture of Pretoria by General 
Eoberts, in June a year ago. 

On the 2d of April, 1865, the Confederate army 
found itself compelled to abandon the lines in front 
of Petersburg ; and the same day — a very famous 
Sabbath — Jefferson Davis, hastily called from the 
church services he was attending, left Richmond to 
find, if he might, a new seat of government, at Dan- 
ville. The following morning our forces at last 
entered the rebel capital. This was on a Monday ; 
and, two days later, the Confederate President issued 
from DanviUe his manifesto. In it he said to the 



LEE AT APPOMATTOX 3 

people of the South, — " We have now entered upon 
a new phase of the struggle. Relieved from the ne- 
cessity of guarding particular points, our army will 
be free to move from point to point, to strike the 
enemy in detail far from his base. If, by the stress 
of numbers, we should be compelled to a temporary 
withdrawal from her [Virginia's] limits, or those of 
any other border State, we will return until the baffled 
and exhausted enemy shall abandon in despair his 
endless and impossible task of making slaves of a 
people resolved to be free." The policy, and line of 
military action, thus indicated were precisely those laid 
down and pursued by the Boer leaders during the last 
sixteen months. 

It is unnecessary for me even to refer to the series 
of events which followed our occupation of Richmond, 
and preceded the surrender of Appomattox. It is 
sufficient to say that on the Friday which followed 
the momentous Sunday, the capitulation of the Army 
of Northern Virginia had become inevitable. Not 
the less for that, the course thereafter to be pursued 
as concerned further resistance on the part of the 
Confederacy was still to be decided. As his Danville 
proclamation showed, Jefferson Davis, though face to 
face with grave disaster, had not for an instant given 
up the thought of continuing the struggle. To do so 
was certainly practicable, — far more practicable than 
now in South Africa, both as respects forces in the 
field and the area of country to be covered by the 
invader. Foreign opinion, for instance, was on this 
point settled ; it was in Europe assimied as a cer- 
tainty of the future that the conquest of the Confed- 
eracy was " impossible." The English journals had 



4 LEE AT APPOMATTOX 

always maintained, and still did maintain, that tlie 
defeat of Lee in the field, or even the surrender of all 
the Confederate armies, would be but the close of one 
phase of the war and the opening of another, — the 
final phase being a long, fruitless effort to subdue a 
people, at once united and resolved, occupying a re- 
gion so vast that it would be impossible to penetrate 
every portion of it, much less to hold it in peaceful 
subjection. As an historical fact, on this point the 
scales, on the 9th of April, 1865, hung wavering in 
the balance ; a mere turn of the hand would decide 
which way they were to incline. Thus, on the morn- 
ing of that momentous day, it was an absolutely open 
question, an even chance, whether the course which 
subsequently was pursued should be pursued, or 
whether the leaders of the Confederacy would adopt 
the policy which President Kriiger and Generals 
Botha and De Wet have in South Africa more re- 
cently adopted, and are now pursuing. 

The decision rested in the hands of one man, the 
commander of the Army of Northern Virginia. Fairly 
reliable and very graphic accounts of interviews with 
General Lee during those trying days and in the 
morning hours of April 9th have either appeared in 
print or been told in conversation, and to two of 
these accounts I propose to call attention. The first I 
find in a book, entitled The End of an Era^ recently 
published by John Sargent Wise, a son of Henry 
A. Wise, once prominent in our national politics. 
Though in 1865 but a youth of nineteen, John S. 
Wise was a hot Confederate, and had already been 
wounded in battle. At the time now in question he 
chanced, according to his own account, to have been 



LEE AT APPOMATTOX 5 

sent by Jefferson Davis, then on his way to Danville, 
with despatches to Lee. At length, after many hair- 
breadth escapes from capture, he reached the Confed- 
erate headquarters late in the night following the 
disastrous battle of Sailor's Creek. By it the line of 
march of the Confederate army towards Danville had 
been intercepted, and it had been forced to seek a 
more circuitous route in the direction of Lynchburg. 
" It was past midnight," writes Mr. Wise, " when I 
found General Lee. He was in an open field north 
of Rice's Station and east of the High Bridge. A 
camp-fire of rails was burning low. Colonel Charles 
Marshall sat in an ambulance with a lantern and a 
lap-desk. He was preparing orders at the dictation 
of General Lee, who stood near, with one hand rest- 
ing on a wheel and one foot upon the end of a log, 
watching intently the dying embers, as he spoke in a 
low tone to his amanuensis." 

Explaining his mission to the Confederate leader, 
Mr. Wise passed the remaining hours of the night in 
bivouac near by ; and early in the morning, the head- 
quarters having moved, he again set out on his quest. 
It was now Friday, the 7th. He had not gone far 
when he stumbled across his father, in bivouac with 
his brigade. Henry A. Wise was then nearly sixty 
years of age ; but the son found him wrapped in a 
blanket, stretched on the ground like a common soldier, 
and asleep among his men. Essentially a Virginian, 
and in many respects typically a Southerner and " fire- 
eater," Henry A. Wise was governor at the time of 
the John Brown Harper's Ferry raid, in October, 
1859, his term expiring shortly after Brown's execu- 
tion. A member of the Virginia Convention which, 



6 LEE AT APPOMATTOX 

immediately after the fall of Sumter, passed the ordi- 
nance of secession, Wise, though an extreme States- 
rights man, had been in favor of " fighting it out in 
the Union," as the phrase then went ; but when Vir- 
ginia became plainly bent on secession, he unhesitat- 
ingly " went with his State." Commissioned as a 
brigadier-general almost at once, he had served in 
the Confederate army throughout the war, and was in 
the thick of the fight at Sailor's Creek. Now, on the 
morning after that engagement, aroused from an un- 
easy sleep by the unexpected appearance of his son, 
almoet the first wish he expressed was to see General 
Lee, and he asked impetuously of his whereabouts. 
The two started together to go to him. John S. Wise 
has described vividly the aspect of affairs as they passed 
along : — " The roads and fields were filled with strag- 
glers. They moved looking behind them, as if they 
expected to be attacked and harried by a pursuing foe. 
Demoralization, panic, abandonment of all hope, ap- 
peared on every hand. Wagons were rolling along 
without any order or system. Caissons and limber- 
chests, without commanding officers, seemed to be 
floating aimlessly upon a tide of disorganization. Ris- 
ing to his full height, casting a glance around him like 
that of an eagle, and sweeping the horizon with his 
long arm and bony forefinger, my father exclaimed : 
' This is the end ! ' It is impossible to convey an idea 
of the agony and the bitterness of his words and ges- 
tures." Then follows this description of the interview 
which ensued : — 

" We found General Lee on the rear portico of the 
house that I have mentioned. He had washed his face 
in a tin basin, and stood drying his beard with a coarse 



LEE AT APPOMATTOX 7 

towel as we approached. ' General Lee,' exclaimed 
my father, ' my poor, brave men are lying on yonder 
hill more dead than alive. For more than a week they 
have been fighting day and night, without food, and, 
by God, sir, they shall not move another step until 
somebody gives them something to eat ! ' 

" ' Come in, general,' said General Lee soothingly. 
' They deserve something to eat, and shall have it ; and 
meanwhile you shall share my breakfast.' He disarmed 
everything like defiance by his kindness. 

" It was but a few moments, however, before my 
father launched forth in a fresh denunciation of the 
conduct of General Bushrod Johnson ^ in the engage- 
ment of the sixth. I am satisfied that General Lee 
felt as he did ; but, assumiiig an air of mock severity, 
he said, ' General, are you aware that you are liable to 
court-martial and execution for insubordination and 
disrespect toward your commanding officer ? ' 

" My father looked at him with lifted eyebrows and 
flashing eyes, and exclaimed : ' Shot ! You can't af- 
ford to shoot the men who fight for cursing those who 
run away. Shot ! I wish you would shoot me. If 
you don't, some Yankee probably will within the next 
twenty-four hours.' 

" Growing more serious. General Lee inquired what 
he thought of the situation. 

" ' Situation ? ' said the bold old man. <• There is 
no situation ! Nothing remains, General Lee, but to 
put your poor men on your poor mules and send them 
home in time for spring ploughing. This army is 

^ Elsewhere in his book (pp. 358, 359), and in another connection, 
J. S. Wise is equally severe in his characterization of Bushrod John- 



8 LEE A T APPOMA TTOX 

t 

hopelessly whipped, and is fast becoming demoralized. 
These men have already endured more than I believed 
flesh and blood could stand, and I say to you, sir, 
emphatically, that to prolong the struggle is murder, 
and the blood of every man who is killed from this 
time forth is on your head. General Lee.' 

"This last expression seemed to cause General Lee 
great pain. With a gesture of remonstrance, and even 
of impatience, he protested : ' Oh, general, do not talk 
so wildly. My burdens are heavy enough. What 
would the country think of me, if I did what you sug- 
gest ? ' 

" ' Country be d d ! ' was the quick reply. 

' There is no country. There has been no country, 
general, for a year or more. You are the country to 
these men. They have fought for you. They have 
shivered through a long winter for you. Without pay 
or clothes, or care of any sort, their devotion to you 
and faith in you have been the only things which have 
held this army together. If you demand the sacrifice, 
there are still left thousands of us who will die for you. 
You know the game is desperate beyond redemption, 
and that, if you so announce, no man or government 
or people will gainsay your decision. That is why I 
repeat that the blood of any man killed hereafter is 
upon your head.' 

" General Lee stood for some time at an open win- 
dow, looking out at the throng now surging by upon 
the roads and in the fields, and made no response." ^ 

It wiU be remembered that John Sargent Wise was 
individually present at this conversation, a youth of 
nineteen. I have as little respect as any one well can 
1 The End of an Era, pp. 433-435. 



LEE AT APPOMATTOX 9 

have for the recollection of thirty years since as a basis 
of history. Nevertheless, it would seem quite out of 
the question that a youth of only nineteen could have 
been present at such a scene as is here described, and 
that the words which then passed, and the incidents 
which occurred, should not have been indelibly im- 
printed upon his memory. I am disposed, therefore, 
to consider this reliable historical material. Mean- 
while, it so chances that I am able to supplement it by 
similar testimony from another quarter. 

Some years ago I was, for a considerable period, 
closely associated with General E. P. Alexander, who, 
in its time, had been chief of artillery in Long- 
street's famous corps ; and it was General Alexander 
who, on the morning of July 3, 1863, opened on the 
Union line at Gettysburg what Hancock described as 
" a most terrific and appalling cannonade," intended 
to prepare the way for the advance of Pickett's divi- 
sion. In April, 1865, General Alexander was, if my 
recollection serves me right, in command of the artil- 
lery of the Army of Nortliern Virginia. In many 
connections I had found occasion to notice the singu- 
lar tenacity of his memory. He seemed to forget 
nothing ; nor was he less accurate in matters of detail 
than in generalities. He delighted in reminiscence 
of the great war, and he recalled its incidents with 
the particularity of a trained ofiicer of the general 
staff. He thus many times, always with the same 
precision, repeated to me, or in my hearing, the details 
of interviews with Lee during the retreat from Peters- 
burg, and more especially of one, on the morning of 
April 9th. Of what he said I have since retained 
a vivid memory. During Friday, April 7th, the 



10 LEE AT APPOMATTOX 

day Wise found his way to Lee's headquarters, the 
weary Confederate army pressed forward, vainly try- 
ing to elude the hot pursuit of the Union advance, 
led by Sheridan. On Saturday, the 8th, according to 
General Alexander, the leading Confederate officers 
became so demoralized that one of them. General 
Pendleton, was authorized by a sort of informal coun- 
cil to wait on Lee, and to tell him that, a surrender 
seeming inevitable, they were prepared to take the 
responsibility of advising it. Recognizing his mili- 
tary obligations, and not yet convinced that his com- 
mand was hopelessly involved, Lee distinctly resented 
the advice. He told General Pendleton that there 
were too many men yet remaining in the ranks to 
think of laying down arms, and his air and manner 
conveyed a rebuke. 

Twenty-four additional hours of fasting, marching, 
and fighting put a new face on the situation. Two 
days before, on the 7th, shortly after the Wise inter- 
view. General Alexander had met Lee at Farmville, 
and a consultation over the maps took place. Alex- 
ander had then pointed out Appomattox as " the dan- 
ger point," the roads to Lynchburg there intersecting, 
and the enemy having the shortest line. Sheridan 
did not lose his advantage, and, on Sunday, the 9th 
of April, Lee found his further progress blocked. 
That morning General Alexander again met Lee. 
Both realized the situation fuUy. Moreover, as chief 
of artillery, Alexander was well aware that the lim- 
ber-chests were running low ; his arm of the service 
was in no condition to go into another engagement. 
Yet the idea of an abandonment of the cause had 
never occurred to him as among the probabilities. 



LEE AT APPOMATTOX 11 

All night he had lain awake, thinking as to what 
was next to be done. Finally he had come to the 
conclusion that there was but one course to pursue. 
The Confederate army, while nominally capitulating, 
must in reality disperse, and those composing it should 
be instructed, whether individually or as part of de- 
tachments, to get each man to his own State in the 
most direct way and shortest possible time, and report 
to the governor thereof, with a view to a further and 
continuous resistance. 

Thus, exactly what is now taking place in South 
Africa was to take place in the Confederacy. Gen- 
eral Alexander told me that, as he passed his batteries 
on his way to headquarters, the men called out to him, 
in cheery tones, that there were still some rounds re- 
maining in the caissons, and that they were ready to 
renew the fight. He found Lee seated on the trunk 
of a fallen tree before a dying camp-fire. He was 
dressed in uniform, and invited Alexander to take a 
seat beside him. He then asked his opinion of the 
situation, and of the course proper to be pursued. 
Full of the idea which dominated his mind, Alexander 
proceeded at once to propound his plan, for it seemed 
to him the only plan worthy of consideration. As he 
went on. General Lee, looking steadily into the fire 
with an abstracted air, listened patiently. Alexander 
said his full say. A brief pause ensued, which Lee 
finally broke in somewhat these words : " No ! Gen- 
eral Alexander, that will not do. You must remem- 
ber we are a Christian people. We have fought 
this fight as long as, and as well as, we knew how. 
We have been defeated. For us, as a Christian 
people, there is now but one course to pursue. We 



12 LEE AT APPOMATTOX 

must accept the situation ; these men must go home 
and plant a crop, and we must proceed to build up 
our country on a new basis. We cannot have re- 
course to the methods you suggest." I remember 
being deeply impressed with Alexander's comment, as 
he repeated these words of Lee. They had evidently 
burned themselves into his memory. He said : " I 
had nothing to urge in reply. I felt that the man 
had soared way up above me, — he dominated me com- 
pletely. I rose from beside him ; silently mounted 
my horse ; rode back to my command ; and waited 
for the order to surrender." 

Then and there, Lee decided its course for the Con- 
federacy. And I take it there is not one solitary man 
in the United States to-day. North or South, who does 
not feel that he decided right. 

The Army of Northern Virginia, it will be remem- 
bered, laid down its arms on the 9th of April. But 
General Joseph Johnston was in command of another 
Confederate army then confronting Sherman, in 
North Carolina, and it was still an open question what 
course he would pursue. His force numbered over 
40,000 combatants ; more than the entire muster of 
the Boers in their best estate. Lee's course decided 
Johnston's. S. R. Mallory, who was present on the 
occasion, has left a striking account of a species of 
council held at Greensboro, North Carolina, on the 
evening of the 10th of April, by Jefferson Davis and 
the members of his cabinet, with General Johnston. 
Davis, stubborn in temper, and bent on a policy of con- 
tinuous irregular resistance, expressed the belief that 
the disasters recently sustained, though " terrible," 
should not be regarded as " fatal." " I think," he 



LEE AT APPOMATTOX 13 

added, "we can whip the enemy yet, if our people 
will turn out." When he ceased speaking, a pause 
ensued. Davis at last said, " We should like to hear 
your views, General Johnston." Whereupon John- 
ston, without preface or introduction, and with a tone 
and manner almost spiteful, remarked in his terse, 
concise, demonstrative way, as if seeking to condense 
thoughts that were crowding for utterance : " My 
views are, sir, that our people are tired of the war, 
feel themselves whipped, and will not fight." ^ 

We all know what followed. Lee's great military 
prestige and moral ascendency made it easy for some 
of the remaining Confederate commanders, like John- 
ston, to follow the precedent he set ; while others of 
them, like Kirby Smith, found it imposed upon them. 
A firm direction had been given to the course of 
events ; an intelligible policy was indicated. 

I have in my possession a copy of the Index^ the 
weekly journal published in London during our civil 
war. The official organ of the Confederate agents 
in Europe, it was intended for the better enhghten- 
ment of foreign opinion, more especially the English 
press. The surrender of Lee was commented upon 
editorially in the issue of that paper for April 27th. 
" The war is far from concluded," it declared. " A 
strenuous resistance and not surrender was the im- 
alterable determination of the Confederate authorities, 
. . . and if the worst comes to the worst there is the 
trans-Mississippi department, where the remnant of 
[Johnston's] army can find a shelter, and a new and 
safe starting-point." 2 On the 11th of May follow- 

1 Alfriend: Life of Jefferson Davis, pp. 622-626. 

2 Captain Raphael Semmes, of Alabama fame, wrote as follows, in 



14 LEE AT APPOMATTOX 

ing, the surrender of Johnston's army was announced 
on the same terms as that of Lee ; but in summing up 
the situation, the Index still found " the elements of 
a successful, or, at least, a protracted resistance." On 
the 25th of May, it had an article entitled " Southern 
Kesistance in Texas," in which it announced that, 
" Such a war will be fierce, ferocious, and of long 
duration," — in a word, such an expiring struggle as 
we are to-day witnessing in South Africa. In its 
issue of June 1st, the Index commented on "The 
capture of President Davis ; " and then, and not until 
then, forestalling the trans-Mississippi surrender of 
Kirby Smith, brought to it by the following mail, it 
raised the wailing cry, '-^ Fuit Ilium. . . . The South 
has fallen." 

Comparing the situation which then existed in the 
Confederacy with that now in South Africa, it must 
also be remembered that General Lee assumed the 
responsibility he did assume, and decided the policy 
to be pursued in the way it was decided, under no 

a private letter to an English friend, published in the London Morning 
Herald, during March, 1865 : " The State of Texas alone has within 
her limits all the materials, and is fast getting the appliances, for 
equipping and maintaining armies, and when you reflect that she has 
three times as much territory as France, and that countless herds of 
horses and beef cattle wander over her boundless prairies, you can 
well imagine with what contempt this warlike people regard the insane 
threat of subjugation. If our armies were driven to-morrow across 
the Mississippi River, we could still fight the enemy for a century to 
come in Texas alone. So dismiss all your fears, my friend, our inde- 
pendence is an accomplished fact, let the war continue as long as the 
Yankee pleases, and with what varying results it may." In its issue 
of March 15, 1865, the London Ti7nes editorially said : " These ter- 
ritories are too vast to be occupied, and the elements of rebellion they 
contain are too rife to be left to themselves. They may be penetrated 
in every direction, but we do not see how they are to be held or sub- 
dued." 



LEE AT APPOMATTOX 15 

ameliorating conditions. Politically, unconditional 
surrender was insisted upon ; and Lee's surrender was, 
politically, unconditional. Even more so was John- 
ston's ; for, in Johnston's case, the modifying terms of 
capitulation agreed on in the first place between him 
and Sherman were roughly disallowed at Washington, 
and the truce, by an order coming thence, abruptly 
terminated. Then Johnston did what Lee had already 
done ; ignoring Davis, he surrendered his army. 

In the case of the Confederacy, also, an absolutely 
unconditional political surrender implied much. The 
Emancipation Proclamation of January, 1863, which 
confiscated the most valuable chattel property of the 
Confederacy, remained the irreversible law of the land. 
The inhabitants of the South were, moreover, as one 
man disfranchised. When they laid down their arms 
they had before them, first, a military government ; 
and, after that, the supremacy of their former slaves. 
A harder fate for a proud people to accept could not 
well be imagined. The bitterness of feeling, the 
hatred, was, too, extreme. It may possibly be argued 
that the conditions in this country then were different 
from those now in South Africa, inasmuch as here it 
was a civil war, — a conflict between communities of 
the same race and speech involving the vital question 
of the supremacy of law. This argument, however, 
seems to imply that, in case of strife of this descrip- 
tion, a general severity may fairly be resorted to in 
excess of that permissible between nations ; in other 
words, that we are justified in treating our brethren 
with greater harshness than we would treat aliens 
in blood and speech. Obviously, this is a questionable 
contention. 



16 LEE AT APPOMATTOX 

It might possibly also be claimed that the bitter- 
ness of civil war is not so insurmountable as that of 
one involving a question of race dominance. Yet it 
is difficult to conceive bitterness of greater intensity 
than existed between the sections at the close of our 
civil war. There is striking evidence of this in the 
book of Mr. Wise, from which I have already quoted. 
Toward its close he speaks of the death of Lincoln. 
He then adds the following : — 

" Perhaps I ought to chronicle that the announce- 
ment was received with demonstrations of sorrow. If 
I did, I should be lying for sentiment's sake. Among 
the higher officers and the most intelligent and con- 
servative men, the assassination caused a shudder 
of horror at the heinousness of the act, and at the 
thought of its possible consequences ; but among the 
thoughtless, the desperate, and the ignorant, it was 
hailed as a sort of retributive justice. In maturer 
years I have been ashamed of what I felt and said 
when I heard of that awful calamity. However, men 
ought to be judged for their feelings and their speech 
by the circumstances of their surroundings. For four 
years we had been fighting. In that struggle, all we 
loved had been lost. Lincoln incarnated to us the 
idea of oppression and conquest. We had seen his 
face over the coffins of our brothers and relatives and 
friends, in the flames of Richmond, in the disaster at 
Appomattox. In blood and flame and torture the tem- 
ples of our lives were tumbling about our heads. We 
were desperate and vindictive, and whosoever denies it 
forgets or is false. We greeted his death in a spirit 
of reckless hate, and hailed it as bringing agony and 
bitterness to those who were the cause of our own agony 



LEE AT APPOMATTOX 17 

and bitterness. To us, Lincoln was an inhuman 
monster, Grant a butcher, and Sherman a fiend." 

Indeed, recalling the circumstances of that time, it 
is fairly appalling to consider what in 1865 must have 
occurred, had Kobert E. Lee then been of the same 
turn of mind as was Jefferson Davis, or as implacable 
and unyielding in disposition as Kriiger or Botha 
have more recently proved. The national government 
had in arms a million men, inured to the hardships 
and accustomed to the brutalities of war ; Lincoln had 
been freshly assassinated ; the temper of the North 
was thoroughly aroused, while its patience was ex- 
hausted. An irregular warfare would inevitably have 
resulted, a warfare without quarter.^ The Confederacy 
would have been reduced to a smouldering wilder- 
ness, — to what South Africa to-day is. In such a 
death grapple, the North, both in morale and in 
means, would have suffered only less than the South. 
From both sections that fate was averted. 

It is not my purpose to enter into any criticism of 
the course of events in South Africa, or of the policy 
there on either side pursued. It will be for the future 
to decide whether the prolonged, irregular resistance 
we are witnessing is justifiable, or, if justifiable, 
whether it is wise. Neither of these questions do I 
propose to discuss. My purpose simply is to call at- 
tention, in view of what is now taking place elsewhere, 

^ Commenting- on the '* Suddenness of the Collapse," the Index said, 
editorially, in its issue of June 8, 1865 : " The loss of the armies left 
no alternative but private war, which never yet redeemed a country 
without foreign help, and which is as much directed against society as 
ag'ainst a public foe. Such a course was inconsistent with the genius 
of the Southern people, which is eminently law-abiding- and orderly. 
Brave men know how to accept defeat, and the Southerners have 
accepted theirs, bitter though it is, as only brave men can." 



18 LEE AT APPOMATTOX 

to the narrow escape we ourselves, thirty-six years 
ago, had from a similar awful catastrophe. And I 
again say that, as we look to-day upon Kriiger and 
Botha and De Wet, and the situation existing in the 
Transvaal and the Orange Free State, I doubt if one 
single man in the United States, North or South, — 
whether he participated in the civil war or was born 
since that war ended, — would fail to acknowledge an 
infinite debt of gratitude to the Confederate leader, 
who on the 9th of April, 1865, decided, as he did 
decide, that the United States, whether Confederate 
or Union, was a Christian community, and that his 
duty was to accept the responsibility which the fate 
of war had imposed upon him, — to decide in favor of 
a new national life, even if slowly and painfully to be 
built up by his own people under conditions arbitrarily 
and by force imposed on them. 

In one of the Confederate accounts of the great 
war 1 is to be found the following description of Lee's 
return to his Richmond home immediately after he 
had at Appomattox sealed the fate of the Confed- 
eracy. With it I wiU conclude this paper. On the 
afternoon of the previous day, the first of those paroled 
from the surrendered Army of Northern Virginia had 
straggled back to Richmond. The writer thus goes 
on : " Next morning a small group of horsemen ap- 
peared on the further side of the pontoons. By some 
strangle intuition it was known that General Lee was 
among them, and a crowd collected all along the route 
he would take, silent and bareheaded. There was no 
excitement, no hurrahing; but as the great chief 
passed, a deep, loving murmur, greater than these, 

1 De Leon: Four Years in Rebel Capitals, p. 367. 



LEE AT APPOMATTOX 19 

rose from the very hearts of the crowd. Taking off 
his hat and simply bowing his head, the man great in 
adversity passed silently to his own door ; it closed 
upon him, and his people had seen him for the last 
time in his battle harness." 



After preparing the foregoing paper, I wrote to 
General Alexander, asking him to verify my recollec- 
tion of the account of what passed at his meeting with 
General Lee at Appomattox. His reply did not reach 
me in time for the meeting of the American Anti- 
quarian Society, at which the paper was read. He 
wrote in part as follows : " I am greatly interested in 
what you wish, having often thought and spoken of 
the contrast between Lee's views of the duty of the 
leaders of a people, and those held at the time by 
President Davis, and now held by Kriiger and the 
Boer leaders ; and I have written of it, too, in my 
own war recollections, which I am writing out for my 
children. 

^'•Essentially^ your recollections are entirely cor- 
rect ; though some of the details are not exact. Two 
days before, I had talked with General Lee over his 
map, and noted Appomattox Courthouse as the ' dan- 
ger point.' When I came up on the 9th to where he 
had halted on the road, he called me to him, and 
began by referring to previous talk, and then he asked 
me, — ' What shall we do to-day ? ' For an account 
of our conversation I will cut out of a scrap-book two 
pages which contain a clipping from the Philadelphia 
Press of a letter I wrote twenty years ago." 

In the course of his letter. General Alexander fur- 
ther said, — " The gist of my argument to General 
Lee was that the governors of the Southern States 
might make some sort of ' Terms,' which would bar 



LEE AT APPOMATTOX 21 

trials for treason, etc. ; and it was based on the as- 
sumption that Grant would demand 'unconditional 
surrender.' And I certainly think, too, that Grant 
deserves equal jiraise and gratitude for his high- 
mindedness in his liberal treatment of his foe — more 
absolutely at his mercy than was Buckner at Fort 
Donelson, or Pemberton at Yicksburg." . . . 

" I particularly remember, too, his (Lee's) dwell- 
ing on the fact that the men were already, as it were, 
' demoralized ' by four yea^rs of war, and would but 
too easily become mere bushwhackers." 

The clipping referred to was from an issue of the 
Press of July, 1881. The narrative contained in 
it, now not easily accessible, is of such interest and 
obvious historical value, as throwing light on what 
was passing in Lee's mind at one of the most critical 
moments in the national history, that I here reproduce 
it in f uU : — 

" The morning of the 9th of April, 1865, found the 
Confederate army in a position in which its inevitable 
fate was apparent to every man in it. The skirmish- 
ing which had begun in its front as its advance guard 
reached Appomattox Courthouse the night before had 
developed into a sharp fight, in which the continu- 
ous firing of the artillery and the steady increase of 
the musketry told to all that a heavy force had been 
thrown across our line of march, and that reinforce- 
ments to it were steadily arriving. The long trains 
of wagons and artillery were at first halted in the road 
and then parked in the adjoining fields, allowing the 
rear of the column to close up and additional troops 
to pass to the front to reinforce the advanced guard 
and to form a reserve line of battle in their rear, 



22 LEE AT APPOMATTOX 

under cover of which they might retire when neces- 
sary. While these dispositions were taking place, 
General Lee, who had dismounted and was standing 
near a fire on a hill about two miles from the Court- 
house, called the writer to him, and, inviting him to a 
seat on a log near by, referred to the situation and 
asked : ' What shall we do this morning ? ' Although 
this opportunity of expressing my views was unex- 
pected, the situation itself was not, for two days 
before, while near Farmville, in a consultation with 
General Lee over his map, the fact of the enemy's 
having the shortest road to the Appomattox Court- 
house had been noted and the probability of serious 
difficulty there anticipated, and in the mean time 
there had been ample opportunity for reflection on all 
of the emergencies that might arise. Without re23ly- 
ing directly to the question, however, I answered first 
that it was due to my command (of artillery) that I 
should tell him that they were in as good spirits, 
though short of ammunition and with poor teams, as 
the}^ had ever been, and had begged, if it came to a 
surrender, to be allowed to expend first every round 
of ammunition on the enemy, and surrender only the 
empty amnmnition chests. To this General Lee re- 
plied that there were remaining only two divisions of 
infantry sufficiently well organized and strong to be 
fully relied upon (Field's and Mahone's), and that 
they did not number eight thousand muskets together ; 
and that that force was not sufficient to warrant him 
in undertaking a pitched battle. ' Then,' I answered, 
' general, there are but two alternatives, to surrender 
or to order the army to abandon its trains and dis- 
perse in the woods and bushes, every man for himself, 



LEE AT APPOMATTOX 23 

and each to make his best way, with his arms, either 
to the army of General Johnston, in North Carohna, 
or home to the governor of his State. We have all 
foreseen the probability of such an alternative for two 
days, and I am sure I speak the sentiments of many 
others besides my own in urging that rather than sur- 
render the army you should allow us to disperse in 
the woods and go, every man for himself.' 

" ' What would you hope to accomplish by this ? ' 
" I answered ; ' If there is any hope at all for the 
Confederacy or for the separate States to make terms 
with the United States or for any foreign assistance, 
this course stands the chances, whatever they may be ; 
while if this army surrenders this morning, the Con- 
federacy is dead from that moment. Grant will turn 
150,000 fresh men against Johnston, and with the 
moral effect of our surrender he will go, and Dick 
Taylor and Kirby Smith will have to follow like a row 
of bricks, while if we aU take to dispersing in the 
woods, we inaugurate a new phase of the war, which 
may be indefinitely prolonged, and it will at least 
have great moral effect in showing that in our pledges 
to fight it out to the last we meant what we said. And 
even, general, if there is no hope at all in this course 
or in any other, and if the fate of the Confederacy is 
sealed whatever we do, there is one other considera- 
tion which your soldiers have a right to urge on you, 
and that is your own military reputation, in which 
every man in this army, officer or private, feels the 
utmost personal pride and has a personal property 
that his children will prize after him. The Yankees 
brought Grant here from the West, after the failure 
of all their other generals, as one who had whipped 



' v^ 



24 LEE AT APPOMATTOX 

everybody lie had ever fought against, and they call 
him " Unconditional Surrender " Grant, and have 
been bragging in advance that you would have to sur- 
render too. Now, general, I think you ought to spare 
us all the mortification of having you to ask Grant for 
terms, and have him answer that he had no terms to 
offer you.' 

"I still remember most vividly the emotion with 
which I made this appeal, increasing as I went on, 
until my whole heart was in it ; and it seemed to me 
at the moment one which no soldier could resist and 
against which no consideration whatever could be 
urged ; and when I closed, after urging my sugges- 
tions at greater length than it is necessary to repeat, 
looking him in the face and speaking with more bold- 
ness than I usually found in his presence, I had not a 
doubt that he must adopt some such course as I had 
urged. 

" He heard me entirely through, however, very 
calmly, and then asked : ' How many men do you 
estimate would escape if I were to order the army to 
disperse ? ' 

" I replied : ' I suppose two thirds of us could get 
away, for the enemy could not disperse to follow us 
through the woods.' 

" He said : ' We have here only about sixteen 
thousand men with arms, and not all of those who 
could get away would join General Johnston, but most 
of them would try and make their way to their homes 
and families, and their numbers would be too small to 
be of any material service either to General Johnston or 
to the governors of the States. I recognize fully that 
the surrender of this army is the end of the Confeder- 



LEE Af APPOMATTOX 25 

acy, but no course we can take can prevent or even 
delay that result. I have never believed that we 
would reeeive foreign assistance, or get our liberty 
otherwise than by our own arms. The end is now 
upon us, and it only remains to decide how we shall 
close the struggle. But in deciding this question we 
are to approach it not ordy as soldiers but as Christian 
men, deciding on matters which involve a great deal 
else besides their own feelings. If I should order 
this army to disperse, the men with their arms, but 
without organization or control, and without provisions 
or money, would soon be wandering through every 
State in the Confederacy, some seeking to get to their 
homes, and some with no homes to go to. Many 
would be compelled to rob and plunder as they went 
to save themselves from starvation, and the enemy's 
cavalry would pursue in small detachments, particu- 
larly in efforts to catch the general officers, and raid 
and burn over large districts which they will other- 
wise never reach, and the result would be the inau- 
guration of lawlessness and terror and of organized 
bands of robbers all over the South. Now, as Chris- 
tian men, we have not the right to bring this state of 
affairs upon the country, whatever the sacrifice of per- 
sonal pride involved. And as for myself, you young 
men might go to bushwhacking, but I am too old ; 
and even if it were right for me to disperse the army, 
I should surrender myself to General Grant as the 
only proper course for one of my years and position. 
But I am glad to be able to tell you one thing for 
your comfort : General Grant will not demand an un- 
conditional surrender, but offers us most hberal terms 
— the paroling of the whole army not to fight until 



26 LEE AT APPOMATTOX 

exclianged.' He then went on to speak of the proba- 
ble details of the terms of surrender, and to say that 
about 10 A. M. he was to meet General Grant in the 
rear of the army, and would then accept the terms 
offered. 

" Sanguine as I had been when he commenced that 
* he must acquiesce in my views,' I had not one word 
to reply when he had finished. He spoke slowly and 
deliberately, and with some feeling ; and the complete- 
ness of the considerations he advanced, and which he 
dwelt upon with more detail than I can now fully re- 
call, speaking particularly of the women and children, 
as the greatest sufferers in the state of anarchy which 
a dispersion of the army would bring about, and his re- 
ference to what would be his personal course if he did 
order such dispersion, all indicated that the question 
was not then presented to his mind for the first time. 

" A short time after this conversation General Lee 
rode to the rear of the army to meet General Grant 
and arrange the details of the surrender. He had 
started about a half hour when General Fitz Lee sent 
word to General Longstreet that he had broken through 
a portion of the enemy's line, and that the whole army 
might make its way through. General Longstreet, on 
learning this, directed Colonel Haskell of the artillery ,i 

1 Colonel J. C. Haskell, of South Carolina ; " a bom and a resource- 
ful artilleryman, [who] knew no such thing as fear." General Long- 
street evidently used General Alexander's paper in the Philadelphia 
Press in preparing the account, contained in his Manassas to Appo- 
mattox, of what occurred on the day of Lee's surrender. A further re- 
ference to Colonel Haskell may be found in Wise : The End of an Era 
(p. 360). Longstreet says that, at Appomattox, " there were ' surren- 
dered or paroled ' 28,356 officers and men." A week previous to the 
capitulation, Lee's and Johnston's combined forces numbered consid- 
erably over 100,000 combatants. [C. F. A.] 



LEE A T APPOMA TTOX 27 

wlio was very finely mounted, to ride after General Lee 
at utmost speed, killing his horse, if necessary, and re- 
call him before he could reach General Grant. Colonel 
Haskell rode as directed, and a short distance in rear 
of the army found General Lee and some of his staff 
dismounted by the roadside. As he with difficulty 
checked his horse, General Lee came up quickly, ask- 
ing what was the matter ; but, without waiting for a 
reply, said : ' Oh ! I 'm afraid you have killed your 
beautiful mare. What did you ride her so hard for ? ' 
On hearing General Longstreet's message, he asked 
some questions about the situation, and sent word to 
General Longstreet to use his own discretion in making 
any movements ; but he did not himself return, and in 
a short while another message was received that the 
success of the cavalry under General Fitz Lee was but 
temporary, and that there was no such gap in the 
enemy's line as had been supposed. Soon afterward 
a message was brought from the enemy's picket that 
General Grant had passed around to the front and 
would meet General Lee at Appomattox Courthouse, 
and General Lee accordingly returned. 

" Meanwhile, as the Confederate line under General 
Gordon was slowly falling back from Appomattox 
Courthouse after as gallant a fight against overwhelm- 
ing odds as it had ever made, capturing and bringing 
safely off with it an entire battery of the enemy's, Gen- 
eral Custer, commanding a division of Federal cavalry, 
rode forward with a flag of truce, and, the firing hav- 
ing ceased on both sides, was conducted to General 
Longstreet as commanding temporarily in General 
Lee's absence. Custer demanded the surrender of the 
army to himself and General Sheridan, to which Gen- 



28 LEE AT APPOMATTOX 

eral Longstreet replied that General Lee was in com- 
munication with General Grant upon that subject, and 
that the issue would be determined between them. 
Custer replied that he and Sheridan were independent 
of Grant, and unless the surrender was made to them 
they would ' pitch in ' at once. Longstreet's answer 
was a peremptory order [to Custer] at once [to return] 
to his own lines, and ' try it if he liked.' Custer was 
accordingly escorted back ; but fire was not reopened, 
and both lines remained halted, the Confederate about 
a half mile east of the Courthouse. 

" General Lee, returning from the rear shortly after- 
ward, halted in a small field adjoining Sweeney's house, 
a little in rear of his skirmish line, and, seated on 
some rails under an apple-tree, awaited a message from 
General Grant. This apple-tree was not only entirely 
cut up for mementos within two days afterward, but 
its very roots were dug up and carried away under 
the false impression that the surrender took place 
under it.^ 

" About noon a Federal staff officer rode up and an- 
nounced that General Grant was at the Courthouse, 
and General Lee with one of his staff accompanied 
him back. As he left the apple-tree General Long- 
street's last words were : ' Unless he offers you liberal 
terms, general, let us fight it out.' 

" It would be a difficult task to convey to one who 

1 The surrender took place in the house of a Mr. McLean, a gentle- 
man who, by a strange coincidence, owned a farm on Bull Run at the 
beginning- of the war. General Beauregard's headquarters were at 
McLean's house, just in the rear of Blackburn's ford, during the first 
battle fought by the army, July 18, 1861. McLean moved from Bull 
Run to get himself out of the theatre of war. The last battle took 
place on his new farm, and the surrender in his new residence. 



LEE AT APPOMATTOX 29 

was not present an idea of the feeling of the Confed- 
erate army during the few hours which so suddenly, 
and so unexpectedly to it, terminated its existence, and 
with it all hopes of the Confederacy. Having been 
sharply engaged that very morning, and its movements 
arrested by the flag of truce, while one portion of it 
was actually fighting and nearly aU the rest, infantry 
and artillery, had just been formed in line of battle in 
sight and range of the enemy, and with guns unlim- 
bered, it was impossible to realize fuUy that the war, 
with all its hopes, its ambitions, and its hardships, was 
thus ended. There was comparatively very little con- 
versation, and men stood in groups looking over the 
scene ; but the groups were unusually silent. It was 
not at first generally known that a surrender was in- 
evitable, but there was a remarkable pre-acquiescence 
in whatever General Lee should determine, and the 
warmest expressions of confidence in his judgment. 
Hanks and discipline were maintained as usual, and 
there is little doubt that, had General Lee decided to 
fight that afternoon, the troops would not have disap- 
pointed liim. About 4 p. m. he returned from the 
Courthouse, and, after informing the principal officers 
of the terms of the surrender, started to ride back to 
his camp. 

"The universal desire to express to him the un- 
abated love and confidence of the army had led to the 
formation of the gunners of a few battahons of artil- 
lery along the roadside, with orders to take off their 
hats in silence as he rode by. When he approached, 
however, the men could not be restrained, but burst 
into the wildest cheering, which the adjacent infantry 
lines took up ; and, breaking ranks, they all crowded 



30 LEE AT APPOMATTOX 

around him, cheering at the tops of their voices. Gen- 
eral Lee stopped his horse, and, after gaining silence, 
made the only speech to his men that he ever made. 
He was very brief, and gave no excuses or apologies 
for his surrender, but said he had done all in his 
power for his men, and urged them to go as quickly 
and quietly to their homes as possible, to resume 
peaceful avocations, and to be as good citizens as they 
had been soldiers ; and this advice marked the course 
which he himself pursued so faithfully to the end." 
Boston, November 6, 1901. 

Note. — While the foregoing was passing through the press, there 
appeared in the Century magazine for April, 1902 (volume Ixiii. pp. 
921-944), a series of papers relating to the surrender of Appomat- 
tox. One of these papers, entitled "Personal Recollections of the 
Break-up of the Confederacy," was by General Alexander. Another 
was by Colonel Charles Marshall, the military secretary to General 
Lee, referred to by Mr. John Sargent Wise. {Supra, page 5.) In the 
Century paper General Alexander recounts the circumstances of his 
interview with General Lee more in detail, and with greater exactness, 
than in his contribution to the Philadelphia Press of twenty years be- 
fore ; but the two narratives differ in no material respect. 



, II 

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON : BEFORE AND 
AFTER 1 

Negotiated during the spring of 1871, and signed 
on the 8th of May of that year, the Treaty of Wash- 
ington not only put to rest questions of difference of 
long standing, big with danger, between the two lead- 
ing maritime nations of the world, but it incorporated 
new principles of the first importance into the body 
of accepted International Law. The degTee, more- 
over, to which that treaty has influenced, and is now 
influencing, the course of human affairs and historical 
evolution in both hemispheres is, I think, little appre- 
ciated. To that subject I propose this evening to 
address myself. 

The time to make use of unpublished material bear- 
ing on this period — material not found in newspapers, 
public archives, or memoirs, which have already seen 
the light — has, moreover, come. So far as any con- 
siderable political or diplomatic result can be said to 
be the work of one man, the Treaty of Washington 

^ This paper was orig'inally prepared as an address, to be delivered 
before the New York Historical Society on its ninety- seventh anni- 
versary, on the evening' of Tuesday, November 19, 1901. Owing to 
the length to which it grew in preparation, it was on that occasion 
so compressed in delivery as to occupy but one hour. Subsequently 
revised, it supplied the material for a course of four lectures before 
the Lowell Institute in Boston, on the 3d, 6th, lOth, and 13th of the 
following December. 



32 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

was tlie work of Hamilton Fish. Mr. Fisli died in 
September, 1893 — now over eight years ago. Wlien 
the treaty was negotiated, General Grant was Presi- 
dent ; and General Grant has been dead more than 
sixteen years. In speaking of this treaty, and describ- 
ing the complications which led up to it, and to which 
it incidentally gave rise, frequent reference must be 
made to Charles Sumner and John Lothrop Motley ; 
and, while Mr. Sumner died nearly twenty-eight years 
ago, Mr. Motley followed him by a little more than 
three years only. Thus, between the 11th of March, 
1874, and the 7th of September, 1893, all those I have 
named — prominent actors in the drama I am to de- 
scribe — passed from the stage. They belonged to a 
generation that is gone. Other public characters have 
since come forward ; new issues have presented them- 
selves. The once famous Alabama claims are now 
" ancient history," and the average man of to-day 
hardly knows what is referred to when allusion is 
made to " Consequential Damages," or " National 
Injuries," in connection therewith; indeed, why should 
he ? — for when, in June, 1872, that issue was at Geneva 
finally put to rest, he who is now (1901) President of 
the United States was a boy in his fourteenth year. 
None the less, as the Treaty of Washington was a very 
memorable historical event, so President Grant, Sec- 
retary Fish, Senator Sumner, and Minister Motley are 
great historic figures. Their achievements and dissen- 
sions have already been much discussed, and will be 
more discussed hereafter ; and to that discussion I 
propose now to contribute something. My theme in- 
cludes the closing scene of a great drama ; a scene in 
the development of which the striking play of indi- 
vidual character will long retain an interest. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 33 

History aside, moreover, the Treaty of Washington 
itself is a living, and it may even be said a controlling, 
factor in the international situation of to-day ; — 

"And enterprises of great pith and moment 
With this regard their currents turn awry, 
And lose the name of action." 

That treaty was signed at Washington on the 8th of 
May, 1871 ; the battle of Majuba Hill took place in 
South Africa nine years from the following 27th of 
February. Separated in time, and occurring on dif- 
ferent sides of both the equator and the Atlantic, the 
two events had little apparent bearing on each other ; 
yet the settlement effected through the American treaty 
forestalled the outcome of the African war. 



Between 1861 and 1865 the United States was 
engaged in a struggle which called for the exertion of 
all the force at its command ; as, to a lesser extent, 
Great Britain is now. The similarity between the 
war in South Africa and the Confederate war in this 
country early attracted the attention of English 
writers, and one of the most thoughtful of their civil 
and military critics has put on record a detailed com- 
parison of the two.i " Each of these conflicts," this 
authority asserts, " had its origin in conditions of long 
and gradual growth, rendering an ultimate explosion 
inevitable. Each of them deeply affected the whole 
existence of the communities which found themselves 
in antagonism. In each case, therefore, the energy 
and the duration of the fighting far ^exceeded the 
expectations of most of those who might have seemed 

1 Spenser Wilkinson : War and Policy (1900), pp. 422-439. 



34 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

to be in a position to judge." To the same effect, 
another author^ refers to the "striking resemblance" 
between the two struggles. " The analogy," he says, 
" like any other historical analogy, must not be pressed 
too far, but there is a remarkable parallelism in the 
general character of the political issues, in the course 
of negotiations preceding war, and in the actual con- 
duct of the campaigns, a parallelism which sometimes 
comes out in the most insignificant details." This 
analogy the writer might advantageously have carried 
into his discussion of the effect of both wars on foreign 
opinion at the time of each. He correctly enough 
admits that, during the struggle in South Africa, — 
" The whole of Europe almost was against us, not so 
much from any consideration of the merits of the case, 
as from the dislike and jealousy of England which 
have developed so enormously in the last decade ; " 
but he significantly adds, — " In the United States 
sympathies were much divided." In fact, during our 
Civil War the entire sympathies and hearty good-will 
of the great body of those composing what are known 
as the governing and influential classes throughout 
Europe, west of the Vistula, were enlisted on the side 
of the Confederacy. In these classes would be included 
all those of rank, members of the learned professions, 
the commercial, financial and banking circles, and 
officers of the two services — the army and the navy. 
And then also, as in the case of the South African 
war, this instructive accord arose, not " from any con- 
sideration of the merits of the case," but from " dis- 
like and jealousy ; " — the dislike and jealousy of 
American democracy, which " had developed so enor- 
1 The Times : History of the War in South Africa. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 85 

moiisly in the course " of the decade or two immedi- 
ately preceding the outbreak of 1861. This was no- 
ticeably the case in England ; there " sympathies were 
much divided," but the line of cleavage was horizontal. 
Speaking largely, and allowing, of course, for numerous 
exceptional cases, the more conscientious and think- 
ing among the poor and lowly, especially of the non- 
conformists, instinctively sympatliized with the Union 
and the North ; while of the privileged and the monied, 
the commercial and manufacturing classes, it may 
safely be asserted that nine out of ten were heart 
and soul on the side of the rebel and slaveholder. It 
is only necessary for me further to premise that as 
respects foreign governments, and the principles of 
international law and amity relating to the concession 
of belligerent rights, — the recognition of nationality, 
neutrality, and participation of neutrals, direct and 
indirect, in the operations of war, — the position of 
the Confederacy and the two South African republics 
were in essentials the same. The latter, it is true, 
were not maritime countries, so that no questions of 
blockade, and comparatively few of contraband, arose ; 
but, on the other hand, while the Confederates were, 
as respects foreign nations, insurgents, pure and simple, 
the South African republics had governments de jure 
as well as de facto. Great Britain claimed over them 
a species of suzerainty only, undefined at best, and 
plainly questionable by any power disinclined to recog- 
nize it. This the British authorities ^ deplore, and 
try to explain away ; but the fact is not denied. 

So far, therefore, as the status of those in arms 
against a government claiming sovereignty is of mo- 
^ The Times : History, vol. i. chap. iv. 



36 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

ment, the position of the South African republics was, 
in 1900, far stronger with all nations on terms of 
amity with Great Britain than was the position of the 
Confederacy in 1861-62 with nations then at amity 
with the United States. It consequently followed 
that any precedent created, or rule laid down, by a 
neutral for its own guidance in international relations 
during the first struggle was applicable in the second, 
except in so far as such rule or precedent had been 
modified or set aside by mutual agreement of the par- 
ties concerned during the intervening years. What, 
then, were these rules and precedents established by 
Great Britain in its dealings with the United States 
in 1861-65, which, unless altered by mutual consent 
during the intervening time, would have been ap- 
plicable by the United States to Great Britain in 
1899-1901? 

In the opening pages of his account of the doings 
of the agents of the Confederacy in Europe during 
our Civil War, Captain James D. Bulloch, of the Con- 
federate States Navy, the most trusted and efficient of 
those agents, says that " the Confederate government 
made great efforts to organize a naval force abroad ; " 
and he adds, truly enough, that " the naval operations 
of the Confederate States which were [thus] organized 
abroad possess an importance and attraction greater 
than their relative effect upon the issue of the strug- 
gle." Captain Bulloch might well have gone further. 
He might have added that, in connection with those 
operations, the public men, high officials, courts of 
law, and colonial authorities of Great Britain more 
especially, supported by the press and general public 
opinion of that country, labored conjointly and strenu- 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 37 

ously, blindly and successfully, to build up a structure 
of rules and precedents, not less complete and solid 
than well calculated, whenever the turn of Great Brit- 
ain might come, — as come in time it surely would, — 
to work the downfall of the empire. As that record 
carries in it a lesson of deep significance to all in- 
trusted with the temporary administration of national 
affairs, it should neither be forgotten nor ignored. It 
is well that statesmen, also, should occasionally be 
reminded that, with nations as with individuals, there 
is a to-morrow, and the whirligig of time ever brings 
on its revenges. " All things come to him who waits ; " 
and the motto of the house of Ravenswood was, " I 
bide my time." 

When hostilities broke out in April, 1861, the so- 
called Confederate States of America did not have 
within their own limits any of the essentials to a mari- 
time warfare. With a long coast line and numerous 
harbors, in itself and by itself, so far as aggressive ac- 
tion was concerned, the Confederacy could not be, or be 
made, a base of naval operations. It had no machine 
shops nor yards ; no shipwrights, and no collection of 
material for shipbuilding or the equipment of ships. 
In the days when rebellion was as yet only incipient, 
it was correctly deemed of prime importance to get 
cruisers ; but a diligent search throughout the ports 
of the seceding States disclosed but one small steamer 
at aU adapted for a cruising service. Under these cir- 
cumstances, the minds of those composing the as yet 
embryonic government at Montgomery turned natu- 
rally to Europe ; and, in the early days of May, 1861, 
immediately after the reduction of Fort Sumter, a 
scheme was matured for making Great Britain the base 



38 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

of Confederate naval operations against the United 
States. The nature and scope of the British statutes 
had already been looked into ; the probability of the 
early issuance of a proclamation of neutrality by the 
government of Great Britain was considered, and the 
officials of the Confederate Navy Department were 
confident that the Montgomery government would be 
recognized by European powers as a de facto organi- 
zation. If belligerent rights were then conceded to it, 
the maritime shelter and privileges common to belli- 
gerents under the amity of nations must, it was assumed, 
be granted to its regularly commissioned cruisers. 

The officials in question next looked about for some 
competent Confederate sympathizer, who might be 
despatched to Europe, and there be a species of sec- 
retary in partibus. They decided upon James D. 
Bulloch, at the time a lieutenant in the United States 
Navy, detailed by the government for the command 
of the Bienville^ a privately owned mail steamer rim- 
ning between New York and New Orleans. A Geor- 
gian by birth and appointment. Lieutenant Bulloch, 
according to the form of speech then much in vogue, 
went with his State, and at once, after Georgia seceded, 
put his services at the disposal of the Confederate gov- 
ernment. He was requested forthwith to report at 
Montgomery ; and there, on the 8th and 9th of May, 
he received from S. R. Mallory, the Confederate naval 
secretary, verbal instructions covering all essential 
points of procedure. On the night of the 9th of May, 
Bulloch left Montgomery for Liverpool, his duly des- 
ignated seat of operations. Arriving there on the 4tli 
of June, Secretary Mallory's assistant at once entered 
on his duties, not only purchasing naval supplies, but, 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 39 

before tlie close of the month, he had contracted with 
a Liverpool shipbuilder for the construction of a 
cruiser, and it was already partly in frame. The 
Queen's proclamation of neutrality had then been 
issued some six weeks. The vessel now on the stocks 
was at first called the Oreto ; afterwards it attained 
an international celebrity as the Florida. Acting 
with an energy which fully justified his selection for 
the work of the Confederacy then in hand to be done, 
Captain Bulloch, on the 1st of the following August, 
entered into another contract, this time with the 
Messrs. Laird, under which the keel of a second 
cruiser was immediately afterwards laid in the yards of 
that firm at Birkenhead. The purpose of the Con- 
federate government was well defined. In the words 
of Captain Bulloch, it was " not merely to buy or 
build a single ship, but it was to maintain a perma- 
nent representative of the Navy Department [in 
Great Britain], and to get ships and naval supplies 
without hindrance as long as the war lasted." The 
ports of the Mersey, the Clyde, and the Thames were 
to be the arsenals, and furnish the shipyards, of the 
Confederacy. Nor did the scheme stop here. A cor- 
responding branch of the Confederate Treasury De- 
partment had already been established in Liverpool, 
officially designated the " Depositories " of that organi- 
zation ; 1 and, regardless of any pretence of conceal- 
ment, the naval representative of the Confederacy had 
an office in the premises hired by its fiscal agents.^ 

1 Bulloch : Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe, vol. 
i. p. 65 ; also vol. ii. pp. 216, 416. 

2 Geneva Arbitration : Correspondence concerning Claims against 
Great Britain (Washington, 1871), vol. vii. p. 185. The papers offi- 
cially published in connection with the Geneva Arbitration, under the 



40 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

No hindrance to the operations of the combined branch 
bureaus was anticipated. In other words, Great Brit- 
ain was to be made the base of an organized maritime 
warfare against the United States, the Confederacy 
itself being confessedly unable to conduct such a war- 
fare from within its own limits. The single question 
was, — Would Great Britain permit itself to be thus 
utilized for the construction, equipment, and despatch 
of commerce-destroyers and battleships intended to 
operate, in a domestic insurrection, against a nation 
with which it was at peace ? 

Excepting only the good faith, friendly purpose, 
and apparently obvious self-interest of a civilized gov- 
ernment in the last half of the nineteenth century, 
the provisions of the British Foreign Enlistment Act 
of 1819 constituted the only barrier in the way of the 
consummation of this extraordinary project, — a pro- 
ject which all will now agree was tantamount to a 
proposal that, so far as commerce-destroyers were con- 
cerned, the first maritime nation of the world should 
become an accomplice before the fact in what bore a 
close family resemblance to piracy. As the date of 
its enactment (1819) implies, the British Foreign 
Enlistment Act was passed at the time of the trou- 
bles incident to the separation of its American de- 
pendencies from Spain, and was designed to prevent 
the fitting out in British ports of piratical expeditions 

Treaty of Washington, are voluminous and confusing, the edition of 
1872 not corresponding in its pagination and references with the edi- 
tion in French, nor with the edition of 1871. The argument of the 
United States, as originally printed in Washington in 1871, has a 
pagination wholly distinct from the argument printed as part of the 
edition of 1872. The references in this paper under the title " Ge- 
neva Arbitration " are to the original Washington edition of 1871. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 41 

against Spanish commerce, under cover of letters of 
marque, etc., issued by South American insurrection- 
ary governments. Owing to the long peace which 
ensued on its passage, the act had slept innocuously on 
the statute-book, no case involving a forfeiture ever 
having been brought to trial under it. It was an 
instance of desuetude, covering more than forty years. 
" Labored and cumbrous in the extreme," ^ the 
Foreign Enlistment Act was, after the manner of 
English Acts of Parliament, " overloaded with a mass 
of phrases, alike unprecise and confused, with so much 
of tedious superfluity of immaterial circumstances " as 
to suggest a suspicion that it must have been " spe- 
cially designed to give scope to bar chicanery, to facil- 
itate the escape of offenders, and to embarrass and 
confound the officers of the government charged with 
the administration of law."^ It was, in short, one 
of those statutes in which the British parliamentary 
draughtsman has prescriptively revelled, and through 
the clauses of which judge and barrister love, as the 
phrase goes, to drive a coach-and-six. But it so 
chanced that, in the present case, the coach-and-six 
had, as passengers, the whole British Ministry ; and 
in it they were doomed to flounder pitifully along " in 
the flat morass of [a] meaningless verbosity and con- 
fused circumlocution." ^ Upon the proper construc- 
tion of this notable act, the Confederate representa- 
tives at once sought the opinion of counsel ; and they 
were presently advised that, under its provisions, it 
would be an offence for a British subject to build, 

1 Montag-ue Bernard : Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great 
Britain during the American Civil War (London, 1870), p. 404. 

2 Geneva Arbitration : Argument of the United States, pp. 52, 61. 
8 lb., p. 52. 



42 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

arm, and equip a vessel to cruise against the com- 
merce of a friendly state ; but tlie mere building of a 
ship, though with the full intent of so using her, was 
no offence ; nor was it an offence to equip a vessel so 
built, if it was without the intent so to use her. To 
constitute an offence, the two acts of building a ship 
with intent of hostile use, and equipping the same, 
must be combined ; and both must be done in British 
waters. 1 It hence followed that, under the act, it 
was lawful for an English firm to build a ship in a 
British shipyard designed purposely to prey on Amer- 
ican commerce ; it was also lawful to sell or buy, of 
this same English firm if more convenient, the arti- 
cles of necessary equipment for such vessel from cord- 
age to arms and ammunition ; but the articles of war 
equipment must not go into the vessel, thus making of 
her a complete cruiser, within British maritime juris- 
diction. The final act of conjunction must be effected 
at some distance greater than one league from where 
a British writ ran. Assuming this construction of the 
Foreign Enlistment Act to be correct, its evasion was 
simple. It could be enforced practically only with 
a government strong enough to decline to allow its 
international obligations to be trifled with. If, how- 
ever, officials evinced the slightest indifference respect- 
ing the enforcement of those obligations, and much 
more if the government was infected by any spirit of 
connivance, the act at once became a statute mockery. 
In any large view of policy Great Britain then was, 
as it now is, under strong inducement to insist on the 
highest standard of international maritime observance. 
As the foremost ocean-carrier of the world, it ill be- 

1 Bulloch, vol. i. pp. 65-67. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 43 

came her to connive at commerce-destroying. But, in 
1861, Great Britain had a divided interest ; and Brit- 
ish money-making instincts are well developed. She 
was the arsenal and shipbuilder of the world, as well 
as its ocean-carrier. Her artisans could launch from 
private dockyards vessels of any size, designed for 
any purpose, thoroughly equipped whether for peace 
or war ; and all at the shortest possible notice. Under 
ordinary circumstances, this was a legitimate branch 
of industry. It admitted, however, of easy perver- 
sion ; and the question in 1861 was whether the first 
of commercial nations would permit its laws to be so 
construed as to establish the principle that, in case of 
war, any neutral might convert its ports into nurseries 
of corsairs for the use or injury of either belligerent, 
or of both. 

It is now necessary briefly to recall a once familiar 
record showing the extent to which Great Britain lent 
itself to the scheme of the Confederacy, and the pre- 
cedents it created while so doing. All through the 
later summer of 1861, — the months following the dis- 
grace of Bull Run and the incident of the Trent^ — 
the work of Confederate naval construction was pushed 
vigorously along in the Liverpool and Birkenhead ship- 
yards. Hardly any concealment was attempted of the 
purpose for which the Oreto and the "290 " — as the 
two vessels were called or designated — were designed. 
As the work on them progressed, it was openly super- 
vised by agents known to be in the Confederate employ, 
while British government officials, having free access 
to the yards, looked to it that the empty letter of the 
law was observed. Never was a solemn mockery more 
carefully enacted ; never was there a more insulting 



44 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

pretence at the observance of international obliga^ 
tions ; never a more perfect instance of connivance at 
a contemplated crime, though not so nominated in the 
bond. 

The Oreto^ or Florida^ we are told by Captain Bul- 
loch, was the first regularly built war vessel of the 
Confederate States Navy. " She has," he wrote at 
the time, " been twice inspected by the Custom House 
authorities, in compliance with specific orders from the 
Foreign Office. . . . The hammock-nettings, ports, 
and general appearance of the ship sufficiently indicate 
the ultimate object of her construction, but . . . regis- 
tered as an English ship, in the name of an English- 
man, commanded by an Englishman, with a regular 
official number under the direction of the Board of 
Trade, she seems to be perfectly secure against cap- 
ture or interference, until an attempt is made to arm 
her." Another vessel, carrying the armament of this 
contemplated commerce-destroyer, left England at so 
nearly the same time as the Oreto that those in 
charge of the latter increased her speed, being appre- 
hensive that their consort would arrive first at the 
point of rendezvous. Making Nassau, an English 
port, the last pretence at concealment as to character 
and destination disappeared, in consequence of the 
heedless talk of a Confederate officer there to join 
her. A portion of her crew, also, immediately re- 
ported to the British naval commander at the station 
that the vessel's destination could not be ascertained. 
She was seized ; but, after some legal forms and a 
pretence of a hearing, a decree of restoration was 
entered. Subsequently, before being herself destroyed, 
she captured, and burnt or bonded, some forty ves- 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 45 

sels carrying the United States flag. A precedent 
complete at every point had been created. 

Eelying on the advice of counsel and the experience 
gained in the case of the Florida^ there was absolutely 
no concealment of purpose even attempted as respects 
the Alabama, Built under a contract entered into 
with the avowed agent of the Confederacy, that the 
" 290 " was desisfned as a Confederate commerce- 
destroyer was town talk in Liverpool, — " quite noto- 
rious," as the American consul expressed it. She was 
launched on the 15th of May, 1862, as the Enrica^ 
with " no attempt," as Captain Bulloch testifies, " to 
deceive any one by any pretence whatever." Every- 
thing was done in the " ordinary commonplace way ; " 
and, as Bulloch afterwards wrote, he " always at- 
tributed the success of getting the Alabama finished 
as a sea-going ship, and then despatched, to the fact 
that no mystery or disguise was attempted." ^ John 
Laird, Sons & Co., of Birkenhead, the contracting 
shipwrights, knew perfectly well that they were build- 
ing a cruiser for the Confederate government, spe- 
cially constructed as a commerce-destroyer ; and they 
carefully observed what their counsel advised them 
was the law of the land. They simply built a vessel 
designed to do certain work in a war then in pro- 
gress ; the equipment of that vessel, including its arma- 
ment, was in course of preparation elsewhere. Of 
that they knew nothing. They were not informed ; 
nor, naturally, did they care to ask. The vessel and 
her equipment would come together outside of British 
jurisdiction. Such was the law ; Great Britain lived 
under a government of law; and " to strain the law" 
1 Bulloch, vol. i. p. 229. 



46 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

the government was then in no way inclined. The 
agents of the Confederacy, moreover, " had the means 
of knowing with well-nigh absolute certainty what was 
the state of the negotiations between the United 
States Minister and Her Majesty's Government." ^ 
The work of completion was, however, pressed forward 
with significant energy after the launching of the 
vessel ; so that, by the middle of June, she went out 
on a trial trip. An Englishman, having a Board of 
Trade certificate, was then engaged " merely to take 
the ship to an appointed place without the United 
Kingdom," 2 where she was to meet a consort bearing 
her armament. 

This was in Liverpool ; meanwhile the proposed com- 
merce-destroyer's armament was in course of prepara- 
tion at London, and included " everything required 
for the complete equipment of a man-of-war." The 
goods, when ready, were " packed, marked, and held for 
shipping orders." The Agrippina, a suitable barque 
of 400 tons measurement, was then purchased, and 
quietly loaded. Between the two vessels — the one 
building on the Mersey, the other taking on board a 
cargo in the Thames — there was no apparent connec- 
tion. Every arrangement for the destruction of the 
commerce of a nation at peace with Great Britain was 
being made under the eyes of the customs officials, but 
with scrupulous regard to the provisions of the For- 
eign Enlistment Act. 

A single word from the British Foreign Office would 
then have sufficed to put a stop to the whole scheme. 
That office was fully advised by the American Minister 

1 Bulloch, vol. i. pp. 229, 260, 261. 

2 lb., vol. i. p. 231. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 47 

of what was common town talk at Liverpool. The 
Confederate agent there in charge of operations was 
as well known as the Collector of the Port ; probably 
much more frequently pointed out, and curiously ob- 
served. Had those then officially responsible for Great 
Britain's honor and interests been in earnest, public 
notice would have been given to all concerned, includ- 
ing belligerents, — under the designation of evil-dis- 
posed persons, — that Her Majesty's Government did 
not propose to have Great Britain's neutrality trifled 
with, or the laws evaded. Her ports were not to be 
made, by either belligerent, directly or through eva- 
sion, a basis of naval operations against the other. 
Any ship constructed for warlike purposes, upon the 
builders of which notice had been served at the appli- 
cation of either belligerent, would be held affected by 
such notice ; and thereafter, in case of evasion, would 
not be entitled to the rights of hospitality in any Brit- 
ish waters. Whether, under the principles of inter- 
national law, such vessel could be held so tainted by 
evasion after notice as to be subject to seizure and 
detention whenever and wherever found within British 
jurisdiction, would be matter of further consideration. 
This course was one authorized by international law, 
and well understood at the time. At a later day, the 
Attorney-General, for instance, in debate declared, — 
" I have not the least doubt that we have a right, if 
we thought fit, to exclude from our own ports any par- 
ticular ship or class of ships, if we consider that they 
have violated our neutrality." ^ And, three months be- 
fore the first law adviser of the Crown thus expressed 

^ House of Commons, May 13, 1864. Geneva Arbitration : Corre- 
spondence, etc., vol. V. p. 583 ; see, also, 16., p. 571. The situation was 



48 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

himself, Mr. William Vernon Harcourt, then first 
coming into notice as a writer on questions of interna- 
tional law under the pseudonym of '' Historicus," had 
said in a letter published in the Times, — " It is a sound 
and salutary rule of international practice, established 
by the Americans themselves in 1794, that vessels 
which have been equipped in violation of the laws of 
a neutral state shall be excluded from that hospitality 
which is extended to other belligerent cruisers, on 
whose origin there is no such taint. ... I think that 
to deny to the Florida and the Alabama access to 
our ports would be the legitimate and dignified man- 
ner of expressing our disapproval of the fraud which 
has been practised on our neutrality. If we abstain 
from taking such a course, I fear we may justly lie 
under the imputation of having done less to vindicate 
our good faith than the American government con- 
sented at our instance, on former occasions, to do." ^ 

novel, and the solution of the difficulty through " notice " does not 
seem to have suggested itself to the government. Writing long after 
the event, Lord Selhorne, who, as Sir Roundell Palmer, was, during 
the Rebellion, the chief law adviser of the Crown, thus expressed 
himself : — " [The neutral] might, indeed, by previous notice, exclude 
all or any particular ships of war of either belligerent from his ports ; 
and it might be a reasonable opinion, that an exclusion of a particular 
ship on the ground that she had been equipped within his territory, 
contrary to his neutrality laws, would be justifiable." {Memorials, 
Part II., Personal and Political, 1865-95, vol. i. p. 268.) Viscount 
D'ltajuba, in his opinion at Geneva, formulated the rule in its full 
extent : — " This principle of seizure, of detention, or at any rate of 
preliminary notice that a vessel, under such circumstances, will not 
be received in the ports of the neutral whose neutrality she has vio- 
lated, is fair and salutary. . . . The commission with which such a 
vessel is provided is insufficient to protect her as against the neutral 
whose neutrality she has violated." Papers Relating to Treaty of 
Washington (1872), vol. iv. pp. 97, 98. 

1 London Times, February 17, 1864. Geneva Arbitration : Corre- 
spondence, etc., vol. iv. pp. 203, 204. This point was vigorously insisted 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 49 

Finally, England's Chief Justice laid down the rule in 
the following broad terms, — "A sovereign has abso- 
lute dominion in and over his own ports and waters. 
He can permit the entrance into them to the ships of 
other nations, or refuse it ; he can grant it to some, 
can deny it to others ; he can subject it to such restric- 
tions, conditions, or regulations as he pleases. But, 
by the universal comity of nations, in the absence of 
such restrictions or prohibition, the ports and waters 
of every nation are open to all comers." ^ 

Unless, therefore, the British Ministry was willing 
to stand forward as openly conniving at proceedings 
calculated to bring into contempt the law and the 
Queen's proclamation, the course to be pursued was 
plain ; and the mere declaration of a purpose to pur- 
sue that course, while it would not in the slightest have 
interfered with legitimate ship construction, would 
have put an instant and effectual stop to the building 
and equipment of commerce-destroyers. The law, even 
as it then stood, was sufficient, had the government 
only declared a purpose. Had the will been there, a 
way had not been far to seek. 

No such notice was conveyed. In vain the Ameri- 
can Minister protested. No evidence as to the charac- 
ter of the proposed cruiser, or the purpose for which 

upon by Mr. Cobden in his speech in the House of Commons, April 
24, 1863. " Why," he said, " do you not forbid the reentry of those 
vessels into your ports, that left them, manned by a majority of Eng- 
lish sailors, in violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act ? Would any 
person have a right to complain of that ? Proclaim the vessels that 
thus steal away from your ports, outlaws, so far as your ports are con- 
cerned." Speeches (London, 1870), vol. ii. p. 97. 

1 Papers relating to Treaty of Washington (1872), vol. iv. pp. 416- 
418. Supplement to the London Gazette, September 24, 1872, pp. 
4263, 4264. 



50 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

she was designed, possible for him to adduce, was ad- 
judged satisfactory ; and, finally, when the case became 
so flagrant that action could not in decency be delayed, 
a timely intimation reached the Confederate agent 
through some unknown channel, and, on the 29th of 
July, 1862, the Alabama went out on a trial trip at 
the mouth of the Mersey, from which she did not 
return.^ With British papers, and flying the Brit- 
ish flag, she two days later got under weigh for 
the Azores. At almost the some hour, moving under 
orders from the Confederate European naval bureau 
at Liverpool, her consort, the Agrippina, loaded with 
munitions and equipment, cleared from London. The 
two met at the place designated ; and there, outside 
of British jurisdiction, the stores, arms, and equipment 
were duly transferred. A few days later, the forms 
of transfer having been gone through with, the British 
master turned the ship over to the Confederate com- 
mander, his commission was read, and the Confederate 

1 Much has been written, and more said, as to the particular person 
upon whom rested responsibility for the evasion of the Alabama. Col- 
lusion on the part of officers has been charged, and it was at one time 
even alleged that Mr. S. Price Edwards, then collector of the port of 
Liverpool, had been the recipient of a bribe. This is emphatically- 
denied by Captain Bulloch (vol. i. pp. 258-264), and no evidence has 
ever come to light upon which to rest such an improbable imputation. 
Under these circumstances, the following intensely characteristic 
avowal of Earl Russell, in his volume of Recollections and Suggestions, 
published in 1875, has a refreshing sound. Such curt frankness causes 
a feeling of respect for the individual man to predominate over any, 
or all, other sentiments. The passage referred to (p. 407) is as fol- 
lows : — "I assent entirely to the opinions of the Lord Chief Justice 
of England [in his award in the Geneva Arbitration] that the Ala- 
bama ought to have been detained during the four days in which I 
was waiting for the opinion of the Law Officers. But I think that the 
fault was not that of the Commissioners of the Customs [as asserted 
by Lord Cockburn] ; it was my fault, as Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs." 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 51 

flag run up. Upon which somewhat empty ceremonies, 
the " 290," now the Alabcmia, stood purified of any 
evasion of English law, and, as a duly commissioned 
foreign man-of-war, was thereafter entitled to all bel- 
ligerent rights and hospitalities within British jurisdic- 
tion. Incredible as it now must seem to Englishmen 
as well as to us, a British Ministry, of which Lord 
Palmerston was the head, then professed itself impo- 
tent to assert the majesty, or even the dignity, of the 
law. It had been made the dupe of what Lord Cock- 
burn afterwards not inaptly termed " contrivances," 

— " the artifices and tricks, to which the unscrupulous 
cunning of the Confederate agents did not hesitate to 
resort in violation of British neutrality ; " ^ and yet 
the poor victim of these " artifices and tricks " pro- 
fessed itself utterly unable to make itself respected, 
much less to vindicate its authority. At a later day 
Earl Russell recovered the use of his faculties and 
his command of language. He then, though the law 
had not in the mean time been changed, found means 
to let the Confederate agents understand that " such 
shifts and stratagems " were " totally unjustifiable and 
manifestly offensive to the British Crown." ^ 

Such are the simple facts in the case. And now, 
looking back through the perspective of forty years, 
and speaking with all moderation, is it unfair to ask, 

— Was any great nation ever guilty of a more wan- 
ton, a more obtuse, or a more criminal dereliction? 

' The world's great ocean-carrier permitted a belliger- 

^ Supplement to the London Gazette, September 24, 1872, p. 4231. 
Papers relating to Treaty of Washington (1872), vol. iv. p. 377. 

2 Earl Russell to Messrs. Mason, Slidell, and Mann, February 13, 
1865. Geneva Arbitration : Correspondence, etc., vol. i. p. 631. 



>/ 



52 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

ent of its own creation to sail a commerce-destroyer 
through its statutes ; and then, because of an empty- 
formality observed in a desert mid-ocean rendezvous, 
which chanced to be under Portuguese jurisdiction,^ 
set up a pretence, which can only be adequately char- 
acterized as both brazen and sneaking, that in afford- 
ing protection and hospitality to the vessel thus exist- 
ing through a contemptuous evasion of its own law, 
Great Britain did not stand an accomplice in com- 
merce-destroying. ^ " Shall the blessed sun of heaven 
prove a micher and eat blackberries ? — a question not 
to be asked. Shall the son of England prove a thief, 
and take purses ? — a question to be asked." 

1 Bulloch, vol. i. p. 117. 

2 Something' bearing a close family resemblance to this plea of 
impotency to resent a fraud practised on itself in contempt of law, 
or to vindicate the majesty of the Crown, was advanced by Dr. Ber- 
nard, in defence of the Palmerston-Russell Ministry, even as late as 
1870. The rule of international law he first laid down correctly : — 
*' Every Sovereign has a general right to exclude from his ports 
either all ships-of-war, or any particular ship, or to impose on ad- 
mission any conditions he may think fit ; although the exclusion of a 
particular ship would be unjust and offensive, unless reasonable 
grounds could be shown for it." {Historical Account, p. 413.) He 
then admits (16., p. 437) that : — " The various contrivances by which 
[the Confederate commerce-destroyers] were procured and sent to 
sea were discreditable to the Confederate Government, and offensive 
and injurious to Great Britain. Such enterprises were, and were 
known to be, calculated to embroil the country with the United States ; 
they were carried into effect by artifices which must be accounted 
unworthy of any body of persons calling themselves a Government 
— of any community making pretensions to the rank of an independ- 
ent people. Every transaction was veiled in secrecy, and masked 
under a fictitious purchase, or a false destination. By such devices it 
was intended to blind the eyes of the government of Great Britain." 
Moreover, — " It would be erroneous, I conceive, to contend that the 
taint of illegality, if any, adhering to the Alabama, woseyer ' deposited,' 
as the phrase is, by the termination of her original cruise. She never 
made but one cruise." {lb., p. 414 n.) All this, it might naturally be 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 53 

It is not necessary further to follow the law of 
Great Britain as then laid down, or to enumerate 
the precedents created under it. One thing led to 
another. In the autumn of 1861 Captain Bulloch 
ran the blockade, and, visiting Kichmond, conferred 
with his chief, the Secretary of the Confederate Navy. 
He then learned that the designs of the Eichmond gov- 
ernment, as respects naval operations from a British 
base, had " assumed a broader range." ^ Secretary 
Mallory now contemplated the construction in Great 
; Britain of " the best type of armored vessels for oper- 
' ations on the coast ... to open and protect the 
blockaded ports. ... It was impossible to build them 
I in the Confederate States — neither the materials nor 
i the mechanics were there; and besides, even if iron 

I inferred, -would constitute, if anything- could constitute, "reasonable 
I grounds " for the exclusion of the vessel in question from the ports 
[ of the country so outraged. Instead, however, of reaching that obvi- 
, ous conclusion, the learned publicist concluded that to exclude the 
I ship so offending" would have been " a measure likely to be embar- 
i passed by some dilB&culties ; " and that for the losses occasioned by 
! failure to resent an outrage on itself, " the British nation is not justly 

responsible." 
i In justice to Earl Russell it should be said that, on the sugg-estion 
I of the Duke of Argyll, he did propose to the Cabinet that the colonial 

authorities should be instnicted to detain the " 290," or the Alabama, 
I if she should come within their power, and he even drew up a despatch 

to that effect. All the other members of the Cabinet were, however, 
! against this course, and the despatch was not sent. Lord Westbury, 
j the Chancellor, was " vehement " against it. (Spencer Walpole : 

Lord John Russell, vol. ii. p. 355. See, also, Sir Roundell Palmer : 

i Memorials, 1706-1865, vol. ii. p. 431.) In this case it does not appear 
that the order of detention was intended to apply to the vessel after 
its transfer in other waters to the Confederate authorities. Pre- 
; sumably, it was limited to the ' ' 290," or Enrica, in case she f ol- 

I lowed the course of the Oreto, going- direct from the port of evasion 
to some other port within British jurisdiction. This the " 200 " did 
not do. 

1 Bulloch, vol. i. p. 377. 



54 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

and skilled artisans had been within reach, there was 
not a mill in the country to roll the plates, nor fur- 
naces and machinery to forge them, nor shops to make 
the engines." ^ This was a distinct step in advance ; 
also a long one. It might almost be called a stride. 
Earl Kussell had declared that one great object of the 
British government was to preserve "for the nation 
the legitimate and lucrative trade of shipbuilding ; " 
and if it was " legitimate " to construct a single com- 
merce-destroyer to take part in hostilities then going 
on, why was it not legitimate to construct a squadron 
of turreted iron-clads ? It certainly was more " lucra- 
tive." In the words of Mr. Gladstone, then Chan- 
cellor of the Exchequer, the Confederate leaders, hav- 
ing made an army, " are making, it appears, a navy; " 
and the " lucrative trade " of constructing that navy 
naturally fell to the shipwrights of the Mersey. The 
Prime Minister of Great Britain now, also, boldly 
took the ground in parliamentary debate — speak- 
ing, of course, for the Government — that of this no 
belligerent had any cause to complain. " As a mer- 
cantile transaction," British merchants and manu- 
facturers were at liberty to supply, and had a right 
to supply, one or both of " the belligerents, not only 
with arms and cannon, but also with ships destined 
for warlike purposes."^ To the same effect the 

1 Bulloch, vol. i. p. 380. 

2 House of Commons, July 23, 1863. Geneva Arbitration : Corre- 
spondence., etc., vol. V. p. 695. " It is qviite as much within the Inter- 
national Law to sell ships of war to another nation as it is to sell any 
munitions of war." (Lord Robert Cecil, now (1902) Marquis of Salis- 
bury, House of Commons, May 13, 1864.) Per contra, in April, 1863, 
Mr. Cobden drew the distinction forcibly. He declared the two 
questions totally distinct. ' ' There is no law in this country that 
prohibits the buying and selling or manufacturing or exporting 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 55 

Secretary for Foreign Affairs informed the United 
States Minister tliat, " except on the ground of any 
proved violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act . . . 
Her Majesty's Government cannot interfere with 
commercial deahngs between British subjects and the 
so-styled Confederate States, whether the subject of 
those dealings be money or contraband goods, or even 
ships adapted for warlike purposes." " The cabinet," 
he moreover on another occasion stated, ''were of 
opinion that the law [thus set forth] was sufficient ; 
but that legal evidence could not always be pro- 
cured." ^ Of the sufficiency of that evidence, the 
Government, acting through its legal advisers, was 
the sole judge. As such, it demanded legal proof of 
a character sufficient not only to justify a criminal 
indictment, but to furnish reasonable grounds for 
securing a conviction thereon. The imputation and 
strong circumstances which led directly to the door of 
proof gave, in this case, no satisfaction. Facts of 
unquestioned notoriety could not be adduced, — " no- 
toriety " was not evidence.2 A petty jury in an Eng- 
lish criminal court became thus the final arbiter of 
Britain's international obligations. If that august 

arms and munitions of war. ... I am astonished," he went on, in 
terms peculiarly Cobdenesque, " that Mr. Adams and Mr. Seward 
should have mixed that question up in their correspondence with that 
of equipments for war. I will not say that I was astonished at Mr. 
Seward, because he writes so much that he is in danger of writing on 
every subject, and on every side of a subject ; but I am astonished 
that Mr. Adams should have mixed this question up with what is 
really a vital question — that of furnishing and equipping ships of 
war." Speeches (London, 1870), vol. ii. pp. 84, 85. 

1 Russell to Lyons, March 27, 1863. Geneva Arbitration: Cor- 
respondence^ etc., vol. i. p. 585. 

2 Geneva Arbitration : Treaty of Washington Papers (1872), vol. iv. 
pp. 377, 479 ; see, also, Correspondence, etc., vol. iv. p. 530. 



56 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

tribunal pronounced a case not proven, though the real 
facts were common town talk, the law was not violated, 
and, whatever acts of maritime wrong and ocean out- 
rage followed, foreign nations had no grounds for 
reclamation. And this was gravely pronounced law ; 
" Ay, marry ; crowner's quest law ! " 

Here, indeed, was the inherent, fundamental defect 
of the British position, — what was afterwards de- 
scribed as the " insularity " of the British contentions. 
Unable to rise above the conception of a municipal 
rule of conduct, the governmental vision was bounded 
on the one side by a jury box, and on the other by the 
benches of the House of Commons. Uncertainty, 
closely bordering on vacillation, naturally resulted ; 
for Earl Russell had a firm grasp neither on the prin- 
ciples of international law involved, nor on the ques- 
tions of policy. On the one hand, he wished to pre- 
serve for the shipwrights of the Mersey and the Clyde 
that " trade of shipbuildmg, in which our people excel, 
and which is to great numbers of them a source of 
honest livelihood ; " ^ but, on the other, in an appar- 
ently unguarded moment, he admitted that it was 
" the duty of nations in amity with each other not to 
suffer their good faith to be violated by ill-disposed 
persons within their borders, merely from the ineffi- 
ciency of their prohibitory policy." One day he would 
write to Mr. Adams that the government found itseK 
"unable to go beyond the law, municipal and inter- 
national," — a proposition which few would be disposed 
to controvert ; and then, twelve days later, he went 
through a similar form of reply, assigning " the letter 

1 Russell to Adams, October 26, 1863. Geneva Arbitration : Cor- 
respondence, etc., vol. iii. p. 201. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 57 

of the existing [meaning, apparently, the municipal] 
law " ^ as the extreme of interference .^ 

At last, on full reflection and at a subsequent day, 
he settled on a defence of his action which was almost 
humorously illustrative of " insularity." He trium- 
phantly declared, in complete and final justification 
thereof, that the object of the Palmerston-Russell Min- 
istry throughout was "to preserve for the subject the 
security of trial by jury, and for the nation the legiti- 
mate and lucrative trade of shipbuilding " ! ^ British 
Shipyards and Trial by Jury ! — here, indeed, was 
a hustings cry. When he formulated it, no trial was 
impending ; no general election was imminent ; he 
was himself permanently retired from official life. Yet 
instinctively, and in obedience to a lifelong parlia- 
mentary habit, his mind reverted to time-honored po- 
litical catch-words. Invoking them, a British ministry 
could face with confidence either the benches of the 
Opposition or the ordeal of the constituencies. The 

1 Earl Russell to Mr. Adams, October 4 and 16, 1862. Geneva Ar- 
bitration : Correspondence, etc., vol. vi. pp. 426-429. 

2 Subsequently Lord Selborne expressed bimself on this point, as 
follows : — "It is unnecessary to say that no one in this country con- 
tended for a proposition so plainly untenable as that municipal law is 
a proper and sufficient measure of the neutral rights and obligations 
of nations." {Memorials, Part I., 1766-1865, vol. ii. p. 413.) This 
was written subsequent to the Geneva Arbitration ; the converse was 
certainly assumed at Geneva {Treaty of Washington Papers, etc. (1872), 
vol. iii. pp. 19-24), and it is difficult in reading the Alabama corre- 
spondence to avoid the conclusion that Earl Russell was not clear 
in thought and expression, and his difficulty arose from his inability 
to grasp the fact that Great Britain was under an obligation beyond 
any established by act of Parliament. He did not really attain to a 
clear perception of this principle until actually confronted with the 
issue presented by the case of the Laird rams. It seems to have 
been an instance of education in the elements of international law, so 
gradual as to be suggestive of extreme reluctance under instruction. 

^ Speeches and Despatches (1870), vol. ii. p. 266. 



68 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

cry was epigrammatic ; any one could understand it ; 
it did not admit of an answer, — at least, not at West- 
minster nor at the polling-booths. 

But to those of other nations, called on to stand 
impassively by while their merchant-marine vanished 
in smoke, this sturdy British appeal carried in it a 
somewhat empty, not to say mocking, sound. Trial 
by jury might be the palladium of the British consti- 
tution ; shipbuilding was unquestionably a lucrative 
craft : but when the last became an instrument for 
utilizing Great Britain as a base of naval warfare in 
the hands of one belligerent against another, between 
whom, being at peace with each. Great Britain pro- 
fessed to maintain a perfect and even-handed neutral- 
ity; and when trial by jury, through pre-ordained 
verdicts of " not proven," was perverted into an accom- 
plice before the fact in piracy, — when these things 
came about, foreign nations would not improbably 
find themselves compelled to have recourse to such 
other means of self-preservation as the law of nations 
might afford. The hustings and jury box were not 
the final arbiters between warring States. 

Those tribunals, moreover, highly respectable, no 
doubt, as well as ancient, were distinctly insular. 
They had no place in the code. On the contrary, the 
principle of international law controlling the situation 
was plain. As laid down by the leading English pub- 
licist of that day, it read as follows : — " Each State has 
a right to expect from another the observance of inter- 
national obligations, without regard to what may be the 
municipal means which it possesses for enforcing this 
observance." ^ But, with one eye always fixed on the 

^ Phillimore's International Law, vol. i., preface to second edition, 
p. 21, cited in Geneva Arbitration : Argument of United States, p. 35. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 59 

Opposition benches at Westminster, and the other 
wandering in the direction of the Lancashire jury box, 
Earl Russell instinctively contended that the interna- 
tional obligations of Great Britain were coterminous 
with its parliamentary enactments. If the law of Eng- 
land did not provide adequate protection for the rights 
of foreign nations, it might indeed be changed ; but, 
until changed, it was most unreasonable for the re- 
presentatives of those nations to present claims and 
complaints to Her Majesty's Government. The gov- 
ernment, responsible to Parliament and the jury, had 
done its best. Against it no charge of inefficiency 
would lie. The fact that Great Britain was being 
made the base of naval warfare was ignored, — al- 
though notorious, " not proven," — and the trade in 
ships was pronounced no more contraband than that 
in guns. It is almost unnecessary to say that this 
rule also is one which, in its converse operation, might 
not infrequently lead to inopportune results. 

The Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819 was then 
passed in review. It was pronounced " effectual for 
aU reasonable purposes, and to the full extent to which 
international law or comity can require." ^ In the 
opinion of the Government, there was no occasion for 
its amendment or strengthening. No move was made 
to that end ; no recommendation submitted to Parlia- 
ment. On the contrary, when in March, 1863, the 
neutrality laws were in debate, Lord Palmerston did 
not hesitate to declare from the ministerial benches, if 
the cry that those laws were manifestly defective was 
raised " for the purpose of driving Her Majesty's Gov- 

^ Mr. Hammond to Messrs. Lamport and others, July 6, 1863. Ge- 
neva Arbitration : Correspondence^ etc., vol. i. p. 673. 



60 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

eminent to do something . . . which may be derogatory 
to the dignity of the country, in the way of altering 
our laws for the purpose of pleasing another govern- 
ment, then all I can say is that such a course is not 
likely to accomplish its purpose ; . . . but the people 
and Government of the United States . . . must not 
imagine that any cry which may be raised will induce 
us to come down to this House with a proposal to alter 
the law." ^ Thus another door of future possible escape 
was on this occasion closed, so to speak with a slam, 
by the British Premier. The law, however manifestly 
defective, was not to be changed to please any one. 

Meanwhile, as if to make the record at all points 
complete, and to show how very defective this immu- 
table law was, the courts passed upon the much dis- 
cussed Act. Under the pressure brought to bear by the 
United States Minister a test case had been arranged. 
It was tried before a jury in the Court of Exchequer 
on the 22d of June, 1863, the Laird iron-clads being 
then still on the ways, but in an advanced stage of 
construction. The vessel thus seized and proceeded 
against, in order to obtain a construction of the forty- 
four years old statute, was the Alexandra. This vessel 
was being built with a view to warlike equipment. 
Of that no denial was possible. That she was in- 
tended for use in the Confederate service was a moral 
certainty. The Alabama was at that time in its full 
career of destruction, — carrying out the declared 
purpose of its commander, to " burn, sink, and de- 
stroy." Before her ravages the merchant marine of 
the United States was fast disappearing, — the ships 

^ Debate of March 27, 1863. Geneva Arbitration : Correspondence, 
etc., vol. iv. pp. 530, 531. See, also, Russell to Adams, September 
25, 1863. 26., vol. i. p. 674. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 61 

composing it either going up in smoke, or being trans- 
ferred to otiier flags. With all these facts admitted, 
or of common knowledge, the Lord Chief Baron pre- 
siding at the Alexandra trial proceeded to instruct 
the jury on the law. The Foreign Enlistment Act 
was, he told them, not designed for the protection of 
belligerent powers, or to prevent Great Britain being 
made the base of naval operations directed against 
nations with which that country was at peace. The 
purpose of the Act was solely to prevent hostile naval 
encounters within British waters ; and, to that end, it 
forbade such equipment of the completed ship as would 
make possible immediate hostile operations, it might 
be, " before they left the port." Such things had 
happened ; " and that has been the occasion of this 
statute." He closed with these words: — "If you think 
the object was to build a ship in obedience to an order, 
and in compliance with a contract, leaving those who 
bought it to make what use they thought fit of it, then 
it appears to me the Foreign Enlistment Act has not 
been in any degree broken." 

Under such an interpretation of the statute, the 
jury, of course, rendered a verdict for the defendants ; 
and that verdict the audience in the court-room re- 
ceived with an outburst of applause. This outburst 
of applause was significant ; more significant than 
even the charge of the judge. Expressive of the 
feelings of the British people, it pointed directly to 
the root of the trouble. The trial took place towards 
the close of June, 1863, — a few days only before 
Gettysburg ; and, at that time, England, so far as the 
United States was concerned, had reached a state of 
mind Elizabethan rather than Victorian. The buc- 



62 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

caneering blood — tlie blood of Drake, of Cavendish, 
and of Frobisher — was stirring in British veins. 
The Alabama then stood high in public admiration, 
— a British built ship, manned by a British crew, 
armed with British guns, it was successfully eluding 
the " Yankee " ships of war, and destroying a rival 
commercial marine. Wherever the British jurisdic- 
tion extended, the Alabama was a welcome sojourner 
from the weary sea.^ The company on the decks of 
British mail steamers cheered her to the echo as they 
passed. 

Speaking in the House of Commons on the 24th of 
April, 1863, Mr. Cobden dryly observed of the Eng- 
lish people, — "We generally sympathize with every- 
body's rebels but our own ; " and passing utterances 
in both Europe and this country relating to opera- 
tions now in progress, whether in South Africa or on 
the islands of the Pacific, point distinctly to the gen- 
eral truth of the remark. The sympathy, and the lack 
of sympathy, referred to are in no way peculiar to the 
people of Great Britain. But, in accordance with the 
principle of human nature thus alluded to, so strong 
among the influential classes of Great Britain was the 
feeling of sympathy for the South in 1863, and so 
intense was the enmity to the Union, mixed with a 
contempt as outspoken as it was ill-advised, that those 
sentiments were well-nigh all-pervasive. Speaking 
shortly after, Mr. Cobden again said : — "I declare to 
you that, looking at what is called in a cant phrase in 
London, ' society ; ' looking at society — and society, 
I must tell you, means the upper ten thousand, with 
whom members of Parliament are liable to come in 
^ Geneva Arbitration : Oorrespondence, etc., vol. vi. pp. 494-501. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 63 

contact at the clubs and elsewhere in London ; look- 
ing at what is called ' society ' — looking at the rul- 
ing class, if we may use the phrase, that meet in the 
purlieus of London, nineteen-twentieths of them were 
firmly convinced from the first that the Civil War in 
America could only end in separation." ^ Captain 
Bulloch asserted twenty years later that, being thrown 
while in England a good deal among army and navy 
men, " I never met one of either service who did not 
warmly sympathize with the South ; " ^ a^^ \^q fiiP. 
ther expressed his belief that this was the feeling of 
" at least five out of every seven in the middle and 
upper classes." ^ To the like effect, Mr. G. W. P. 
Bentinck — a member of Parliament — declared in a 
speech at Kings Lynn, October 31, 1862, that, as far 
as his experience went, " throughout the length and 
breadth of the land, wherever I have travelled, I never 
yet have met the man who has not at once said, — 
' My wishes are with the Southerners ; ' " and he went 
on to add that this feeling was mainly due to the fact 
that the Southerner was " fighting against one of the 
most grinding, one of the most galling, one of the most 
irritating attempts to establish tyrannical government 
that ever disgraced the history of the world." * Mr. 

1 At Rochdale, November 24, 1863. Speeches (London, 1870), vol. 
ii. p. 103. 

2 Bulloch, vol. ii. p. 303. 

3 Ih., vol. i. p. 294. 

* Mr. G. W. P. Bentinck was a member of Parliament in his day, 
and doubtless esteemed by others, as by himself, a man not wholly 
devoid of intelligence, nor, perhaps, of judgment even. In the light 
of comments now frequently heard throughout continental Europe, 
and also in America, on the methods of warfare pursued by the Eng- 
lish in South Africa, the following extract from the closing sentences 
of Mr. Bentinck's speech on the occasion referred to is suggestive. 
Every struggle seems, ^in the opinion of observers in sympathy with 



64 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

Gladstone's unfortunate utterance at about the same 
time passed into history; from which it failed not 
afterwards to return sorely to plague him. " We may 
anticipate with certainty the success of the Southern 
States so far as regards their separation from the 
North. . . . That event is as certain as any event yet 
future and contingent can be ; " ^ and again, ten months 
later, he said in Parliament, — " We do not believe 
that the restoration of the American Union by force 
is attainable. I believe that the public opinion of this 
country is unanimous upon that subject. ... I do not 
think there is any real or serious ground for doubt as 
to the issue of this contest." 2 Four months previous, 
Mr. Gladstone's associate in the cabinet. Earl Russell, 

the worsted combatant, to be marked by atrocities theretofore unpre- 
cedented in civilized warfare. Mr. Bentinck thus delivered himself : 
— " So long-, I say, as such acts, in open defiance of all humanity and 
all civilization, are performed and are avowed by the government of 
the Northern States, they cease to have a claim to be ranked among; 
civilized nations. I am not asserting that there are not hundreds and 
thousands of men in the Northern States who are men of education, of 
right, and of Christian feeling, of civilized habits and ideas. Far be it 
from me to make so unfounded an assertion. But there is a further 
lesson to be learned. The result of these much vaunted institutions, 
which we have heard praised before, and which we shall again hear 
praised by the hired spouters of associations, is this, that the nation 
becomes so brutalized that the civilized man disappears ; he is afraid 
to put himself forward; he is ashamed of his country; he has no 
voice in the conduct of her affairs ; and the whole nation is turned 
over to the control of men such as Lincoln and Butler, whom I do not 
hesitate to denounce, after their conduct in the last few months, as 
men who are a disgrace to civilization." 

The whole of this interesting, and extremely suggestive, speech can 
be found in the columns of the London Morning Post, of November 4, 
1862. 

1 Speech at Newcastle, October 7, 1862. London Times, October 9, 
1862. 

2 House of Commons, June 30, 1863. Geneva Arbitration : Corre- 
spondence, etc., vol. v. p. 666. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 65 

had lent emphasis to this opinion by declaring in the 
House of Lords, — " There may be one end of the war 
that would prove a calamity to the United States and 
to the world, and especially calamitous to the negro 
race in those countries, and that would be the subjuga- 
tion of the South by the North." ^ With this idea that 
there could be but one outcome of the struggle firmly 
established in their minds, influential members of the 
Cabinet did not urge recognition simj^ly because, in 
view of the certainty of the result, they deemed such 
action unnecessary and impolitic.^ The whole British 
policy during the Civil War was shaped with a view 
to this future state of affairs, and the creation of bad 
precedents was ignored accordingly. The Union was 
to be divided into two republics, unfriendly to each 
other. There was to be one democratic, free-labor 
republic, or more probably two such, lying between 
the British possessions on the north, and a slave-labor, 
cotton-growing republic on the south; the latter, almost 
of necessity, acting in close harmony of interest, com- 
mercial and political, with Great Britain. For Great 
Britain, eternity itself had thus no day of reckoning. 

Kelying on this simple faith in a certain future, — 
this absolute confidence that the expected only could 
occur, — utterances like the following appeared in the 
editorial columns of the Morning Post, the London 
journal understood most closely to reflect the opinions 
of the Prime Minister : — " From the ruling of the 
judge [in the case of the Alexajidra^ it a]3peared that 
the Confederate government might with ease obtain 

1 House of Lords, February 5, 1863. Geneva Arbitration : Corre- 
spondence, etc., vol. iv. p. 535. 
^ Bulloch, vol. ii. p. 5. 



66 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

as many vessels in this country as they pleased with- 
out in any manner violating our laws. It may be a 
great hardship to the Federals that their opponents 
should be enabled to create a navy in foreign ports, 
but, like many other hardships entailed on belligerents, 
it must be submitted to ; " while, five months before, 
this same organ of " society " and the " influential 
classes" had reached the comfortable conclusion that, 
so far as the Alabama was concerned, the fact " she 
sails upon the ocean is one of those chances of war 
to which the government of the United States ought 
with dignity and resignation to submit." ^ 



II 

Fortunately for maritime law, fortunately for itself, 
the British government paused at this point. The 
" Laird rams," as they were now known, presented a 
test case. London '' society " and the irresponsible 
press of Great Britain might, like the audience in the 
Court of Exchequer, applaud the charge of the Lord 
Chief Baron, and gladly accept the law he laid down 
that it was legal for a belligerent to create a navy in 
a neutral port ; but, none the less, in the words of one 
of the dissenting Barons, by the rulings of the Court 
"the spirit of international law [had been] violated, and 
the spirit and letter of the statute evaded." ^ There 

1 Morning Post, March 14, August 10, 1863. 

^ " A very learned judge has said that we might drive, not a 
coach-and-six, but a whole fleet of ships through that [Foreign En- 
listment] Act of Parliament. If that be a correct description of our 
law, then I say we ought to have the law made more clear and intel- 
ligible." Earl Russell in the House of Lords, February 16, 1864. 
Geneva Arbitration : Correspondence, etc., vol. v. p. 528. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 67 

was no longer any danger, scarcely any inconvenience, 
in a belligerent fitting out a vessel of war in a Brit- 
ish port, and sailing directly thence to begin a hostile 
cruise.^ This, indeed, was at that very time actually in 
preparation. Theretofore the cases had been those of 
individual commerce-destroyers only. Now, an arma- 
ment was in course of construction in a British port, 
intended for a naval operation of magnitude against 
a foreign belligerent with which Great Britain was 
at peace. The vessels composing it were, moreover, 
equipped with weapons of offensive warfare — their 
beaks. Their purpose and destination could not be 
proven in any legal proceedings ; but, known of all 
men, they were hardly concealed by fraudulent bills 
of sale. The law as laid down by the Lord Chief 
Baron in the case of the Alexandra might, therefore, 
as " crowner's quest law," be of the very first class ; 
but for Her Majesty's Government, such a construc- 

^ The construction of such cruisers was, moreover, for the ship- 
wright, an uncommonly safe, as well as profitable, business ; and under 
the practical working of the law as it then stood, the more the inter- 
ference, the greater the profit. This was curiously illustrated in 
the case of the Laird iron-clads. The original contract price for the 
two vessels was £187,500. (Bulloch, vol. i. p. 386.) Owing to fear 
of a seizure by the Government, the contract was transferred to a 
French banker named Bravay, who professed to represent the Pacha 
of Egypt. A gratuity of £5000 was paid to the Messrs. Laird as 
a consideration for their consent to this transfer. (76., p. 404.) It 
then became apparent that the transfer was a mere cover for fraud, 
and the vessels were seized. In the existing state of public opinion, 
the Government was unwilling to go to a jury, — in fact, after the 
ruling of the Chief Baron in the Alexandra trial, it could not have 
done so with any chance of a condemnation, — and accordingly it pro- 
ceeded to negotiate for the purchase of the vessels on its own account. 
The Messrs. Laird now asked for them £300,000, and in the end 
actually got £220,000. (Lord Selborne : Memorials, Part J., 1766- 
1865, vol. ii. p. 450.) Thus, contrary to the usual experience, the 
more their business was interfered with, the richer they became. 



68 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

tion of the law — an act in the statute-book of Great 
Britain — obviously involved serious consequences. 
Were they prepared to go to the journey's end on the 
road thus pointed out ? To what might it lead ? To 
what might it not lead ? 

Into the causes of the change of policy which now 
took place it is not necessary here to enter. The law 
was expounded in the Alexandra case on the 24th of 
June, 1863 ; the battle of Gettysburg was fought, 
and Vicksburg surrendered, on the 3d and 4th of 
the following July ; three months later, on the 9th 
of October, the detention of the Laird iron-clads 
was ordered. After the rulings of the court in the 
Alexandra case, there can be no question that in 
this instance the law was " strained." In due time 
the proceeding was made the ground of attack on the 
government in both Houses of Parliament, on the 
ground that the detention was in violation of law, and 
without sufficient proofs. In these debates the spokes- 
men of the government at last took the proper ground. 
They admitted that Great Britain was under an obli- 
gation to give to the United States its rights under 
the law of nations, whether acts of Parliament fur- 
nished the means of so doing or not. The jDOsition 
thus at last assumed was approved by a comparatively 
small majority. A surprise to the American Minister 
then representing the country in London, the deten- 
tion of the iron-clads thus marked a radical change in 
the policy pursued by the Palmerston-Russell Ministry. 
Earl Russell apparently now first realized the fact he 
afterwards announced in Parliament, " that in this 
conflict the Confederate States have no ports, except 
those of the Mersey and the Clyde, from which to fit 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 69 

i 

out ships to cruise against the Federals ; " ^ and it 
seems to have dawned ujion him that, in the case of 
future hostilities, other nations besides Great Britain 
had ports, and, in certain not impossible contingencies, 
those ports might become bases — perhaps inconven- 
ient bases — of maritime v^^arfare, as were now those 
of the Mersey and the Clyde. It was a thing much to 
be deplored that rules did work both ways, and that 
curses, Hke chickens, would come home to roost ; but, 
this being so, it behooved prudent statesmen to give 
a certain degree of consideration to the precedents 
they were creating. 

Whether Earl Russell reasoned in this wise or not, 
certain it is that after September, 1863, Great Britain 
ceased to be available as a base of Confederate naval 
operations. The moment it felt so disposed. Her 
Majesty's Government found means to cause the neu- 
trality of Great Britain to be respected. My own be- 
lief, derived from a tolerably thorough study of the 
period, is that numerous causes contributed to that 
change. Among the more potent of these I should 
enumerate the stirring of the British conscience which 
followed the Emancipation Proclamation of September, 
1862 ; the conviction, already referred to, that any 
decisive action on the part of Great Britain was unne- 
cessary as well as impolitic, the ultimate success of the 
Confederacy being a foregone conclusion ; the troubled 
state of affairs on the Continent as respects both Po- 
land and Denmark ; and, above all, the honest anger 
of Earl Russell at the consequences which had ensued 
from the evasion of the Alabama. The precedent he 

1 House of Lords, April 26, 1864. Geneva Arbitration: Corre- 
spondence^ etc., vol. V. p. 535. 



70 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

had himself helped to create startled him, — he recoiled 
in presence of its logical consequences ; and, in view 
of the complications then existing on the Continent, or 
there in obvious process of development, the great 
financial and commercial interests of Great Britain 
showed signs of awakening. Awkward questions were 
shortly in order ; and, on the evening of the 13th 
of May, 1864, the head of the great commercial house 
of Barings fairly startled the country by rising in the 
House of Commons, and suggesting certain queries to 
the Government, — queries, now, thirty-seven years 
later, of much significance in connection with events 
in South Africa. " I am," Mr. Baring said, " desir- 
ous of inviting the attention of the House to the situa- 
tion in which this country will be if the precedents now 
established are acted upon in the event of our being 
involved in war, while other States are neutral. Under 
the present construction of our municipal law there is 
no necessity that a belligerent should have a port or 
even a seashore. Provided she has money, or that 
money is supplied to her by a neutral, she may fit out 
vessels, and those vessels need not go to the country 
to which they are said to belong, but may go about 
the seas dealing destruction to British shipping and 
property. Take the case, which I hope we shall avoid, 
of our being at war with Germany. There would, as 
things now stand, be nothing to prevent the Diet of 
Frankfort from having a fleet. A number of the small 
States of Germany might unite together, and become 
a great naval power. Money is all that is required 
for the purpose, and Saxony, without a seashore, might 
have a First Lord of the Admiralty, without any 
docks, who might have a large fleet at his disposal. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 71 

The only answer we could make under those circum- 
stances to France and the United States, who as neu- 
trals might fit out vessels against us on the pretence 
that they were German cruisers, was that we would 
go to war with them ; so that by the course of policy 
which we are pursuing we render ourselves liable to 
the alternative of having our property completely de- 
stroyed, or entering into a contest with every neutral 
Power in the world. We ought, under these circum- 
stances, to ask ourselves what we have at stake. I will 
not trouble the House with statistics on the point, but 
we all know that our commerce is to be found ex- 
tending itself to every sea, that our vessels float in the 
waters of every clime, that even with our cruisers afloat 
it would not be easy to pick up an Alabama^ and that 
the destruction of our property might go on despite all 
our powers and resources. What would be the result ? 
That we must submit to the destruction of our property, 
or that our shipping interests must withdraw their 
ships from the ocean. That is a danger, the appre- 
hension of which is not confined to myself, but is 
shared by many who are far better able to form a judg- 
ment than I am. Recollect that your shipping is 
nearly twice as large as that of the United States. If 
you follow the principle you are now adopting as re- 
gards the United States, you must be prepared to stand 
the consequences ; so strongly was this felt by ship- 
owners that memorials have already been addressed to 
the Government upon the subject. . . . Last night the 
honorable Member for Liverpool presented a peti- 
tion, signed by almost all the great ship-owners of that 
place, enforcing the same view and expressing the same 
anxiety. I am a little surprised at this manifestation, 



72 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

because what is happening around us is a source of 
great profit to our ship-owners ; but it is a proof that 
they are sensible that the future danger will far pre- 
ponderate over the present benefit and advantages." ^ 

When too late, it thus dawned even on the ship- 
builders of the Mersey that, for a great commercial 
people, confederacy with corsairs might be a danger- 
ous, even if not, in their own eyes, a discreditable 
vocation. Firms openly dealing in burglars' tools are 
not regarded as reputable. 

But one way of escape from their own precedents 
might yet remain. It was always the contention of 
Mr. Charles Sumner that a neutral-built ship-of-war 
could not be commissioned by a belligerent on the 
high seas. It was and remained a pirate, — the com- 
mon enemy of mankind, — until its arrival at a port 
of the belligerent to which it belonged, where alone, 
after " depositing its taint," it could be fitted out and 
commissioned as a ship-of-war.^ As any port will do 
in a storm, and drowning men proverbially clutch at 
straws, it is possible to imagine a British ship-owner, 
as he foresaw in vision the Transvaal and the Orange 
Free State involved in a war with Great Britain, ap23ro- 
priating this contention, and trying to incorporate it 
into the International Code. He would then have pro- 
ceeded to argue somewhat as follows : — " Mr. Baring 
was a banker, not a publicist. As a publicist he was 
wrong. A non-maritime nation cannot be a maritime 
belligerent," etc., etc. But, during the course of our 
Civil War, the British authorities, legal and political, 

1 Geneva Arbitration : Correspondence, etc., vol. v. p. 579. 

2 Works, vol. vii. pp. 358, 452-460 ; vol. xiii. p. 68. Pierce : Sumner ^ 
vol. iv. p. 394. 



t 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 73 

seemed to take pleasure in shutting against themselves 
every possible outlet of future escape. So, in this case, 
referring to the contention of Mr. Sumner, the Attor- 
ney-General, speaking after Mr. Baring, expressed 
himself as follows : — " To say that a country whose 
ports are blockaded is not at liberty to avail herself 
of all the resources which may be at her command 
in other parts of the world, that she may not buy ships 
in neutral territory and commission them as ships of 
war without bringing them to her own country first, 
is a doctrine which is quite preposterous, and all 
the arguments founded upon such a doctrine only 
tend to throw dust into men's eyes, and to mislead 
them." 1 

The morning following this significant debate the 
tone of Lord Palmerston's London organ underwent 
a notable change. Grant and Lee were that day 
confronting each other in the Wilderness, resting for 
a brief space after the fearful wrestle of Spottsylvania; 
in London, the conference over the Schleswig-Holstein 
struggle was in session, and the feelings of Great 
Britain were deeply enlisted on behalf of Denmark, 
borne down by the united weight of Prussia and 
Austria. So, in view of immediate possible hostili- 
ties, the Post now exclaimed, — " We are essentially 
a maritime power, and are bound by every motive of 
self-interest to watch with jealousy the observance of 
neutral maritime obligations. We may be at war 
ourselves ; we have a future [South Africa !] to which 
to look forward, and we must keep in mind the pre- 
cept which inculcates the necessity of doing to others 
as we would be done by. . . . War is no longer con- 
1 Geneva Arbitration : Correspondence, etc., vol. v. p. 583. 



74 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

sklered by the commercial classes an impossibility; 
and the ship-owners of Liverpool are considering what 
is to become of their property should we unhappily 
become involved in war, and innumerable Alahamas 
issue from neutral [American] ports to prey upon 
British commerce throughout the world. Suppose that 
circimistances obliged us to espouse the cause of Den- 
mark against her ruthless enemies, would not the 
German States hasten to follow the bad example set 
them by the Confederates, and at which the inefficiency 
of our law obliges us to connive ? " And the London 
organ of " society " and the " influential classes " then 
added this sentence, which, under certain conditions 
actually existing thirty-five years later, would have 
been of very pregnant significance : — " Some petty 
principality which boasts of a standing army of five 
hundred men, but not of a single foot of sea-coast 
[e. g. the Transvaal, the Orange Free State], might 
fit out cruisers in neutral [e. g. American] ports to 
burn, sink, and destroy the commerce of Great Britain ; 
and the enormous amount of damage which may be 
done in a very short time, even by a single vessel, we 
know from the history of the Alabama.''^ ^ 

Thus when the War of the Rebellion closed, the 
trans-Atlantic outlook was, for Great Britain, omi- 
nous in the extreme. Just that had come about which 
English public men and British newspapers had wea- 
ried themselves with asseverating could not possibly 
happen. The Times and Morning Post especially 
had loaded the record with predictions, every one 
of which the event falsified; and, in doing so, they 
had gone out of their way to generate bitter ill- 

1 The Post, May 14 and 18, 18G4. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 75 

feeling by the arrogant expression of a contemptuous 
dislike peculiarly British and offensive. For example, 
the Ti7Jies, " well aware that its articles weigh in 
America more heavily than despatches," first referred 
to us as " this insensate and degenerate i people," and 
then proceeded to denounce " this hateful and atro- 
cious war, . . . this horrible war," which it declared 
was of such a character that its defenders could not 
find in all Europe a single society where they could 
make themselves heard.^ In the same common temper, 
the Standard, reviewing the results of the conflict on 
the very day that Vicksburg, unknown to it, had sur- 

1 The " deg-eneracy " of the American was, at this time, the sub- 
ject of m.uch lachrymose contemplation on the part of British jour- 
nalistic scribes. A writer in that highly respectable quarterly, the 
North British Review, thus delivered himself, for instance, in its 
February number for 1862 (p. 248) : — "In nearly every element of 
political and moral, as distinguished from material, civilization, the 
deterioration of America since the days of Washing-ton had been 
appallingly rapid and decisive. It had ceased to be the land of pro- 
gress, and had become in a peculiar manner the land of retrogression 
and degeneracy." 

^ July 9, 12, 1862, The course and language of the Times at this 
period were peculiarly ill-advised. American opinion on that point 
might be considered prejudiced ; but Mr. Leslie Stephen, then a man 
of thirty-three, has since established a world-wide reputation as a 
critic on questions of taste. Mr. Stephen, in 1865, thus expressed him- 
self in a pamphlet (pp. 105, 106) entitled The " Times " on the American 
War : A Historical Study ; a production not included in his recognized 
writings, and long since forgotten : — " But my complaint against the 
Times is that its total ignorance of the quarrel, and the presumption 
with which it pronounced upon its merits, led to its pouring out a 
ceaseless flood of scurrilous abuse, couched, indeed, in decent lan- 
guage, but as essentially insulting as the brutal vulgarities of the New 
York Herald. No American — I will not say with the feelings of a 
gentleman, for of course there are no gentlemen in America — but no 
American with enough of the common feelings of humanity to resent 
the insult when you spit in his face could fail to be wounded, and, so 
far as he took the voice of the Times for the voice of England, to be 
irritated against England." 



76 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

rendered, declared, — " We have learned to dislike, 
and almost to despise the North ; to sympathize with, 
and cordially to admire, the South. We have learned 
that the South is, on the whole, in the right ; that 
the North is altogether, wilfully and wickedly in the 
wrong." But these expressions of heartfelt contempt 
were not confined to the London press. Liverpool, 
for instance, was conspicuous as a hot-bed of Confed- 
erate sympathy; and, as early as August, 1861, the 
leading journal of that city expressed itseK as follows : 
— " We have no doubt whatever that the vast major- 
ity of the people of this country, certainly of the peo- 
ple of Liverpool, are in favor of the cause espoused by 
the Secessionists. The defeat of the Federalists gives 
unmixed pleasure ; the success of the Confederates is 
ardently hoped, nay, confidently predicted." A year 
later, the London Post referred in the same tone 
to those whom it saw fit, in the rarefied and luminous 
atmosphere of its own exalted wisdom, to describe as 
" the infatuated people across the Atlantic." " The 
whole history of the war is a history of mistakes on 
the Federal side. Blinded by self-conceit, influenced 
by passion, reckless of the lessons of history, and deaf 
to warnings which every one else could hear and 
tremble at, the people of the North plunged into hos- 
tilities with their fellow-citizens without so much as a 
definite idea what they were fighting for, or on what 
condition they would cease fighting. They went to 
war without a cause, they have fought without a plan, 
and they are prosecuting it still without a principle." 
It would then pleasantly allude to the "suicidal frenzy" 
of a contest in which two sections were striving "with 
a ferocity unknown since the times when Indian 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 11 

scalped Indian on the same continent ; " and sorrow- 
fully add, — '^ American pride contemptuously dis- 
dains to consider what may be thought of its pro- 
ceedings by the intelligent in this country ; inflated 
self-sufficiency scorns alike the friendly advice of the 
disinterested and the indignant censures of a disap- 
proving world." And then, finally, when its every 
prevision had proved wrong, and all its predictions 
were falsified, as it contemplated the total collapse of 
the Confederacy, this organ of " society " and the 
'^ influential classes " innocently observed : — " The 
antipathy entertained by the United States toward 
England has, owing to circumstances entirely beyond 
our control, and into which it is unnecessary now to 
enter, been fanned into a fiercer flame during the 
progress of the war ; " ^ and it now spoke of Great 
Britain as " the mother country ! " 

Recorded utterances of this character could be 
multiplied indefinitely ; ^ I take these few, selected at 

1 May 15, 1865. 

2 Those of the Post, read a g-eneration after the event, and in the 
light of passing South African events, are simply inconceivable. 

!^ They reflect a degree of ignorance, and a malignity of disposition, 
difficult to account for. Take, for instance, the following : — " Yet 
what wild tribe, from the Red River or the South Sea Islands, dan- 
cing- round its fires, and goading- each other to fury by its cries, could 
exceed in deliberate cruelty and implacability the citizens of Wash- 
ington on the occasion to which we refer ? " (August 19, 1862.) The 
" occasion " was a " war-meeting " at that time held, " under the au- 

I spices of President Lincoln." " But as the contest went on, it was 
soon seen how little slavery had to do with it ; and even Europe, to a 
man, has lost every spark of interest in the Federal cause. Sympathy 
goes continuously southward." (August 29, 1862.) "We doubt if 
there could be found in the entire universe a more degrading spectacle 
than that of a regiment of negro soldiers fighting in support of the 
Federal government." (September 22, 1862.) " A proclamation would 
almost suffice to dislodge Abraham Lincoln. . . . We believe that if 



78 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

random, merely to illustrate the extreme difficulty 
of the position into which the precedents and declare^ 
tiohs she herself had established, and put freely on 
record, brought Great Britain at the close of our Civil 
War. It is useless to say that, as between nations, 
irresponsible utterances through the press and from the 
platform are entitled to no consideration, and should 
not be recalled. They, none the less, are a fact ; and 
they are not forgotten. On the contrary, they rankle. 
They did so in 1865. 

Happily, however, for the peace of the world, a few 
great facts then stood forth, established and of record ; 
and it is these prominent facts which influence popular 
feeling. English built ships — English manned and 
Enghsh armed — had swept the American merchant 
marine from the seas ; but, most fortunately, an Ameri- 
can man-of-war of not unequal size had, within sight 
of Enghsh shores, sent to the bottom of the British 
Channel the single one of those commerce-destroyers 
which had ventured to trust itself within the range of 

President Davis were to assume the functions of President of the 
United States, the population of the North would gladly accept this 
ready mode of preserving- the integrity of the country, and at once 
acknowledge his authority." (September 24, 1862.) " It is easy to 
conceive, though it may be difficult to ex]}ress, the language in which 
future historians will speak of this deplorable contest. Foolish it has 
been, without a parallel in the annals of human folly. Aimless it 
has been, when the utter hopelessness of the object with which it was 
prosecuted is borne in mind. In no previous wars has the sacrifice of 
human life been proportionally greater ; in none has the expenditure 
been so wantonly, so profligately, extravagant. There remains, how- 
ever, one term which must still be applied. It has been profitless. 
Life, money, and national credit have all been frittered away to pro- 
cure — nothing!" (October 2, 1862.) It is difficult now to recall 
these, and endless similar lucubrations, without mirth ; then they 
hurt. And they were meant to hurt. Perhaps the crudest possible 
revenge for such utterances is, subsequently, and in the cold light of 
actualities, to confront the utterer with them. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 79 

our guns. In this there was much babn. Again, Amer- 
ica was weary of strife, and longed for rest ; and it 
could well afford to bide its time in view of the changed 
tone and apprehensive glances which now came across 
the Atlantic from those whose forecast had deceived 
them into a position so obviously false. In common 
parlance. Great Britain had made her bed ; she might 
now safely be left to a prolonged nightmare as she lay 
in it. The United States — no longer an '' insensate 
and degenerate people " — could wait in confidence. 
Its time was sure to come. 

Great Britain, also, was most uncomfortably of this 
same opinion. The more her public men reflected on 
the positions taken by the Palmerston-Russell Min- 
istry, and the precedents therein created, the worse 
they seemed, and the less propitious the outlook. The 
reckoning was long ; and it was chalked plainly on 
the wall. It was never lost to sight nor out of mind. 
The tendency of events was obvious. They all pointed 
to retaliation in kind ; for, in the summer of 1866, the 
House of Representatives at Washington passed, with- 
out one dissenting vote, a bill to repeal the inhibitions 
contained in the American neutrality laws against 
the fitting out of ships for belligerents. The threat 
was overt ; Great Britain deprecatingly met it by the 
passage, in 1870, of a new and stringent Foreign 
Enlistment Act. 

Just six years elapsed between the close of the War 
of the Rebellion (May, 1865) and the signing of the 
Treaty of Washington (^ay, 1871). For Great 
Britain those were years of rapid education toward a 
new code of international law. Considering the in- 
terval traversed, the time of traversing it cannot be 



80 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

said to have been long. When, in the midst of the Civil 
War, tidings of the depredations of the British built 
Confederate commerce-destroyers reached America, 
instructions were sent to the Minister of the United 
States in London to demand reparation. To this de- 
mand Earl Russell, then Foreign Secretary, in due time 
responded. Not only did he deny any liability, legal 
or moral, but he concluded his reply with this highly 
significant, not to say petulant remark : — "I have 
only, in conclusion, to express my hope that you may 
not be instructed again to put forward claims which 
Her Majesty's Government cannot admit to be 
founded on any grounds of law or justice." ^ 

The discussion seemed closed ; Great Britain had 
apparently taken her stand. In the words of the 
Foreign Secretary, — " Her Majesty's Government 
entirely disclaim all responsibility for any acts of the 
Alabama:' ^ This was in March, 1863. On the 19th 
of June, 1864, the depredations of the Alabama 
were brought to a summary close. When the Con- 
federate Secretary of War at Richmond heard of the 
loss thus sustained, he wrote immediately (July 18) 
to the Liverpool bureau of his department : " You 
must supply her place if possible, a measure [now] 
of paramount importance." ^ This despatch reached 
its destination on the 30th of August, and on the 20th 
of October the head of the bureau had " the great 
satisfaction of reporting the safe departure on the 
8th inst." of the Shenandoah from London, and its 

1 Dip. Cor., 1863, p. 380. Russell to Adams, September 14, 1863. 
Geneva Arbitration : Correspondence, etc, vol. iii. p. 164. 

^ Russell to Adams, March 9, 1863. Geneva Arbitration : Carre' 
spondence, etc., vol. iii. p. 122. 

3 Bulloch, vol. ii. p. 112. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 81 

consort, the Laurel^ from Liverpool, " within a few 
hours of each other ; " and this in spite of " embar- 
rassing and annoying inquiries from the Customs 
and Board of Trade officials." ^ The Shenandoah now 
took up the work of destruction which the Alabama 
was no longer in position to continue. It thus de- 
volved on the American Minister to present further 
demands on the Foreign Secretary. But, in the mean 
time, the situation had materially changed. The cor- 
respondence over the depredations of the Alabama 
was abruptly closed by Earl Russell seven weeks be- 
fore the unfortunate battle of Chancellorsville ; Lee 
surrendered at Appomattox just two days after Mr. 
Adams brought to the notice of the Foreign Secretary 
the depredations of the Shenandoah. 

A long correspondence ensued, which was closed on 
the 2d of the following December by Lord Clarendon, 
Earl Russell's successor as Foreign Secretary. His 
despatch was brief ; but in it he observed, " that no 
armed vessel departed during the war from a British 
port to cruise against the commerce of the United 
States ; " and he further maintained that throughout 
the war " the British government have steadily and 
honestly discharged all the duties incumbent on them 
as a neutral power, and have never deviated from the 
obligations imposed on them by international law." ^ 
And yet in this correspondence the first step in the 
direction of a settlement was taken, — a step curiously 
characteristic of Earl RusseU. As indicative also of 
the amount of progi-ess as yet made on the long road to 
be traversed, it was the reverse oi encouraging. Earl 

1 Bulloch, vol. ii. pp. 131-133. 

2 Geneva Arbitration : Correspondence^ etc., vol. iii. p. 625. 



82 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

Kussell had brought Great Britain into a position from 
which she had in some way to be extricated. The 
events of April and May, 1865, in America were very 
significant when viewed in their bearing on the fast 
rising European complications incident to the blood- 
and-iron policy to which Count Bismarck was deliber- 
ately giving shape. Dark clouds, ominous of coming 
storm, were hanging on the European horizon ; while 
America, powerful and at peace, lowered angrily 
British-ward from across the Atlantic. It was a con- 
tinuous, ever-present menace, to be averted only when 
approached in a large way. One course — one course 
alone — was open to the British statesmen. But to see 
and follow it called for an eye and mind and pen 
very different, and far more quick and facile, than the 
eye, mind, and pen with which nature had seen fit to 
endow the younger scion of the ducal house of Bed- 
ford. 

Had he been equal to the situation, it was then in 
the power of Earl Russell to extricate Great Britain 
from the position into which he had brought her, and 
out of the nettle, danger, to pluck the flower, safety. 
Nor would it have been difficult so to do ; and that 
without the abandonment of any position he had taken. 
Weary of battle and satiated with success, America 
was then in complaisant mood. A complete victor is 
always inclined to be magnanimous, and that was a 
time when, as Mr. Sumner afterwards expressed it, 
" we would have accepted very little." ^ Taking ad- 
vantage of this national mental mood, it would have 
been possible for Earl Russell then, while extricating 
Great Britain from a false position, to have at once 
1 Pierce : Sumner, vol. iv. p. 384. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 83 

obliterated the recollection of the past and forestalled 
the Treaty of Washington, securing at the same time 
the adoption at little cost of a new principle of inter- 
national law obviously in the interest of Great Britain. 
Still insisting in his correspondence with the American 
Minister that Her Majesty's Government had, in the 
language of his successor, " steadily and honestly dis- 
charged all the duties incumbent on them as a neutral 
power," and hence had incurred no liability under any 
recognized principle or precedent of international law 
; for depredations committed by Her Majesty's subjects 
beyond her jurisdiction, — adhering firmly to this con- 
tention, he might have gone on to recognize, in the 
light of a record which he had already over and over 
admitted was a "scandal" and "a reproach to our 
|! laws," that a radical change in the international code 
I was obviously desirable, and that the time for it had 
i come. The neutral should be responsible for results 
whenever, after due notice of a contemplated infrac- 
tion was given (as in the cases of the Florida and 
Alabama)^ she permitted her territory to be made by 
one belligerent the base of operations against another. 
The laws ought, he would have admitted, to be ade- 
quate to such an emergency ; and they should be en- 
forced. He might well then have expressed the honest 
regret Great Britain felt that her laws had during our 
rebellion proved inadequate, and a proper sense of the 
grievous injury the United States had in consequence 
I sustained. The rest of the way out would then have 
been plain. In view of Great Britain's commercial 
and maritime interests, she could well afford to incur 
large pecuniary sacrifices to secure the future protec- 
tion involved in the change of international law con- 



84 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

tended for by the American government. She could 
not ask that protection for the future with no regard 
to the past. That Great Britain had incurred to a 
certain extent a moral obligation through the insuf- 
ficiency of her statutes, combined with the unsatisfac- 
tory state of international law, could not be denied in 
view of the oft recorded admission that the cases of the 
Confederate commerce-destroyers were a " scandal " 
and a " reproach." Under these circumstances. Great 
Britain was prepared to assent to the modifications of 
international law now contended for by the United 
States ; and, to secure the manifest future advantage 
involved in their adoption, would agree, subject to 
reasonable limitations as to extent of liability, etc., to 
have those principles operate retrospectively in the case 
of such Confederate commerce-destroyers as had, after 
notice given, sailed from British ports of origin during 
the Civil War. 

In the light of what afterwards occurred, including 
the Treaty of Washington and the results of the 
Geneva Arbitration, it is not difficult to imagine the 
astonishment with which the American Minister would 
have read a despatch couched in these terms, and the 
gratification with which the American people would 
have hailed it. It would have been, in the reverse, a 
repetition of the Trent experience, — the honest ac- 
knowledgment of a false attitude. The clouds would at 
once have rolled away. While the national pride of 
Great Britain would have suffered no hurt, that of the 
United States would have been immensely flattered. 
The one country would have got itself gracefully, and 
cheaply, out of an impossible position. It would have 
secured an advantage of inestimable future value at a 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 85 

cost in reality nominal, and a cost which it afterwards 
had to pay ; the other party would have achieved a great 
diplomatic victory, crowning and happily rounding out 
its military successes. Most unfortunately, as the re- 
sult showed, Earl Russell did not have it in him thus 
to rise to the occasion. On the contrary, with that 
curious conventional conservatism which seems innate 
in a certain class of English public men, — an inability 
to recognize their own interests if presented in unac- 
customed form, — the British Foreign Secretary de- 
clined to consider those very changes in the law which 
Parliament five years later voluntarily adopted, and 
which, seven years later, Great Britain agreed to in- 
corporate in a solemn treaty. The proposed hability 
for the abuse of neutrality by belligerents, so invalu- 
able to England, Lord Russell now characterized as 
"most burdensome, and, indeed, most dangerous;" 
while, with a simplicity almost humorous, he ejacu- 
lated, — " Surely, we are not bound to go on making 
new laws, ad infinitum^ because new occasions arise." ^ 
So, high-toned Englishman as he was. Lord Russell, 
guided by his instincts and traditions, as Prime Min- 
ister characteristically went on to make perceptibly 
j worse what, as Foreign Secretary, he had already 
made quite sufficiently bad. He did not aggrandize, 
he distinctly belittled, his case. In reply to the re- 
newed demands of the American Minister, he sug- 
gested, in a most casual way, the appointment of a 
joint commission, to which should be referred " all 
claims arising during the late Civil War [his note was 
dated August 30, nearly four months after the cap- 

1 Russell to Adams, August 30, 1865. Geneva Arbitration : Cor- 
respondence, etc., vol. i. p. 677 ; vol. iii. p. 561. 



86 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

ture of Jefferson Davis], whicli the two powers shall 
agree to refer." ^ The correspondence was at once 
published in the Gazette ; and, so general was the pro- 
position of reference, that the Times, in commenting 
editorially on it the morning after publication, ad- 
mitted the desirability of a settlement, and construed 
the proposal of a commission as designed to embrace 
all the American claims. The " Thunderer's " utter- 
ance on this point might be inspired, — a feeler of 
public opinion ; a possible way out seemed to open. 
Earl Russell characteristically lost no time in closing 
it. At a later day, after the Alabama claims had been 
arbitrated and paid, his Lordship asserted that he had 
always been willing to have them assumed, or, as he 
expressed it, would " at once have agreed to arbitra- 
tion," could he have received assurances on certain 
controverted issues, involving, as he considered, the 
honor and dignity of Great Britain.^ This was clearly 
an afterthought in the light of subsequent events. 
No suggestion of that nature was ever made by him 
to Mr. Adams ; and when, in October, 1865, such a 
possible construction was put upon his despatches, he 
made haste to repudiate it. In fact. Earl Russell, 
still Foreign Secretary, but soon to become Premier, 
was not yet ready to take the first step in the edu- 
cational process marked out for Great Britain. The 
dose was, indeed, a bitter one ; no wonder Lord Rus- 
sell contemplated it with a wry face. 

So the Foreign Secretary, in October, 1865, lost no 
time in firmly closing the door which seemed opening. 
The day following the editorial implication of the 

1 Geneva Arbitration : Correspondence, etc., vol. iii. p. 562. 

2 Recollections and Suggestions, p. 278. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 87 

Times, there appeared in its columns an official correc- 
tion. The correctness of the implication was denied. 
As Mr. Adams wrote in his diary, the proposal of a 
joint commission, thus explained, "really stands as 
an offer to refer the British claims, and a facile re- 
fusal to include ours. Wonderful liberality ! " And, 
a few days later, he added : — " The issue of the pre- 
sent complication now is that Great Britain stands as 
asking for a commission through which to procure a 
settlement of claims advanced by herself, at the same 
time that she refuses at the threshold to permit the 
introduction of all the material demands we have 
against her. Thus the British position passes all the 
time from bad to worse. The original blunder, in- 
spired by the over-eagerness to see us divided, has 
impelled a neutral policy, carried to such extremes of 
encouragement to one belligerent as seemingly to haz- 
ard the security of British commerce, whenever the 
country shall become involved in a war. The sense 
of this inspires the powers of eastern Europe with 
vastly increased confidence in pursuing their particu- 
lar objects. It is not difficult to see that whatever 
views Russia may ultimately have on Constantinople 
will be much fortified by a consciousness of the diver- 
sion which it might make through the neutral ports 
of the United States against the British commerce ,of 
one half of the globe. We lose nothing by the passage 
of time ; Great Britain does." 

This somewhat obvious view of the situation evi- 
dently suggested itself to the mind of Earl Russell's 
successor in the Foreign Office, for Earl Russell, on 
the death of Lord Palmerston, in the autumn of 1865, 
became Prime Minister. So, one day in the following 



88 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

December, Mr. Adams was summoned to an official 
interview with the new Secretary. The conversation 
at this interview, after the matters immediately in hand 
were disposed of, passed to the general and well-worn 
subject of the neutrality observed by Great Britain 
during the struggle which, seven months before, had 
come to its close. Lord Clarendon, Mr. Adams wrote, 
insisted that the neutrality " had been perfectly kept ; 
and I signifying my conviction that a similar observa- 
tion of it, as between two countries so closely adjacent 
as Great Britain and France, would lead to a declara- 
tion of war by the injured party in twenty-four hours. 
Here we might have closed the conference, but his 
Lordship proceeded to continue it by remarking that 
he had it on his mind to make a suggestion. He 
would do so. He went on to express his long convic- 
tion of the expediency of a union of sentmient and 
policy between two great nations of the same race. 
He hoped to see them harmonize, after the immediate 
irritation consequent upon the late struggle should 
have passed away, more than ever before. There 
were many things in what was called International 
Law that are now in a vague and unsatisfactory con- 
dition; it would, therefore, seem very desirable that 
by some form of joint consultation, more or less exten- 
sive, these points could be fixed on something like a 
permanent basis. He inquired of me whether I thought 
my government would be at all inclined to entertain 
the idea. I rephed that the object was certainly de- 
sirable ; but that, in the precise state in which things 
had been left, I could give no opinion on the question 
proposed. All that I could do was to report it ; and 
that not in any official way. His Lordship talked a 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 89 

little grandly about our overlooking the past, letting 
bygones be bygones, and considering these questions 
solely on their abstract importance as settling great 
principles. He said that two such very great coun- 
tries could scarcely be expected to stoop to concessions 
or admissions in regard to one another. Would I 
reflect upon the whole matter. All this time I was 
rather a listener than a speaker, and committed myself 
to nothing but vague professions. The fact stares up 
that this government is not easy at the way the case 
has been left by Lord Russell, and desires to get out 
of it without mortification. My own opinion is rather 
against any effort to help them out. I ought to note 
that yesterday Mr. W. E. Forster called to see me 
for the purpose of urging precisely the same tentative 
experiment at Washington. He reasoned with me 
more frankly, in the same strain, and evidently con- 
templated a more complete process of rectification of 
the blunder than Lord Clarendon could hint. I also 
talked to him with more freedom, in a strain of great 
indifference about arriving at any result ; the advan- 
tage was on our side, and I saw no prospect of its 
diminishing with time. He ended by asking me to 
think a little longer about a mode of running the 
negotiation ; for, if it could be done, he felt sure that 
enough power could be applied to bring this govern- 
ment to consent to it. I replied that all that could 
be done now must pass through private channels. 
The record was made up, and I had no inclination to 
disturb it." 

This call of Mr. Forster at that particular junc- 
ture was significant ; for Mr. Forster less than a 
month before had gone into Earl Russell's Ministry, 



90 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

becoming Under-Secretary for the Colonies ; and Mr. 
Forster was well known to be a friend of the United 
States. Badly compromised by Lord Kussell's blun- 
dering committals, the government at last appreciated 
the situation, and was feeling for a way out. The 
position now taken by the Foreign Secretary and Mr. 
Forster was clearly suggestive of the subsequent John- 
son-Clarendon Convention. Nothing, however, imme- 
diately resulted. Lord Clarendon had, indeed, at the 
time of his talk with Mr. Adams, already put his sug- 
gestion in shape to be formally submitted to Secretary 
Seward through the British Minister at Washington ; 
and when, six weeks later, his despatch appeared in 
the Blue Book, Mr. Adams wrote : " The object is 
now evident. It is to blunt the effect of Lord Rus- 
sell's original blunder, and try to throw the odium of 
it back by a new offer, which we must decline. The 
contrivance will scarcely work. It is certainly civil 
to propose that we should bear all the consequences 
of their policy, and consent to secure them against 
any future application of it to themselves." 

As showing how very sensitive to the situation in 
which they had been placed the English now were, 
Mr. Adams two days later mentioned a long conversa- 
tion with Mr. Oliphant, a member of Parliament, then 
just back from a visit to America. The Fenian move- 
ment was at that time much in evidence through its 
British dynamite demonstrations, and the Irish in the 
United States were consequently in a state of chronic 
excitement. Mr. Olijihant called in regard to it. 
After some discussion of that matter, the conversation 
drifted to the policy pursued by the British govern- 
ment toward the United States, of which Mr. Oli- 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 91 

phant " evidently had not approved. It should have 
been either positive intervention, or positive amity. 
The effort to avoid both had excited nothing but ill- 
will from both parties in the war. One Southern 
man whom he had met had gone so far as to declare 
that he was ready to fight England even on the case 
of the Alabama, I briefly reviewed the course taken, 
and pointed out the time when the cordiality between 
the countries could have been fully established. It 
was not improved ; and now I had little hope of re- 
storing it for many years." It was during the ensu- 
ing summer that the lower house of Congress passed 
by acclamation the bill already referred to, repealing 
the inhibitions of the neutrality laws. 

A change of ministry at this time took place in 
Great Britain. Earl Russell, with the Liberals, went 
out of office, and Lord Derby, at the head of the 
Conservatives, came in. Lord Stanley, the oldest son 
of the new Premier, succeeded Lord Clarendon in the 
Foreign Office, and again the old straw was threshed 
over. A distinct step was, however, now marked in 
advance. The new Prime Minister took occasion to 
intimate publicly that a proposition for the arrange- 
ment of the Alahama claims would be favorably 
entertained ; and the Times, of course under inspira- 
tion, even went so far as to admit that Earl Russell's 
position on that subject was based on a " somewhat 
narrow and one-sided view of the question at issue. 
It was not safe," it now went on to say, " for Great 
Britain to make neutrals the sole and final judges of 
their own obligations." This was a distinct enlarge- 
ment of the " insular " view. It amounted to an 
abandonment of the contention that a petty jury in 



92 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

an Englisli criminal court was the tribunal of last 
resort on all questions involving the international 
obligations of Great Britain. 

The interminable diplomatic correspondence then 
began afresh; and, in the course of it, Secretary 
Seward rested the case of the United States largely 
on what both he and Mr. Adams termed " the pre- 
mature and injurious proclamation of belligerency" 
issued by the British government in May, 1861. 
This he pronounced the fruitful source whence all 
subsequent evil came. Lord Stanley took issue with 
him on that point. He did not deny a responsibility 
for the going forth of Confederate commerce-destroy- 
ers from British ports, and a certain liability for the 
damages by them caused ; but, he contended, the Brit- 
ish government could not consent to arbitrate the 
question whether the Confederacy was prematurely 
recognized as a belligerent. The recognition of belli- 
gerency in any given case was, he contended, a matter 
necessarily resting in the discretion of a sovereign, 
neutral power. He intimated, however, a willingness 
to arbitrate all other questions at issue. 

In view of the position always from the commence- 
ment taken by the American Secretary of State and 
his representative in London, this limited arbitration 
could not be satisfactory. Time and again Seci^etary 
and Minister had emphasized the impropriety and un- 
friendliness of the Queen's proclamation of May 13, 
1861, and the consequences thereof, so momentous as 
scarcely to admit of computation. Accordingly, the 
discussion again halted. In July, 1868, Mr. Reverdy 
Johnson of Maryland succeeded Mr. Adams in Lon- 
don ; and, once more, negotiations were renewed. But 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 93 

now tlie British government had so far progressed 
towards its ultimate and inevitable destination that, 
a discreet silence being on both sides observed in the 
matter of the proclamation of May, 1861, a conven- 
tion was readily agreed to covering all claims of the 
citizens and subjects of the two countries against 
the government of each. While this treaty was in 
course of negotiation, another change of ministry took 
place in Great Britain ; and Mr. Gladstone, who had 
been Chancellor of the Exchequer throughout the 
Civil War, became Premier, Earl Kussell being now 
finally retired from official life. " Lord Clarendon was 
again placed in charge of the Foreign Office. Under 
these circumstances, the form of convention agreed to 
by Lord Derby was revised by his successor in such a 
way as to make it satisfactory to Secretary Seward, 
and, on the 14th of January, 1869, it received the 
signatures of Mr. Johnson and Lord Clarendon. It 
was known as the Johnson -Clarendon Convention. 

In hurrying this important negotiation to so quick 
a close, both Secretary Seward and Reverdy Johnson 
were much influenced by a natural ambition. They 
both greatly desired that a settlement of the moment- 
ous issues between the two English-speaking nations 
should be effected through their individual agency. 
Mr. Seward especially was eager in his wish to carry 
to a final solution the most difficult of the many intri- 
cate complications which dated back to the first weeks 
of his occupation of the State Department. Accord- 
ingly, he did not now repeat his somewhat rhetorical 
arraignment of Great Britain in the correspondence of 
two years before, because of the proclamation of 1861. 
No longer did he roar so as to do the genuine Ameri- 



94 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

can's heart good to hear him, but he did so aggravate 
his voice as to roar as gently as a sucking dove ; he 
roared as 't were a nightingale. It thus became sim- 
ply a question of the settlement of the money claims of 
individual citizens and subjects of one country against 
the government of another. Lord Stanley's contention 
on the recognition of belligerency issue was tacitly ac- 
cepted as sound. This, as will presently appear, im- 
plied a great deal. It remained to be seen whether 
that primal offence — that original sin which 

" Brought death into the world and all our woe " — 

could thus lightly and in silence be relegated to the 
limbo of things unimportant, and so, quite forgotten. 

The negotiation had been entered upon in Septem- 
ber, 1868 ; the convention was executed in January fol- 
lowing. But in the interim a presidential election had 
taken place in the United States ; and, when the treaty 
reached America, the administration of Andrew John- 
son was, in a few weeks onlj^, to be replaced by that of 
General Grant. Secretary Seward would then cease 
to be at the head of the Department of State ; and, as 
he now wrote to Reverdy Johnson, " the confused light 
of an incoming administration was spreading itself over 
the country, rendering the consideration of political 
subjects irksome, if not inconvenient." Charles Sumner 
was at that time chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, a position he had held through eight 
years. As chairman of that committee, the fate of the 
treaty rested largely with him. The President-elect, 
with no very precise policy in his mind to be pursued 
on the issues involved, wished to have the claims con- 
vention go over until his administration was installed ,• 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 95 

and when, in February, the convention was taken up 
in the Senate committee, all its members expressed 
themselves as opposed to its ratification. " We begin 
to-day," Mr. Sumner then said, referring to the rejec- 
tion of the proposed settlement as a foregone conclu- 
sion, "an international debate, the greatest of our 
history, and, before it is finished, in all probability the 
greatest of all history." ^ 



III 

It was now that Mr. Fish came upon the scene, — 
the successor of Secretary Seward in the Department 
of State. And here, perhaps, it would be proper for 
me to say that I had no personal acquaintance with 
Mr. Fish. I never met him but once. In the summer 
of 1890, 1 think it was, some years preceding his death, 
I passed a morning with him by appointment at his 
country home at Garrison, going there to obtain from 
him, if I could, some information on a subject I 
was then at work on. Beyond this, I knew him only 
as a public character, more or less actively engaged in 
political life through twenty-five exceptionally event- 
ful years. 

Held in its Committee of Foreign Relations, the 
Johnson-Clarendon Convention was not acted upon by 
the Senate, at the time sitting in executive session, 
until the 13th of April, 1869. It was then rejected 
by a practically unanimous vote (54 to 1) following an 
elaborate speech in condemnation of it by the chairman 
of the committee having it in charge. That speech 
was important. It marked a possible parting of the 
1 Pierce : Sumner^ vol. iv. p. 384. 



96 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

ways. In that speech, and by means of it, Mr. Sum- 
ner not only undid, and more than undid, all that yet 
had been done looking to an amicable adjustment of 
the questions at issue between the two nations, but he 
hedged thick with difficulties any future approach to 
such an adjustment. To appreciate this, the essential 
feature of the Clarendon-Johnson Convention must be 
borne constantly in mind. 

As I have already said, that convention provided 
only for the settlement of the claims of individuals. 
All questions of liability were to be referred to arbi- 
tration. The right of Great Britain to judge for it- 
self as to the time and manner of the recognition of the 
Confederacy as a belligerent power was not called in 
question, or submitted to arbitrament, A settlement 
was thus made possible ; indeed, the way to a settle- 
ment was opened wide. The concession was also 
proper ; for, viewed historically, and with a calm regard 
for recognized principles of international law, it must be 
admitted that the long and strenuously urged conten- 
tion of Secretaiy Seward and Mr. Adams over what 
they described as the " premature and injurious pro- 
clamation of belligerency," and the consequences of the 
precipitancy of Great Britain in the early stages of the 
Eebellion, was by them carried to an undue length. 
Indisputably, the British Ministry did issue the very 
important proclamation of May, 1861, with undue 
haste ; and, in so doing, they were presumably actu- 
ated by a motive they could not declare. The newly 
accredited American Minister had not then reached 
London ; but he was known to be on his way, and, in 
fact, saw the just issued proclamation in the Gazette 
the morning of his arrival. The intention of the 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 97 

government may fairly be inferred. It apparently 
was that this question should be disposed of, — be an 
accomplished fact, — in advance of any protests. It 
had been decided on ; discussion was useless. This 
was neither usual nor courteous. It was, moreover, in 
direct disregard of assurances given : and, in the ex- 
cited state of the American public mind at that time, 
while it was passionately denounced, evil auguries were 
drawn from it. Yet it by no means followed that the 
step was taken in an unfriendly spirit, or that it in 
fact worked any real prejudice to the Union cause. 
That it was a grievous blow, given with a hostile intent, 
and the source of infinite subsequent trouble and loss 
to the United States government. Secretary Seward 
and Mr. Adams always afterwards maintained ; and, 
during the war, very properly maintained. But for 
it, they asserted and seem even to have persuaded 
themselves, the Eebellion would have collapsed in its 
infancy. Because of it, the struggling insurrection 
grew into a mighty conflict, and was prolonged to at 
least twice the length of life it otherwise would have 
attained. For this, they then proceeded to argue, 
and for the loss of life and treasure in it involved. 
Great Britain stood morally accountable ; or, as Secre- 
tary Seward years afterwards saw fit to phrase it, in 
rhetoric which now impresses one as neither sober nor 
well considered, it was Her Majesty's proclamation 
which conferred " upon the insurrection the pregnant 
baptismal name of Civil War." 

There then was, and there now is, nothing on which 
to base so extreme an assumption. On the contrary, 
the historical evidence tends indisputably to show that, 
though designedly precipitate, the proclamation was 



98 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

issued with no unfriendly intent. On this point, the 
statement of William E. Forster is conclusive. Mr. 
Forster, then a newly elected member of Parliament, 
himself urged the issuance of the proclamation, and 
looked upon it as a point gained for the cause of the 
Union ; ^ and eight years later he declared that " from 
personal recollection and knowledge " he could testify 
that " the proclamation was not made with unfriendly 
animus " to the United States. On the contrary, he 
showed it was issued '•'• in accordance with the earnest 
wishes of himself and other friends of the North." 2 

The principle of international law involved is simple, 
and founded on good sense. In no case and under no 
circumstances can a declaration of neutrality, which 
carries with it of necessity a recognition of the fact 
of belligerency, be a wrong to a power which is itself 
exercising, or has assumed to exercise against neutrals, 
any of the rights of war. Exclusion by blockade, 
search for contraband, and capture as prize on the 
high seas are distinct acts of war. All these rights 
the government of the United States claimed, and 
exercised, after the 19th of April, 1861. It is diffi- 
cult to see how foreign governments, in view of the 
consequent interruptions of commerce and seizure of 
property, could long ignore such an abnormal state 
of affairs. They might, from an excess of comity, do 
so for a few weeks, and until the state of war and its 
consequences became fixed and manifold ; but of this 
they were of necessity the judges.^ 

Neither is there any ground not admitting of dis- 
pute on which to argue that the issuance by the British 

1 Reid : Forster, vol. i. p. 335. 2 jj^^ ^^i, ij^ pp^ 12, 21. 

^ See Appendix A, infra p. 199. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 99 

government of the proclamation of May, 1861, How- 
ever premature, and with whatever intent, was pro- 
ductive of any injury to the United States. On 
the contrary, it has been plausibly contended that 
it worked in the end most potently in favor of the 
Union cause.^ It is obvious that the proclamation 
could not in any event have been withheld more than 
ninety days ; for within that period the Confederacy 
had at Manassas incontrovertibly established its posi- 
tion as a belligerent, and the Confederate flag on the 
high seas, combined with a Union blockade of three 
thousand miles of hostile coast, was evidence not easily 
explained away of a de facto government on land. 
Under such conditions, it is idle to maintain that the 
recognition of belligerency did not fairly rest in the 
discretion of neutrals. Moreover, had the recognition 
been delayed until after the disgrace of Bull Run, it 
would in all probability have been complete, and have 
extended to a recognition of nationality as well as of 
mere de facto belligerency. Nor, finally, is there any- 
thing in the record, as since more fully developed, 
which justifies a belief that the struggle would have 
been shorter even by a month, or in any degree less 
costly as respects either life or treasure, had the Con- 
federacy never been buoyed up by the confident hope 
of foreign recognition, and consequent aid from with- 
out. The evidence is indeed all the other way. As 
since developed, it is fairly conclusive that, almost to 
the end, and unquestionably down to the close of 
1863, while the Confederates, rank and file as well 
as leaders civil and military, confidently counted on 
being able, through the potency of their cotton con- 

^ Life of C. F. Ada7ns, American Statesmen Series, pp. 171-174. 

L.ofC. 



100 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

trol, to compel an even reluctant European recogni- 
tion,^ yet they never for a moment doubted their 
ability to maintain themselves in arms and achieve 
independence without extraneous aid of any kind. 
Thirty years in preparation, calling into action all the 
resources of a singularly masterful and impulsive race, 
numbering milhons and occupymg a highly defensible 
territory of enormous area, the Confederate rebellion 
vras never that sickly, accidental foster-child of Great 
Britain vrhich, in all their diplomatic contentions, 
Secretary Seward and Senator Sumner tried so hard 
to make it out, — a mere bantling dandled into pre- 
mature existence by an incomplete foreign recognition. 
On the contrary, from start to finish, it was Titanic 
in proportions and spirit. It presented every feature 
of war on the largest scale, domestic and foreign. From 
the outset, neutral interests were involved ; European 
opinion was by both sides invoked. In face of such 
conditions and facts as these, to go on, to the end of 
the chapter, asserting that such a complete and for- 
midable embodiment of all-perversive warlike energy 
should, through years, have been ignored as an exist- 

1 The evidence on this point, thoug-h now largely forgotten, is over- 
whelming. Jefferson Davis, in common with the great mass of the 
people of the Confederacy, had an implicit — an almost childlike faith 
in the commercial, and consequent political, supremacy of cotton. 
They wanted no other ally. They went the full length gone by J. 
H. Hammond of South Carolina when, on the 4th of March, 1858, 
he thus expressed himself in the Senate at Washington : — " Without 
firing a gun, without drawing a sword, should [the States of the North] 
make war on us, we could bring the whole world to our feet. What 
would happen if no cotton was furnished for three years ? I will not 
stop to depict what every one can imagine ; but this is certain, Eng- 
land would topple headlong, and carry the whole civilized world with 
her. No, you dare not make Avar on cotton. No power on earth dares 
to make war on it — Cotton is King ! " 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 101 

ing fact by ail foreign nations, and refnsed a recog- 
nition even as belligerent, was, historically speaking, 
the reverse of creditable — it was puerile. Yet, after 
this unparalleled struggle had been brought to a close, 
Secretary Seward had the assurance to assert in a 
despatch to Mr. Adams, vn-itten in January, 1867 : — 
" Before the Queen's proclamation of neutrality the 
disturbance in the United States was merely a local 
insurrection. It wanted the name of war to enable it 
to be a civil war and to live ; " and tliis was merely 
the persistent iteration of a similar statement likewise 
made to Mr. Adams shortly prior to the 1862 disasters 
at Shiloh and before Richmond : — "If Great Britain 
should revoke her decree conceding belligerent rights 
to the insurgents to-day, this civil strife . . . would 
end to-morrow." ^ 

The Johnson-Clarendon Convention was open to 
criticism at many points, and its rejection by the Sen- 
ate was altogether defensible. It did, however, have 
one merit, it quietly relegated to oblivion the alto- 
gether untenable positions just referred to. By so 
much the discussion approached a rational basis. Un- 

! fortunately, it was upon that very feature of the set- 

\ tlement Mr. Sumner characteristically directed his 
criticism, and brought his rhetoric to bear. In so 
doing he gave the debate a violent wrench, forcing it 
back into its former impossible phase ; and, in so far 

J as in him lay, he put obstacles, well-nigh insuperable, 
in the way of any future approach to an adjustment. 

; Recurring in his speech, subsequently published by 

order of the Senate, to the sentimental grounds of 

complaint because of conjectural injuries resulting 

1 Dip. Car. 1862, p. 43. See Appendix B, infra, p. 204. 



102 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

from precipitate action based on an assumed un- 
friendly purpose in the issuance of the proclamation 
of May 13, 1861, he proceeded to do what his great 
model Burke had declared himself unwilling to do, 
— he framed an indictment of a whole people, — an 
indictment of many counts, some small, others gran- 
diose, all set forth in rhetoric incontestably Sumner- 
esque. In 1869 he fairly outdid Seward in 1862. 
Because of the proclamation, and because of that 
solely, he pronounced Great Britain responsible not 
only for the losses incurred through the depredations 
of all British built Confederate commerce-destroyers, 
but for all consequent losses and injuries, conjectural 
and consequential, computable or impossible of com- 
putation, including the entire cost of the Civil War 
during half its length, and an estimate of the value 
of a large and increasing proportion of the world's 
carrying trade. The " war prolongation " claim, as 
it was called, Mr. Gladstone afterwards estimated as 
alone amounting to eight thousand million dollars 
(£1,600,000,000).! j^i-oni lack of information only, 
Mr. Sumner failed to include a trifle of an hundred 
millions, which the Confederate Secretary of the Navy 
had, in 1864, put down as the increased expenditure 
imposed on the United States by the naval opera- 
tions set on foot by his department alone ;2 but he 
counterbalanced this omission by including an hun- 
dred and ten millions on account of " our natural 
increase in [a certain] branch of industry which an 
intelligent statistician " had told him we might have 
looked for, if, etc., etc. He then triumphantly added, 
" Of course this (1110,000,000) is only an item in 
1 Reid : Forster, vol. ii. p. 24. 2 Bulloch, vol. ii. p. 112. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 103 

our bill." 1 The chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations then put himself on record deliber- 
ately, and not in the heat of debate, as estimating the 
money liability of Great Britain, because of the issu- 
ance of the proclamation of May 13, 1861, at twenty- 
five hundred millions of dollars ; and he clinched the 
matter by declaring that " whatever may be the final 
settlement of these great accounts, such must be the 
judgment in any chancery which consults the simple 
equity of the case." And this proposition the Senate 
of the United States now by formal vote approved, 
promulgating it to the world as its own. 

No one in the United States was at that time so 
familiar with the issues between the two countries, or 
so qualified to speak understandingly of them, as Mr. 
Adams, from his Boston retirement then watching the 
course of events with a deep and natural interest. On 
reading Mr. Sumner's speech, and noting the unanim- 
ity of the vote by which the Senate had rejected the 
convention, he wrote, — " The practical effect of this 
is to raise the scale of our demands of reparation so 
very high that there is no chance of negotiation left, 
unless the English have lost all their spirit and char- 
acter. The position in which it places Mr. Bright 
and our old friends in the struggle is awkward to the 
last degree. Mr. Goldwin Smith, who was at the 
meeting of the [Massachusetts] Historical Society 
[which chanced that day to be held] , spoke of it to me 
with some feeling. The whole affair is ominous of 
the change going on in our form of government ; for 
this is a pronunciamento from the Senate as the treaty- 
making power. There were intimations made to me 

^ Works, vol. xiii. p. 83. 



104 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

in conversation that the end of it all was to be the 
annexation of Canada by way of full indemnity. 
Movements were going on in that region to accelerate 
the result. I suppose that event is inevitable at some 
time ; but I doubt whether it will come in just that 
form. Great Britain will not confess a wrong, and 
sell Canada as the price of a release from punishment. 
... I begin to be apprehensive that the drift of this 
government under the effect of that speech will be to 
a misunderstanding ; and, not improbably, an ultimate 
seizure of Canada by way of indemnification." To 
the same effect the British Minister at Washington, 
Mr. Thornton, was apprising his government that, in 
the Senate debate held in executive session, " Mr. 
Sumner was followed by a few other Senators, all 
speaking in the same sense. Mr. Chandler, Senator 
from Michigan, seeming to be most violent against 
England, indicating his desire that Great Britain 
should possess no territory on the American Conti- 
nent." 

General Grant was now fairly entered on his first 
presidential term, and Mr. Fish had, for some five 
weeks, been Secretary of State. So far as concerned 
an amicable settlement between Great Britain and the 
United States, the outlook was unpropitious ; less pro- 
pitious, in fact, than at any previous time. The new 
President was a military man, and, in the language of 
Mr. Sumner, he was " known to feel intensely on the 
Alabama question." At the close of the war he had 
expressed himself in a way hostile to Great Britain, not 
caring whether she " paid ' our little bill ' or not ; upon 
the whole he would rather she should not, as that 
would leave the precedent of her conduct in full force 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 105 

for us to follow, and he wished it understood that we 
should follow it." During the war, he had been accus- 
tomed to regard Great Britain as "an enemy," and the 
mischief caused by her course he thought not capable 
of overstatement; and, in May, 1869, Sumner wrote 
that the President's views were in close conformity 
with those set forth in his speech, and that after its 
delivery General Grant had thanked and congratulated 
him.i Everything, consequently, now seemed to indi- 
cate that events must take the course thus marked out 
for them. Great Britain would have to face the con- 
tingencies of the future weighted down by the policy 
followed by Pahnerston and Russell, and confronted 
by the precedents of the Florida^ the Alabama^ and 
the Shenandoah. She had taken her position in 
1861-65, defiantly proclaiming that, for her, condi- 
tions could never be reversed, the womb of the future 
contained no day of reckoning, — no South Africa. 

Into the details of what now ensued, it is not neces- 
sary here to enter. They are matter of history ; and 
as such, sufficiently familiar. I shall pass rapidly 
over even the Motley imbroglio, coming directly to the 
difficulty between Mr. Fish and Mr. Sumner, — high 
officials both, the one Secretary of State, the other 
chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions. In regard to this difficulty much has been 
written ; more said. In discussing it, whether by 
pen or word of mouth, no little temper has been dis- 
played ; 2 but, so far as I am aware, its significance 
in an historical way has never been developed. As 
I look upon it, it was an essential element, — almost 

1 Pierce: Sumner, vol. iv. pp. 255, 389, 393,410. 
^ See, for example, Pierce : Sumner, vol. iv. p. 469. 



106 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

a necessary preliminary to that readjustment between 
the United States and Great Britain now so influ- 
ential a factor in the international relations of four 
continents. 

The divergence between the two was almost imme- 
diate. The position of Mr. Fish, as head of the State 
Department, was, so far as Mr. Sumner was concerned, 
one of great and constantly increasing difficulty. The 
latter had then been seventeen years a member of the 
Senate, and, during eight of the seventeen, chairman 
of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Secretary 
Seward had been Mr. Sumner's senior in the Senate, 
and afterwards Secretary of State from the commence- 
ment of Sumner's chairmanship of his committee. 
Naturally, therefore, though he had often been bitter 
in his attacks on the Secretary, — at times, indeed, 
more suo, indulging even in language which knew no 
limit of moderation,! — he regarded him with very dif- 
ferent eyes from those through which he cast glances 
of a somewhat downward kind on Seward's successor 
in office. In earlier senatorial days, when they sat 
together in that body during the Pierce administra- 
tion, Mr. Fish had always evinced much deference 
to Sumner's scholarly and social attributes, and had 
treated him with a consideration which the latter not 
impossibly misconstrued. The evidence is clear and 
of record that, when unexpectedly called to take 
charge of the State Department, Mr. Fish was solicit- 
ous as to Sumner's feeling towards him, and anxious 
to assure himself of the latter's cooperation and even 
guidance. Meanwhile, though wholly unconscious of 
the fact, Mr. Sumner could not help regarding Mr. 
1 Adams : B. H. Dana, vol. ii. pp. 258, 259. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 107 

Fish as a tyro, and was not disposed to credit him 
with any very clearly defined ideas of his own.i He 
assumed, as matter of course, that at last the shaping 
of the foreign policy of the country would by seniority 
devolve upon him. The appointment of Mr. Motley 
to succeed Mr. Reverdy Johnson in the English mis- 
sion undoubtedly confirmed him in this opinion. Mr. 
Motley was his appointee. That the new plenipoten- 
tiary regarded himself as such at once became appar- 
ent ; for, immediately after his confirmation, he pre- 
pared a memoir suggestive of the instructions to be 
given him. The Johnson-Clarendon Convention had 
just been rejected ; the course now to be pursued was 
under advisement ; Mr. Sumner's recent speech was 
still matter of general discussion. The new President 
was understood to have no very clearly defined ideas 
on the subject ; it was assumed that Mr. Fish was 
equally susceptible to direction. Mr. Motley, there- 
fore, looked to Mr. Sumner for inspiration. In his 
memorandum he suggested that it was not advisable 
at present to attempt any renewal of negotiations. 
And then he fell back on the proclamation of May, 
1861 ; proceeding to dilate on that wrong committed 
by Great Britain, — a wrong so deeply felt by the 
American people ! This sense of wrong had now been 
declared gravely, solemnly, without passion ; and the 
sense of it was not to be expunged by a mere money 
payment to reimburse a few captures and conflagra- 
tions at sea. And here, for the present, he proposed 
to let the matter rest. A time might come when 
Great Britain would see her fault, and be disposed to 
confess it. Reparation of some sort would then nat- 

1 Pierce : Sumner, vol. iv. pp. 375, 378. 



108 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

urally follow ; but, meanwhile, it was not for the 
United States to press the matter further. 

Distinct indications of a divergence of opinion as to 
the course to be pursued were at once apparent. The 
President, acting as yet under the influence of Mr. 
Sumner, wished Mr. Motley to proceed forthwith to 
his post ; Mr. Fish inclined to delay his going. Mean- 
while the Secretary was at work on the new Minister's 
letter of instructions ; and in them he clearly did not 
draw his inspiration from the Motley memoir. On 
the contrary, referring to the fate of the Johnson- 
Clarendon Convention in the Senate, he proceeded to 
say that, because of this action, the government of the 
United States did not abandon " the hope of an early, 
satisfactory, and friendly settlement of the questions 
depending between the two governments." The sus- 
pension of negotiations, he added, would, the President 
hoped, be regarded by Her Majesty's Government, as 
it was by him, " as wholly in the interest, and solely 
with a view, to an early and friendly settlement." 
The Secretary then went on to open the way to such 
a settlement by defining, in terms presently to be re- 
ferred to, the views of the President on the effect to be 
ascribed to the Queen's proclamation of May, 1861. 

At this point, the reason became apparent why Mr. 
Fish was in no haste to have the newly appointed Min- 
ister proceed at once to London. The Secretary was 
in a dilemma. The rule of action he was about to lay 
down as that which should have guided the British 
government in 1861 must control the United States 
in 1869. That was obvious ; but, in 1869, the United 
States was itself the interested observer of an insur- 
rection in the neighboring island of Cuba ; and, more- 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 109 

over, the new President was not backward in express- 
ing the warm sympathy he felt for the insurgents 
against Spanish colonial misrule. He wished also to 
forward their cause. That wish would find natural ex- 
pression in a recognition of belligerent rights. General 
Grant was a man of decided mind ; he was very per- 
sistent ; his ways were military ; and, as to principles 
of international law, his knowledge of them can hardly 
be said to have been so much limited as totally want- 
ing. He inclined strongly to a policy of territorial 
expansion ; but his views were in the direction of the 
tropics, — the Antilles and Mexico, — rather than to- 
wards Canada and the north. As the event, however, 
showed, once his mind was finally made up and his 
feelings enlisted, it was not easy to divert him from his 
end. In the matter of foreign policy, the course he 
now had in mind, though neither of the two at first 
realized the fact, involved of necessity and from the 
outset a struggle with Mr. Sumner ; and, to one who 
knew the men, appreciating their characteristics and 
understanding their methods, it was plain that the 
struggle would be bitter, prolonged and unrelenting. 

As different in their mental attributes as in their 
physical appearance, while Mr. Sumner was, intellectu- 
ally, morally and physically, much the finer and more 
imposing human product. Grant had counterbalancing 
qualities which made him, in certain fields, the more 
formidable opponent. With immense will, he was 
taciturn ; Sumner, on the contrary, in no way deficient 
in will, was a man of many words, — a rhetorician. 
In action and among men. Grant's seK-control was 
perfect, — amounting to complete apparent imperturb- 
ability. Unassuming, singularly devoid of self-con- 



110 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

sciousness, in presence of an emergency his blood never 
seemed to quicken, his face became only the more set 
— tenacity personified ; whereas Sumner, — when mor- 
ally excited, the rush of his words, his deep, tremulous 
utterance, and the light in his eye did not impart 
conviction or inspire respect. Doubts would suggest 
themselves to the unsympathetic, or only partially 
sympathetic, listener whether the man was of alto- 
gether balanced mind. At such times, Mr, Sumner 
did not appreciate the force of language, nor, indeed, 
know what he said ; and, quite unconsciously on his 
part, he assumed an attitude of moral superiority and 
intellectual certainty, in no way compatible with a 
proper appreciation of the equality of others. In the 
mind of a man like Grant, these peculiarities excited 
obstinacy, anger and contempt. Thus, an agitator and 
exponent of ideas, Mr. Sumner might and did stunu- 
late masses, but never, man or boy, was he a leader 
among equals. Moreover, as one of his truest friends 
and warmest admirers said of him, he was prone to re- 
gard difference of opinion as a moral delinquency. ^ 
Grant, on the contrary, not retentive of enmities, re- 
gardless of consistency, and of coarse moral as well as 
physical fibre, moved towards his ends with a stubborn 
persistency which carried others along with him, and 
against which a perfervid., rhetorical opposition was 
apt to prove unavailing. 

Mr. Fish stood between the two. So far as ques- 
tions of foreign policy, and problems of international 
law, were concerned, though, as the result unmistakably 

1 " A man who did not believe there was another side to the ques- 
tion, who would treat difference of opinion almost as moral delin- 
quency." George William Curtis, in his oration on Charles Sumner, 
Orations and Addresses, vol. iii. p. 230. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 111 

showed, well grounded in fundamental principles and 
with a grasp of general conditions at once firm and 
correct, there is no evidence that, before his quite 
unexpected summons to the Department of State, the 
new Secretary had felt called upon to form definite 
conclusions. Mr. Fish was, however, not only a law- 
yer by profession, but, without any claim to being 
what is known as a jurist or publicist, his thought 
had a distinctly legal turn. No more doctrinaire 
than mercantile or philanthropic, his was essentially a 
practical mind, strongly infused with saving common 
sense. By nature cautious and conservative, not an 
imaginative man, having passed his whole life in a New 
York social and commercial environment, he would 
have inclined to proceed slowly in any path of national 
expansion, most of all in one heading towards the 
tropics, and an admixture of half-breeds. So far as 
Great Britain was concerned, he would, on the other 
hand, be disposed to effect, if he could, an amicable, 
business-Kke settlement on rational terms. From the 
beginning he was inclined to think Mr. Sumner had 
in his speech gone too far, — that the positions he had 
taken were not altogether tenable. The British pro- 
clamation of May, 1861, he regarded as a " grievous 
wrong " under all the circumstances of the case ; but 
he assented to the position of Lord Stanley that issu- 
ing it was within the strict right of the neutral, and 
the question of time was one of judgment. As he 
wrote to a friend in May, 1869, four weeks after Mr. 
Sumner had enunciated very different views in his 
Senate speech, the proclamation could be made subject 
of complaint only as leading in its execution and en- 
forcement to the fitting out of the Alabama^ etc., and 



112 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

the moral support given in England to tlie rebel cause. 
" Sumner's speech was able and eloquent, and perhaps 
not without a good effect. . . . Although the only 
speech made in the debate, it was not the argument 
of all who agreed in the rejection of the treaty, and 
we cannot stand upon it in all its points." ^ Within 
a week of the rejection of the Johnson-Clarendon 
Convention he wrote to another friend, — "Whenever 
negotiations are resumed, the atmosphere and the sur- 
roundings of this side of the water are more favorable 
to a proper solution of the question than the dinner- 
tables and the public banquetings of England." 

Thus, from the very commencement, there was an 
essential divergence of view between the Secretary of 
State and the Senator from Massachusetts, as well as 
between the latter and the President. As between 
Charles Sumner and Ulysses S. Grant, past friendly 
relations, similar social connections, and common tastes 
would decidedly have drawn Mr. Fish towards the 
former ; but, by nature loyal, he was distinctly repelled 
by Mr. Sumner's demeanor. 

I have dwelt on these personal factors, and diver- 
gences of view and aim, for they must be kept con- 
stantly in mind in considering what was now to occur. 
They account for much otherwise quite inexplicable. 
In history as a whole, — the inexhaustible story of 
man's development from what he once was to what he 
now is, — the individual as a factor is so far minimized 
that the most considerable unit might probably have 
been left out of the account, and yet the result be in 
no material respect other than it is. Exceptional forces 
and individual traits counterbalance each other, tend- 

^ See Appendix C, infra, p. 206. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 113 

Ing always to average results. With episodes it is far 
otherwise. In them the individual has free play ; and, 
accordingly, the personal factor counts. The Treaty 
of Washington was an episode. In dealing with the 
conditions which led up to that treaty, the minds of 
Charles Sumner and Hamilton Fish naturally moved 
on different lines ; while it so chanced that the likes 
and dislikes, the objectives, surroundings and methods 
of Ulysses S. Grant , — disturbing factors, — largely 
affected the result. 



IV 

In the years 1869 and 1870, as indeed throughout 
his public life, Charles Sumner was intent on the Afri- 
can, and questions of human right ; and consequently, 
while, in the matter of territorial expansion, he might 
look vaguely to Canada and a Greater American policy, 
he would instinctively be opposed to any movement in 
the direction of the tropics. President Grant, on the 
contrary, from the beginning of his first presidential 
term, was bent on early acquisitions in the West In- 
dies, and disposed to adopt a summary tone towards 
Spain. As respects Great Britain, his attitude, one 
of comparative indifference, admitted of almost indefi- 
nite shaping. Mr. Fish, new, and not comfortable, in 
his unsolicited position, was inclined to be influenced, 
— almost to be led, by Sumner ; but he at the same 
time looked to Grant as the head of an administration, 
in which he himself held the place of precedence, and 
was disposed to give to his chief a thoroughly loyal 
support. New in their positions, and, so far as Grant 
was concerned, strange to each other, they had all to 



114 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

find tlieir bearings. Under such circumstances, inex- 
perienced in foreign affairs and unduly distrustful of 
himself on questions of international law, the new 
Secretary seems in some degree to have turned to 
Caleb Gushing ; nor could he, among men then avail- 
able at Washington, have found a more competent or 
tactful adviser. Of decided parts, with good attain- 
ments and remarkable powers of acquisition, Caleb 
Cushing was a man of large experience, much human 
insight, and, while given to manipulation, he was not 
hampered either in council or in action by any excess 
of moral sensibility. He understood the situation ; 
and he understood Mr. Sumner. 

In the matter of the Queen's proclamation of May, 
1861, and the concession of belligerent rights, it was 
thus a case of alternatives, — the rule of British ac- 
countability to be laid down for the new administration 
must not stand in the way of a more than possible line 
of aggressive action towards Spain. That the instruc- 
tions now prepared for Mr. Motley were more rational 
than the positions assumed by Mr. Sumner four weeks 
before, must be admitted ; they were also more in ac- 
cordance with recognized principles of international 
law. In his Senate speech Mr. Sumner had contended 
that, because of the proclamation, the liability of Great 
Britain must be fixed at amounts scarcely calculable 
in money, — a damage " immense and infinite," — "a 
massive grievance," all dependent on " this extraordi- 
nary manifesto," the " ill-omened," the " fatal " pro- 
clamation which " had opened the floodgates to infinite 
woes." Mr. Fish, with the Cuban situation obviously 
in mind, declared, on the contrary, that the President 
recognized " the right of every power, when a civil con- 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 115 

flict has arisen in another state, and has attained a 
sufficient complexity, magnitude and completeness, to 
define its own relations and those of its citizens and 
subjects toward the parties to the conflict, so far as 
their rights and interests are necessarily affected by 
the conflict." Then followed some saving clauses, care- 
fully framed ; but, as already foreshadowed in Mr. 
Fish's correspondence, the precipitate character of the 
" unfriendly " proclamation was dwelt upon only as 
, showing " the beginning and the animus of that course 
I of conduct which resulted so disastrously to the United 
States." In the original draught, these instructions had 
been even more explicit on this point ; and, for that 
reason, had led to a characteristic remonstrance on the 
. part of Mr. Sumner. Having early got some inkling 
I of their character, he at once went to the house of Mr. 
\ Davis, and there, speaking to the Assistant Secretary 
I in a loud voice, tremulous and vibrating with excitement, 
' he had exclaimed, — " Is it the purpose of this Admin- 
I istration to sacrifice me, — me, a Senator from Massa- 
I chusetts ? " — and later he wrote to the Secretary him- 
'^ self, declaring his dissent " from the course proposed," 
on the ground that " as chairman of the Senate com- 
I' mittee I ought not in any way to be a party to a state- 
I ment which abandons or enfeebles any of the just 
I grounds of my country as already expounded by Seward, 
t Adams, and myself." To this more than merely im- 
plied threat, Mr. Fish had contented himself by reply- 
i ing that, whether the modifications were of greater or 
of less significance, they could " hardly be of sufficient 
importance to break up an effort at negotiation, or to 
break down an Administration." i Mr. Gushing here 

^ Davis : Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, pp. 31-34, 114-116. 



116 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

intervened, and his skilful hand temporarily adjusted 
the difficulty.^ The adjustment was, however, only 
temporary. The inevitable could not be averted, and 
coming events already cast their shadows before. 

To revive in detail the painful Motley imbroglio of 
1870 is not necessary for present purposes. Suffice 
it to say that, when he reached England, Mr. Motley 
was, apparently, quite unable to clear his mind of what 
might, perhaps, not inaptly be described as the Procla- 
mation Legend ; and, both in his official interviews with 
the British Foreign Secretary and in social intercourse, 
he failed to follow, and apparently did not grasp, the 
spirit of his instructions. Confessing to a " despondent 
feeling " as to the " possibihty of the two nations ever 
understanding each other, — of the difficulty, at this 
present moment, of their looking into each other's 
hearts," — he, in his first interview with Lord Claren- 
don, fell heavily back on the ubiquitous and everlasting 
proclamation, as the " fountain-head of the disasters 
which had been caused to the American people, both 
individually and collectively, by the hands of Enghsh- 
men." Historically untrue and diplomatically injudi- 
cious, this tone and stand evinced, on the part of Mr. 
Motley, an inability to see things in connection with 
his mission otherwise than as seen by Mr. Sumner. 
His misapprehension of the objects his official supe- 
rior had in view was obvious and complete. 

Grant afterwards said that when Mr. Motley's de- 
spatch containing his report of this interview reached 
Washington, it made him very angry, adding, as it did, 
" insult " to " injury." This statement, though made 
some eight years after the event,^ is altogether probable 

1 Pierce : Sumner, vol. iv. p. 405. 

2 Interview at Edinbui'g'h, New York Herald, September 25, 1877. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 117 

in view of the somewhat complicated, if extremely in- 
teresting, state of affairs then existing at Washington. 
But to a complete understanding of what can only 
be described as Mr. Motley's most unfortunate diplo- 
matic faux 2^cts^ it is necessary here to diverge from 
the narrative. 

The despatch of the new Minister containing the 
report of his first conference with Lord Clarendon 
reached the Department of State in due course of 
time, and was acknowledged by the Secretary on the 
28th of June. In the course of the Edinburgh inter- 
view of eight years later, just referred to, Grant said, 
— "As soon as I heard of [the tenor of Motley's con- 
versation with Clarendon] I went over to the State 
Department, and told Governor Fish to dismiss Motley 
at once. ... I have been sorry many a time since 
that I did not stick to my first determination." Grant 
was, indeed, as he stated, " very angry " on this occar- 
sion. Nor, in the light of what is now known, was 
the cause of his anger far to seek. It was due to the 
state of affairs in Cuba, and the course he then had 
in mind to pursue in respect thereto. 

One of the inherent defects of Grant as a civil 
administrator was what Mr. Sumner, at a later day, 
termed his " aide-de-campish " tendency. As President 
he was surrounded, and greatly influenced, by his old 
field associates, — at once the terror and despair of his 
constitutional advisers and official associates. The best, 
and by far the most influential, of this White House 
staff was General Rawlins, Grant's first Secretary of 
War. He, at least, held an official position ; most of 

The report of the conversation was, in this case, authorized, and pre- 
pared by John Russell Young, Grant's recognized travelling' companion. 



118 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

the others were irregular army assignments, holding 
no position at the White House recognized by law.^ 
During the early months of Grant's first administra- 
tion, the Secretary of War, though in declining health, 
was greatly concerned over the course of events in 
Cuba. As afterwards appeared, he had even a money 
interest in the success of the insurrection then on foot 
in the island. With his customary energy, he pressed 
the cause of the insurgents on the President, demand- 
ing their recognition as belligerents. For this no 
grounds existed. As Secretary Fish afterwards pri- 
vately wrote, — "They have no army, ... no courts, 
do not occupy a single town, or hamlet, to say nothing 
of a seaport, . . . carrying on a purely guerrilla war- 
fare, burning estates and attacking convoys, etc. . . . 
There has been nothing that has amounted to ' W^ar.' 
Belligerency is a fact. Great Britain or France might 
just as well have recognized belligerency for the Black 
Hawk War." None the less, so far did General Raw- 
lins's urgency prevail on the President that, as Mr. 
Motley's malign diplomatic star would have it, the 
detailed report of his arraignment of the Queen's pro- 
clamation of 1861 reached Washington at the very 
time when the President was himself meditating, and 
the Secretary of State was apprehending, a similar 
proclamation as respects the Cuban insurgents. Nor 
merely that. A few weeks later, the President not 
only caused such a proclamation to be drawn up, but 
signed it himself, directed the Secretary of State to 
affix to it the official seal, and then to promulgate it. 

1 J. D. Cox : " How Judge Hoar ceased to be Attorney-General," 
Atlantic Monthly Magazine (August, 1895), vol. Ixxvi. p. 1G2 ; Sumner: 
"Republicanism vs. Grantism," Works, vol. xv. pp. 131-138. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 119 

This was on the 19 th of August. Mr. Bancroft Davis, 
the Assistant Secretary of State, was intrusted with 
the order for the purpose of affixing the seal, — it 
having been signed in the cabin of the Fall River 
boat, — and with it returned to Washington ; and 
there, in obedience to the direction of Mr. Fish, he 
deposited the document in a safe place, to await fur- 
ther directions. In that " safe place " this proclama- 
tion, vital to Cuba's insurrectionists and, probably, to 
the country's peace, rested for months and years. It 
never was promulgated.^ 

With Grant, an order was an order ; and an order. 



^ Some facts concerning' this sing'ular episode, copied from Mr. 
Fish's diary by his son, Hamilton Fish, were published in an Asso- 
' ciated Press despatch, from Albany, in the New York papers of 
j March 16, 1896. Writing* a year after the occurrences referred to in 
j the text, July 10, 1870, Mr. Fish said that Grant made use of these 
( expressions to him, — " On two important occasions, at least, your 
steadiness and wisdom have kept me from mistakes into which I 
I should have fallen." Mr. Fish then added, these two occasions were 
j " one preventing the issuing", last August and September, of the pro- 
I clamation of Cuban belligerency, which he had sig-ned, and which 
I he wrote me a note instructing me to sign (which I did) and to issue 
\ (which I did not), and, second, the Cuban message of June 13 " 
j (1870). The message last referred to {Messages, etc., of the Pre- 
i sidents, vol. vii. p. 64), setting forth a definite policy as respects Cuba 
and Spain, was at the time a great relief to the members of the 
Cabinet. It amounted to a complete chang-e of administration front, 
brought about by the insistence of the Secretary of State, and almost 
as the alternative to his resignation. Though very reluctant to yield 
on this point, the President finally did so, affixing" his signature to the 
message as drawn up by the Secretary. In response to a request 
therefor, the family of Mr. Fish have kindly furnished me extracts 
from the diary relating to this interesting bit of history, supplement- 
ary to those already published by Mr. Hamilton Fish, in the Asso- 
ciated Press despatch above referred to. These are of such value, 
and so extremely creditable to Mr. Fish, that they are printed in 
full, together with those previously published by Mr. Fish's son, in 
Appendix E {infra, p. 215) of this paper. 



120 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

something to be obeyed. Why, in this case, the order 
was not obeyed, or some one held to strict account for 
disobedience, does not appear. He seems to have for- 
gotten all about it at the time ; and, subsequently, he 
expressed much gratification at this failure of memory. 
In point of fact he, at that particular juncture, had 
other things to think of. It was the vacation season, 
and he was away from Washington, — at Newport, in 
New York, and in the mountains of western Penn- 
sylvania ; Mr. Fish was at his country place, at Gar- 
rison on the Hudson ; General Rawlins was ill at 
Washington, — dying, in the last stages of pulmonary 
consumption. It so chanced that Messrs. Jay Gould 
and James Fisk, Jr., of New York had made up 
their minds that this particular j)eriod was one favor- 
able for the execution of a great financial stroke. 
They proceeded accordingly, and their operations cul- 
minated in the famous " Gold Corner," and the long- 
remembered Wall Street " Black Friday " of Septem- 
ber 24, 1869. Never fastidious in the selection of his 
company, the President had been brought into some 
sort of an association with these men through his 
brother-in-law, Abel R. Corbin, a resident of New 
York. Him they had fairly entangled in their meshes ; 
through him they were scheming to ensnare the Pre- 
sident. ^ They did not succeed ; but they did influ- 
ence his action as President, and they threw the whole 
financial macliinery of the country, including that of 
the United States government, into confusion. For 
some time public attention was concentrated on them 
and their misdoings, to the utter exclusion of all else, 

^ Henry Adams : Chapters of Erie, The New York Gold Conspiracy, 
pp. 100-134. See, also, infra, p. 224. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 121 

including Cuba. It was Grant's first experience with 
men of that stamp in Wall Street ; well for him had 
it been his last. 

Thus the last formal act preliminary to the issuance 
of a proclamation of Cuban belKgerency was performed 
during the evening of August 19 ; the Secretary of 
War died on the 9th of the month following ; fifteen 
days later was Wall Street's " Black Friday." The 
Rawlins pressure on Grant had then ceased; thenceforth 
the proclamation slept, innocuous, in the safe of the 
Department of State. But, though thus pigeon-holed, 
it might well have been issued at any time subsequent 
to the 19th of August ; and that it was not so issued 
was due, apparently, to the fact that Secretary Fish 
withheld it during the President's vacation absence 
from Washington. Grant's thoughts chanced then to 
be otherwise directed, and subsequent events made the 
action he had decided on manifestly inexpedient. 

Returning to Mr. Motley and the report of his first 
conversation with Lord Clarendon, it is now quite 
apparent why Grant was^ "very angry indeed" when 
he first heard of it. The diplomacy of Mr. Motley 
certainly was not happy. With a degree of fortuitous 
infelicity truly remarkable, it was most nicely calcu- 
lated to compromise the President and the Secretary 
of State. By the merest chance did it fail so to do. 
The lesson could not have been lost ; and it was small 
matter of surprise that Mr. Motley was promptly 
relieved from the necessity of further discussing the 
Alabama claims, and the Queen's proclamation of 
May, 1861, in its connection therewith. However 
Mr. Fish felt about Cuba, — and on that subject his 
views were quite well defined, — he could have enter- 



122 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

tained no wish to have his representative in London 
get him into a position which might not improbably 
demand of him much awkward explanation, founded 
on distinctions not at once apparent. ^ However, as it 
was almost inmiediately decided that, so far as the 
settlement of outstanding difficulties between the two 
nations was concerned, any future negotiations should 
be conducted in Washington, Mr. Motley ceased at 
this point to be a factor in the course of events. 

Now, however, an extremely adroit, though unoffi- 
cial, intermediary appeared on the stage ; and his 
presence almost immediately made itself felt. Born 
in Scotland in 1820, and emigrating with his parents 

1 Thoug-h a man of extensive research, Mr. Sumner, unlike Mr. 
Fish in that respect, had not a legal mind. He prided himself on 
his acquaintance with International Law ; but, when occasion arose, 
he instinctively evolved his law from his inner consciousness, and it 
rarely failed to meet the emergency. The difficulty with it was that 
it was apt to be of a code peculiarly his own, and not found in the 
books usually accepted as authoritative. It was so in the case of 
foreign built Confederate cruisers ; it was so as respects the Queen's 
proclamation of May, 1861 ; it was so as respects national, as con- 
tradistinguished from private, claims. An accomplished litterateur 
and brilliant historian, Mr. Motley was unacquainted with law, and 
quite innocent of any leg'al instinct. When, therefore, Mr. Motley 
undertook to expound Mr. Sumner's jurisprudence, the result might 
not improbably be something for which a matter-of-fact government 
■would not care always to be held responsible. In the present case, 
Mr. Motley in June descanted most eloquently to Lord Clarendon 
on the sin of commission involved in the premature recognition 
of Confederate belligerency by the British government ; but, six 
months later, President Grant declared that a " nation is its own 
judge, when to accord the rights of belligerency, either to a people 
struggling to free themselves from a government they believe to 
be oppressive, or to independent nations at war with each other." 
{Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. vii. p. 32.) Even this 
discrepancy was unquestionably embarrassing ; a Cuban proclamation 
actually outstanding would obviously have aggravated the embarrass- 
ment. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 123 

to Ameuica at the age of sixteen, Sir John Rose, or 
Mr. Rose as he still was in 1869, had been for a num- 
ber of years prominent in Canadian public life. A 
natural diplomat of a high order, he was at this time 
acting as British commissioner on the joint tribunal 
provided by the treaty of 1863 to arbitrate the claims 
of the Hudson's Bay and Puget Sound companies. Mr. 
Caleb Cushing was of counsel in that business, and 
relations of a friendl}^ nature grew up between him and 
the British arbitrator. Whether already privately au- 
I thorized so to do or not, Mr. Rose, who was very solicit- 
ous of an arrangement between the two nations, skil- 
fidly instilled into Mr. Cushing a belief that he, Mr. 
Rose, might be of use in the delicate work of reopening 
negotiations on new lines. Accordingly, on the 26 th 
j of June, — only eight weeks after the rejection of the 
I Johnson-Clarendon Convention, and sixteen days after 
• Mr. Motley's despondent interview with Lord Clar- 
I endon just referred to, — Mr. Cushing, then in Wash- 
j ington, wrote to Mr. Rose, in Ottawa. Referring to 
I previous letters between them, he now told him that 
\ he had that day seen Secretary Fish, and had arranged 
I for Mr. Rose to meet him. "I am," he wrote, "not 
1 sanguine of immedAate conclusion of such a treaty as 
I either you or I might desire. But I think the time 
j has arrived to commence^ trusting that discretion, pa- 
j tience, and good-will on both sides may eventuate, in 
I this important matter, satisfactorily to the two govern- 
j ments." ^ Accordingly, on the 8th of July, Mr. Rose 

1 1 In this letter Mr. Cushing" significantly went on to say, — " In view 
i of the disposition which the Senate of the United States has recently 
j shown to assume more than its due, or at least than its usual part, in 
the determination of international questions, you will appreciate the 
I unreadiness of the Executive, at the present time, to take upon itself 



124 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

called on the Secretary in Washington. The first of 
the interviews which led up to the Treaty of Wash- 
ington two years later took place next day at Mr. 
Fish's dinner-table. The basis of a settlement was 
then discussed, and that subsequently reached out- 
lined by Mr. Fish, who laid especial emphasis on the 
necessity of " some kind expression of regret " on 
the part of Great Britain over the course pursued in 
the Civil War. The two even went so far as to con- 
sider the details of negotiation. The expediency of a 
special commission to dispose of the matter was dis- 
cussed, and, among others, the names of the Duke of 
Argyll and John Bright were canvassed in connection 
therev/ith. 

Immediately after this interview Mr. Rose went to 
England. Hi^ official and personal relations with men 
high in influence were close; and, moreover, another 
personage of growing consequence in English minis- 
terial circles was now at work laboring earnestly and 
assiduously to promote an adjustment. In 1869 
William E. Forster was fast rising into the front 
rank of English public men. President of the Privy 
Council in Mr. Gladstone's first Ministry, he was act- 
ing as Minister of Education. Nine years later, in the 
second Gladstone Ministry, he was to occupy the crucial 
position of Secretary for Ireland. Always, from his 
first entrance into public life in 1861, an earnest, out- 

any spontaneous or doubtful ventures, especially on the side of Eng- 
land." The reference was, of course, to Mr. Sunaner, and pointed to 
an already developing source of trouble. Grant's first presidential term 
was yet in its fourth morfth only. On the " disposition " referred to 
by Mr. Gushing, see the paper by A. M. Low, entitled " The Oligarchy 
of the Senate," in the North American Review for February, 1902, 
vol. 174, pp. 238-243. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 125 

spoken, consistent and insistent friend of democratic 
United States, — during the Civil War the one in that 
small group of friends held by Mr. Adams in " most 
esteem," ^ — Mr. Forster was now strenuous in his 
advocacy of a comprehensive settlement of the issues 
arising out of the Rebellion, and the honest admission 
by Great Britain of the ill-considered policy then pur- 
sued. His name also had been discussed by Mr. Fish 
and Mr. Rose as one of the proposed special mission. 
Within less than two months, therefore, of the re- 
jection of the Johnson-Clarendon Convention, the 
Treaty of Washington was in the air ; and, curiously 
enough, within a month of the time when Mr. Motley 
in London was confessing to Lord Clarendon his 
" despondent feeling " in view of the *' path surrounded 
by perils," and talking of "grave and disastrous 
misunderstandings and cruel wars," Secretary Fish 
and Mr. Rose, comfortably seated at a dinner-table 
in Washington, were quietly paving the way to a com- 
I plete understanding. Nothing more occurred during 
j that summer ; but, in the course of it, Mr. Fish thus 
I expressed his views in a letter to a correspondent, — 
an expression at this early date to which subsequent 
I events lent much significance : — " The two English- 
j speaking progressive liberal Governments of the world 
j should not, must not, be divided — better let this 
j question rest for some years even (if that be neces- 
I sary) than risk failure in another attempt at settle- 
I ment. I do not say this because I wish to postpone a 
j settlement — on the contrary, I should esteem it the 
i greatest glory, and greatest happiness of my life, if it 
could be settled while I remain in official position ; 

^ Keid : Forster^ vol. ii. p. 10. 



126 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

and I should esteem it the greatest benefit to my 
country to bring it to an early settlement. ... I want 
to have the question settled. I would not, if I could, 
impose any humiliating condition on Great Britain. 
I would not be a party to anything that proposes 
to ' threaten ' her. I believe that she is great enough 
to be just ; and I trust that she is wise enough to 
maintain her own greatness. No gTeatness is incon- 
sistent with some errors. Mr. Bright thinks she was 
drawn into errors — so do we. If she can be brought 
to think so, it will not be necessary for her to say so ; 
— at least not to say it very loudly. It may be said 
by a definition of what shall be Maritime International 
Law in the future, and a few kind words. She will 
want in the future what we have claimed. Thus she 
will be benefited — we satisfied." Written in the 
early days of September, 1870, this letter set forth 
clearly the position of Mr. Fish : it also correctly 
foreshadowed the course of the diplomacy which had 
already been entered upon. 

During the autumn of 1869 the Alabama claims, 
and the unsatisfactory relations of the country with 
Great Britain, were discussed at more than one Cabi- 
net meeting in Washington. At this time, while the 
Secretary of State professed himself as ready to nego- 
tiate whenever England came forward with a fairly 
satisfactory proposition, the President favored a policy 
of delay. Presently, Mr. Rose was again heard from. 
The letter he now wrote has since often been referred 
to and much commented upon, though it was over 
twenty years before its authorship was revealed.^ In 

1 By Mr. J. C. Bancroft Davis, in his Mr. Fish and the Alabama 
Claims, p. 48. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 127 

it lie said, - — "I have had conversations in more than 
one quarter, — which you will readily understand 
without my naming them, and have conveyed my 
own helief^ that a kindly word, or an expression of 
regret, such as would not involve an acknowledgment 
of wrong, was likely to be more potential than the most 
irrefragable reasoning on principles of international 
law." Mr. Kose then went on to touch upon a very 
delicate topic, — Mr. Motley's general London presen- 
tation of his country's attitude. " Is your representa- 
tive here," he added, " a gentleman of the most con- 
ciliatory spirit ? . . . Does he not — perhaps naturally 

— let the fear of imitating his predecessor influence 
his course so as to make his initiative hardly as much 
characterized by consideration for the sensibilities of 
the people of this country, as of his own ? . . . I think 
I understood you to say, that you thought negotiations 
would be more likely to be attended with satisfactory 
results, if they were transferred to, and were concluded 
at, Wasliington ; because you could from time to time 
communicate confidentially with leading Senators, and 
know how far you could carry that body with you. 
. . . But again is your representative of that mind ? 

— and how is it to be brought about ? By a new, or 
a special envoy — as you spoke of — or quietly through 
Mr. Thornton ? ... If I am right in my impression 
that you would prefer Washington and a new man, 
and you think it worth while to enable me to repeat 
that suggestion as one from myself in the proper quar- 
ter, a line from you — or if you prefer it, a word by 
the cable, will enable me to do so." 

Eight days later, on the 11th of the same month, 
Mr. Rose again wrote to Mr. Fish, calling his atten- 



128 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

tion to the speech of Mr, Gladstone at the Guildhall, 
which, he said, " hardly conveys the impression his 
tone conveyed with reference to United States affairs. 
There was an earnest tone of friendship that is hardly 
reproduced." ^ 

At the time these letters reached Mr. Fish, the 
relations between him and Mr. Sumner were close, 
and still friendly. The Secretary spoke to the Senator 
freely of Mr. Rose's visits, and consulted with him 
over every step taken. Knowing that Mr. Sumner 
and Mr. Motley were constantly interchanging let- 
ters, he took occasion to advise Mr. Sumner of the 
intimations which had thus reached him, giving, of 
course, no names, but saying simply that they were 
from a reliable quarter. The well-meant hint was 
more than disregarded, Mr. Sumner contenting himself 
with contemptuous references to the once celebrated 
McCracken episode.^ Years afterwards, in the same 
spirit, Mr. Motley's biographer sneeringly referred to 
the still unnamed writer of the Rose letters as "a 
faithless friend, a disguised enemy, a secret emissary, 
or an injudicious alarmist." ^ 

The reply of Mr. Fish to the letters of Mr. Rose 
revealed the difficulties of the Secretary's position. 
The individuality of Mr. Sumner made itself felt at 
every point. In London, Mr. Motley reflected the 
views of the chairman of the Senate Committee on 
v/ Foreign Relations rather than those of the Secretary 
of State ; in Washington, the personal relations of 
Mr. Sumner with the British Minister were such as 

^ See Appendix D, infra, p. 212. 
^ Davis : Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, p. 128. 
^ O. W. Holmes : Memoir of John Lothrop Motley (1879), pp. 178, 
179. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 129 

to render the latter undesirable at least as a medium 
of negotiation. Referring first to his intimations con- 
cerning Mr. Motley, Mr. Fish replied to Mr. Rose as 
follows : — 

" Your questions respecting our Minister, I fear 
may have been justified by some indiscretion of ex- 
pression, or of manner, but I hope only indiscretions 
of that nature. Intimations of such had reached me. 
I have reason to hope that if there have been such 
manifestations, they may not recur. Whatever there 
may have appeared, I cannot doubt his desire to aid 
in bringing the two Governments into perfect accord. 
... I have the highest regard for Mr. Thornton, 
and find him in all my intercourse, courteous, frank, 
and true. A gentleman with whom I deal and treat 
with the most unreserved confidence. He had, how- 
ever, given offence to Mr. Sumner (chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations), whose posi- 
tion with reference to any future negotiation you un- 
derstand. I chance to know that Mr. Sumner feels 
deeply aggrieved by some things which Mr. Thornton 
has written home, and although he would not con- 
sciously allow a personal grief of that nature to preju- 
dice his action in an official intercourse with the 
representative of a State, he might unconsciously be 
led to criticism unfavorable to positions which would 
be viewed differently, if occupied by some other per- 
son. ... I am very decidedly of opinion that when- 
ever negotiations are to be renewed, they would be 
more likely to result favorably here than in London. 
I have so instructed Mr. Motley to say, if he be ques- 
tioned on the subject." 

Such was the posture of affairs at the close of the 



130 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

year 1869. Events now moved rapidly, and the gen- 
eral situation became more and more complicated. In 
Europe, the war-clouds which preceded the Franco- 
Prussian storm-burst of 1870 were gathering; in 
America, President Grant was, persistently as ear- 
nestly, pressing his schemes of West Indian annexar 
tion. In London, Mr. Rose was informally sounding 
the members of the government to ascertain how far 
they were willing to go ; in Washington, Mr. Thorn- 
ton was pressing the Secretary " with much earnest- 
ness to give him an intimation of what would be 
accepted " by the United States. The outbreak of 
hostilities between France and Germany six months 
later brought matters, so far as Great Britain was 
concerned, fairly to a crisis. In presence of serious 
continental complications, — in imminent danger of 
beino: drawn into the vortex of conflict, — Great Brit- 
ain found itself face to face with the Alabama prece- 
dents. Like " blood-bolter' d " Banquo, they would not 
down. The position was one not likely to escape the 
keen eye of Count Bismarck. England's hands were 
tied. Internationally, she was obviously a negligible 
quantity. The principles laid down and precedents 
established only six years before were patent, — fresh 
in the minds of all. Her Majesty's Government re- 
membered them ; Count Bismarck was advised of 
them ; each was well aware of the other's knowledge. 
The Ministry were accordingly in an extraordinarily 
receptive mental condition. 

On this side of the Atlantic the situation compli- 
cated itself no less rapidly. Colonel Babcock, one of 
the group of young army officers already referred to, 
who, having been members of General Grant's mili- 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 131 

tary staff, were retained, under detail, near his person 
during his presidency, had been sent down by him to 
examine, as an engineer, the bay of Samana, and to 
report upon it as a coaling station. Presently he got 
back, and, at the next meeting of the Cabinet, the 
President paralyzed his official advisers by announc- 
ing, in a casual sort of way, " Babcock has returned, 
as you see, and has brought a treaty of annexation." 
To say that never before in the whole history of the 
government had any President made such a naive 
exhibition is quite within safe bounds. Ignorance 
of law and usage, and an utter absence of the sense 
of propriety, were about equally pronounced. A sub- 
ordinate officer of engineers, sent to a West Indian 
island to make a report on a coaling station, had not 
only undertaken to negotiate a formal treaty for the 
annexation of an entire foreign country to the United 
States, but had actually executed it, entitling himself 
in the solemn instrument " Aide-de-camp " to His Ex- 
cellency, and his " special agent to the Dominican Re- 
public." Instead of charitably concealing the mingled 
assurance and incompetency of the young man under 
a private rebuke, the President now adopted as his 
own this pronounced opera bouffe performance, irre- 
sistibly suggestive of the Grand Duchy of Gerolstein. 
Sent to examine a harbor, the President's aide had 
undertaken to annex a negro republic ! This being so, 
there is small occasion for surprise that, when the 
President brought the matter up in cabinet meeting, 
the gaze of all about the table involuntarily turned 
toward the Secretary of State. Mr. Fish sat " impas- 
sive, and his eyes were fixed on the portfolio before 
him." Had it not been somewhat appalling, the sit- 



132 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

uation would have been farcical in the extreme. As 
it was, it may well be doubted whether even Judge 
Hoar's strong sense of humor rose to the occasion. 
The startling bit of information thus conveyed by the 
President was received in expressive silence, broken 
at last by a single hesitating query, which remained 
unanswered. The atmosphere of general disapproval 
was, however, pervasive, and painfully apparent; so 
nothing more was then said, nor was the matter ever 
again submitted to the assembled Cabinet.^ None 
the less, the idea of annexation had taken possession 
of the presidential mind, and from that time Grant 
became intent upon it ; and intent in his character- 
istic way. It was a cardinal point in his policy. 
Obviously, the support of the chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations was very necessary 
to the success of the scheme, for the treaty, however 
irregularly negotiated, must go to the Senate for rati- 
fication ; a foreign country and its people could not 
be annexed by a proclamation of the Commander- 
in-chief, even though countersigned by an aide-de- 
camp. So, warned by his Cabinet experience, as well 
as by the fate of the Johnson-Clarendon Convention, 
the President-General made up his mind to exert all 
his influence on the chairman of the committee ; and, 
consequently, in the early days of January, he, the 
Chief Executive of the United States, dropped in one 
evening at Mr. Sumner's house, while the latter was 
at dinner with some friends, and sought to enlist his 
influence, — designating him repeatedly as chairman 
of the " Senate Judiciary Committee," — in support of 

1 Cox: " How Judge Hoar ceased to be Attorney-General," Atlan- 
tic Montldy Magazine (August, 1895), vol. Ixxvi. pp. 1G5-107. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 133 

what afterwards became known as President Grant's 
Dominican policy. What followed is familiar his- 
tory. During the immediately ensuing months there 
took place a complete division between the two men. 
They thereafter became not only politically opposed, 
but bitter personal enemies. 

To all outward appearances, during those months, 
no advance whatever was being made towards an 
adjustment with Great Britain ; but, in point of fact, 
both time and conditions were rapidly ripening. In 
the early days of September, 1870, the Imperial gov- 
ernment of France collapsed at Sedan ; and, on the 
13 th of that month, M. Thiers arrived in London 
soliciting on behalf of the new French republic the 
aid and good offices of Great Britain. His mission 
was, of course, fruitless ; but, none the less, it could 
not but emphasize in the minds of those composing 
the Ministry the difficulty of England's position. If 
it failed so to do, a forcible reminder from America 
was imminent, and followed ahnost immediately. In 
December, with Paris blockaded by the Prussians, 
France was brought face to face with dismemberment. 
The general European situation was, from an English 
point of view, disquieting in the extreme. At just 
this juncture, within one week of the day on which his 
Parliament called on the Prussian King to become 
Emperor of Germany, and the French delegate gov- 
ernment, to avoid a German army operating in the 
heart of the country, removed its sittings from Tours 
to Bordeaux, — at just this juncture (December 5). 
President Grant took occasion to incorporate the fol- 
lowing distinctly minatory passage, draughted by his 
Secretary of State, into his annual message : — 



134 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

" I regret to say that no conclusion has been reached 
for the adjustment of the claims against Great Britain 
growing out of the course adopted by that Govern- 
ment during the Rebellion. The cabinet of London, 
so far as its views have been expressed, does not 
appear to be willing to concede that Her Majesty's 
Government was guilty of any negligence, or did or 
permitted any act during the war by which the United 
States has just cause of complaint. Our firm and 
unalterable convictions are directly the reverse. I 
therefore recommend to Congress to authorize the 
appointment of a commission to take proof of the 
amount and the ownership of these several claims, on 
notice to the representative of Her Majesty at Wash- 
ington, and that authority be given for the settlement 
of these claims by the United States, so that the 
Government shall have the ownership of the private 
claims, as well as the responsible control of all the 
demands against Great Britain. It cannot be neces- 
sary to add that whenever Her Majesty's Government 
shall entertain a desire for a full and friendly adjust- 
ment of these claims, the United States will enter 
upon their consideration with an earnest desire for a 
conclusion consistent with the honor and dignity of 
both nations." 

The hint thus forcibly given was not lost in Lon- 
don. The educational process was now complete. The 
message, or that portion of it which most interested 
the British public, appeared in the London journals 
of December 6, and was widely commented upon. 
It was characterized as " menacing " in tone, and 
" thorouglily unpromising of any friendly settlement." 
Significantly enough, in another column of the same 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 135 

issue of the Times appeared the headline, " Rouen and 
Orleans have fallen ! " while the paper was crowded with 
letters descriptive of the conflicts at Gravelotte and 
Metz, together with accounts of the investment of Paris 
and of Gambetta's harangues at Tours. The general 
continental situation was even more " menacing " than 
the message of the American President. In any event, 
the steps of diplomacy, ordinarily so very sedate, were 
now quickened to an unusual, not to say unprecedented, 
pace. Indeed, the gait now struck in London bore, 
so to speak, a close resemblance to a run. Exactly 
five weeks later, on the 9th of January, 1871, Mr. 
Rose was again in Washington. Coming ostensibly 
on business relating to the Dominion of Canada, 
he was in reality at last fully empowered to open 
negotiations looking to an immediate settlement. The 
very evening of the day he arrived, Mr. Rose dined 
with Mr. Fish. The after-dinner talk between the 
two, lasting some five or six hours, resulted in a con- 
fidential memorandum.! More carefully formulated 
by Mr. Rose the following day, this paper reached 
Mr. Fish on the 11th of January. He expressed him- 
seK, on acknowledging its receipt, as inspired with 
hope. 

Hamilton Fish was no more ambitious than imagi- 
native. Though he held the position of Secretary 
of State during both of the Grant administrations, 
he did so with a genuine and well-understood reluc- 
tance, and was always contemplating an early retire- 
ment. At this juncture, however, there can be no 
doubt his ambition was fired. That which a year 
before he had pronounced as, among things possible, 
^ Davis : Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, p. 59. 



136 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

"the greatest glory and the greatest happiness" of 
his Hfe, was within his reach. He was to be the 
official medium through which a settlement of the 
questions between "the two English-speaking, pro- 
gressive liberal " covmtries was to be effected. That 
was to be his monument. To a certain extent, also, 
conditions favored him. Mr. Sumner and his Senate 
speech on the Johnson-Clarendon Convention were 
the great obstacles in the way. For, as Mr. Fish had 
himself expressed it a year previous, — " The elo- 
quence, and the display of learning and of research 
in [that] speech, and — perhaps above all — the 
gratification of the laudable pride of a people in being 
told of the magnitude of wealth in reserve for them 
in the way of damages due from a wealthy debtor, 
captivated some, and deluded more." Of this wide- 
spread popular feeling, reinforced by the anti-British 
and Fenian sentiment then very prevalent, account had 
to be taken. Strangely enough, moreover, Mr. Sum- 
ner's lukewarmness as respects any settlement at that 
time, much more his possible opposition to one origi- 
nating with the State Department, indirectly forwarded 
that result ; for, as already seen, the President and the 
Massachusetts Senator were now in open conflict over 
the former's Dominican policy. In that struggle Sec- 
retary Fish had most properly, if he remained in office, 
reconciled himself to siding with his official head. The 
Motley imbroglio had followed. With the most friendly 
feeling towards Mr. Motley personally, and sincerely 
desirous of avoiding so far as possible any difficulty 
with Mr. Sumner, Mr. Fish's expressed wish was to 
continue Mr. Motley in his position, taking from hinu 
all part in the proposed negotiation, and giving him 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 137 

explicit instructions in no way to refer to it, or seek 
to influence it. He was practically to be reduced to a 
functional representative. To this the President would 
not assent. He insisted that Mr. Motley represented 
Mr. Sumner more than he did the Administration, 
and he declared in a cabinet meeting, at which the 
matter was discussed, that he would " not allow Sum- 
ner to ride over " him. The Secretary continued to 
plead and urge, but in vain. The President was im- 
placable. It was then suggested that Mr. Sumner 
should himself be nominated to succeed Motley, and 
General Butler, then in the House of Representatives, 
and Mr. Cameron, Senator from Pennsylvania, called 
on the Secretary to advocate this solution of the diffi- 
culty. They pronounced Sumner unpractical and arro- 
gant, and urged that he should be got out of the 
way by any practicable method. This suggestion also 
was discussed at a cabinet meeting, and the President 
expressed a willingness to make the nomination, on 
condition that Sumner would resign from the Senate ; 
but he also intimated a grim determination to remove 
him from his new office as soon as he had been con- 
firmed in it. At last Mr. Fish was compelled to 
yield; and, under the President's explicit direction, 
he wrote to Mr. Motley a private letter, couched in 
the most friendly language, in which he intimated as 
clearly as he could that so doing was most painfid to 
him, but he must ask for a resignation. The incident 
had no historical significance, but was very character- 
istic of Grant. The method of procedure was his, — 
less abrupt, less marked by military curtness than three 
similar dismissals from his Cabinet ; but, owing to Mr. 
Motley's international position and literary prestige, 



138 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

such an unwonted proceeding at tlie time excited much 
comment, while it has since been exhaustively dis- 
cussed. Grant gave his own explanation of it,^ and 
diplomatists,^ biographers,^ and essayists^ have each 
in turn passed judgment upon it. Under these cir- 
cumstances, it is sufficient here to say that whatever 
was then done, was done by General Grant's impera- 
tive order, and solely because of Mr. Motley's inti- 
mate personal relations with Mr. Sumner, and the 
latter's opposition to the President's Dominican poHcy. 
The urgent and repeated remonstrances of the Secre- 
tary of State were of no avail. Utterly unqualified for 
political life, and only partially adapted for diplomacy, 
Mr. Motley was thus doomed to illustrate the truth of 
Hamlet's remark as to the danger incurred by him of 
lesser weight who chances 

" Between the pass and fell incensed points 
Of mighty opposites." 

It may, however, be pertinent to say, that, in view of the 
close personal relations existing between Mr. Sumner 
and Mr. Motley, it is not easy to see how the latter 
could have been allowed to remain at London, the 
supposed representative of the United States, with the 
Massachusetts Senator in open opposition to the Ad- 
ministration. Indeed, bearing in mind the whole situa- 
tion as it then existed, there seems reason to conclude 
that the President, with his instinctive strategic sense, 

1 In the conversation, already referred to, with Young, at Edin- 
burgh, September 11, 1S77, three months after Mr. Motley's death ; 
reported in the New York Herald of the 25th of the same month. 

2 " Motley's Appeal to History," by John Jay. An Address before 
the New York Historical Society ; subsequently printed in the Inter- 
national Review (1877), vol. iv. pp. 838-854. 

^ Pierce : Sumner, vol. iv. pp. 446-451. 

4 0. W. Holmes : Memoir of Motley (1879), pp. 155-190. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 139 

grasped the essential fact in the case more firmly than 
did the Secretary. The immediate control of the exter- 
nal relations of the government, and the shaping of 
its foreign policy, were fast passing out of the hands 
of the executive, and into those of a Senate committee. 
This tendency had to be checked. The correspondence 
between Senator Sumner and Minister Motley has 
never been published, and it is questionable whether 
it now exists. A few brief extracts from Sumner's 
letters to Motley are to be found in Pierce's biography 
of the former ; but Motley's letters to Sumner were 
looked upon by Mr. Pierce as " absolutely confiden- 
tial," and of them he made no use. Those are not 
now to be found in the files ; but the few short excerpts 
from the Sumner letters, which have been printed, 
, are very suggestive. They show conclusively the 
( nature of the intercourse. It was intimately semi-offi- 
' cial. Difficulty from this source had from the outset 
I been foreseen ; for when, immediately after his appoint- 
I ment to the English mission, Mr. Motley was in Bos- 
• ton, he naturally called on Mr. Adams, seeking light 
\ on the course best to be pursued in his new position. 
Referring to the interview, Mr. Adams then wrote, — 
j " His embarrassment is considerable in one particular 
I which never affected me, and that is in having two 
I masters. Mr. Seward never permitted any interfer- 
, ence of the Senate, or Mr. Sumner, with his direction 
\ of the policy." Under these circumstances, when the 
I break between Grant and Sumner became pronounced, 
(the displacement of Motley almost of necessity fol- 
i lowed. The executive had to resume its functions ; 
and, to do so effectively, it must be represented by 
agents in whom it had confidence, and who were not 



140 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

in the confidence of its opponents. It is somewhat 
strange that Mr. Motley should have had no susj^icion 
of so obvious a fact. 

His failure to suspect it, and follow the reluctant 
suggestion of the Secretary, affronted, none the less, 
the military instincts of the President, whose anger 
towards the Massachusetts Senator was now at white 
heat. It was even publicly said that he had de- 
clared to a Senator that, were he not President, he 
"would caU [Mr. Sumner] to account." ^ He had, 
also, cause for wrath ; not only was there notoriously 
very " free talk " about the President at Mr. Sum- 
ner's table,^ but those holding confidential relations at 
the White House — the military household — oj)enly 
asserted that Mr. Sumner had more than intimated 
that he, Grant, was intoxicated when, early in Janu- 
ary, 1870, he had made his memorable after-dinner 
call at his, the Senator's, house. The Senator from 
Massachusetts could not forthwith be called " to 
account ; " the Minister to Great Britain could, in a 
way. So, when Mr. Motley refused to resign, his 
removal was ordered. This the Secretary delayed, for 
he expected then himself shortly to retire, and was 
more than willing to leave the final act of displace- 
ment to his successor. At the last moment he was, 
however, prevailed upon to continue in office, sorely 
against his own wishes ; and what then, as respects 
the English mission, occurred, is matter of record. 
That the patience of the Secretary had been sorely 
tried during the intervening time, does not admit of 
question. To this subject, and the probable cause of 

1 Sumner: Works, vol. xiv. p. 256. 

2 Davis : Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, p. 56. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 141 

his irritation, I shall have occasion to refer presently. 
Unfortunately, as is apt to be the case with those of 
Netherlandish blood, though slow to wrath, Mr. Fish's 
anger, once aroused, was neither easily appeased nor 
kept within conventional bounds ; and now it extended 
beyond its immediate cause. He felt aggrieved over 
the course pursued by Mr. Motley. In it he saw no 
regard for the difficulties of the position in which 
he himself stood ; and he was especially provoked by 
the minister's voluminous record of the circumstances 
attending his displacement, placed by him on the files 
of the Department, and entitled " End of Mission." 
Accordingly, Mr. Fish's long-contained anger found 
expression in the well-known letter, addressed to Mr. 
Moran, secretary of the legation at London, and then 
acting as charge d'affaires. This letter, in a first 
draught, was read by the Secretary to the President, 
in presence of Vice-President Colfax and Senator 
Conkhng, before it was despatched ; and, while the 
last-named gave to it his approval, the President not 
only declined to allow certain alterations suggested by 
Mr. Colfax to be made, but expressed his wish that 
not a word in the paper be changed. 

Immaterial as all this may at first seem, it had a 
close and important bearing on the negotiations pre- 
liminary to the Treaty of Washington, now fairly 
initiated. In this case, indeed, one negotiation may 
be said to have hung upon the fate of another ; for, 
though the outcome of Colonel Babcock's diplomacy 
had not again been brought to the attention of the 
Cabinet, it was an open secret that all those composing 
it were by no means earnest in support thereof. The 
White House hangers-on and tale-bearers were also 



142 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

abnormally busy, even for them. The newspapers 
consequently teemed with rumors ; the atmosphere was 
rife with gossij). General Grant was not the man 
long to submit to this state of things ; if nought else, 
he was a disciplinarian. So he presently intimated, 
with much show of feeling, that certain members of 
his Cabinet — more particularly the Secretary of the 
Treasury, the Attorney-General, and the Secretary of 
the Interior — Messrs. Boutwell, Hoar, and Cox — 
were not giving the support he deemed proper to the 
San Domingo treaty. The first he declared was op- 
posed to the treaty ; the second said " nothing in its 
favor, but sneers at it ; " the third did not open his 
mouth to utter a word in its support. A few days 
later he brought up this cause of complaint in a cabi- 
net meeting, plainly saying that he wished all the 
members of his Cabinet, and all his friends, to use 
every proper effort to aid him. He went on to state 
that he did not propose to let those who opposed him 
in this matter " name Ministers to London," etc., etc., 
and he then entered on a warm defence of Colonel 
Babcock, proclaiming his belief in the utter falsity 
of the charges made against that officer. After some 
further discussion, and a general expression of approval 
of the plan of holding members of the party to the 
support of an administration policy, the matter was 
allowed to drop. This was on the 14th of June. The 
very next day the resignation of the Attorney-General 
was called for, in the way and under the circumstances 
his colleague. General Cox, afterwards described in 
the pages of The Atlantic Monthly. Evidently, the 
President-General was disciplining his Cabinet.^ A 
1 It is proper to say that the President assigned for this proceeding 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 143 

day or two later he called in the evening on Mr. Fish 
at his house, and, in the course of the conversation 
which ensued, took occasion to express his sense of the 
support the Secretary had given his favorite measure, 
and to intimate a sense of obligation therefor. He 
probably felt this the more, as he was not unaware 
that Secretary Fish had taken the course he did solely 
from a sense of loyalty, and in opposition to his own 
better judgment. Mr. Fish had finally brought him- 
self to regard the treaty as a measure of policy 
inaugurated by the head of the Administration ; and, 
after that policy was fairly entered upon, did what 
he properly could to forward it. This, also, not- 
withstanding the fact that the treaty had been most 
irregularly negotiated in derogation of the Depart- 
ment of State, and that it was in charge of persons 
whose standing had in no degree increased public 
confidence.^ But, in dealing historically with Presi- 
dent Grant, and seeking to explain both the influ- 
ences which operated upon him and his methods of 
procedure, the fact must ever be kept in mind that 
he was essentially a soldier, and not a civilian. As a 
soldier, he achieved all his successes, and they were 
great ; as a civilian, his life was a conspicuous failure. 

different reasons to various people. The reason stated in the text was 
that clearly intimated to Secretary Fish. Secretary Boutwell was 
given to understand that the change was made because divers Sen- 
ators declared themselves as not on speaking terms with the Attorney- 
General, and refused to visit his department while he was at its head ; 
on the other hand, Secretary Cox was told that it was thought desirable 
to have one representative from the South in the Cabinet, rather than 
two from Massachusetts. All these reasons may have had weight in 
the President's mind; and, in selection for immediate use, he took 
into more or less careful consideration the individual with whom he 
was talking. 

1 See Appendix E, ivfra, p. 222. 



144 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

In his military capacity, exacting obedience, he ap- 
preciated loyalty. As a civilian, he looked upon 
the members of his cabinet as upon a headquarters 
staff, and, while he enforced discipline by curt dis- 
missal, he rewarded fidelity by return in kind. It was 
so now : Hoar, he abrujjtly dismissed ; to Fish, he gave 
a reciprocal support. As the Secretary of State had 
proved loyal to him in the Dominican matter, he, in 
return, stood ready to adopt any policy towards Great 
Britain the Secretary might see fit to recommend. 
If, moreover, such a policy implied of necessity a 
conflict with Mr. Sumner, it would, for that very 
reason, be only the more acceptable. The President 
thus became a tower of strength in the proposed nego- 
tiation. 

Still while, on the whole, the conditions contribut- 
ing to success seemed to predominate, the fate of the 
Johnson-Clarendon Convention had to be borne in 
mind. Mr. Sumner was chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations. To defeat the 
result of a negotiation, it was necessary to control but 
a third of the Senate ; and his influence in that body 
had recently been emphasized by the rejection of the 
Dominican treaty, in favor of which the President 
had made use of every form of argument and induce- 
ment within the power of an executive to employ. 
So, after the proposal of Sir John Rose had been dis- 
cussed by the Secretary with Senator Conkling and 
General Schenck, the newly designated minister to 
England, it was agreed that Mr. Fish should seek 
an interview with the Massachusetts Senator, and, by 
a great show of consideration, see if he could not be 
induced to look favorably on the scheme. 



1 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 145 

What ensued was not only historically interesting, 
but to the last degree characteristic ; it was, moreover, 
altogether unprecedented. The Secretary of State 
actually sounded the way to an interview with the 
chairman of a Senate committee through another 
member of that committee, — a species of " mutual 
friend," — the interview in question to take place, 
not at the Department of State, but at the house of 
the autocratic chairman.^ The meeting was arranged 
accordingl}^ ; and, on the morning of the 15th of 
January, six days only after Sir John Rose's arrival 
in Washington, Mr. Fish, with Sir John's confidential 
memorandum in his pocket, stood at Mr. Sumner's 
door. In the meeting that ensued the business in 
hand was discussed. At the close of the interview, 
Mr. Sumner expressed a wish to take further time in 
which to consider the matter, but promised an answer 
shortly. Thereupon the Secretary took his leave.^ 

1 Davis : Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, p. 133. 

^ In answer to a request for any entry in the diary of Mr. Fish relat- 
ing- to what passed at this interview, I have received the following 
from the family of Mr. Fish, with permission to use it : — 

"1871. January 15. Sunday. Call upon Sumner ; introduce the 
question and read to him Rose's ' Confidential Memorandum.' He 
declaims ; Boutwell conies in at this point, conversation continued. 
Sumner insists that it should be understood in advance what Great 
Britain is willing to agree to, on the several questions. Boutwell 
says he has learnt through the Bankers that Great Britain intends to 
concede the inshore Fisheries in consideration of our yielding San 
Juan. I say that cannot be conceded ; the West will be united 
against the cession of San Juan. 

" I try to obtain from Sumner an expression of opinion as to the an- 
swer to be given to Rose ; ask what will be the candid judgment of 
the world when it is known that Great Britain makes the overtures 
she has made, if she accompany them with a distinct understanding that 
her liability for the acts of the Alabama is to be admitted if the 
United States decline the negotiation. Refer to the danger of actual 
collision on the Fishery grounds, and the serious complications that 
would ensue. 



146 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

Then, in due time, followed one of the most curious 
incidents in diplomatic history, an incident than which 
few could more strikingly illustrate the changes which 
in a comparatively short space of time take place in 
public opinion, and the estimate in which things are 
held. Two days later, on the 17th of January, Sec- 
retary Fish received from Senator Sumner a brief, 
initialed memorandum, embodying this, to those of the 
present time, fairly astounding proposition : ^ — 

" Finally I tell him that I have come officially to him as chairman 
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to ask his opinion and 
advice ; that I am entitled to it, as I must give an answer, etc. 

" He says that it requires much reflection, etc. 

" I then on leaving him request him to consider the subject, and to 
let me know his opinion within a day or two. 

" In the evening I call upon Gov. Morton at the National. Explain 
the proposition to him, and read him Rose's ' Confidential Memoran- 
dum.' He thinks the Alabama question ought to be settled, and the 
sooner the better ; that it would justify the President in convening 
an extra session of the Senate. Thinks the country would regard 
the recognition by Great Britain of liability for the Alabama, and 
reference of the question of liability as to the other vessels as satis- 
factory ; that the public mind considers the Alabama as embrac- 
ing the whole class of questions ; but he says that beside the actual 
losses by the Alabama, Great Britain should assume the expenses of 
this Government in endeavoring to capture her ; that this would be 
regarded as ' consequential ' damage, and would satisfy the public 
expectation on that point. 

" I ask whether a treaty on that basis could be ratified by the Senate 
against Sumner's opposition. He thinks it would. Says Casserly fol- 
lows Sumner, so does Schurz and Patterson ; on mentioning that Pat- 
terson had been consulted and approved, he replies, that ' gives a 
majority of the committee, and there can be no doubt of the Senate.' " 

In the Appendix to the American Case, submitted to the tribu- 
nal at Geneva, the expenses incurred by the United States govern- 
ment in its eiforts to capture the British built commerce-destroyers 
was estimated, and reimbursement on that account was demanded 
as a consequential injury. The expense incurred was estimated at 
$7,080,478.70. (Geneva Arbitration ; Correspondence, etc., vol. vii. 
p. 120, table.) The claim was disallowed. 

1 Moore : International Arbitrations, vol. i. p. 525. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 147 

" First. — The idea of Sir John Rose is that all 
questions and causes of irritation between England 
and the United States should be removed absolutely 
and forever, that we may be at peace really, and good 
neighbors, and to this end all points of difference 
should be considered together. Nothing could be 
better than this initial idea. It should be the start- 
ing-point. 

" Second. — The greatest trouble, if not peril, be- 
ing a constant source of anxiety and disturbance, is 
from Fenianism, which is excited by the British flag 
in Canada. Therefore the withdrawal of the British 
flag cannot be abandoned as a condition or prelimi- 
nary of such a settlement as is now proposed. To 
make the settlement complete, the withdrawal should 
be from this hemisphere, including provinces and is- 
lands." 



Since his death, nearly thirty years ago, Charles 
Sumner has been made the subject of one of the most 
elaborate biographies in the language. Patient and 
painstaking to the last degree, nothing seems to have 
.escaped the notice of Mr. Pierce, and the one conspic- 
uous fault of his work is its extreme length. Con- 
ceived on a scale which assumes in the reader an 
interest in the subject, and an indifference to toil, 
commensurate with those of the author, it was carried 
to completion in strict conformity with the initial plan. 
The official biography of Lincoln by Messrs. Nicolay 
and Hay is not inaptly called by them " A History ; " 
and its ten substantial volumes, averaging over 450 
pages each, defy perusal. Life simply does not suffice 



148 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

for literature laid out on such a Brobdingnagian scale ; 
all sense of proportion is absent from it. Yet the ten 
volumes of the Lincoln include but a quarter part 
more reading matter than Mr. Pierce's four. On a 
rough estimate, it is computed that these fourteen 
volumes contain some two million words. The most 
remarkable, and highly characteristic, memorandum 
just quoted is expressed in about 220 words ; and yet 
for it Mr. Pierce found no space in his four solid 
volumes. He refers to it indeed, showing that he was 
aware of its existence ; but he does so briefly, and 
somewhat lightly, in his text,^ though laboring painfully 
over it in an appendix.^ Mr. Storey, in his smaller 
biography of Sumner, makes no reference at all to it ; 
apparently it had failed to attract his notice. AikI yet, 
that memorandum is of much historical significance. 
A species of electric flash, it reveals what then was, 
and long had been, in Sumner's mind. It makes 
intelligible what woidd otherwise remain well-nigh 
incomprehensible ; if, indeed, not altogether so. 

To those of this generation, — especially to us with 
the war in South Africa going on before our eyes, — 
it would seem as if the first perusal of that memoran- 
dum of January 17 must have suggested to Mr. Fish 
grave doubts as to Mr. Sumner's sanity. It reads 
like an attempt at clumsy ridicule. The Secretary of 
State had gone to an influential Senator in a serious 
spirit, suggesting a business settlement of grave inter- 
national complications ; and he was met by a proposi- 
tion which at once put negotiation out of the question. 
What could the man mean ? Apparently, he could 

1 Pierce : Sumner, vol. iv. pp. 480, 481. 

2 16., pp. 635-638. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 149 

only mean that lie did not intend to permit any ad- 
justment to be effected, "if in his power to prevent. 
Such unquestionably is the impression this paper now 
conveys. Meanwhile, strange as it seems, when re- 
ceived it could have occasioned Mr. Fish no especial 
wonder ; except, perhaps, in its wide inclusiveness, it 
suggested nothing new, nothing altogether beyond the 
pale of reasonable expectation, much less of discus- 
sion. It brought no novel consideration into debate. 
Surprising now, this statement measures the revolu- 
tion in sentiment as respects dependencies which has 
taken place during the last thirty years. 
^ *' From 1840 to, say, 1870, the almost universal 
belief of thoughtful Englishmen was that the colonies 
contributed nothing or little to the strength of Eng- 
land. We were bound, it was thought, in honor, to 
protect them ; the mother country should see that her 
children were on the road to become fit for independ- 
ence ; the day for separation would inevitably come ; 
the parting, when it took place, should be on friendly 
terms ; but the separation would be beneficial, for 
both parent and children. Even a Conservative min- 
ister spoke, or wrote, it is said, about our ' wretched 
colonies.' To-day the whole tone of feeling is changed ; 
her colonies are, it is constantly asserted, both the 
glory and the strength of Great Britain. Not the 
extremest Radical ventures to hint a separation." i To 
similar effect another authority, an American, refer- 
ring to the same period, says, — " We find England 
declining to accept New Zealand when offered to her 
by English settlers ; treating Australia as a financial 

^ Letter signed " An Observer," dated Oxford, August 22, 1901, in 
New York Nation of September 12, 1901. 



150 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

burden, useful only as a dumping-ground for crimi- 
nals ; discussing in Parliament whether India be 
worth defending; questioning the value of Hong- 
Kong, and even refusing to be responsible for terri- 
tories in South Africa." ^ So late even as 1881, ten 
years after the negotiation of the Treaty of Washing- 
ton, there can be little doubt that this feeling — the 
conviction of the Httle worth of dependencies — in- 
spired the policy pursued towards the South African 
republics by the second Gladstone administration, 
after the disaster of Majuba Hill. 

In the mind of Mr. Sumner, the ultimate, and, as 
he in 1870 believed, not remote withdrawal of all 
European flags, including, of course, the British, from 
the western hemisphere, was a logical development of 
the Monroe doctrine. That doctrine, as originally set 
forth, was merely a first enunciation, and in its sim- 
plest form, of a principle which not only admitted of 
great development, but was in the direct line of what 
is known as Manifest Destiny. Secretary Seward's 
Alaska acquisition, bringing to an end Kussian do- 
minion in America, created a precedent. One Euro- 
pean flag then disappeared from the New World. 
Covering areas of consequence, those of Spain and 
Great Britain only remained ; and more than twenty 
years before, Richard Cobden had written to Sumner, 
— "I agree with you that Nature has decided that 
Canada and the United States must become one for 
all purposes of inter-communication. ... If the peo- 
ple of Canada are tolerably unanimous in wishing to 
sever the very shght thread which now binds them 
to this country, I see no reason why, if good faith and 

1 Poultney Bigelow: The Children of the Nations, p. 332. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 151 

ordinary temper be observed, it should not be done 
amicably." Charles Sumner did not belong to the 
Bismarckian school of statesmanship, — he was no 
welder in blood and iron ; and these words of Cobden 
furnished the key of the situation as it lay in his 
essentially doctrinaire mind. He, accordingly, looked 
forward with confidence to the incorporation of the 
British possessions into the American Union ; but, as 
Mr. Pierce truly enough says, he always insisted that 
it " should be made by peaceful annexation, by the 
voluntary act of England, and with the cordial assent 
of the colonists." ^ Nor, in April, 1869, when he 
delivered his National Claims or Consequential Dam- 
ages speech in the Senate, did this result seem to 
him remote. Five months later, still borne forward 
on the crest of a flooding tide, — little prescient of 
the immediate future, — he quoted before the Massa- 
chusetts State Republican convention Cobden's words 
of prophecy, and triumphantly exclaimed, — " The 
end is certain ; nor shall we wait long for its mighty 
fulfilment. In the procession of events it is now at 
hand, and he is blind who does not discern it." ^ 

Read with this clue in mind, Mr. Sumner's utter- 
ances between 1869 and 1871 — including his speech 
on the Johnson-Clarendon negotiation, his address be- 
fore the Massachusetts Republican convention in the 
following September, and his memorandum to Secre- 
tary Fish of sixteen months later — become intelligible, 
and are consecutive. The claims against Great Brit- 
ain, mounting into the thousands of millions, were 
formulated and advanced by him as no vulgar pot- 

1 Pierce : Sumner, vol. iv. p. 637. 

2 Works, vol. xiii. p. 129. See, also, vol. xii. p. 173. 



152 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

house score, to be itemized, and added up in the form 
of a bill, and so j^resented for payment. Oii the con- 
trary, they were merely one item in the statement of 
a "massive grievance," become matter of gravest in- 
ternational debate. The settlement was to be com- 
mensurate. Comprehensive, grandiose even, it was to 
include a hemispheric flag-withdrawal, as well as a 
revision of the rules of international law. The ad- 
justment of mere money claims was a matter of alto- 
gether minor consideration ; indeed, such might well 
in the end become makeweights, — mere pawns in the 
mighty game. 

It is needless to say that the imexpected was sure 
to occur in the practical unfolding of this picturesque 
programme. Indeed, a very forcible suggestion of the 
practical danger involved in it, just so long as the 
average man is what he is, was brought home to the 
Senator from Massachusetts when he resumed his seat 
in executive session after completing his speech on the 
Johnson-Clarendon Convention, — the carefully pre- 
pared opening of the great world debate. Mr. Zacha- 
riah Chandler of Michigan subsequently took the 
floor. He was a Senator much more closely than Mr. 
Sumner representative of the average American public 
man. And Mr. Chandler proceeded unconsciously to 
furnish an illustration of the practical outcome of 
Mr. Sumner's scheme as he, the average American, 
understood it. He entirely concurred in Mr. Sumner's 
presentation of national injuries, consequential dam- 
ages, and a sense of " massive grievance." " If Great 
Britain," he then went on to say, " should meet us in 
a friendly spirit, acknowledge her wrong, and cede all 
her interests in the Canadas in settlement of these 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 153 

claims, we will have perpetuate peace with her ; but, if 
she does not, we must conquer peace. We cannot 
afford to have an enemy's base so near us. It is a 
national necessity that we should have the British 
possessions. He hoped such a negotiation would be 
opened, and that it would be a peaceful one ; but, if 
it should not be, and England insists on war, then 
let the war be ' short, sharp, and decisive.' " ^ The 

^ See report of debate in New York Tribune, April 21, 1869. There 
is reason to believe that, in this utterance, Mr. Chandler more nearly 
reflected the original views of General Grant than did Mr. Sumner, or, 
subsequently, Mr. Fish. Always military. Grant, as President, looked 
upon the accession of the British Dominion to the American Union as 
both inevitable and hig-hly desirable for all concerned. He was what 
is now known as a thoroug-h expansionist. Hence, when the Civil 
War closed, he was in favor of an immediate invasion of Mexico. 
{Around the World with General Grant, vol. ii. p. 163.) As President, 
he later proceeded to annex islands in the West Indies in the wholly 
unceremonious fashion already described in this paper. He had fully 
considered a Canadian campaign, and was of opinion that " if Sheri- 
dan, for instance, with our resources, could not have taken Canada in 
thirty days, he should have been cashiered." {lb., p. 167.) Mr. Sum- 
ner never contemplated forcible annexation as the result of a war 
with Great Britain growing out of his theory of national injuries. He 
did look to a voluntary and peaceable consolidation of adjacent Eng- 
lish-speaking territories and their inhabitants. Grant also looked for 
such a consolidation, but was quite ready to have it come about as the 
result of a campaign, and incidental beneficent compulsion. Again, 
Secretary Fish stood between the two. Mr. Sumner's policy was, under 
the circumstances, fraught with immediate danger. He was for keep- 
ing the questions at issue open, a cause of possible rupture at any 
moment ; and for that rupture Grant always stood ready. This the 
English Minister (Sir Edward Thornton) perfectly understood. Hence 
his eagerness to effect a settlement. Grant, meanwhile, was indiffer- 
ent, and Sumner, unconsciously, was playing into his hands. Finally, 
as the result of a quarrel with Sumner, Grant gave Fish a free hand. 
He might effect a settlement if he could ; but if, for any reason, he 
failed in so doing, recourse would be had to the other plan of pro- 
cedure. The Secretary might then stand aside, and the Commander- 
in-chief would settle the question of claims against Great Britain, 
individual and national, through a process never contemplated by the 



154 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

report of these utterances was at once transmitted by 
tlie British Minister to his government ; and, taken in 
connection with Mr. Sumner's arraignment, and his 
presentation of consequential damages, furnished those 
composing that government, as well as Professor Gold- 
win Smith, with much food for thought.^ 

The policy proper to be pursued in the years fol- 
lowing 1869 rapidly assumed shape in Mr. Sumner's 
mind. He worked it out in every detail. As, shortly 
after, he wrote to his friend. Dr. S. G. Howe, — "I 
look to annexation at the North. I wish to have that 
whole zone from Newfoundland to Vancouver." It 
was with this result distinctly present to him, and as 
a first step thereto, that he secured the English mis- 
sion for Mr. Motley. Through Motley he thought to 
work. He, chairman of the United States Senate 
Committee on Foreign Eelations, was to mould and 
shape the future of a hemisphere, — President, Secre- 

Massaehusetts Senator. It is not suggested that evidence in support 
of this statement can be adduced ; or even exists. That, however, 
Grant's extreme personal dislike for Mr. Sumner, and his sense of 
obligation to Mr. Fish, greatly influenced his action on the question 
of a settlement with Great Britain, admits of no doubt. It gave Mr. 
Fish the opportunity, of which he availed himself. The alternative 
Grant always had in mind in the event of his Secretary's failure, or 
British recalcitrancy, is alone open to question. 

1 It was unquestionably to this utterance of Senator Chandler's, 
and to counteract its effect, that Mr. Sumner used the following lan- 
guage, in his speech of five months later, just referred to : — " Some- 
times there are whispers of territorial compensation, and Canada is 
named as the consideration. But he knows England little, and little 
also of that great English liberty from Magna Charta to the Somerset 
case, who supposes that this nation could undertake any such transfer. 
And he knows our country little, and little also of that great liberty 
that is ours, who supposes that we could receive such a transfer. On 
each side there is impossibility. Territory may be conveyed, but not 
a people. I allude to this suggestion only because, appearing in the 
public press, it has been answered from England." 



THE TREATY OF WASHINOTON 155 

tary of State, and Her Majesty's Ministers being as 
clay in his potter hands, with Motley for the deftly 
turning wheel. Concerning this project he seems dur- 
ing the summer of 1869 to have been in almost daily 
correspondence with his friend near the Court of St. 
James, and in frequent conference with Secretary 
Fish at Washington. On June 11 he wrote to the 
former that the Secretary had, two days before, sounded 
the British Minister on the subject, of Canada, the 
American claims on Great Britain being too large to 
admit of a money settlement. Sir Edward Thornton, 
he went on, had replied that England " did not wish to 
keep Canada, but could not part with it without the 
consent of the population." The Secretary next wanted 
Mr. Sumner to state the amount of claims ; to which 
he had replied that he did not regard it as the proper 
time for so doing. This letter, it so chanced, was 
dated the very day after Mr. Motley's first unfortunate 
interview with the British Foreign Secretary ; and 
that diplomatic jeremiad might not inaptly have con- 
cluded with a premonitory hint of what his mentor 
and guide was on the morrow to write, — a hint of 
the nature suggested by Mr. Schurz in a letter to 
Secretary Fish,i written at this very time. Then, only 
four days later, — on the 15th of June, — Mr. Sum- 
ner again advises his correspondent of a dinner-table 
talk with men in high official circles, and significantly 
adds, — "All feel that your position is as historic as any 
described by your pen. England must listen, and at 
last yield. I do not despair seeing the debate end — 
(1) In the withdrawal of England from this hemi- 
sphere ; (2) In remodelling maritime international law. 

^ Infra, Appendix C, p. 209. 



156 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

Such a consummation would place our republic at the 
head of the civilized world." Here was no whisper 
of mere money claims ; and, five days after, he writes 
in the same spirit, referring apparently to the Sec- 
retary of State, — " With more experience at Wash- 
ington, our front would have been more perfect." ^ 
The " debate " referred to was, of course, that " inter- 
national debate, the greatest of our history, and, before 
it is finished, in all probability the greatest of all 
history." Thus, in June, 1869, the chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Kelations was sending 
what were in effect unofficial instructions to a facile 
national representative, couched, be it noticed, in the 
very words used by the writer eighteen months later 
in the memorandum just quoted. 

In one of these letters, it will be observed, Mr. Sum- 
ner told Motley that Secretary Fish had that day 
sounded the British Minister as to a possible cession 
of Canada in liquidation of our national claims, and 
appeasement of our sense of " massive grievance." 2 
The statement was correct ; and not only at this junc- 
ture, but repeatedly, was a comprehensive settlement on 
such a basis urged on the British government. Both 
President and Secretary were thus of one mind with 
Mr. Sumner. In November, 1869, for instance, four 
months after Sir John Rose's first visit to Washington, 
and at the very time he was writing to Mr. Fish about 
Mr. Motley's attitude in London, an entire cabinet 
meeting was occupied in a discussion of the Alahama 
claims. The President then suggested the possibility 
of Great Britain quitting Canada ; and he mtimated. 

^ Pierce : Sumner, vol, iv. pp. 409-412. 
2 lb., vol. iv. p. 409. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 157 

Ms belief that, in such case, we ought to be satisfied 
with the payment for the losses actually sustained 
through the Confederate commerce-destroyers, com- 
bined with a settlement satisfactory to us of the prm- 
ciples of maritime neutrality law. A few days later 
he expressed his unwiUingness at that time to adjust 
the claims ; he wished them kept open until Great Brit- 
ain was ready to give up Canada. When certain 
members of the Cabinet thereupon assured him that 
Great Britain looked upon Canada as a source of weak- 
ness, quoting Lord Carlisle and Sir Edward Thornton, 
the President at once replied, — " If that be so, I 
would be willing to settle at once." During the fol- 
lowing weeks, — December, 1869, and January, 1870, 

— the subject was frequently discussed between Secre- 
tary Fish and Sir Edward Thornton. The former 
urged on the latter the entire withdrawal of Great 
Britain from Canada, and an immediate settlement of 
all claims on tliat basis. To this Sir Edward replied, 

— " Oh, you know that we cannot do. The Canadians 
find fault with me for saying so openly as I do that 
we are ready to let them go whenever they shall wish ; 
but they do not desire it." In its issue of December 
18, 1869, while these conversations, taking place in 
Washington, were duly reported in Downing Street, 
the Times^ probably inspired, expressed itself as fol- 
lows : — " Suppose the colonists met together, and, 
after deliberating, came to the conclusion that they 
were a very long way off from the United Kingdom, . . . 
and that every natural motive of contiguity, similar- 
ity of interests, and facility of administration induced 
them to think it more convenient to slip into the Union 
than into the Dominion. Should we oppose their de- 



158 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

termination ? We all know we should not attempt 
to withstand it, if it were clearly and intelligibly pro- 
nounced. . . . Instead of the Colonies being the de- 
pendencies of the Mother Country, the Mother Country 
has become the Dej)endency of the Colonies. We are 
tied, while they are loose. We are subject to danger, 
while they are free." And a few months later, when 
the Dominion undertook to find fault with some of the 
provisions of the Treaty of Washington, the same 
organ of English opinion thus frankly delivered itself : 
— " From this day forth look after your own business 
yourself ; you are big enough, you are strong enough, 
you are intelligent enough, and, if there were any de- 
ficiency in any of these points, it would be supplied by 
the education of self-reliance. We are both now in a 
false position, and the time has arrived when we should 
be relieved from it. Take up your freedom ; your days 
of apprenticeship are over." In view of such utter- 
ances as these from the leading organs of the mother 
country, Mr. Sumner certamly had grounds for as- 
suming that a not unwilling hemispheric flag-with- 
drawal by Great Britain was more than probable in the 
early future. 

Returning to what took place in Washington in 
March, 1870, on the eve of the Franco-Prussian war, 
Secretary Fish had another long conversation with Sir 
Edward Thornton, which showed forcibly how conscious 
those composing the English Ministry were of the 
falseness of Great Britain's position, and of the immi- 
nence of danger. The Secretary again urged on the 
Minister that her American provinces were to Great 
Britain a menace of danger ; and that a cause of irri- 
tation, and of possible complication, would, especially 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 159 

in those times of Fenianism, be removed, should they 
be made independent. To this Mr. Tliornton replied, 
— "It is impossible for Great Britain to inaugurate 
a separation. They are willing, and even desirous, to 
have one. Europe may at any moment be convulsed ; 
and, if England became involved, it would be impossi- 
ble to prevent retaliation, and the ocean would swarm 
with Alahamas. England would then be compelled 
to declare war." The Secretary consoled him by agree- 
ing that commerce-destroyers would then be fitted out 
in spite of all the government might, or could, attempt 
to prevent them. 

Up to this point the chairman of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations, the President, the Sec- 
retary of State, and the members of the Cabinet 
generally had gone on in happy concurrence. They 
had the same end in view. But now the cleavage 
between President and Senator rapidly widened. A 
week only after the conversation with Sir Edward 
Thornton last referred to, General Grant cautioned 
Mr. Fish against communicating to Mr. Sumner any 
confidential or important information received at the 
State Department. Later, he became persuaded that 
the Massachusetts Senator was constitutionally un- 
truthful; but, as yet, he considered him only unfair and 
inaccurate. The chairman of the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations ceased, however, to be thereafter 
a direct factor in the negotiation with Great Britain. 

Thus far, in pursuance of the policy dimly outlined 
in the executive session debate on the Johnson-Clar- 
endon Convention, the two questions of a settlement 
of claims and Canadian independence had been kept 
closely associated. They were now to be separated. 



160 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

Yet the change was gradual ; for Mr. Sumner's policy 
had a strong hold on the minds of both President and 
Secretary.! Even as late as September, 1870, only 
five months before the Treaty of Washington was 
negotiated, Secretary Fish and Sir Edward Thornton 
had another conversation on the subject of Canadian 
independence. It originated in one of the endless 
squabbles over the Fisheries. The Secretary intimated 
his belief that the solution of that question would 
be found in a separation of the Dominion from the 
mother country. Thereupon Mr. Thornton repeated 
what he had, he declared, often said before, — that 
Great Britain was willing, and even anxious, to have 
the colonies become independent ; but could do no- 
thing to force independence on them. He then added, 
— " It is impossible to connect the question of Ca- 
nadian independence with the Alabama claims ; not 
even to the extent of providing for the reference of 
the question of independence to a popular vote of the 
people of the Dominion. Independence," he added, 
"means annexation. They are one and the same 
thing." This conversation, it will be observed, took 

1 In his first annual message to Congress, December 6, 1869 {Mes- 
sages of the Presidents, vol. vii. p. 32), General Grant thus expressed 
himself, — the Secretary of State undoubtedly having- draughted the 
paragraph : — " The United States have no disposition to interfere 
with the existing relations of Spain to her colonial possessions on this 
continent. They believe that in due time Spain and other European 
powers will find their interest in terminating those relations, and estab- 
lishing their present dependencies as independent powers — members 
of the family of nations." Seven months later (July 14, 1870), the 
President transmitted to the Senate, in reply to a resolution, a report 
from the Secretary of State, in which was the following: — "This 
policy . . . looks hopefully to the time when, by the voluntary de- 
parture of European governments from this continent and the adjacent 
islands, America shall be wholly American." (16., p. 74.) 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 161 

place on the very day the investment of Paris by the 
victorious German army was pronounced complete. 
In the existing European situation everything was 
possible, anything might be anticipated. 

Though his resignation had been requested, Mr. 
Motley still remained in London. His early removal 
was contemplated by the President, and the question 
of who should replace him was under consideration. 
The appointment was offered to O. P. Morton, then a 
Senator from Indiana. Wholly the President's, the 
selection was the reverse of happy. Governor Mor- 
ton was inclined to accept; but he desired first to 
know whether he would, as Minister, have the Ala- 
bama claims settlement intrusted to him. The Presi- 
dent then talked the matter over with Secretary Fish, 
and what he said showed clearly the hold which Sum- 
ner's views had on him. He proposed that the new 
Minister should attempt a negotiation based on the 
following concessions by Great Britain : (1) the pay- 
ment of actual losses incurred through the depre- 
dations of British Confederate commerce-destroyers ; 

(2) a satisfactory revision of the principles of inter- 
national law as between the two governments ; and 

(3) the submission to the voters of the Dominion of 
the question of independence. In commenting imme- 
diately afterwards on this conversation, Mr. Fish 
wrote, — " The President evidently expects these Pro- 
vinces to be annexed to the United States during his 
administration. I hope that it may be so. That 
such is their eventual destiny, I do not doubt ; but 
whether so soon as the President expects may be a 
question." Owing to the result of an election in In- 
diana held shortly after, it was deemed inexpedient 



162 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

for Governor Morton to vacate his seat in the Senate. 
He consequently declined further to consider a dip- 
lomatic position. Though in no way germane to the 
subject of this paper, it is interesting to know that 
it was to fill the vacancy thus existing that General 
Butler shortly after brought forward the name of 
Wendell Phillips. The President, Mr. Fish noted, 
" very evidently will not consider him within the 
range of possibilities of appointment." 

The pressure for some settlement now brought to 
bear on the British government was day by day be- 
coming greater. About the middle of November the 
Russian Minister took occasion to suggest to Secre- 
tary Fish, in a neighborly sort of way, that the 
present time — that of the Franco-Prussian war — 
was most opportune to press on Great Britain an 
immediate settlement of the Alabama claims. Two 
weeks later the message of the President was sent 
to Congress, with the significant paragraph already 
quoted. In his next talk with Sir Edward Thorn- 
ton, Secretary Fish alluded to the suggestion made 
to him by the Russian Minister, and Sir Edward, 
in return, frankly asked him what the United States 
wanted. And now at last the negotiation took a new 
and final turn. The Secretary, dropping Canada^ 
from the discussion, asked merely an expression of 
regret on the part of Great Britain, an acceptable de- 
claration of principles of international law, and pay- 
ment of claims. This conversation took place on the 
20th of November ; nineteen days later, on the 9th of 
December, at a cabinet meeting held that day. Sec- 
retary Fish read in confidence a private letter to him 
from Sir John Rose, " intimating that the British 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 163 

cabinet is disposed to enter on negotiations." It 
would thus appear that the obstacle in the way of a 
renewed negotiation had been the purpose of the 
United States to combine in some way a settlement of 
money claims, private and national, with a movement 
looking to the withdrawal of the British flag, in whole 
or in part, from the North American continent. The 
moment this suggestion was withheld, the British cabi- 
net lost no time in signifying its readiness to negoti- 
ate. None the less, the whole scheme of Mr. Sumner, 
underlying his famous speech of April 13, 1869, and 
the appointment of Mr. Motley to the English mis- 
sion, was thereby and thenceforth definitely aban- 
doned. In his memorandum, therefore, the chairman of 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations demanded 
nothing altogether new ; he merely, stating the case 
in its widest form, insisted upon adherence to a famil- 
iar policy long before formulated. None the less, there 
is a wide difference between the concession of its 
independence to a particular dependency, no matter 
how considerable, and the somewhat scenic, and obvi- 
ously compulsory, withdrawal of a nation's flag from 
half the globe. In Mr. Sumner's imagination, the 
British drum-beat was no more to follow the rising 
sun. 



VI 

The narrative now returns to the point when Mr. 
Sumner's memorandum of January 17 reached the 
Secretary of State. Mr. Davis says, " I well remem- 
ber Mr. Fish's astonishment when he received this 
document. At first he almost thought any attempt 



164 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

at negotiation would prove futile." ^ Probably the 
word " dismay " would describe more accurately than 
" astonishment " Mr. Fish's state of mind at this 
juncture. Undoubtedly, he had, time and time again, 
discussed with Mr. Sumner the whole question of 
European withdrawal from America, altogether or in 
part, whether from Canada alone or from the hemi- 
sphere. He had referred to it publicly in the pas- 
sages already quoted from the President's messages. 
The proposition, therefore, can have excited no " as- 
tonishment " in him. It might well, however, have 
caused a feeling of dismay, for it threatened to bring 
to an abrupt close the incipient negotiation he so 
much had at heart. It was phrased also as an ulti- 
matum. Closing the door to discussion, it precipitated 
into the immediate present the academic problem of a 
possibly remote future. After full talk, and subse- 
quent mature reflection, the chairman of the Senate 
Committee gave it as his judgment that the demand, 
known to be at that time impossible of concession, 
" cannot be abandoned as a condition or preliminary." 
Language could scarcely be stronger. The Secre- 
tary had cause for discouragement. His failure had 
been complete. But, whatever may have been the 
sensations of the Secretary when gasping under the 
first effects of this icy douche, those of the Presi- 
dent must also be taken into account. He was es- 
sentially the man for that situation. He was in his 
element. What followed bore unmistakably the im- 
press of his handiwork ; for, to the military eye, one 
thing must at once have been apparent. The situ- 
ation was simplified ; his opponent had put himself 
1 Davis : Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, p. 137. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 165 

in his power. Instinctively, he grasped the oppor- 
tunity. The natural, indeed the only inference to be 
drawn from the memorandum, was that the chairman 
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in- 
tended to put an immediate stop to the proposed 
negotiation, if in his power so to do. The considera- 
tions influencing him were obvious. The course of 
procedure now suggested was wholly at variance with 
the policy outlined by him. In June, 1869, he had 
written to Mr. Motley, — "I should make no ' claim ' 
or ' demand ' for the present ; " and to Caleb Cushing 
a month later, — "Our case, in length and breadth, 
with all details, should be stated to England without 
any demand of any kind." And now, in January, 
1871, he did not regard the conditions of a success- 
ful and satisfactory settlement with Great Britain, on 
the basis he had in view, as being any more propi- 
tious than in June, 1869. Eighteen months only 
had elapsed. The fruit was not yet ripe ; — then why 
shake the tree ? That " international debate, the 
greatest of our history, and before it is finished, in all 
probability the greatest of all history," seemed draw- 
ing to a lame and impotent, because premature, con- 
clusion. His memorandum was, therefore, an attempt 
at a checkmate. By formulating demands which he 
knew would not be entertained, he hoped at once 
to end the proposed negotiation. The country would 
then await some more convenient occasion, when. 
Great Britain being entirely willing, a mild com- 
pulsion in favor of independence could be brought 
to bear upon her American dependencies. On the 
other hand, the issue presented in this memorandum 
was clear and not to be evaded, — Was the Executive 



166 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

to shape the foreign policy of the United States ; 
or was it to receive its inspiration from the room of 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations ? Either 
that committee must be brought into line with the 
State Department, or the Secretary of State should 
accept his position as a chairman's clerk. 

A delicate question between the executive and legis- 
lative departments of the government — a question as 
old as the Constitution — was thus involved. What 
constituted an attempt at improper interference by 
one department with the functions and organization 
of the other ? It is obvious that, in a representative 
government under the party system, where both the 
legislative and the executive departments are con- 
trolled by the same party organization, the legislative 
committees should be so organized as to act in rea- 
sonable accord with the responsible executive. It is 
a purely practical question. The executive cannot, of 
course, directly interfere in the organization of the 
legislative body ; but it has a perfect right to demand 
of its friends and supporters in the legislative bodies 
that those having charge through committees of the 
business of those bodies should be in virtual harmony 
with the Administration. Certainly, they should not 
be in avowed hostility to it. As Grant himself 
later said,^ it was indeed a singular spectacle " to find 
a Senate with the large majority of its members in 
sympathy with the Administration, and with its chair- 
man of the Foreign Committee in direct opposition to 
the foreign policy of the Administration, in theory and 
detail." There was force in this statement, and the 
President was fully justified in asking of his party a 
1 At Edinburgh, New York Herald, September 25, 1877. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 167 

release from a position of such obvious embarrassment. 
Indeed, under any proper construction of functions, 
those thus finding themselves in virtual opposition 
might well decline committee appointments necessarily 
placing them in a position where they feel under com- 
pulsion to thwart and hamper the measures of the party 
of which they nominally are members. Such should, in 
parliamentary parlance, take their places below the 
gangway. In the winter of 1870-71 Mr. Sumner was 
in that position. Chairman of the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Eelations, on cardinal features of foreign 
policy he was notoriously in proclaimed opposition. 
Such being the case, it is at least an open question 
whether, in view of the executive functions of the Sen- 
ate, he should not have voluntarily declined longer to 
serve as chairman of that particular committee. His 
serving was clearly an obstruction to the Administra- 
tion, and its friends constituted a large majority of 
the Senate ; it would, moreover, be perfectly possi- 
ble for him to exert his influence both in the cham- 
ber and in the committee-room without being the offi- 
cial head of the committee, intrusted as such with the 
care, of measures on the defeat of which he was intent. 
He was in an obviously false position. The practice 
under our government is the other way. Senatorial 
courtesy and seniority, it is well known, prevail ; 
and Secretaries must govern themselves accordingly. 
Nevertheless, in the case of Mr. Sumner and his 
chairmanship in 1870—71, this practice was carried 
to its extreme limit ; and, after the presidential can- 
vass of the following year, he must necessarily, and 
by common consent, have been superseded. Even 
now, indeed, when, having been active in opposition 



168 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

to one measure of foreign policy by wliicli the Presi- 
dent set great store, he declared liimseK in advance 
opposed to another measure of yet greater moment, 
the future was plainly foreshadowed. A wholly im- 
possible preliminary condition to the proposed measure 
must, he declared, be insisted upon, — or, once more 
to quote his own words, " cannot be abandoned." 

In January, 1871, the Forty-first Congress was 
fast drawing to its close. Chosen at the election 
which made Grant President for the first time, that 
Congress was overwhelmingly Republican ; so much so 
that, of seventy-two Senators admitted to seats, sixty- 
one were supporters of the Administration. And 
yet, in a body thus made up, — a body in which 
the opposition numbered but eleven members, — not 
one in six, — a treaty in behalf of the ratification of 
which the President had exerted all his influence, 
personal and official, had failed to secure even a 
majority vote. The chairman of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, regardless of private personal solici- 
tation on the part of the chief Executive wholly uni^rece- 
dented in character, had been not only unrelenting but 
successful in his opposition. The President-General 
looked upon this action on the part of a Senator at 
the head of the Committee on Foreign Relations as, 
during war, he would have regarded the action of a 
department commander who, refusing to cooperate in 
the plan of general campaign laid down from head- 
quarters, should exert himself to cause an operation 
to fail. Such a subordinate would be summarily re- 
lieved. He seems actually to have chafed under his 
inability to take this course with the chairman of a 
Senate committee ; and so he primarily relieved his 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 169 

feelings at the expense of the friend of the chairman, 
the Minister to England. He was within his power, 
and him he incontinently dismissed. 

This distinctly savored of Jackson rather than of 
Washington. The White House had, in truth, be- 
come a military headquarters. But the President's 
personal feelings, as well as the General's instinct for 
discipline, had been outraged, and he was intent on 
the real offender, — the Senator from Massachusetts. 
Hence it followed that, when Secretary Fish, with Mr. 
Sumner's memorandum in his hand, went to the White 
House for instructions, the President's views as to the 
independence, and subsequent early annexation, of the 
British possessions at once underwent a change. As 
he welcomed an issue with his much-disliked antago- 
nist upon which he felt assured of victory, hemispheric 
flag-withdrawals ceased to interest him. A great pos- 
sible obstruction in the path of the proposed negoti- 
ation was thus suddenly removed. The General-Pre- 
sident promptly instructed the Secretary to go to Sir 
John Rose, and advise him that the Administration 
was prepared to accept the proposal for a commission 
to settle all questions between the countries. That 
was, however, a preliminary move only. By it, the 
Administration was committed to action of great 
import. A crucial case was presented; one on which 
no unnecessary risk would be incurred. The next 
and really vital step remained to be taken. 

When the first Congress of Grant's earlier admin- 
istration met in its final session at the usual date in 
December, 1870, an attempt was made foreshadowing 
what occurred four months later. A partial reorgan- 
ization of the Senate Committee on Foreign Eelations 



170 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

was discussed, with a view to the introduction into that 
committee of some element less under its chairman's 
influence, and holding more intimate relations with 
the Executive. A place was to be found for Roscoe 
Conkling of New York. If possible, Mr. Conkling 
was to be substituted for Mr. Sumner ; but if Mr. 
Sumner was found too firmly fixed, Mr. Schurz was 
to be replaced as a member of the committee ; or, as 
a final resort, Mr. Patterson of New Hampshire, if 
Mr. Schurz also proved immovable. The last change 
was finally decided upon ; but, when the committee as 
thus altered was reported in caucus, Sumner objected. 
Senatorial courtesy then prevailing, the scheme was 
for the time being abandoned.^ Charles Sumner was, 
however, yet to learn that, in civil as in military life, 
Ulysses S. Grant was a very persistent man. 

Two weeks later Mr. Sumner did what he had 
hitherto refrained from doing. Up to this time he 
had expressed himself with characteristic freedom, 
denouncing the President in conversation and in 
letter ,2 but he had not opposed him in debate. He 
now openly broke ground against him in a carefully 
prepared speech on the Dominican question. In the 
position he took, he was probably right. He would 
certainly be deemed so in the light of the views then 
generally taken of the world-mission of the United 
States ; but that was during the country's earlier 
period, and before the universality of its mission 
was so plainly disclosed as it now is. Whether cor- 
rect, however, in his position or not, his manner and 
language were characteristic, and unfortunate. The 

1 Pierce : Sumner, vol. iv. p. 456. 

2 lb., pp. 448, 454; Forum, vol. xxiv. p. 406. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 171 

question on both sides had become personal ; the feel- 
ing uncontrollable : and, throughout his career, — 
early and late, — Mr. Sumner did not appreciate the " ^va^vc-t/^'^-'""'^ 
significance of words. He failed to appreciate them 
in the speech now made, entitled by him " Naboth's 
Vineyard," wherein he accused the President of seek- 
ing surreptitiously to commit the country to a '' dance 
of blood." On the 9th of January, less than three 
weeks after this outbreak, the papers relating to the 
recall of Mr. Motley were, by order of the President, 
sent to the Senate. This was on a Monday ; and 
it was on the following Sunday morning that Mr. 
Fish called on Mr. Sumner by arrangement, with 
the Sir Jolm Rose memorandum. The climax was 
then at hand. Among the papers relating to the 
removal of Mr. Motley was one in which the Secre- 
tary had referred to some unnamed party as being 
" bitterly, personally, and vindictively hostile " to the 
President ; while, in another passage, he had spoken 
of the President as a man than whom none " would 
look with more scorn and contempt upon one who 
uses the words and the assurances of friendship to 
cover a secret and determined purpose of hostility." 

The allusion was unmistakably to Sumner. It was 
so accepted by him. There is nothing in the record 
which justifies it ; and, while it indicates a deep per- 
sonal feeling on the part of Mr. Fish, it was unneces- 
sarily offensive. Mr. Sumner had a right to take 
offence at it ; nor, indeed, could he well help so doing. 
On the other hand, Mr. Fish was not improbably 
equally incensed at some denunciatory remarks of 
Mr. Sumner's brought to his ears by White House 
intermediaries, then abnormally active. However this 



172 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

may be, and the record is silent on the point, the 
Motley papers were laid before the Senate on the 
very Monday upon which Sir John Rose reached 
Washington. A week from Tuesday, the eighth day 
after the transmission of those papers, the memoran- 
dum of Mr. Sumner of January 17 reached the Secre- 
tary. The break between the two officials was com- 
plete ; they were no longer on sjDeaking terms. 

January was now more than half over, and, in six 
weeks' time, the Forty-first Congress was to pass out 
of existence. When, on the 4th of March, the new 
Congress came into being, the committees of the Sen- 
ate would have to be reappointed, and, of necessity, 
largely remodelled, nineteen newly elected members of 
the body replacing a similar number whose terms had 
expired. Mr. Sumner's dejDOsition from the chairman- 
ship he would then have filled through five successive 
Congresses had meanwhile become a fixed idea in the 
presidential mind ; ^ and Secretary Fish shaped his 
course accordingly. On the 24th of January he again 
met Sir John Rose. A week had intervened since 
the receipt of Mr. Sumner's memorandum, and dur- 
ing that week the Secretary had been holding consul- 
tations with Mr. Sumner's senatorial colleagues ; of 
coarse, absolutely ignoring that gentleman. While 
so doing, he had carefully informed himself as to the 
attitude of the Democratic minority in the chamber, 

1 Mr. Davis says {Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims.^ p. 67) : — " Mr. 
Fish and the President thought it unwise to make the change. 
When, however, this ultimatum [the Rose memorandum of Janu- 
ary 17] was received from Mr. Sumner, Mr. Fish, with the assent of 
the President, withdrew all opposition." But, elsewhere (76., p. 130), 
Mr. Davis says, " No Senator has ever told me what induced the Sen- 
ate to make the change." 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 173 

now increased to seventeen in a body numbering in 
all seventy-four. Mr. Bayard and Mr. Thurman were 
the recognized leaders of the opj)osition ; and, from 
both, he received assurances of support. Upon the 
other side of the chamber, the administration Sen- 
ators could, of course, be counted on ; and through 
their leaders, Messrs. Conkling and Edmunds, it was 
well known that they were ripe for revolt against the 
Sumner committee-regime. The personal relations of 
Mr. Sumner with General Grant and Mr. Fish, or 
rather the absence of all personal relations between 
the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations and the President and Secretary of State, 
was matter of common knowledge. The several Sen- 
ators consulted were also informed as to Mr. Sum- 
ner's attitude towards the proposed negotiations, and 
a carefully drawn memorandum in relation thereto 
was submitted to them by the Secretary. No pre- 
caution was neglected. 1 

Charles Sumner was a man with whom it is difficult 
to deal historically. His is a large figure ; senatorially 
viewed, perhaps none is larger. He projects himself 
from the canvas. In referring also to any considera- 
ble public character, it is not easy to call attention to 
his foibles and limitations, as affecting results, without 
appearing to lay undue emphasis upon them. It is 
especially so in the case of Mr. Sumner ; for he was a 
man of intense individuality, and, as he grew in years, 
his foibles were always more in evidence. In the mat- 
ters now under consideration, also, they seem to have 
affected his public conduct and his relations with others 
to a peculiar extent ; and this was, perhaps, to be in a 
^ Moore : International Arbitrations, vol. i. pp. 525, 529. 



174 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

degree accounted for by the fact that he had then re- 
cently passed through a most trying domestic experi- 
ence, well calculated to disturb a temperament never 
disposed to placidity.^ Though highly respected, Mr. 
Sumner was not a favorite among his colleagues. In 
many respects a man of engaging personality, kind, 
sympathetic, and considerate, essentially refined and 
easy of approach, he could not brook sustained opposi- 
tion on any question which to his mind involved the 
moral issue. Recognizing superiority in no one, he then 
became restive in presence of any assertion of equality. 
The savor of incense was sweet in his nostrils ; while he 
did not exact deference, habitual deference was in later 
life essential to his good-will. Among his colleagues, 
especially those not politically opposed but more or less 
lacking in sympathy, his unconsciously overbearing 
habit when what was ever present to his mind as " the 
cause " was involved almost necessarily made him ene- 
mies. In those days, also, " the cause " was never quies- 
cent ; and, when intent upon it, Mr. Sumner's language 
became rhetorically intemperate and his temper impla^ 
cable. These terms seem strong ; and yet they are not 
so strong as those used of hun at the time by men of his 
own age, and friends of years' standing. One instance 
will suffice. " Sumner," wrote R. H. Dana not long 
before, " has been acting like a madman ... in the 
positions he took, the arguments he advanced, and the 
language he used to the twenty out of twenty-five Re- 
publican Senators who differed from him. If I coidd 
hear that he was out of his head from opium or even 
New England rum, not indicating a habit, I should be 

1 See on this point the sug-gestive incident mentioned by Mr. Davis: 
Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, p. 55. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 175 

relieved. Mason, Davis, and Slidell were never so in- 
solent and overbearing as he was, and his arguments, 
his answers of questions, were boyish or crazy, I don't 
know which." Again, in June, 1861, the same excel- 
lent authority describes, in the famiharity of private 
correspondence, the Senator as coming from Washing- 
ton "full of denunciation of Mr. Seward. . . . He 
gave me some anxiety, as I listened to him, lest he 
was in a heated state of brain.^ He cannot talk five 
minutes without bringing in Mr. Seward, a^nd always 
in bitter terms of denunciation. . . . His mission is 
to expose and denounce Mr. Seward, and into that 
mission he puts all his usual intellectual and moral 
energy." Two years later Mr. Dana was in Wash- 
ington. In the interim he, an old personal as well as 
poHtical friend, had ventured to question the Senator's 
policy. He now, as was his wont, at once called on 
Mr. Sumner, leaving his card. The call was not re- 
turned, nor did Mr. Dana hear anything from Mr. 
Sumner during the succeeding twenty days while in 
Washington, or see him, except once when, by chance, 
they encountered each other at a friend's house. All 
this was characteristic of the man. To any question 
in which he was deeply concerned, there was but one 
side.^ As it was his mission to denounce Seward in 

1 Mr. J. C. Bancroft Davis, under similar circumstances, records the 
same impression. " Mr. Sumner seemed to be in a state of great ex- 
citement. His tremulous manner and loud voice made upon me the 
impression that his mind was affected." {Mr. Fish and the Alabama 
Claims, p. 32.) 

2 " Once, in later days, when I argued with him that opponents 
might be sincere, and that there was some reason on the other side, 
he thundered in reply, ' Upon such a question there is no other side.' " 
(Eulogy of Georg'e William Curtis, Massachusetts Memorial of Charles 
Sumner, p. 148.) " But at the time of [the San Domingo affair], all he 



176 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

1861, ten years later it was his mission to denounce 
Grant ; and he fulfilled it. As he " gave the cold 
shoidder" to Dana in 1863, so he gave it to Fish in 
1871.1 Consequently, in 1871, more than half the 
body of which he was in consecutive service the senior 
member were watching for a chance to humiliate him. 
As Mr. Fish looked at it, Mr. Sumner had now 
taken his position squarely across the path the Admin- 
istration proposed to pursue on a momentous question 
of foreign policy, — a government measure. He 
understood, or thought he understood, Mr. Sumner's 
mental processes, and his methods of parliamentary 
action. Assuredly, he was not without recent experi- 
ence of them. He shaped his course accordingly ; de- 
ciding to give, in the first place, to those now possibly 
being invited to another diplomatic humiliation, frank 
and full notice of the difficulties they must expect to 
encounter, and the danger they would incur. There 
was to be no ground on which to rest against him a 
future charge of deception, or even of suppression of 
facts. So, at his next meeting with Sir John Rose on 
the 24th of January, — a meeting which took place at 
the Secretary's house, and not at the State Depart- 
ment, — Mr. Fish began by quietly, but in confidence, 
handing Sir John the Sumner hemispheric flag-with- 
drawal memorandum. Sir John read it ; and, having 



said was so deeply grounded in his feeling and conscience, that it 
was for him difficult to understand how others could form different 
conclusions. ... It was difficult for him to look at a question or 
problem from more than one point of view, and to comprehend its 
different bearings, its complex relations with other questions or pro- 
blems ; and to that one point of view he was apt to subject all other 
considerations." (Eulogy of Carl Schurz, 7^., pp. 241, 255.) 

1 Pierce : Sumner, vol. iv. p. 468 ; Adams : B. H. Dana, vol. ii. p. 265. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 177 

done so, returned it, apparently without comment. 
Mr. Fish then informed him that, after full consid- 
eration, the government had determined to enter on 
the proposed negotiation ; and, should Great Britain 
decide to send out special envoys to treat on the basis 
agreed upon, the Administration would spare no effort 
" to secure a favorable result, even if it involved a con- 
flict with the chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations in the Senate."^ 

The die was cast. So far as the chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was concerned, 
the man of Donelson, of Vicksburg, and of Appomattox 
now had his eye coldly fixed upon him. As to the 
settlement with Great Britain, it was to be effected 
on business principles, and according to precedent ; 
" national " claims and hemispheric flag-withdrawals 
were at this point summarily dismissed from consid- 
eration. 

The purport of the last interview between Mr. Fish 
and Sir John Rose was immediately cabled by the 
latter to London ; and, during the week that ensued, 
the submarine wires were busy. The Gladstone Min- 
istry, thorouglily educated by fast-passing continental 
events, — France prostrate and Germany defiant, — 
was now, heart and soul, intent on extricating Great 
Britain from the position in which it had, ten years 
before, put itseK under a previous administration of 
which Mr. Gladstone had been a prominent, as well 
as an active and an influential, member. Before the 
seven days had expired an agreement was reached ; 
and, on the 1st of February, Sir Edward Thornton 
notified Secretary Fish of the readiness of his gov- 
ernment to send a special mission to Washington 

^ Moore : International Arbitrations, vol. i. pp. 528-530. 



178 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

empowered to treat on all questions at issue between 
the two countries. The papers were duly submitted 
to Congress, and, on the 9th of February, President 
Grant sent to the Senate the names of five persons, 
designated as commissioners to represent the United 
States in the proj)osed negotiation. The nominations 
were promptly confirmed. The question was now a 
practical one : — Would Great Britain humble its pride 
so far as to avail itself of the chance of extrica- 
tion thus opened ? — and, if it did humble its pride 
to that extent, could the administration of President 
Grant so shape the negotiation as to get the United 
States out of the position in which Mr. Sumner had 
partially succeeded in putting it? His more than 
possible opposition to any settlement at that time had 
to be reckoned with ; if necessary, overborne. 

For present purposes, it is needless to enter into the 
details of the negotiation which ensued. If not fa- 
miliar history, I certainly have no newjight to throw on 
it. Under the skilful business guidance of Mr. Fish, 
the settlement moved quietly and rapidly to its fore- 
ordained conclusion. It is, however, still curious to 
study, between the lines of the record, the extent to 
which the Sumner memorandum influenced results, 
and how it in the end only just failed to accomplish 
its author's purpose. It rested among Mr. Fish's 
private papers, a bit of diplomatic dynamite, the ex- 
istence of which was known to few, and mentioned by 
no one. Not a single allusion is to be found to it in 
the debates, the controversies, or the correspondence 
of the time. Mr. Pierce, in his life of Sumner, ear- 
nestly combats ^ Mr. Bancroft Davis's statement ^ that 

1 Pierce: Sumner, vol. iv. p. 481. 

2 Davis : Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, p. 137. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 179 

certain Senators were fully, if confidentially, advised 
of the existence of the memorandum and of the atti- 
tude of Mr. Sumner. In this he is clearly in error. ^ 
At least four Senators knew of both, but, not without 
reason, seem to have been afraid of the former. The 
danger, of course, lay in the direct and forcible appeal 
to Fenianism contained in the memorandum ; for the 
Irish-Americans then constituted a much more for- 
midable political factor than now, and they were in a 
higlily inflammatory condition. The echoes of the 
last raid on the Dominion had hardly died away in the 
press,2 and it would not have been a difficult task, es- 
pecially for Mr. Sumner, to have excited an outburst 
of Irish- American feeling which would have so affected 
a minority at least of the Senate as effectually to seal 
the fate of any treaty. In view of this fact, George 
F. Edmunds of Vermont, then serving in his second 
senatorial term, and one of those in Mr. Fish's confi- 
dence and on whom he most depended, had good cause 
subsequently to allude in a somewhat mysterious way 
to the Sumner propositions as " most astonishing and 
extravagant, . . . the mere statement of [which] 
would have put an end to all negotiations at once." ^ 
As a rule. United States Senators have not been re- 
garded as, among mortals, exceptionally discreet or 
secretive. In this case, however, they proved so. 
Not a lisp was heard outside of the Senate doors, or 
presumably inside of them, as respects either Fenian- 

^ Moore : International Arbitrations, vol. i. p. 529. 

2 Papers Relating to the Treaty of Washington (1872), vol. ii. p. 258. 
The last Fenian move on the Dominion, calling for action on the part 
of the United States government, occurred as late as October, 1871. 

^ Memorial Address before the Legislature of New York, April 5, 
1894, p. 47. 



180 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

ism or British hemispheric flag-withdrawals. Yet, 
when it came to the preparation of what is known as 
" the American case " for the Geneva Arbitration, there 
can be little doubt that the knowledge of Mr. Sum- 
ner's attitude, and the desire to forestall the effect of 
any possible later appeal to the Irish- American element, 
contributed sensibly to that extreme presentation of 
national injuries, indirect claims, and consequential 
damages which, in the following autumn, startled 
Great Britain from its propriety, and brought the 
treaty to the verge of rejection. Had it led to that 
result, the possible consequences might now, did space 
permit, be interesting to consider ; but such a result, 
whether an advantage or otherwise to the world at 
large, would have been a singular tribute to the influ- 
ence of Charles Sumner. In all human probability, 
also, a calamity to Great Britain. 

But to return to the narrative. General Grant was 
now handhng a campaign. He did it in character- 
istic fashion. His opponent and his objective were 
to him clear, and he shaped his plan of operations 
accordingly. So rapidly did events move, so ready 
ripe for action were all concerned, that the Joint High, 
Commission, as it was called, organized in Washington 
on the 27th of February, exactly seven weeks from 
the arrival there of Sir John Rose. On the 8th of 
the following May, the treaty was signed ; and, on the < 
10th, the President sent it to the Senate. It was at 
once referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. 
Mr. Sumner was, however, no longer chairman of that 
committee. On the 8th of March, — two months be- 
fore, — the negotiators were struggling with the vexed 
question of indirect claims, Mr. Sumner's special sen- 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 181 

atorlal thunder ; and, on the day following, at a Sen- 
ate Republican caucus then held, he was deposed. As 
the story has been told in all possible detail, it is need- 
less here to describe what then occurred. The step 
taken, like the situation because of which it was taken, 
was one almost without precedent, and there is reason 
to conclude that it had been decided upon in the coun- 
cils of the Administration Senators, acting in har- 
mony with inspiration from the White House, quite 
irrespective of the fate of any possible treaty which 
might result from negotiations then in progress. How- 
ever that may be, its complete justification can be 
found in facts now loiown in connection with that 
negotiation. Upon certain points there is no longer 
room for controversy. As already pointed out, in the 
conduct of the foreign policy of the country, the chair- 
man of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
was, and is, virtually, and in everything but name, a 
part of the Administration. He is, or should be, its 
confidential mouthpiece, both in dealing with the com- 
mittee, and upon the floor of the Senate sitting in 
executive session. He should accordingly be wholly 
and intimately in the confidence of the State Depart- 
ment on all questions of foreign policy. No other 
chairman of any congressional committee is similarly 
placed ; for, as respects the treaty -making power, the 
Senate is not a legislative body, it is the council of 
the Executive. In March, 1871, a settlement with 
Great Britain had become a cardinal feature, — it 
might be said the cardinal feature in the President's 
foreign policy, as represented by his official organ, the 
State Department. With the head of that department 
the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign 



182 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

Relations was no longer upon speaking terms ; while, in 
private, his denunciation of him and of the President 
was loud and limitless. That chairman had, moreover, 
been consulted as to the negotiation before it was ini- 
tiated, and, in reply, had signified his opinion that the 
withdrawal of the British flag from this hemisphere, 
including provinces and islands, could not be aban- 
doned as a condition, or preliminary, of settlement. 
In a private letter to Dr. Francis Lieber at this time, 
Mr. Fish wrote, — " Sumner says that, before entering 
into any conference. Great Britain must withdraw her 
flag from 'this hemisphere, including the provinces, 
and the islands ' (Qwcere, Belize, Guiana, Falkland Is- 
lands, Jamaica, Trinidad, etc., as well as the Bahamas 
and Bermudas ?) ; also, that ' we cannot afford to 
accept admission of liability ' for the Alabama claim, 
as that would ' dishonor ' the other claims." With 
the Senate fate of the Johnson-Clarendon Convention 
fresh in memory, this memorandum of the chairman 
of the committee Mr. Fish had privately communi- 
cated to the confidential agent of the British govern- 
ment. Under the circumstances, so doing was on his 
part right and proper. After its experience over 
the Johnson-Clarendon Convention, that government 
of right ought to be — indeed, had to be — advised of 
this danger before being invited to enter upon a nego- 
tiation which might result in another mortifying rebuff. 
In making his unofficial communication of it, the Sec- 
retary had intimated to the agent that, shoidd Great 
Britain still decide to proceed with the negotiation, 
the Administration would spare no effort to secure a 
favorable result, " even if it involved a conflict " with 
Mr. Sumner. To any one who knew the President 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 183 

and liis methods, mental and military, such a committal 
admitted of no misconstruction. Unquestionably, the 
contents of Mr. Simmer's memorandum were weU 
known to every one of the British plenipotentiaries, 
as also was the pledge of the Administration in con- 
nection therewith. This premised, the course now 
j)ursued was more than justifiable ; it was necessary, 
as well as right.^ For the Administration, in face of 
the notice thus given, to have permitted the continu- 
ance of Mr. Sumner in his chairmanship, if to prevent 
was in its power, would have been worse than child- 
ish; it would have distinctly savored of bad faith with 
the British negotiators: and neither General Grant 
nor Mr. Fish was ever chargeable with bad faith, any 
more than the record of the former was indicative of 
a proneness to indecisive or childish courses of pro- 
cedure. 

On the 9th of March, therefore, in accordance with 
the understood wishes of the President, Mr. Sumner 
was deposed by his senatorial colleagues from the chair- 
manship of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions. But when, some two months later, the treaty was 
reported back to the Senate by the committee as now 
organized, with a favorable recommendation, the ques- 
tion of interest was as to the course Mr. Sumner would 
pursue. Would he acquiesce ? It was well under- 
stood that on all matters of foreign policy the Senate, 
if only from long habit, gave a more than attentive ear 
to his utterances. Almost daily, after the treaty was 
transmitted to the Senate and until it was reported 
back from committee, intimations from this person and 
from that — callers on Mr. Sumner, or guests at his 

1 See Appendix F, infra, pp. 225-244. 



184 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

table — reached the Department of State, indicating 
what the deposed chairman proposed to do, or not to 
do. One day Judge Hoar, now serving as one of the 
Joint High Commissioners, would announce that Mr. 
Sumner had declared himself the evening before in 
favor of the treaty, and was preparing a speech ac- 
cordingly ; on the evening of the very day of this 
reassuring announcement another gentleman would 
come to Mr. Fish directly from Mr. Sumner's table 
to say that his host had just been criticising the 
treaty, and proposed to urge amendments. The Brit- 
ish commissioners were especially solicitous. They 
even went so far as to ignore their instructions to 
leave Washington as soon as possible after the treaty 
was signed. The Administration wished them to re- 
main there, as one of the Englishmen wrote, on the 
ground that they might be able to influence "par- 
ticular Senators, such as the Democrats and (still 
more) Sumner, over whom [the Administration has] 
no party control." Sir Stafford Northcote then goes 
on to say of Mr. Sumner, — " We have paid him a 
great deal of attention since he has been deposed, and 
I think he is much pleased at being still recognized 
as a power." ^ Sir Stafford might well say that they 
had paid him a great deal of attention. Mr. Sumner's 
egotism and love of flattery were tolerably well under- 
stood ; and the Englishmen, realizing that he was 
" very anxious to stand well with England," humored 
him to the top of his bent. Lord de Grey, for instance, 

1 Sir Stafford Northcote added, — "He certainly is [a power], for 
though I think the Government could beat him in the Senate, he could 
stir up a great deal of bad feeling- in the country, if he were so 
minded." (Lang : Northcote, vol. ii. p. 23.) 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 185 

presently to be made Marquis of Ripon, the head of 

the British side of the commission, went out of his 

{ way to inform the deposed chairman that, without his 

i speech on the Johnson-Clarendon Convention, "the 

treaty could not have been made, and that he [Lord 

I de Grrey] worked by it as a chart." Nor were the 

American commissioners less solicitous, though they 

went about it in a more quiet way. For, hardly was 

the ink of the signatures to the treaty dry before Judge 

Hoar called at Mr. Sumner's door with a copy, which 

, he commended to the Senator's favorable consideration 

j " as meeting on all substantial points the objections 

he had so well urged against the Johnson-Clarendon 

■ Convention." 

( That Mr. Sumner, had he, on consideration, con- 
, eluded that it was his duty to oppose the ratification 
j of the treaty, could, placed as he now was, have secured 
! its rejection, is not probable. As chairman of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations it would almost un- 
i questionably have been in his power so to do ; not 
I directly, perhaps, but through the adoption of plausi- 
ble amendments, — that practice of " customary disfig- 
\ urement," according to President Cleveland, which 
! , treaties undergo " at the hands of the United States 
I Senate." ^ This course Mr. Fish apprehended. On 
I the 18th of May, Mr. Trumbull, then Senator from 
I Illinois, and deservedly influential, called at the De- 
! partment to inquire whether an amendment would 
jeopardize the treaty. In reply he was assured that 
I any amendment, however trivial, would, in all prob- 
ability, destroy the treaty, as it would enable Great 

1 See paper of A. M. Low, " The Oligarchy of the Senate," North 
American Review (February, 1902), vol. 174, p. 242. 



186 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

Britain either to withdraw entirely, or, in any event, 
to propose counter-amendments. In point of fact, Mr. 
Sumner, while advocating approval, did offer amend- 
ments ; ^ but, no longer chairman of the committee, he 
was shorn of his strength. Up to the very time of vot- 
ing, he was enigmatical. He would intimate a sense of 
great responsibility, inasmuch as he realized the extent 
to which the country was looking to him for guidance ; 
and he would then suggest doubts. His mind was not 
clear, etc., etc. On the direct issue of approval the 
solid phalanx of administration Senators would un- 
questionably have been arrayed against him ; and, on 
the Democratic side of the chamber, he was far from 
popular. None the less, had he even remotely re- 
sembled his contemporary then in the House of Repre- 
sentatives, Benjamin F. Butler, 2 it would have been in 
his power, playing on the Hibernian element, and the 
anti-English feeling then very rife, to have made much 
trouble. The treaty bears distinct marks of having been 
framed with this in view. In its provisions, not only 
did Mr. Sumner find the ground in great degree cut 
away from under him, but he could not help realizing 
that, in view of his speech on the Johnson-Clarendon 
Convention, he stood to a certain extent committed. 
It was not open for him to take the hemispheric flag- 
withdrawal attitude. So doing was impossible. He 
had not taken it before ; and, though his reasons for 
not taking it then were obvious, to take it now would, 
under the circumstances, inevitably expose him to ridi- 
cule. He was thus fairly and plainly circumvented. 

^ Pierce : Sumner, vol. iv. pp. 489, 490. 

2 General Butler subsequently made two public speeches in opposi- 
tion to the Treaty of Washington. 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 187 

But, more and most of all, Charles Sumner was, be 
it ever said, no demagogue. Somewhat of a doctri- 
naire and more of an agitator, he was still in his way 
an enlightened statesman, with aspirations for America 
and mankind not less generous than perfervid. His 
egoism was apparent ; nor has his rhetoric stood the 
test of time. A hearty hater, and unsparing of de- 
nunciation, he hated and denounced on public grounds 
only ; but his standards were invariably high, and he 
was ever actuated by a strong sense of obligation. 
His course now was creditable. In his belief, an un- 
surpassed opportunity had been lost. A rejection of 
the proposed adjustment, manifestly fair so far as it 
went, could, however, result only in keeping alive a 
source of acute irritation between two great nations. 
That involved a heavy responsibility ; a responsibility 
not in Mr. Sumner^s nature to assume. Accordingly, 
he accepted the inevitable ; and he accepted it not 
ungracefully. General Grant numbered him with 
Buckner, Pemberton, Johnston, Bragg, and Lee, — 
among his vanquished opponents. As to Mr. Fish, 
the two were never afterwards reconciled ; but the 
Secretary now had his way.^ 

Into the subsequent difficulties encountered by Sec- 
retary Fish in his work of saving Great Britain in 
spite of Great Britain's self, it is needless to enter. 
Suffice it to say they can all be traced back to the 
positions assumed by Mr. Sumner in April, 1869. 
As already pointed out, it was obviously from an 
over-desire to forestall Mr. Sumner that Secretary 
Fish's Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Bancroft 
Davis, a little later jeopardized the whole treaty by the 

1 See Appendix G, pp. 245-255. 



188 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

extreme grounds taken on the subject of national in- 
juries, indirect claims, and consequential damages, and 
the somewhat intemperate way in which the same were 
urged. It is wholly unnecessary here to enter into 
the question of responsibility for this portion of what 
was known as " The Case of the United States." In 
preparing it, Mr. Davis unquestionably acted under 
instructions from Secretary Fish, and in cooperation 
with the very able counsel who had the matter in 
charge. Whatever was done by him was done subject 
to approval ; and was, undoubtedly, fully considered 
before being approved. Those thus responsible for 
the presentation of the case naturally felt that, with 
Mr. Sumner's historic indictment of the Johnson-Clar- 
endon Convention fresh in memory, the full record of 
grievance had to be set forth, or the American people 
might resent a tacit abandonment of what they had 
been taught to regard as their just demands. With 
an eye to this possibility, — Sumner always in mind, 
— Mr. Fish had at an early stage of the negotiations 
significantly intimated to his colleagues that " he sup- 
posed it was pretty well agreed that there were some 
claims which would not be allowed by the arbitrators, 
but he thought it best to have them passed upon." ^ 
So, in avoiding the senatorial ScyUa, the counsel of the 
United States subsequently brought the ark of settle- 
ment squarely up against the British Charybdis. Six 
years later, when both Mr. Sumner and Mr. Motley 
were dead,^ General Grant made contemptuous refer- 

1 Davis : Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, p. 77. 

2 In the interview at Edinburgh, published in the New York Her- 
ald of September 25, 1877. Another conversation with Grant on this 
topic is g-iven by Young in his Around the World with Grant (vol. ii. p. 
279). It illustrates the utter worthlessness of unverified recollections 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 189 

ence to the " indirect damage humbug," as he then 
phrased it ; and, as set forth in the American " case " 
presented at Geneva, it was a " humbug," — a by no 
means creditable " humbug." As such it had by some 

as a basis for the statement of historic details. He was at the time 
of this interview on a steamship in Asiatic waters, far from books, 
records, and memoranda. He is reported as then saying : — " When 
Mr. Fish prepared our case against England, and brought it to me for 
approval, I objected to the indirect claim feature. Mr. Fish said he 
entirely agreed with rae, but it was necessary to consider Mr. Sum- 
ner. Mr. Sumner was at the head of the committee in the Senate 
that had charge of foreign affairs. He was not cordial to the treaty. 
. . . Mr. Sumner had also laid great stress upon indirect claims. 
Not to consider them in our case, therefore, would offend him. . . . 
The argument of Mr. Fish convinced me, but somewhat against my 
will. I suppose I consented because I was sincerely anxious to be 
on terms with Sumner." It is not easy to conceive anything much 
more mistaken than these utterances. Grant had quarrelled with 
Sumner, and ceased to be on speaking terms with him, a year before 
the negotiations, which preceded the treaty, were initiated. AVhen 
the case for the Board of Arbitration under the treaty was prepared, 
Mr. Sumner had ceased to be chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations. He had spoken and voted for the treaty ; and, 
while the treaty was no longer at issue, neither President nor Secre- 
tary cared to conciliate him. The indirect claims were inserted in 
the case by direction of Fish, and for reasons which he put on record, 
wholly at variance with those attributed to him by Grant. Finally, 
Grant, as President, never objected to the claims, and, subsequently, 
was wholly unwilling that they should be withdrawn from the con- 
sideration of the Geneva tribunal. Indeed, in February, 1872, when 
it seemed probable that Great Britain would, because of our insist- 
ence on those claims, refuse to go on at Geneva, he actually wanted 
Secretary Fish to instruct Mr. Adams to remain at Geneva, and to 
sign the award alone should all the other arbitrators withdraw. It 
was necessary for Mr. Fish to call his attention to the fact that, under 
the terms of the treaty, the award had to be signed by a majority of 
the arbitrators. The suggestion of Mr. Adams remaining behind, 
after all the others were gone, and then proceeding to mulct Great 
Britain in satisfactory damages was again suggestive of op^ra bouffe 
performances and Gerolstein methods. There can, however, be no 
doubt that Grant was, in 1879, giving a perfectly truthful statement 
of his recollection of the events of 1871. Merely, his recollection 
deceived him as to every particular. 



190 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

means to be got rid of ; and at Geneva it was, with 
general accej^tance, so got rid of.^ Be it always, how- 

1 There is, however, another side to the question of indirect claims 
as presented in the " case " at Geneva. It is well put in the follow- 
ing- extracts of a despatch from Secretary Fish to Minister Schenck, 
of April 23, 1872 {Papers relating to the Treaty of Washington (1872), 
vol. ii. pp. 475, 476) : — " Neither the Government of the United States, 
nor, so far as I can judge, any considerable number of the American 
people, have ever attached much importance to the so-called ' indirect 
claims,' oi' have ever expected or desired any award of damages on 
their account. . . . You will not fail to have noticed that through the 
whole of my correspondence we ask no damages on their account ; we 
only desire a judgment which will remove them for all future time as 
a cause of difference between the two Governments. In our opinion 
they have not been disposed of, and, unless disposed of, in some way, 
they will remain to be brought up at some future time to the disturb- 
ance of the harmony of the two Governments. ... In the correspond- 
ence, I have gone as far as prudence will allow in intimating- that we 
neither desired nor expected any pecuniary award, and that we should 
be content with an award that a State is not liable in pecuniary 
damages for the indirect results of a failure to observe its neutral 
obligations. It is not the interest of a country situate as are the 
United States, with their large extent of sea-coast, a small Navy, and 
smaller internal police, to have it established that a nation is liable in 
damages for the indirect, remote, or consequential results of a failure 
to observe its neutral duties. This government expects to be in the 
future, as it has been in the past, a neutral much more of the time 
than a belligerent. It is strange that the British Government does 
not see that the interests of this g-overnment do not lead them to 
expect or to desire a judgment on the ' indirect claims ; ' and that they 
fail to do justice to the sincerity of purpose, in the interests of the 
future harmony of the two nations, which has led the United States 
to lay those claims before the tribunal at Geneva." 

The above contains a sufficient defence of the presentation of the 
" claims." The defect in the American " case " was rather one of 
taste. Its contentions were advanced with an aggressiveness of tone, 
and attorney-like smartness, more appropriate to the wrang-lings of a 
quarter-sessions court than to pleadings before a grave international 
tribunal. In this respect they do not compare favorably with the 
British papers. As Sir Roundell Palmer truly says, in these last 
"no pains were spared to avoid the use of any language which could 
wound the susceptibilities, or offend the high spirit of a generous 
nation. ... In all these respects, the American ' Case ' was in the 
most marked contrast with our own. ... Its tone was acrimonious, 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 191 

ever, remembered, the vulgarized bill tben presented 
was not the sublimated balance-sheet Charles Sumner 
had in mind. His was no debit-and-credit account, 
reduced to dollars and cents, and so entered in an 
itemized judgment ; nor was this better understood 
by any one than by President Grant. It is but fair 
to assume that, in the rapid passage of events between 
1870 and 1877, the facts now disclosed had been by 
him forgotten. 

In Wemyss Keid's " Life of William E. Forster " 
is a chapter devoted to this subject. I think it may 
not unfairly be said that Mr. Forster now saved the 
treaty. In the first outburst of indignation over the 
resurrection in the American " case " of Sumner's self- 
evolved equities and incalculable claims, a special 
meeting of the British cabinet was summoned, at 
which a portion of the members were for withdrawing 
forthwith from the arbitration. Though he himself, 
' unadvised as to the real motive for so emphasizing the 
I demand on account of national injuries, held the whole 
( thing to be a case of " sharp practice," yet Mr. Fors- 
j ter counselled a moderate and prudent course, — as 
I he put it, " a cool head and a cool temper wanted ; " 
' adding, " I never felt any matter so serious." He 
I then drew up a special memorandum for the use of 
j his colleagues, looking to such action as would be most 
j likely to leave open the way to an understanding. 
I Upon this all the ministers, save four, were against 
j him. Mr. Forster next met Mr. Adams, then pass- 
1 ing through London on his way home from the pre- 

totally wanting- in international courtesy." {Memorials Personal and 
Political 18G5-95 ; vol. i. p. 229.) The truth, as well as the con- 
tained force, of this censure cannot be gainsaid. 



192 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

liminary meeting of the tribunal of arbitration at 
Geneva, he being a member of it ; and Mr. Adams 
fairly told him that, for Great Britain, it was a case 
of now or never. If, Mr. Adams said. Great Britain 
insisted on the absolute exclusion of the indii^ct 
claims, America must withdraw ; and, if it did, " the 
arbitration was at an end, and America would never 
make another treaty." 

During: those anxious weeks the British cabinet 
was the scene of more than one heated discussion ; 
and, so severe was the tension, the very existence of 
the Ministry was threatened. On the afternoon of 
April 24, Forster intimated to General Schenck, the 
American Minister, that, unless something was done, 
he and the Marquis of Ripon "could not keep the 
treaty alive." Mr. Adams was now once more in 
London on his way to Geneva, and Mr. Forster again 
saw him, receiving the assurance that " Fish and the 
President had the Senate well in hand ; " yet, this 
notwithstanding, when an article supplemental to the 
treaty, obviating the cause of trouble, was agreed on 
and submitted to the Senate, that body so amended 
it before ratification that the English government 
professed itself unable to concur. It seemed as if 
the last chance of a pacific settlement was about to 
vanish. 

On the 15th of June, the Court of Arbitration met 
at Geneva, pursuant to adjournment. Everything was 
in the air. At Geneva, however, the policy of the 
State Department was understood ; and, intrusted to 
\ experienced hands, it was, at the proper time, skil- 
fully forwarded. A way out of the last and most 
serious of all the dangers which imperilled the settle- 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 193 

ment was thus devised, and the arbitration moved 
on thenceforth upon common-sense business lines to a 
practical result. 

Times change, and with them the estimate in which 
nations hold issues. Recollecting the levity, at times 
marked by more than a trace of sarcasm and petulance, 
with which the British Foreign Secretary had received 
our earliest reclamations because of injuries inflicted 
on our mercantile marine by British built commerce- 
destroyers, I cannot refrain, before closing, from a 
few words descriptive of the very different mood in 
which the Ministry then in power awaited tidings of 
the final results reached at Geneva. It was the 15th 
of June, 1872. The treaty was in question. The 
Court of Arbitration met at Geneva at noon ; in Lon- 
don, at the same hour, a meeting of the cabinet was 
in session, — a meeting almost unique in character. 
The members waited anxiously for tidings. For two 
hours they attended listlessly to routine parliamentary 
work ; and then took a recess. When, at 3 o'clock, 
the time for reassembling came, no advices had been 
received. Thereupon, a further adjournment was 
taken until 5.30. Still no telegram. All subjects 
of conversation being now exhausted, the members 
sat about, or faced each other in silence. It was a 
curious situation for a ministry. Had England hu- 
miliated herself by an expression of fruitless regret ? 
Those present contemplated the situation in the true 
parliamentary spirit. " The opposition would snigger 
if they saw us," remarked one ; and the speaker soon 
after sent for a chess-board, and he and Mr. Forster 
took chairs out on the terrace in front of the cabinet- 



194 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

room, and there sat down to a game, using one of the 
chairs as a table. Three games were played; but 
still no tidings. So the company dispersed for din- 
ner. As the tribunal adjourned over until Monday, 
no tidings came that night ; the method of procedure 
had, however, been arranged, and Mr. Fish communi- 
cated with. His assent to what was proposed came 
immediately ; and meanwhile Mr. Forster was bestir- 
ring himself in London to " urge help to Adams," and 
a " short, helpful telegram " was forwarded. " After 
all," wrote Mr. Forster that night, " this treaty, which 
has as many hves as a cat, will live." On the 
afternoon of the fourth subsequent day, this staunch 
friend of America and of peace scribbled, from his 
seat in the ministerial benches of the House of Com- 
mons, this note to his wife : " Hip, hip, hip, hooray ! the 
final settlement of the indirect claims came during 
questions to-day, and Gladstone announced it amid 
great cheers on our side and the disgust of the Tories. 
This is a good year now, whatever happens." It was 
the 20th of June, 1872, — one month over eleven 
years since the issuance of the famous proclamation. 
A heavy shadow was lifted from off the future of the 
British Empire. That it was thus lifted must in all 
historic truth be ascribed to Hamilton Fish. 

In discussing the developments of history, it is 
almost never worth while to waste time and ingenuity 
in philosophizing over what might have been. The 
course of past events was — as it was ! What the 
course of subsequent events would or might have 
been, had things at some crucial juncture gone other- 
wise than as they actually did go, no one can more 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 195 

tlian guess. Historical consequences are not less 
strange than remote. For instance, the lessons of 
our own War of Independence, closed six-score years 
ago, are to-day manifestly influencing the attitude 
and action of Great Britain throughout her system 
of dependencies. Should the system ever, as now 
proposed, assume a true federated form, that result, 
it may safely be asserted, will be largely due to the 
experience gained a century and a quarter ago on the 
North American continent, supplemented by that now 
being gained in South Africa. In view of the enor- 
mous strides made by science during the last third of 
a century, it cannot be assumed that, as respects war- 
fare on land or on sea, what was possible in 1863 
would be possible now. The entire globe was not 
then interlaced with electric wires, and it may well be 
that another Alabama is as much out of the range of 
future probabilities as a ship flying the black flag, 
with its skull and crossed bones, was outside of those 
of 1861. This, however, aside, it is instructive, as 
weU as interesting, to summarize the record which has 
now been recalled, and to consider the position in 
which Great Britain would to-day find itself but for 
the settlement effected and principles estabhshed by 
means of the Treaty of Washington. 

So far as the international situation is concerned, 
the analogy is perfect. Every rule of guidance appli- 
cable in our Civil War of 1861-65 is a fortiori 
applicable in the South African war of 1899-1902. 
The contention of Great Britain from 1861 to 1865 
was that every neutral nation is the final judge of 
its own international obligations ; and that, in her 
own case, no liability, moral or material, because of a 



196 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

violation of those obligations was incurred, no matter 
how scandalous the evasions might subsequently prove 
to have been, unless the legal advisers of the gov- 
ernment pronounced the ascertainable evidence of 
an intention to violate the law sufficient to sustain a 
criminal indictment. In view of the " lucrative " 
character of British shipbuilding, it was further main- 
tained that any closer supervision of that industry, 
and the exercise of " due diligence " in restraint of 
the construction of commerce-destroyers, would impose 
on neutrals a " most burdensome, and, indeed, most 
dangerous " liability. Finally, under the official con- 
struction of British municipal law, — a law pro- 
nounced by Her Majesty's government adequate to 
any emergency, — there was " no necessity that a naval 
belligerent should have a port, or even a seashore." 
The South African republics, for instance, "might 
unite together, and become a great naval power," 
using the ports of the United States as a base for their 
maritime operations. " Money only was required for 
the purpose." Then came the admission of Sir Ed- 
ward Thornton that, in case Great Britain were en- 
gaged in war, retaliations in kind for the Alabama and 
the Florida would naturally be in order ; commerce- 
destroyers would be fitted out on the Pacific coast as 
well as the Atlantic, in spite of all the United States 
government might, or could, do to prevent them ; and, 
with them, the high seas would swarm. War must 
follow ; and then Canada was " a source of weakness." 
On land and on sea. Great Britain was equally vul- 
nerable. 

From such a slough of despond was Great Britain 
extricated by the Treaty of Washington. That much 



THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 197 

is plain ; all else is conjecture. But it is still curious 
to consider what might well have now resulted had 
the United States, between 1869 and 1871, definitely 
for its guidance adopted the policy contemplated by 
Charles Sumner instead of that devised by Hamilton 
Fish, and had then persistently adhered to it. In the 
hands and under the direction of Mr. Sumner, the 
method he proposed to pursue to the end he had in 
mind might have proved both effective and, in the 
close, beneficent. So long as all things are possible — 
Who can say ? But Mr. Sumner died in 1874 ; and 
with him must have died the policy he proposed 
to inaugurate. Characteristically visionary, he was 
wrong in his estimate of conditions. He in no wise 
foresaw that backward swing of opinion's pendulum, 
from the " wretched colonies " estimate of 1870 to the 
Imperiwn et Lihertas conceptions of 1900. Mr. Fish, 
on the other hand, less imaginative, was more nearly 
right. He effected a practical settlement ; and, in so 
doing, he accomplished a large result. For to-day it 
is apparent to all who carefully observe that, as the 
direct outcome of the American Civil War, the world 
made a long stride in advance. It is a great mistake 
to speak of the Florida^ the Alabama^ and the Shen- 
andoah as " privateers." They were not. No " pri- 
vateer," in the proper acceptation of the word, ever 
sailed the ocean under the Confederate flag ; the com- 
merce-destroyers of that conflict, whether fitted out on 
the Mersey and Clyde, or in home ports, were, one and 
aU, government ships-of-war, owned and regularly com- 
missioned by the belligerent whose flag they flew, and 
commanded by its officers. Their single mission was, 
none the less, to burn, sink, and destroy private prop- 



198 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

erty on the high seas. They were engaged in no legiti- 
mate — no recognized operation of modern warfare ; 
unless it be legitimate for an invading army wholly to 
devastate a hostile country, leaving behind it a smok- 
ing desert only. On the ocean, the archaic principle 
still obtains that the immunity of private property 
from capture or destruction is confined to times of 
peace ; and, when war intervenes, mankind reverts to 
piracy, as the natural condition of maritime life. So 
the commerce-destroyers were not pirates, — common 
enemies of mankind ; but, as a result of the Treaty of 
Washington, a new and broad principle will inevitably, 
in some now not remote hereafter, replace this relic 
of barbarism, — the principle that private property, 
not contraband of war, is as much entitled to immunity 
from destruction or capture on water as on land. It 
is, accordingly, not unsafe even now to predict that the 
Florida^ the Alabama,, and the Shenandoah will go 
down in history, not as themselves pirates, but as the 
last lineal survivals of the black-flagged banditti of the 
olden time. If this so prove, it will in the close be 
apparent that the Treaty of Washington supplemented 
the Proclamation of Emancipation, rounding out and 
completing the work of our Civil War. The verdict of 
history on that great conflict must then be that the blood 
and treasure so freely poured out by us between Sum- 
ter and Appomattox were not expended in vain ; for, 
through it and because of it, the last vestiges of piracy 
vanished from the ocean, as slavery had before disap- 
peared from the land. 



APPENDIX Ai 

The grounds on which the British government 
proceeded in May, 1861, when it issued the proclama- 
tion of belligerency, were clearly set forth by Lord 
Palmerston in the course of a debate in the House 
of Commons, exactly four years later ; when, the Civil 
War having been brought to a close, the proclama- 
tion was withdrawn. Throughout that period Lord 
Palmerston was Premier ; and, on the 15th of May, 
1865, — the proclamation having been issued on May 
18, 1861, — he said, in answer to a question in the 
House, — " The President of the United States issued 
a proclamation declaring a blockade of all the coasts 
and certain ports of the Southern Confederacy, in 
accordance, as he said, with the law of nations. Now 
a blockade, according to the law of nations, is a bel- 
ligerent right, which can trnly accrue to a State which 
is at war ; and I need not say that if there is one bel- 
ligerent there must be tw^o at least, and therefore the 
fact of the President of the United States declaring 
that he established a blockade in accordance with the 
law of nations gave him all those rights which belong- 
to a belligerent in declaring a blockade — the right of 
capture, and condemnation, and the right of search 
in regard to neutral vessels. The British government 
had only one of two courses to pursue ; the first, to 
refuse to submit on the part of British vessels to 
1 See supra, p. 98. 



200 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

those belligerent rights, on the ground that there was 
no formal belligerent on the other side. That was 
not a course which was at all expedient to pursue, and 
therefore the only course left us was to acknowledge 
and submit to those belligerent rights ; and that neces- 
sarily involved the recognition that the other party 
was also a belligerent." . . . 

Looking at the facts in the case through a vista of 
forty years, and in connection with all accej)ted prin- 
ciples of international law, it must now be acknow- 
ledged that there was much truth, as well as sound 
legal sense, in the dictum on this point of Chief Jus- 
tice Cockburn, in his extremely unconventional " opin- 
ion " filed in connection with the Geneva award: — 
" The pretension that the Federal Government could 
treat the contest as a war, so as to declare a blockade, 
and thereby exclude neutral nations from access to 
the blockaded ports for the purpose of trade, while 
neutral governments, on the other hand, were not 
entitled to treat the war as one going on between two 
belligerent powers, is a proposition which is, I say it 
with all respect for Mr. Adams, really preposterous." ^ 
But to appreciate the full audacity of the positions on 
this point assumed by Secretary Seward, — the cor- 
rectness of which, largely through the utterances of 
Senator Sumner, yet has vogue as a species of Amer- 
ican article of historic faith, — it is necessary to bear 
certain facts and dates distmctly in mind. The Rebel- 

1 Papers relating to the Treaty of Washington (1872), vol. iv. p. 321. 
On this point, see also a forcible exposition of the correct principles 
of international law in the letter of Earl Russell to Mr. Adams of 
May 4, 1865. Geneva Arbitration : Correspondence, etc., vol. i. p. 295. 
The whole subject is thoroughly discussed by Lord Cockburn, in his 
" opinion." Papers, etc., pp. 313-326. 



APPENDIX A 201 

lion assumed the shape of a fully developed civil war 
on April 12, 1861, when the Confederates opened 
fire on Fort Sumter. April 19, seven days later, the 
President issued his proclamation, announcing the 
blockade of some 2700 miles of sea-coast, " in pursu- 
ance of the laws of the United States and of the law 
of nations in such case provided." ^ The appeal was 
thus made to " the law of nations," and the step was 
not taken as a matter of mere municipal regulation. 
At the same time, Secretary Seward informed for- 
eign ministers to this country, and instructed our own 
representatives abroad, that the blockade would " be 
strictly enforced upon the principles recognized by the 
law of nations ; " and, further, provided for the treat- 
ment of the "armed vessels of neutral states." ^ The 
Queen's proclamation of May 13 was published four- 
teen days after the receipt in London of the news 
of the surrender of Sumter, and of information that 
the Confederate government had taken steps looking 
to the issue of letters of marque ; twelve days after 
receipt of intelligence of President Lincoln's procla- 
mation of blockade ; and three days after the official 
communication of the fact by Mr. Dallas, the American 
Minister in London, to Lord John Russell, Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs.^ One of the most considerable 
branches of British commerce — that to and from the 
American cotton ports — was thus, at a moment's no- 
tice, not only interfered with, but broken up ; British 
vessels were, under the law of nations, subjected to 
search, and liable to capture ; the law of contraband 

1 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. vi. p. 14. 

2 Papers relating to Treaty of Washington (1872), vol. i. p. 213. 

3 lb., p. 218. 



202 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

and prize applied, and was enforced. Almost at once 
the struggle involved armaments, by sea and land, of 
the first magnitude, and conflicts marked by an almost 
unparalleled loss of life. Yet Secretary Seward per- 
sistently maintained that this struggle — well-nigh the 
fiercest on record — in no way concerned foreign na- 
tions, and that they had no right to even recognize it 
as existing. So far as the world at large was con- 
cerned, — though its commerce was broken up, its 
vessels searched, seized and condemned, and its pro- 
perty confiscated as contraband, — the disturbance was 
merely local and insignificant in character, concerning 
no one but ourselves. Most assuredly, official effront- 
ery could go no further. 

That the recognition by the British government of 
a state of belligerency, of necessity involving two par- 
ties, should, if possible, have been in courtesy deferred 
until the arrival of the newly appointed American 
Minister, known to be on his way, is indisputable. 
Most fortunately for the United States, it was not so 
deferred. On the other hand, every hour of delay in 
the recognition of the blockade by neutral governments 
involved the possibility of unauthorized search, and 
consequent seizures, due to hostilities, the existence 
of which was stoutly denied by the United States, and, 
therefore, not notified to those concerned by neutral 
governments. The situation was, in. the language of 
Lord Cockburn, " preposterous," and could only con- 
tinue for a brief period, and that at great risk, through 
the exercise of extreme comity on the part of neutrals. 

And yet, so strong is tradition, the question is still 
asked, — how could that proclamation have been con- 
sidered by Mr. Forster, or any one else, as a point 



APPENDIX A 203 

gained for the United States? The answer seems 
obvious. It was given by Lord Palmerston in the 
speech above quoted. The United States declared an 
extensive blockade, under and by virtue of interna- 
tional law and usage. By the Queen's proclamation, 
that blockade was recognized. This was of vital im- 
portance to the United States, and an important 
concession on the part of foreign powers. A re- 
cognition of the blockade, with all that recognition 
implied, was, therefore, in May, 1861, the point gained 
for the cause of the Union *' in accordance with the 
earnest wishes of [William E. Forster] and other 
friends of the North." As to Secretary Seward's con- 
tention that our Civil War was no affair of any nation 
but the United States, it will not, in the light of his- 
tory and of international law, bear an instant's exam- 
ination. The British proclamation of belligerency of 
May 13, 1861, was the logical and legal sequence of 
the President's proclamation of blockade of the 19th 
of the previous month. By the nations whose com- 
merce was affected by it, the blockade had either to 
be recognized or disallowed ; and its recognition was 
essential to the Union cause. 

The difficulty with Secretary Seward was one not at 
all uncommon among men, whether in public station 
or private life. He claimed for the side he repre- 
sented all and every right known to the code ; he then 
vehemently protested against the application to him- 
self, by those affected by his action, of its logical and 
necessary consequences under that code. His conten- 
tions may have been wise, as well as bold, under the 
circumstances and at the time ; but American histo- 
rians and publicists cannot afford to profess responsi- 
bility for them now. They are quite untenable. 



APPENDIX Bi 

This assertion seems to have been a favorite one 
with Secretary Seward ; and he repeated it so often, 
in terms only slightly varied, that he evidently per- 
suaded himself of its truth. He thus wrote to Mr. 
Pike, the Minister at the Hague, — " This domestic 
war . . . would come to an end to-morrow if the Euro- 
pean States should clearly announce that expectations 
of favor from them must be renounced." ^ To the same 
effect he wrote to Mr. Sanford, at Brussels, May 23, 
1862, — "Europe has thus put this beneficent gov- 
ernment upon an ordeal more solemn and fearful," ^ 
etc. On the 19th of February, 1862, he wrote to 
Mr. Dayton, at Paris, — "Let the European States 
. . . concede now to the Union half as much toleration 
as they have practically, though unintentionally, shown 
to disunion, and the Civil War will come to an end 
at once." ^ Even a year later, after the battle of 
Gettysburg, he wrote to Mr. Adams, — " The insur- 
rection . . . has now descended so low that mani- 
festly it would perish at once, if it were left like the 
late insurrection in India, like the insurrection which 
a few years ago occurred in Canada ... to stand by 
means of its own strength, not as a recognized bellig- 
erent."^ The Sepoy mutiny of 1857 was undoubtedly 
a fierce struggle for supremacy ; but it now seems in- 

1 Supra, p. 101. 

2 Dip. Cor. 1862, p. 597- See, also, pp. 597, 612. 
8 lb., p. 656. 

4 lb., p. 317 ; see, also, pp. 320, 327, 332, 337, 338. 
6 Dip. Cor. 1863, p. 328. 



APPENDIX B 205 

credible that an American Secretary of State could, 
in the summer of 1863, with Grant's Wilderness 
campaign and Sherman's march to the sea in the womb 
of the immediate future, have gravely put our Civil 
War on an equal footing with the Canada " six-county 
insurrection " of 1837, effectually suppressed by mili- 
tia and one regiment of infantry, after a single repulse 
of a fourth of a regiment from a brewery extemporized 
into a stronghold. But the same lack of any correct 
sense of proportion is apparent in all the discussions 
of the Rebellion period, and of the period immediately 
succeeding the Rebellion, whether diplomatic and par- 
liamentary, or legal and historical. It permeates the 
United States " Case," prepared for submission to the 
Geneva tribunal. Seward and Sumner, Motley and 
Davis, seemed all affected by it, the difference being 
only one of degree and temperament. It was a psy- 
chological phenomenon. America still hung on the 
lips of Europe, as the old colonial, dependency spirit, 
continually asserting itself, died slowly out. In the 
case of Secretary Seward, it must be said that, though 
he overdid the thing grossly, he yet wrote and talked 
largely for effect ; but there is no reason to think Mr. 
Sumner did not fully and actually believe what he said, 
when, in April, 1869, he asserted in the Senate that 
a certain paper manifesto, recognizing a fact of com- 
mon knowledge, put forth in London in May, 1861, 
and followed by no act, added " not weeks or months, 
but years to our war." It is not easy to see how the 
genuine, innate, provincial spirit could have gone 
further. The moment " Her Majesty's Proclamation " 
entered into account, the nascent rebellion, no longer 
a Palladian giant, was suddenly transformed into a 
puny, workhouse British bastard. 



APPENDIX C^ 

Wkiting privately to his friend, S. B. Euggles of 
New York, on May 18, 1869, — just five weeks after 
the delivery of Mr. Sumner's National Claims speech, 
— Mr. Fish thus explains himself, covering the whole 
situation, and indicating, on his part at least, a clear 
comprehension of the law governing it : — 

" Public law recognizes the right of a sovereign 
power, when a civil conflict has broken out in another 
country, to determine when that conflict has attained 
sufficient complexity, magnitude, and completeness, 
to require (not merely to excuse^ for the protection of 
its own interests and peace, and of the interests and 
relations and duties of its own citizens or subjects, 
a definition of its relations, and of the relations of 
its citizens or subjects to those of the parties to the 
conflict. 

" In the exercise of this right, the foreign power is 
responsible to the general obligations of right, and must 
be guided by facts, not by prejudice for or against 
the parent country, or the insurgents — least of all 
against the parent country, when weU established, and 
a friendly power. 

" Having defined its relations to the parties in the 
civil conflict as one of neutrality, it must enforce its 
neutral position, and allow no infraction thereof : give 
no favor. 

^ See supra, p. 112. 



APPENDIX C 207 

" England professes to have exercised only what is 
a recognized right of a sovereign foreign power. 

" We have held she was precipitate ; much may 
well be said on this side — she had promised to 
await Mr. Adams's arrival, but anticipated it, and of 
course any information or explanation he might make. 
Still England says — the United States had declared 
a blockade — which is ' war ' — the Confederates had 
announced ' letters of marque ' and ' prize courts ' which 
mean ' war ' — both sides had levied large armies ; 
forts had been seized, etc., etc. 

" This would seem to give some justification to her 
concession of belligerency, and disprove the complaint 
of this act [of concession] of some of its force. Then, 
again, France and other powers were contemporaneous 
with England in the same concession. The United 
States make no claim against them^ and it is impor- 
tant to separate them from any intent to unite with 
England in resisting the claim. 

" The complaint against England is, that she sub- 
sequently allowed acts inconsistent with neutrality, 
and these acts (to a certain extent) reflect back upon 
the act of concession of belligerency, and to this extent 
alone should the complaint be limited of the procla- 
mation of neutrality. No other nation which conceded 
belligerency (even at or about the same time with 
England) was guilty of such subsequent causes of 
injury. 

" The British proclamation of neutrality is, there- 
fore, subject of complaint, only as leading to^ as char, 
acterized hy^ and authorizing in its execution and 
enforcement the fitting out of the Alabama^ etc., etc., 
the acts of hospitality, etc., given in their colonial 



208 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

ports, to those piratical cruisers, and as leading to tlie 
moral support given in England to the Rebel cause. 

" Mr. Sumner makes the act of concession per se, 
a grievance; he draws a distinction not recognized by 
publicists, between belligerency on land and what he 
terms ' ocean belligerency.' Belligerency is war, and 
whether on land or on the ocean, or on both, is a fact ^ 
and not susceptible of division — certainly not, when 
the parties to the conflict each have seaboard, and 
ports and commerce. 

" This is (perhaps) the main point in his argument, 
and is one which it will be difficult to maintain — 
difficult, at least, to establish now, as applicable to 
Prize Courts. 

'' Pray let me hear from you. The newspapers seem 
sJiy of dissent from what seems to be the controlling 
argument in bringing the Senate to its vote. 

'''-But the fact is, many Senators dissented from the 
argument while agreeing in the conclusion." 

As to the influence of Mr. Sumner's position and 
legal contentions as contributing to the defeat of the 
Johnson -Clarendon Convention, Mr. Fish at the same 
time (May 17) wrote to Senator W. P. Fessenden, 
then at his home in Portland, Maine, where he died 
early in the following September. Mr. Fessenden, on 
May 25, replied as follows : — 

" As to Sumner's speech, I can only say that it 
would not, in my judgment, be safe to look at it in 
the light of an ultimatum. Such an idea would be 
simply preposterous. 

" When delivered, I considered it as intended for a 



APPENDIX C 209 

statement of our grievances, not of our claims. I per- 
ceive that the language is stronger than I had supposed 
and in some particulars unguarded and exceptionable, 
and calculated to give a wrong impression. I was 
pleased with the tone of the speech, and so said ; though 
it would have been vastly better to have made none at 
all, and trusted to the effect of such a vote. But it 
was not possible for Sumner to omit availing himself 
of such an occasion. On the whole, I think no great 
harm will be done by it. 

" It is absurd to suppose that the offence of recog- 
nizing belligerency can be atoned for by the payment 
of money. Still, under the circumstances, it was a 
grievous wrong, and coupled with subsequent avowals 
and conduct would have justified a declaration of war. 
The occasion for that, however, has gone by. Yet we 
are entitled to something in the nature of a plaster 
for the sore — a little of ' Mrs. Winslow's Soothing 
Syrup ' at least. The fault of the treaty was that it 
offered absolutely nothing, and might have left mat- 
ters in a worse condition than they now are." 

Mr. Carl Schurz, then in the Senate, writing con- 
fidentially from St. Louis, said to Secretary Fish : — 

" We shall then endeavor to find a form of settle- 
ment as regardful of the national pride of England, 
and of her material interests^ as possible. (Distant 
hint at Canada.) In the mean time we prefer not to 
indulge in possibly exciting discussions, but, for the 
present, we are content to leave the question oj)en^ 
giving the British Government a fair chance for quiet 
consideration. 



210 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

" Mr. Motley might furthermore be instructed, 
when by Lord Clarendon a point of international law 
is urged upon him, never to reply promptly, to refer 
the matter to his Government whenever there is a 
chance for it, and, when he cannot avoid giving an 
answer, to be very short. He ought to produce the 
impression that we are rather inclined to take the 
matter very easy and are in no haste whatever. He 
might, when very hard pressed, occasionally ask the 
question, whether England would be content to have 
us follow the precedent set by her ? In private con- 
versation he might freely speak of the annexation of 
the North American provinces as being the decided 
wish of the American people in settlement of the 
claims, leaving the Government uncommitted. It is 
our interest to familiarize them gradually with the 
idea." 

George F. Edmunds of Vermont was, at the time 
of the rejection of the Johnson-Clarendon Conven- 
tion, a member of the Senate. In a private letter, 
written thirty-three years later, he thus gave his re- 
collections of the effect of Mr. Sumner's speech on 
the minds of his colleagues : — 

" I am confident that the Johnson-Clarendon treaty 
was not rejected by reason of its failure to embrace 
the stupendous claims of Mr. Sumner based upon 
Great Britain's recognition of belligerency. I do not 
believe there were more than ten Senators, if as many, 
who stood upon any such gTound. I am sure the 
majority of the Senate acted upon the ground that the 
making of such a treaty, and in such a form, would 
not only be a very small piecemeal toward the restora- 
tion of good relations, but would be a kind of recog- 



APPENDIX C 211 

nition of the fact that we had nothing more to com- 
plain of than the ordinary and accidental wrongs that 
the government of one country continually commits 
or permits against the citizens of another. Nobody 
who possessed even a moderate knowledge of the 
principles of international law, and their practice, 
would, unless laboring under some great emotion, 
maintain for a moment that Great Britain had vio- 
lated international law, or had done an act in that 
sense hostile to the United States. It was only valu- 
able and important as throwing light upon the later 
conduct of that Government in permitting the building 
and departure of Confederate vessels and munitions of 
war from her ports." 



APPENDIX D^ 

The following is the speech referred to in the text, 
so far as it related to the United States. It was 
delivered at the Lord Mayor's banquet, November 9, 
1869, and printed in the London Times ^oi the follow- 
ing day. 

" Without arrogating influence, I think we are 
bound on every occasion that may offer to make every 
effort towards composing those differences and allay- 
ing those disturbances which may arise in different 
portions of the world ; and I rejoice to think that, on 
more than one occasion since his return to office, my 
noble friend who holds the seals of the Foreign-office 
has had the satisfaction of receiving the liberal and 
handsome acknowledgments of foreign Governments 
for the useful contributions he has made towards the 
accommodation of their relations. One exception, per- 
haps — one partial exception — I ought to name. It 
is an exception of the deepest interest. I refer to our 
relations with the United States. But there is no 
occasion, my Lord Mayor, that I should refer to those 
relations in any terms except those of peace and con- 
cord. (Cheers.) Were I tempted to depart from that 
friendly strain I should, indeed, be admonished to 
judge more correctly and to speak more wisely by an 
event which has happened in the city in the course of 
the last few days. Your quick associations will out- 

1 See supra, p. 128. 



APPENDIX D 213 

run my allusions. You will know that I refer to the 
death of Mr. Peabody, a man whose splendid benefac- 
tions — which, indeed, secure the immortality of his 
name in that which he regarded as his old mother 
country, but which, likewise, in a broader view, is 
applicable to all humanity — taught us in this com- 
mercial age, which has witnessed the construction of 
so many colossal fortunes, at once the noblest and 
most needful of all lessons — namely, he has shown us 
how a man can be the master of his wealth instead of 
being its slave. (Cheers.) And, my Lord Mayor, 
most touching it is to know, as I have learnt, that 
while, perhaps, some might think he had been unhappy 
in dying in a foreign land, yet, so were his affections 
divided between the land of his birth and the home of 
his early ancestors, that that which had been his fond 
wish has, indeed, been realized — that he might be 
buried in America, but that it might please God to 
ordain that he should die in England. (Cheers.) My 
Lord Mayor, with the country of Mr. Peabody we are 
not likely to quarrel. (Loud cheers.) It is true, 
indeed, that the care and skill of diplomacy, animated 
by the purest and most upright feelings, though they 
have not imperilled, yet have failed to lead to a final 
issue at this moment the tangled questions of law that 
have been in discussion between the two countries ; but 
the very delay that has taken place, instead of being 
a delay tending to anger, has been a delay promoted 
by kindred good-will and by the belief that the inter- 
vention of a limited time may be likely to obviate any 
remaining difficulty. (Cheers.) My Lord Mayor, I 
speak with confidence in anticipating that that which 
the whole world would view with horror and amaze- 



214 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

ment, namely, a parricidal strife between England and 
America, — is above all things tbe most unlikely to 
grow out of this state of affairs. My confidence is, in 
the first place, in the sentiment which I know ani- 
mates the Government of the United States as well as 
our own, it is in the sentiment which we believe to 
pervade the mind of the people of these two great 
countries ; and, permit me to add, I have yet another 
source of confidence, connected with some of those 
changes which we are witnessing in the age in which 
we live. I mean this change in particular, that as in 
every country there has long been, and especially in 
the best governed countries, not only a force of law, 
but also of opinion that has tended to restrain it, so 
with the augmenting intercourse of nations there is 
now growing up what I may term an international 
opinion, a standard of international conduct higher 
than the standard which a particular nation sets up 
for itself, and to which it becomes more and more from 
year to year as we live necessary that each country 
should conform consistently with the rights and duties 
of the whole mass of the civilized community of the 
world." 



APPENDIX E^ 

The condition of affairs in Cuba became matter of 
discussion again in 1896. Senator Sherman then 
stated, in the course of a Senate debate, that, in 1870, 
there had been a conflict of opinion between President 
Grant and Secretary Fish. Mr. Hamilton Fish, son 
of the Secretary, who had died three years before, was, 
in 1896, Speaker of the New York House of Assembly, 
and he permitted the publication of an Associated 
Press despatch, dated Albany, March 15, which threw 
much light on this question, — a question always of 
interest, inasmuch as Cuban complications gave its 
shape to the whole foreign policy of the government 
during General Grant's first administration, includ- 
ing the country's attitude towards Great Britain, after 
the rejection of the Johnson-Clarendon Convention. 

The younger Hamilton Fish then said, — " During 
his eight years' service in the State Department Mr. 
Fish kept, chiefly as a reference record for his own 
use, a diary in his own handwriting, containing a min- 
ute of important transactions and of his conversations 
with the President, members of the Cabinet, Senators, 
and other leading public men in regard to the more 
prominent of the foreign questions with which he had 
to deal. From May 31 to June 13, 1870, the date 
of President Grant's special message to Congress on 
Cuban belligerency, the entries in the diary are many, 
1 Supra, p. 119. 



216 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

and very full, in regard to the origin, preparation, 
discussions in the Cabinet, and final completion of the 
special message." 

The following passages from the diary were then 
given to the correspondent of the Associated Press, 
his despatch appearing, in whole or in part, in many 
journals of the following day (March 16, 1896) : — 

February 19, 1870. " Called this morning, by ap- 
pointment, to see Senator John Sherman on subject 
of the unit of coinage. After conversing on that 
question, I referred to his resolution introduced in the 
Senate, and his speech in favor of recognizing the 
belligerency of Cuba, and asked if he had recently 
examined the treaty with Spain of 1795. He said he 
had not ; was not aware of the existence of such a 
treaty. I referred to its provisions, and to the prob- 
able consequences of the exercise by Spain of the right 
of visit (or of search) ; thought our people would not 
submit to it, and that the consequences would soon 
develop in war ; said that fighting was not belliger- 
ency ; there is fighting, but no belligerency in Cuba ; 
there is no government of the insurrectionary party, 
no political organization, etc. He admitted that he 
had not examined the subject closely, but said there 
is a good deal of excitement in the country on the 
subject. I advised him, in connection with the passing 
of his resolution of belligerency, to prepare bills for 
the increase of the public debt, and to meet the in- 
creased appropriation which will be necessary for the 
army, navy, etc." 

June 10, 1870. "Judge Orth and General Butler 
called in the evening to urge the sending of a message 
by the President on the question of Cuban belliger- 



APPENDIX E 217 

ency. Orth says the vote will be close. Banks wiU 
make the closing speech, but there are some twenty 
or thirty quiet members who may be decided by his 
speecli, but would not go against the President's 
views." 

June 12, 1870. " Stay at home and prepare a mes- 
sage on the Cuban belligerency question, to be sub- 
mitted for the President's consideration, in case he 
agreed to send one. He has not yet returned from 
his fishing excursion." 

June 13, 1870. "It was generally admitted that if 
war is to be resorted to it should be by a direct decla- 
ration, and not by embarrassing Spain by a declara- 
tion of belligerency; agrees unanimously that no con- 
dition of facts exists to justify belligerency. Finally 
the President amends his sentences by referring in 
general terms to seizures on the high seas, embargoes 
of property, and personal outrages. Robeson adds 
the concluding sentences, claiming that the question 
of belligerency is distinct from those questions of 
wrongs which are being pressed for indemnification, 
and, if not satisfied, they will be made the subject of 
a future message. And thus it is agreed that the 
message shall be sent in." 

In view of the close bearing of the policy at this 
time pursued towards Spain on the policy pursued 
towards Great Britain, I asked the representatives of 
Mr. Fish for any further entries from the diary made 
at that time on this topic. In compliance with my 
request, the following were furnished. 

A cabinet meeting was held on the day following 
that of the last passage from the diary quoted in the 
Associated Press despatch above referred to : — 



218 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

June 14, 1870. "Also read Clinton J. Trues' 
(Consul at St. Thomas) despatch, not numbered, 
dated April 16. . . . President thinks he may be 
removed, and wishes to give the place to a nominee 
of Governor Morton. He has wished to give almost 
every place, for some weeks past, to some friend of 
Morton. He then speaks of the San Domingo treaty ; 
his desire for its ratification ; that he wishes all the 
members of his Cabinet, and all his friends, to use all 
proper efforts to aid him ; that he will not consider 
those who oppose his policy as entitled to influence 
in obtaining positions under him; that he will not 
let those who oppose him ' name Ministers to Lon- 
don,' etc., etc. ; refers warmly and affectionately to 
Babcock, whose innocence of the charges against him 
he confidently believes ; speaks very strongly against 
Perry, against whom he says grave charges were made 
while in the army. . . . 

" A general approval is expressed by the members 
of the Cabinet, on the announcement of his determi- 
nation to hold members of the party to the support 
of the policy of the Administration. (I did not say 
so, but hope it may mean something more than San 
Domingo.) I did say that I was glad to hear this (it 
is what I had recommended some months ago when the 
President said he would remove men from New York 
Custom House and Post Office, who had been appointed 
on recommendation of Evarts and others connected 
with the New York Sun; but Boutwell interposed 
and prevented the carrying out of this determination), 
and hoped it would be applied to the general policy of 
the Administration, and referred to the paper read a 
short time before from D. C. Forney, and said that 



APPENDIX E 219 

while J, W. Forney supported the Cuban policy, 
etc." 

June 17, 1870. "Not an allusion was made at the 
Cabinet to Judge Hoar's resignation, or to the pro- 
ceedings in the House on the ' Cuba ' message ; after 
the meeting (Hoar, Cox, Robeson and I, on the por- 
tico) Hoar and Cox congratulated me most cordially, 
saying it was ' the greatest triumph the Administra- 
tion had yet achieved.' Robeson said, ' Yes — the 
first triumph.' All concur in the opinion that the 
movement was wise, and beneficial in its results, that 
it has served to concentrate and consolidate the party, 
and to exhibit a policy, and the capacity of rallying 
the party. This in truth has been the great want of 
the party ; the presentation of some issue on which 
they should be required, as party men, to say ' yes ' 
or ' nay ' distinctly upon some issue presented by the 
Administration ; we have not done it before. Each 
man has been allowed to follow his own peculiar views. 
Consequently all the measures presented by the Ad- 
ministration thus far have failed. I felt that the 
' Cuban ' question was the one on which perhaps 
more than on any other, the sensational emotions of 
the party and of the country might be arrayed in 
opposition to what is honest and right. Believing, as 
I do, that the public sentiment, however much influ- 
enced by questions of sentiment, and of supposed 
popular impulse, is sure eventually to be just and 
correct, I have pressed this question in the way I 
have done, and first tried the proposed message sub- 
mitted a short time since ; finding the President would 
not adopt it, I tried the latter message, and he was 
induced with great hesitation, and with much reluc- 



220 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

tance, to sign it, and after it was sent in he told me 
that he feared he had made a mistake. I never 
doubted the propriety of it, nor the 'policy' of it, 
in the mere sense of ordinary politics. It evoked a 
fierce debate, and much denunciation, but it evoked 
also much good sense, in the speeches of those who 
sustained it ; an expression of good, sound interna- 
tional law, and of honesty of purpose, and it brought 
the gravity of the case to the consideration of Con- 
gress ; and the Administration, after the severest 
debate on a question of Foreign Policy which has 
occurred for years, was triumphantly sustained. In 
the mere and the low sense, of a political or partisan 
question, it has consolidated the party, and those who 
are the demagogues and the disorganizers, — the men 
who follow a party so long as they can control it. In 
a higher view, it has shown that the representatives 
of the country can rise above the temporary and fer- 
vent appeals of a momentary excitement of popular 
sympathy in support of the obligations of national 
duties, and in the line and direction of honesty and of 
right, even when opposed by clamor, and by appeals 
to passion. Most sincerely am I thankful for the 
result, and that I have been a very humble instrument 
in bringing it to its conclusion. I have been most 
grossly maligned and assailed. At times I have been 
inclined to retire and abandon the cause, but I have 
felt it a duty to stand or fall with what I felt to be a 
principle. The office I hold has no attractions for 
me ; it is attended with immense labor, with great 
sacrifices of comfort, and of personal and family asso- 
ciations, with privations of pursuits with which I had 
surrounded myself, and which were congenial to my 



APPENDIX E 221 

tastes and my years. . . . Most gladly would I be 
relieved of its honors, and its labors, its responsi- 
bilities, and the constant criticisms and misrepresen- 
tations to which its incumbent is exposed. If I could, 
now, to-day, when the vote of Congress has emphatic- 
ally sustained me, with a consciousness of duty, resign, 
I would follow Hoar's example, and send a written 
note, declaring myself once more free from official 
duties and responsibilities. I do not quite yet see the 
road clear. I hope to do so soon. I certainly shall 
find it open before long. 

" While at dinner Judge Hoar called. He goes 
home this evening, to return, and remain in office until 
the end of July. 

" The public announcement of his resignation, he 
tells me, was ' owing to one of the leaks at the White 
House — that the President had given his reply to 
one of the confidential clerks to be copied, and thus 
it had gotten out ; ' hearing it had been telegraphed 
to the public prints in New York, and thus given to 
the world, he had advised the immediate nomination 
of his successor, to relieve the President from the 
importunity which would otherwise follow. He said 
that he called for the purpose of urging me ' under 
all circumstances to hold fast,' and added most kindly 
and flatteringly, that I was * the bulwark now stand- 
ing between the Country and its destruction.' 

" This may be very complimentary, but while I am 
trying to do my duty, I can by no means accept either 
the compliment or the responsibility — (I mean before 
very long to retire from the Cabinet, and from all 
public position) . I told the »Tudge that I did not feel 
that I could much longer stand the labor, and the 



222 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

annoyance and abuse of official position. With great 
apparent (and I doubt not sincere) earnestness he 
urged me not to think of leaving. But there is a 
time in a man's life when he must leave public ser- 
vice, and there is a time when he ought to leave it, 
and a time when he is entitled to leave it. I con- 
scientiously think that one of the two latter has very 
nearly, if not quite, arrived in my case. If there be 
no other ground for this opinion, I may honestly say 
' the wish is Father to the thought.' I should be 
infinitely happier out of office. 

" In the evening the President came to see me. . . . 
Again referring to the difference of views with regard 
to ' San Domingo,' he expressed regret that Boutwell 
had not been present on Tuesday when he spoke of 
his expected assistance from the Members of his Cabi- 
net ; said I had always given him aid with regard 
to it. (I have certainly been loyal to a measure of 
policy which he inaugurated, and after it was entered 
upon have done what I could to sustain it. I might 
have paused before entering upon it, and think it has 
been embarrassed unnecessarily by the interference of 
those who were not properly charged with the manage- 
ment of such negotiations, and by the intervention of 
some persons whose standing had not increased public 
confidence.) He also said that Belknap, Robeson and 
Cresswell had sustained it. That there was no man 
whom he loved more than Governor Cox, but regretted 
he had not given the Treaty his support. He referred 
to the newspaper rumors of further changes in the 
Cabinet, and that reporters had called upon him 
yesterday to inquire as to them ; said he had given 
Mr. Gobright (Agent of the Associated Press) the 



APPENDIX E 223 

correct statement, and asked if I had read it ; the New 
York Times of this morning was lying on my table, 
and I read Gobright's article, and the correspondence 
between Hoar and him ; he says Gobright's article is 
substantially correct. Taking up the subject of news- 
paper rumors, and newspaper reporters, I say that I 
had observed the rumors with respect to myself, and 
had been visited last evening by many reporters, and 
I now desired again to repeat what I had more than 
once before said to him, that I should be glad to 
withdraw from the Cabinet, and would do so at any 
moment when he would accept my resignation. He 
replied, ' I will tell you when I want to do so — don't 
speak of it until then.' I answered that it was a 
laborious position, full of responsibilities, and without 
thanks, exposing one to great abuse and misrepresen- 
tation, and I could not stand it much longer. He said 
that he was aware of the thanklessness of the position, 
and could understand that nothing, but a sense of 
duty, would retain a man in the position of a Cabinet 
Minister. He would not, however, listen to my wish 
to withdraw. . . . 

" I referred to the recent debate and vote in the 
House on the Cuban question, and remarked in con- 
nection therewith, ' I hope that you have no reason to 
regret sending the Message.' He replied, ' I like the 
vote very much — the debate was violent, and denun- 
ciatory ; it is strange that men cannot allow others to 
differ with them, without charging corruption as the 
cause of the difference ; ' pressing the question again 
as to the Message, he said, ' No — I think it has done 
good ; ' he continued in deprecation of the personalities 
and abuse heaped upon public men ; said he had been 



224 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

the subject of investigation (referring to the Davis- 
Hatch inquiry, now in progress), and alluded to the 
' Gold Speculation ' investigation of some months 
back, with a good deal of feeling, and said, ' There is 
little inducement other than a sense of duty in hold- 
ing public position in this country — but for that I 
do not know what there is to induce a man to take 
either the place I hold, or one in the Cabinet, and 
were it not for that I would resign immediately.' 
He seemed very well satisfied with the result of the 
Cuban discussion, and said that he observed that Gen- 
eral Butler had thought proper to disclaim the author- 
ship of the message for Cushing. I said that the 
papers, especially the New York Sun^ ascribe every 
paper officially written to Cushing, but that as to the 
message on Cuban belligerency, no person whatever 
had seen a word of it, until I had read it to him on 
Monday morning, except the Attorney-General, that I 
wrote it every word with my own hand on Sunday, 
and went in the afternoon to Judge Hoar's ; read it 
to him, and he suggested the change of some three or 
four words, only, which change was made." 



APPENDIX Fi 

The expression used in the text that " this pre- 
mised, the course now pursued in the deposition of 
Mr. Sumner from the chairmanship of the Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations was more than justifi- 
able ; it was necessary, as well as right," has, since the 
publication of this address, been criticised. Friends 
and admirers of Mr. Sumner, of whom there are 
many, especially in New England, have taken issue on 
this point, contending that, under all the circumstances 
even yet disclosed, the removal was unprecedented, 
and an arbitrary exercise of power by a partisan ma- 
jority of Republican Senators, acting in obedience to 
what was, practically, an executive demand. 

By the word " right " in the text, it was meant that 
the action taken in this matter was taken for good 
and sufficient reasons, and with due regard to those 
public interests which should always be the dominat- 
ing consideration in the minds of legislators, whether 
members of the United States Senate or any other 
parliamentary body. This conclusion was reached 
after a careful examination of the record and the 
principles involved ; nor have I seen any reason why 
it should be withdrawn, or in any way modified. In 
reviewing the subject, some repetition of statements 
made in the text is unavoidable. 

The contention on the part of the adherents of Mr. 
1 See supra^ p. 183. 



226 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

Sumner appears to be based upon erroneous premises, 
leading to conclusions which would render parlia- 
mentary government in the United States practically 
impossible. Some confusion of thought, as well as 
misajDprehension of facts, seems also to pervade many 
of the criticisms. It is, in the first place, tacitly, 
perhaps unconsciously, assumed that the Senate of 
the United States is, in some inscrutable way, a 
judicial rather than a legislative body, and that the 
chairmen of Senate committees are, by usage and pre- 
scription, amounting to an unwritten law, entitled to 
retain their positions, in any event, until the political 
complexion of the body is so changed that one party 
supplants the other as the dominating power. This 
subject will be discussed presently ; here it is only 
necessary to say that no ground whatever exists on 
which to rest any such assumption. The United 
States has a system of parliamentary government; 
and that term implies a government by party, the 
executive and the legislative being independent of 
each other in theory, but, in practice, expected to 
cooperate and work in party harmony. Asa rule, and 
under normal conditions, it is essential to the proper 
management of public business that one political party 
should control both departments of government — the 
legislative as well as the executive. If a policy is to 
be carried out, the two cannot be continually at cross- 
purposes. 

In 1871, a large majority of those composing both 
branches of Congress were friendly to the administra- 
tion of General Grant. They were what are known, 
and properly known, as Administration men, occupying, 
in parliamentary language, the government benches. 



APPENDIX F 227 

In every legislative body, it is well understood that the 
committees should, for the proper transaction of busi- 
ness, reflect the feelings and sympathies of the whole 
body, the majority being dominant in them. If they 
fail so to do, they are, and should be, remodelled so 
as to bring the desired result about. This is essen- 
tial to any successful government by party. While 
the Executive may not interfere in any improper 
way in the appointment of legislative committees, the 
Cliief Executive has a perfect right, and, indeed, it is 
his duty, to cause members of Congress, whether in 
the Senate or the House, to be fully informed as to 
the policy of the Administration ; and it has been the 
practice that the machinery of each body is so ar- 
ranged as to work in harmony with that policy, and 
not in opposition to it. Such has always been the 
practice. All this is elementary. 

This being so, it is now contended that Mr. Sum- 
ner was deposed from the chairmanship of his com- 
mittee, which he held through usage and under pre- 
scriptive right, by executive action. In other words, 
that President Grant brought his influence to bear 
upon a subservient, not to say servile, majority of 
the Senate, causing a gross injustice to be done to 
an eminent leader of his own party. There is no 
evidence on which to base such a contention. This 
is apparent from a careful review of the facts as here- 
tofore disclosed, and it is improbable that any new or 
additional facts will come to light. 

It was asserted at the time, and is still asserted, 
that the removal of Mr. Sumner was due entirely to 
his course in regard to the San Domingo treaty. Of 
this, again, there is no evidence. On the contrary, in 



228 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

voting against the ratification of the San Domingo 
treaty Mr. Sumner acted in imison with a majority 
of the Senate, and reflected the views of a majority. 
That the San Domingo treaty was the remote cause 
of Mr. Sumner's displacement is true. It is not true 
that it was the approximate, or moving, cause. The 
quarrel — for in the end it became a personal quar- 
rel, and not a political difference over a specific mea- 
sure — between Mr. Sumner, General Grant and Mr. 
Fish — did, it is true, originate on the San Domingo 
question ; but, so far as that issue went, it was an 
ordinary political difference. Subsequently, in his 
strong desire to secure the ratification of the treaty. 
President Grant took the very unusual course of call- 
ing upon Mr. Sumner personally at his house on an 
evening in January, 1871, under the circumstances 
fully described by Mr. Pierce, and in this paper. What 
followed grew out of a difference of recollection be- 
tween himself and Mr. Sumner as to what then took 
place, aggravated by a constitutional incompatibility 
in the tempers of the two men. President Grant 
always insisted that Mr. Sumner then promised to 
throw his influence in aid of the ratification of the 
treaty. There is no question that General Grant was 
here in error. Mr. Sumner, taken by surprise, natu- 
rally spoke in a guarded manner ; and the President 
misconstrued his words. Afterwards, the tale-bearers 
and gossip-mongers, especially of the White House 
military staff, carried to General Grant's ears exag- 
gerated reports of indiscreet remarks on the j^art of 
Mr. Sumner, for which, there is no question, there 
was more or less basis. Subsequently, Mr. Sumner 
did not go to the President, and frankly explain his 



APPENDIX F 229 

position, — a failure on his part for which he after- 
wards more than once expressed regret. The breach be- 
tween the two then rapidly widened, and soon involved 
Mr. Fish ; for Secretary Fish, acting in loyalty to 
the head of the Administration, endeavored to influ- 
ence Mr. Sumner. This attempt Mr. Sumner met in 
a characteristic way ; that is, by charging the Secre- 
tary with a change of front, and insisting upon it 
that, under the circumstances, the proper course for 
him to pursue was to resign. This he did in a way 
which deeply offended Mr. Fish ; and Mr. Fish had 
not a forgiving disposition. The quarrel thus begun 
culminated over the papers relating to the dismissal 
of Mr. Motley, ending in an open affront put upon 
the Secretary of State by the Senator from Massa- 
chusetts, at a dinner given by General Schenck, in 
January, 1871. At that very time the negotiations 
leading to the Treaty of Washington were actively 
going on. 

Such was the position of affairs in January, 1871. 
The Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions of the Senate, as it was then constituted, was 
not on speaking terms with either the President or 
the Secretary of State. Meanwhile, as stated in the 
text, the position of the Chairman of the Committee 
on Foreign Relations of the Senate then was, as it 
now is, different from that of any other member 
of the whole legislative body. The Senate partici- 
pates in executive functions so far as treaties are con- 
cerned ; hence it is obviously necessary to the proper 
conduct of any foreign policy that friendly, and even 
intimate, relations should exist between the executive 
department and the chairman of that committee ; for 



230 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

lie of necessity is the spokesman of the Executive on 
the floor of the Senate, the Senate alone of the legis- 
lative department having any immediate connection 
with foreign policy. All business relating to treaties, 
nominations, etc., is thus put in the hands of the 
chairman of the committee. He shaj)es it, brings it 
before his committee, and subsequently has charge of 
it on the floor of the Senate. Under these circum- 
stances, it would seem to be so obvious as to call for 
no argument that matters relating to the foreign policy 
of the government cannot be properly handled if the 
chairman of the Senate committee having them in 
charge and the two chiefs of the executive depart- 
ment do not act in harmony. When the friends of 
the Administration, therefore, control the Senate, it is 
eminently desirable, if the party to which the Admin- 
istration and they belong is to be responsible for 
a foreign policy, that the Senate Committee on For- 
eign Relations should be so composed as to act in per- 
fect accord with the Executive. The friends of Mr. 
Sumner contend, however, that, in his case, this was 
unnecessary ; that the business of the country could 
have been conducted without public detriment by a 
chairman who was in open and avowed hostility to 
the Executive, and that, in such case, the Executive 
had no good ground of complaint, and, certainly, 
would not be justified in urging its friends in the 
Senate to readjust the committee so as to give the 
Administration a fair chance both to have a policy, 
and to carry it into effect. This proposition I do not 
care to argue. To my mind it is plainly untenable. 
That the public business, under such circumstances, 
would go on after a fashion, is probable; that it 



APPENDIX F 231 

would go on as it should go on, is out of tlie ques- 
tion. 

Such being the facts, a change of assignments hav- 
ing become expedient, for the proper conduct of pub- 
lic affairs, it would seem unreasonable to expect the 
President to dismiss from the executive councils the 
Secretary of State, and then to resign himself, in 
order to make way for others less personally objec- 
tionable to the chairman of a Senate committee. A 
reorganization of the committee, and the transfer of 
its chairman to some other field of influence and 
usefulness, would seem to offer a more practicable 
solution of the trouble. This obvious fact could 
hardly fail to suggest itself to the average senatorial 
mind. It implied no indisputable, or even pronounced, 
tendency to subserviency. It is a conclusion, on the 
contrary, which any self-respecting man might so 
discipline himseK as, in time, to reach. 

It is obvious that, in the early days of January, 
1871, the Executive had not become fully satisfied 
that a rearrangement of the Senate committee was 
indispensable. Had such a conclusion been reached, 
the Secretary of State would not, as he did, have 
called on the chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations to get his views on the subject of the pro- 
posed negotiation with Great Britain, and, if possi- 
ble, to gain his support thereto. That proposed ne- 
gotiation, it must further be borne in mind, was the 
cardinal feature in the policy of the Administration at 
that time. As such it took precedence. On it the 
Administration largely rested its claim for the support 
of the country in a presidential election then nearly 
impending. For the Secretary of State thus to seek 



232 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

the opinion of the chairman of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations was unprecedented. Nevertheless, 
he did it. Greater deference could not have been 
paid. 

The result of the interview that followed is set forth 
in the text. But it is maintained by the friends of 
Mr. Sumner that, when he said, as, in his memoran- 
dum to Mr. Fish he did say, that the " withdrawal of 
the British flag cannot be abandoned as a condition 
or preliminary " to the proposed negotiation, he should 
not have been considered as having proposed an ulti- 
matum, as it is called ; and it indicated almost a 
degree of moral turpitude on the part of the Secre- 
tary to suppose that he really meant any such thing. 
The Secretary, it is contended, should have assumed 
that this utterance was on his part a mere diplomatic 
pretence, and that subsequently he would prove amen- 
able to reason, or, at the proj)er time, change his 
mind. 

Such a process of convenient and surely foreseeable 
change is scarcely in accordance with the general 
understanding of Mr. Sumner's public record and 
mental attributes. He had no sense of humor ; and, 
therefore, it was improbable that he could have in- 
tended his memorandum as a pleasantry. What he 
wrote was written after two days of careful considera- 
tion, in the full light of a prolonged oral discussion 
with the Secretary. The whole ground had been 
gone over. As the result of much meditation, and 
acting unquestionably under a gTave sense of public 
responsibility, he then penned his memorandum, than 
which it would seem nothing could be more explicit. 
The Secretary certainly was justified in assuming that 



APPENDIX F 233 

the Senator meant what he wrote. Mr. Fish then 
found hmiself in a difficult position. Mr. Sumner 
had also said in the memorandum, in a clause not 
quoted in the text, that '^ no proposition [looking to 
renewed negotiations] can be accepted unless the 
terms of submission are such as to leave no reason- 
able doubt of a favorable result. There must not be 
another failure." In that opinion the Secretary fully 
coincided. Mr. Fish, therefore, found himself con- 
fronted with this proposition : — He was to begin a 
negotiation, — which, on no account, should fail of 
success, — in the face of an explicit statement of the 
chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions that the negotiation in question should be 
entered upon only upon a condition, or preliminary, 
which, if stated, would bring it at once to a close. 
The dilemma was obvious ; there was but one course 
for the Secretary to pursue. If he proposed to deal 
honestly by the British government, making no attempt 
to inveigle it into a false position, he must explain the 
situation to its representatives fairly and openly, and, 
if they then expressed a willingness to proceed, it only 
remained for him to pledge the Administration to 
carry it to a satisfactory result, if it could, over any 
opposition which the chairman of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations might have it in his power to offer. 
To those who knew Mr. Sumner, it needs no argu- 
ment to prove that, under the circumstances, it would 
have been altogether unjustifiable for the Secretary 
to enter into a negotiation, leaving Mr. Sumner as an 
unknown quantity in position to control the result. 
He had to be eliminated. At least, that was a rea- 
sonable view to take of the situation ; the only view, 



234 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

unquestionably, which would commend itself to the 
military mind of General Grant. He could never have 
been disposed to leave a formidable enemy intrenched 
in his rear. 

The rest followed, naturally and inevitably. After 
careful deliberation. Secretary Fish sent for four 
leaders of the Senate, two of each party, — Messrs. 
Thurman and Bayard on the part of the Opposition, 
and Messrs. Conkling and Edmunds representing the 
friends of the Administration. With them he con- 
sulted freely, making plain the situation. They ad- 
vised together as to the course best to pursue. 

All apparently agreed. Naturally, being experi- 
enced men, skilful in handling a parhamentary body, 
the question at once arose, how the issue could best 
be presented. Mr. Sumner's dis23lacement from his 
stronghold, the chairmanshiji of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, was the result to be brought about. 
The fact that he was not friendly to the proposed 
negotiation could not well be put forward, in view 
of the grounds upon which he rested his opposition. 
This was obvious. Under these circumstances, the 
parliamentary leaders naturally fell back upon the 
very sufficient difficulty apparent in the attempt pro- 
perly to conduct a foreign policy under a condition 
of affairs so wholly unexampled as that then exist- 
ing. It is said that the removal of Mr. Sumner was 
unprecedented. So also, it will be agreed, was the 
situation. An unprecedented situation can only 
apparently be dealt with through exceptional mea- 
sures of correction. 

Under the rules of that body, and the practice of 
the government from the beginning, it is customary to 



APPENDIX F 235 

revise tlie committees of the Senate every two years, 
the terms of one third of the Senators then coming to 
a close, and the places of that third being filled, either 
by reelection or by change of occupant. This peri- 
odical rearrangement was to be made in March, 1871, 
after the Forty-first Congress expired.. The matter 
was discussed in a caucus of Republican Senators, and 
the necessity of reorganizing the Committee on For- 
eign Relations was discussed, upon the grounds stated. 
Undoubtedly, the Executive had intimated to its 
friends in the Senate that such a change was in its 
judgment necessary to the development of a policy, and 
the proper conduct of public affairs. Those affairs 
would sustain detriment by a continuance of existing 
conditions. It was also right and proper that this 
argument in favor of a change should be advanced. 
Furthermore, it was right and proper that Senators 
should give due consideration to it. To the majority 
the argument seemed good ; and the change was made. 
This is believed to be a fair statement of the case ; 
and, in the light of such statement, it is difficult to 
see how any allegation of improper interference of 
the Executive in legislative action can be sustained. 
It is futile to argue that the Senate is a quasi-judi- 
cial body, and that the Executive has consequently 
no more right to try to influence its members than it 
would have to seek to affect the decision of a court of 
law by representations made to judges out of court. 
The two cases are in no respect analogous. The is- 
sues before the Senate are political ; the issues before 
the court of law are legal. On political issues — 
questions of policy — it is the business and duty of 
the Executive to try by all legitimate means to bring 



236 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

about harmonious action. The legislative department 
should understand thoroughly the purpose and policy 
of the Executive. In March, 1871, it was notorious 
that Mr. Sumner had broken with the Administra- 
tion. A year later the break was avowed. He then 
went over to the Opposition. In 1871 his proper seat 
was, so to speak, below the gangway ; in 1872 it was 
on the opposition side of the chamber. Under such 
circumstances it is difficult to see how his displace- 
ment by the act of a majority with whom he was no 
longer in sympathy, and whose views he had ceased to 
represent, can be characterized as " among the most 
unwarrantable, grossly unjust, and inexcusable acts in 
our political history." ^ Stronger language could not 
have been used had Mr. Sumner held his position by 
vested right, or judicial tenure. The logical result of 
such a contention would be to insist that the so-called 
" courtesy of the Senate " is one of the precious muni- 
ments of the Constitution, having no limits and ad- 
mitting of no exceptions. The disj)lacement of Mr. 
Sumner was in disregard of "the courtesy of the 
Senate ; " it was, therefore, equivalent to a wilful 
infraction of the fundamental law. 

That the contrary view here taken is sustained by 
men of experience in public life, and after years of 
reflection on the facts of this particular case, admits 

1 D. H. Chamberlain, in the Boston Herald and the Springfield 
Bepuhlican, of Sunday, February 23, 1902. The paper here referred 
to, afterwards published in pamphlet form under the title of " Charles 
Sumner and the Treaty of Washing-ton," is by far the most elaborate 
and carefully arg-ued discussion of the displacement of Mr. Sumner 
from his committee chairmanship which has yet appeared. It is un- 
necessary to say that the conclusions reached by Governor Chamberlain 
are diametrically opposed to those set forth in this paper. 



APPENDIX F 237 

of proof. George S. Bout well, for instance, was at the 
time Secretary of the Treasury. Though a member 
of Grant's Cabinet, Mr. Boutwell sympathized with 
Mr. Sumner on the Dominican issue. He has recently 
expressed himself thus as regards the displacement of 
Mr. Sumner from his chairmanship : — 

" Mr. Sumner's course in regard to the acquisition 
of San Domingo contributed to the separation between 
the President and the chairman of the Committee on 
Foreign Kelations, but opposition without personality 
would not have produced alienation on the part of the 
President. Other Senators were opposed to the acqui- 
sition of San Domingo, and there were members of his 
Cabinet who did not sympathize with his policy, as the 
President well knew ; but those facts in themselves 
did not tend in the least to alienation. ... As far as 
I have knowledge, you have stated with accuracy the 
conditions and circumstances which led to and required 
the removal of Mr. Sumner from the head of the Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations. The time had come when 
Mr. Sumner limited his conversation with the Secre- 
tary of State to official matters. Such are the require- 
ments of administration that it is not possible for the 
head of a department to conduct the business of his 
department, unless he can have full and free conversa- 
tion with the members of committees, not even exclud- 
ing those who represent a party in Opposition. Inas- 
much as the hostility which Mr. Sumner entertained 
for the Secretary of State extended to the President, 
it was not possible that any change of intercourse be- 
tween the department and the head of the Committee 
on Foreign Relations could be effected by the removal 
of the Secretary. Hence a change in the chairmanship 



238 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

of the Committee on Foreign Kelations became a public 
necessity, essential to the administration of the govern- 
ment." 

George F. Edmunds was, as stated in the text, then 
a Senator from Vermont. After thirty-one years of 
reflection, Mr. Edmunds has recently expressed himself 
as follows. In reading what he says, it is only neces- 
sary to bear in mind that many Senators who were 
satisfied of the propriety of the act on grounds of public 
policy were opposed to it for reasons of party unity. 
They felt apprehensive of the ill feeling it would neces- 
sarily generate. Mr. Edmunds has said : — 

" At the time of the caucus in December, 1870, it 
was thought by a majority of the Eepublican Senators 
that the relations between Mr. Sumner and Mr. Fish 
had not become so absolutely broken as to prevent the 
necessary communications between the Secretary of 
State and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
Eelations. When the new Congress came into being, 
and the Senate committees had all expired, and many 
changes had taken place in the personnel of the Senate, 
and the relations between the Secretary of State and 
Mr. Sumner had become entirely severed, it was 
thought that the public interest absolutely demanded 
that the chairman of the committee should be on terms 
of personal good-will and civility with the Secretary 
of State, and accordingly, and I think almost unani- 
mously, the Republican caucus determined not to re- 
appoint Mr. Sumner, and this, so far as I recollect, 
was done without any factional or other inquiry into 
whether Mr. Sumner or Mr. Fish were in the wrong ; 
and I believe that at least three fourths if not nine 
tenths of the gentlemen concerned both respected, and 



APPENDIX F 239 

were on personally friendly terms, with Mr. Sumner, 
as I was myself. The rules of the Senate were framed 
with the purpose that at the opening of a new Con- 
gress the Senate should feel perfectly free to make such 
changes in the chairmanship and personnel of all her 
committees as should be deemed expedient, without 
giving any gentleman a right to complain that he had 
been dismissed from office." 

John Sherman of Ohio was then, as for many 
years afterwards, a leading member of the Senate. 
Few were more influential in that body. Writing 
over twenty years later, Mr. Sherman said : — " Social 
relations between the Secretary of State and Mr. 
Sumner had become impossible ; and — considering 
human passion, prejudice and feeling — anything like 
frank and confidential communication between the 
President and Mr. Sumner was out of the question. 
A majority of the Republican Senators sided with the 
President. . . . When we met in March it was known 
that both [the San Domingo and British negotiations] 
would necessarily be referred to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, and that, aside from the hostile 
personal relations of Mr. Sumner and the Secretary 
of State, he did not, and could not, and would not, re- 
present the views of a majority of his Republican col- 
leagues in the Senate, and that a majority of his com- 
mittee agreed with him. Committees are, and ought 
to be, organized to represent the body, giving a major- 
ity of members to the prevailing opinion, but fairly 
representing the views of the minority. It has been 
the custom in the Senate to allow each party to choose 
its own representatives in each committee, and in pro- 
portion to its numbers. ... In deciding Mr. Sum- 



240 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

ner's case, in view of the facts I have stated, two plans 
were urged : — 

" First — To place him at the head of the new and 
important Committee of Privileges and Elections, 
leaving the rest of the Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions to stand in the precise order it had been, with 
one vacancy to be filled in harmony with the majority. 

" Second — To leave Mr. Sumner to stand in his 
old place as chairman, and to make a change in the 
body of the committee by transferring one of its mem- 
bers to another committee, and fill the vacancy by a 
Senator in harmony with the majority. 

" My own opinion was that the latter course was the 
most polite and just ; but the majority decided, after 
full consideration and debate, upon the first alter- 
native." 1 

Though Mr. Sherman expressed himself in the 
subsequent debate in open Senate in terms of strong 
opposition to the course pursued, his objection was 
based on party considerations. In his judgment the 
situation called for remedial action ; but not the action 
proposed. He preferred to put Mr. Sumner in a 
minority, and under guardianship, in the committee of 
which he was to remain the nominal head. If he still 
remained chairman, and, as such, the official mouth- 
piece of the committee and its intermediary with the 
Department of State, this position would certainly 
have been to him both embarrassing and mortifying. 
He would scarcely have submitted to it. It would seem 
more kindly, and scarcely less courteous, squarely to 
reorganize the committee ; which, at least, had the 
merit of accomplishing the result in view, and avoid- 

1 Recollections of Forty Years, vol. i. pp. 471, 472. 



APPENDIX F 241 

ing unseemly conflicts both in committee and on tlie 
floor of the Senate. 

The following extracts from the editorial pages of 
the New York Nation — then very critical of the 
course pursued by the Administration — give a con- 
temporary view of the whole matter, and of the per- 
sonage chiefly concerned : — 

" It seems not improbable that an attempt will be 
made in the Senate to make the settlement of the 
Alabama case depend on the willingness of Great 
Britain to abandon all her possessions on this side of 
the ocean, including her West Indian Islands. The 
germ of this idea made its appearance in the columns 
of the Tribune about two years ago, in the shape of a 
hint that nothing short of the cession of Canada would 
suffice to satisfy the American public for the wrongs 
it had suffered. The source of this suggestion could 
hardly have been doubtful, as it was a natural enough 
deduction from Mr. Sumner's statement of the measure 
of damages in his famous speech. Under the rule he 
laid down, the surrender of Canada indeed would have 
only been a moderate atonement. Since then the 
conception has grown and expanded until it involves 
the total retirement of England from the Western 
continent and the adjacent isles ; and Mr. Sumner is 
, apparently as anxious to connect his name with the 
i execution of this great scheme as the President is 

I to connect his with the settlement of the affair in the 
ordinary way by the payment of pecuniary damages. 
Of course, the production of the plan by the American 
commissioners is not at all likely, as they are all ra- 
tional politicians and men of business ; but it is not 
at aU unlikely to find supporters enough in the Senate 



242 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

to secure the rejection of any treaty the commissioners 
may agree on." (February 23, 1871.) 

" The main business of the chairman of the Senate 
committee is not to negotiate treaties, but to discuss 
with the Executive such treaties as have been negoti- 
ated, and to receive from it explanations about them. 
His first business, therefore, is to be a good organ of 
communication on this particular class of subjects be- 
tween the President and Senate, and nobody can be 
said to be well fitted for this duty whose personal rela- 
tions with the President are of an unpleasant nature. 
In fact, we go so far as to say that a proper sense of 
his duty, and of the fitness of things, and a proper 
appreciation of the delicacy of the machinery of such 
a government as ours, might have suggested to Mr. 
Sumner the expediency of resigning the chairmanship 
as soon as he found himself arrayed in open and bit- 
ter hostility to General Grant. It must be remem- 
bered that his resigning the chairmanship would not 
deprive the Senate of the benefit of his counsels. It 
would enable no act of the Administration to escape 
his supervision. . . . 

"We allude to his [Sumner's] want of judgment 
and want of sense of responsibility in the use of lan- 
guage. He talks sometimes in the wildest way, and 
apparently without being fully conscious of the force 
or bearing of what he says. ... It would not be un- 
natural that, in view of all these facts, and on the eve 
of an attempt to settle a most important controversy 
with England, in which he has taken a most excited 
part, and has given utterance to most extraordinary 
views of international law and morality, the Adminis- 
tration should wish for some friendlier, calmer, and 



APPENDIX F 243 

more accurate organ of communication with the body 
which is to ratify any treaty it may enter into." 
(March 16, 1871.) 

" Some fresh light has, however, been thrown on 
the causes of the great Sumner-Fish quarrel, by the 
new Washington paper, the Cajntal^ whose account 
is said to be ' semi-official.' It appears to have arisen 
out of an ill-judged attempt of the foolish Fish to get 
Sumner to take the English mission and abandon his 
opposition to the San Domingo scheme. Sumner, of 
course, refused with a pitying smile. The unhappy 
Fish ' left the house a baffled and disappointed man,' 
and then went to work to ' insult ' Mr. Motley. After 
the appearance of his letter to Moran, however, the 
poor old coward did not dare to go near ' the Old Bay 
State Lion ' for some time, but at last mustered up 
courage to call at his den to meet Sir John Rose on 
official business. The evening passed quietly enough, 
and, we are glad to say, ' intellectually and profita- 
bly,' and the Fish doubtless thought he was forgiven 
and restored to favor. Far from it. After he had 
gone, Sumner sat down ' after midnight in the quiet 
of his library,' and considered his case afresh, and 
came to the conclusion that he ought still further to 
punish him. This cruel but we presume just decision 
reached, the house of Mr. Schenck was chosen for the 
execution of the sentence. The judge and culprit met 
I there at dinner, and in the course of the meal poor 
JFish, little knowing what was in store for him, ' made 
ja frivolous remark about duck and partridge ' across 
the table to the ' Numidian Lion ' — for as such it 
appears Mr. Sumner figured on this occasion, doubt- 
less having ascertained that an ' Old Bay State Lion ' 



244 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

was, to say the least, an anomaly. ' The Lion ' merely 
looked at him, and made no reply. '• Fish's weak 
nature,' says the chronicler, ' felt the shock.' Small 
blame to him, say we ; whose nature would n't ' feel 
the shock ' if a Numidian Lion looked at him in 
silence across a small table ? The effect on American 
securities of this dreadful business, we are glad to say, 
has not yet been perceptible ; but mighty agencies 
work slowly." (March 23, 1871.) 



APPENDIX G^ 

It is curious, as well as historically interesting, to 
trace in the correspondence and memoranda of Mr. 
Fish the gradual change of his tone and feeling 
towards Mr. Sumner. Their personal as well as social 
relations, as colleagues in the Senate from 1851 to 
1857, have already been referred to.^ Though tak- 
ing very different views, politically and morally, of 
the issues of the day, they were intimate.^ Indeed, 
\ in no house in Washington was Mr. Sumner so inti- 
j mate or so welcome as in that of Mr. Fish. The 
( single term during which the latter served expired 
! in March, 1857. Twelve years later, in March, 
I 1869, he was unexpectedly called into Grant's cab- 
I inet. He then at once wrote to Mr. Sumner, ex- 
pressing the earnest hope that he might " rely upon 
your friendship and your experience and ability, for 
your support and aid to supply my manifold deficien- 
cies." During the earlier months of Secretary Fish's 
tenure of office, the relations between the two were of 
the most friendly character, — official, social and per- 
sonal. Indeed, officially, no Senator had ever been 
treated by the head of the State Department in so con- 
fidential a way, — it might almost be said, a way so 
deferential. The first difference arose over the instruc- 
tions to Mr. Motley, as stated already. Mr. Sumner 

1 See supra, p. 187. ^ Supra, p. 106. 

^ Pierce : Sumner, vol. iv. pp. 375-379. 

( 



246 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

on that occasion was, in liis peculiar way, distinctly 
overbearing ; and Mr. Fish did not conceal his sense 
of the fact. It was on the 15th of May, and at the 
State Department. After reading the draught of in- 
structions, Mr. Sumner walked up and down the room, 
talking in a most excited way, and declaring that he 
would " make Motley resign ; " speaking of the Min- 
ister to Great Britain as if he was his man, or agent. 
To this the Secretary replied, — " Let him resign. I 
will put a better man in his place." 

Mr. Bancroft Davis describes another characteristic 
scene which occurred at about this time. Mr. Sumner 
one evening had called, this time by a]3pointment, at 
Mr. Fish's house, to discuss the instructions. When 
his visitor rose to go, Mr. Fish accompanied him to the 
door. " It was one of those mild evenings in May 
which in Washington make the doorsteps so attrac- 
tive. Standing there, Sumner opened his case. They 
talked long. Sumner's voice at last became so loud, 
as his feelings were aroused, that Mr. Fish said, 
pleasantly : ' Sumner, you roar like the bull of Bashan. 
The police will be after us. I think we had better 
adjourn.' Sumner smiled, and bade him good-night." 
All this occurred in May, nearly eight months before 
that after-dinner call on Mr. Sumner at which the 
President tried to secure the Senator's approval of the 
Babcock Dominican treaty. During that time the 
friction between the Secretary and the Senator had 
sensibly increased. Their correspondence was marked 
by occasional exhibitions of feeling, indicative of less 
cordiality. From January to June, 1870, this tend- 
ency to a separation developed apace, until, in June, 
the President insisted on the recall of Mr. Motley. 



APPENDIX G 247 

Grant and Sumner had now openly quarrelled. Each 
denounced the other. E. R. Hoar, up to that time 
Attorney-General in Grant's cabinet, altogether sym- 
pathizing with Sumner in his opposition to the 
West Indian expansion policy, yet maintained his 
friendly, as well as official, relations with the Presi- 
dent. Judge Hoar was wont in after years to describe 
with much humor the Washington doorstep interviews 
he at that time had with Mr. Sumner. Going to the 
house of that gentleman in the evening, his host 
would accompany him to the door as he went away, 
and there, on one side of Lafayette Square, using the 
Attorney-General as a species of buffer between him 
and the President, he would, gradually and uncon- 
sciously, raise his voice until he roared, as Mr. Fish 
expressed it, "like a bull of Bashan." He would 
then, in terms equally unmeasured and stentorian, de- 
nounce the man in the White House on the other side 
of the Square. It would at times seem, as Judge 
Hoar expressed it, as if all Washington, including 
Mrs. Grant, must hear him, and the police would have 
to interfere. 

On the issues now raised, the Secretary of State, 
after much hesitation, sided with the President. He 
did so with reluctance ; but he was a member of the 
Cabinet, and, moreover, as he wrote to a friend at the 
time, " I have a very strong affection for the Presi- 
dent ; he is a very true man, and warm friend, — 
accustomed to deal with men of more frankness and 
sincerity, and loyalty to a cause, than many of those 
whom the business of Washington attracts hither." 
He then went on in the same letter thus to refer to 
Mr. Sumner : — - " Congress is incapable, — suffering 



248 THE TREA^TY OF WASHINGTON 

from the want of leadership, and cursed with incap- 
able aspirants to leadership. Jealousies and disap- 
pointments develop in old Senators, who exhibit 
arrogance, the attendant perhaps of long continuance 
in senatorial position. Clay and Benton, each dom- 
ineered in their day, but they were men capable of 
position ; the aspirant to their control, in the present 
day, knows nothing but books, and not over-much of 
them." This was written on the 23d of June, 1870, 
fifteen months after Grant's inauguration. Within the 
ten days preceding or following, the Dominican treaty 
was rejected by the Senate, and the resignation of the 
Attorney-General, and the Minister to Great Britain, 
called for. Though, in the Dominican matter. Judge 
Hoar had not seen his way to follow the same course 
of loyalty to the head of the administration which Mr. 
Fish had pursued, he recognized the fact that grounds 
might exist for an honest difference of opinion, and 
retained a warm friendly regard for Mr. Fish person- 
ally as well as great respect for his character and 
ability ; a respect which he always afterwards felt, 
and did not fail freely to express. The evening of 
the second day after that upon which he had, in re- 
sponse to the President's somewhat curt request, sent 
in his resignation. Judge Hoar, as elsewhere appears,^ 
called on Mr. Fish to explain the reasons thereof, and 
to urge him " under all circumstances to hold fast ; " 
earnestly adding in language already quoted that in 
his judgment the Secretary of State was "the bul- 
wark now standing between the Country and its 
destruction." It was characteristic of the two men 
that Mr. Sumner was at the same time roughly de- 
1 Supra, p. 221. 



APPENDIX G 249 

manding of Mr. Fish why, under the circumstances 
in which he found himself placed, he did not forth- 
with resign. 

On this point, Mr. Fish, fortunately, hearkened to 
the appeal of Judge Hoar, disregarding the suggestion 
of Mr. Sumner. But the breach between him and 
the latter was now fast widening. Five weeks later, 
on the 6th of August, Mr. Fish thus wrote to Senator 
Howe of Wisconsin : — 

" Mr. Sumner, I fear, is implacable. I passed an 
hour in his study the evening before I left Washing- 
ton. His general tone towards me was very friendly, 
and my farewell was cordial and kind as ever. But 
he was very severe towards the President, and in one 
or two outbursts of rhetorical denunciation he included 
me and any one connected with the Administration. 
I am quite convinced that on such occasions, he is 
not conscious of the extent and violence of his expres- 
sions, and is not wholly the master of himself. . . . 
With large ability, high culture, extended reading, and 
remarkable power of oratory, he lacks knowledge of 
men, is overborne by much vanity (much of it quite 
justifiable), is arrogant and domineering, and these 
qualities increase with years. He has no one of the 
peculiar elements essential for leadership, to which he 
thinks that his long service, and his admitted abil- 
ity, entitle him. . . . Under the name of Mr. Perley 
Poore, he has made a publication neither generous nor 
frank. I should have been quite justified in noticing 
it and denouncing it, and should have done so but for 
my desire to avoid anything to confirm him in his 
estrangement or his antagonism to the Administration, 
and for my determination to avoid, if practicable. 



250 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

being brought personally into controversy with one 
with whom for many years I have had such friendly 
relations, and who has so many very fine qualities. 
... I intend not to lose him as a personal friend. 
I wish not to lose him as a political associate and co- 
worker." 

In the same spirit Mr. Fish some three weeks later 
(August 25) wrote from his home at Garrison to 
Senator Morrill of Vermont : — 

" I had several very friendly interviews with him 
[Sumner], and made statements to the very limit that 
the confidence of my official position would allow, and 
which ought to satisfy any sensible man. But on the 
subject of Mr. Motley's removal, and on his own rela- 
tions with the President, I cannot regard Mr. S. as 
either a reasonable or a reasoning man. He fell back 
always from the facts I presented to a severe expression 
of feeling, and some rhetorical phrase. He seemed to 
me determined to consider himself the cause and the 
object of all that had been, or might be, done. ... I 
am not insensible of his arrogance and overbearing 
temper, but I know, too, his extended literary attain- 
ments, his power of eloquence, and his many good 
qualities, and should deeply regret on his own ac- 
count, and on that of the Republican party, that at 
this late day he should fall from the faith." 

Finally, on the 6th of September following, he 
wrote again, still to Senator Morrill : — 

" He [Sumner] is of great value and importance to 
us ; but, unfortunately, he thinks that value and im- 
portance to embrace the existence of the party. . . . 
He nourishes his supposed griefs, and seems to take 
comfort in imagining everything that is done without 



APPENDIX G 251 

him, or contrary to his wishes, as a personal offence." 
This letter was probably received by Senator Morrill 
on the 7th of September. While it was lying on his 
table, there came to him from Mr. Sumner a most 
characteristic effusion, elated the 8th, to which, two 
days later, he referred, in reply,, as follows : — " You 
characterize [the President's] acts, and that with 
severity — perhaps with greater severity than you are 
aware of. Your words must leap out in your conver- 
sation, and they will inevitably reach the ears of the 
President. 'Brutality,' 'indignity,' 'offensive,' 'utterly 
indefensible conduct,' ' excuses, apologies, and reasons 
which are obviously pretexts, subterfuges, and after- 
thoughts,' would make any man's ears tingle. It may 
be too much to ask you to forget and forgive ; but I 
think it might be wise to let the subject ' alone se- 
verely.' " 1 

This excellent advice Mr. Sumner could not fol- 
low ; and, in the course of the next few weeks, inci- 
dents of personal intercourse apparently occurred which 
brought matters to a crisis. Though not a man of 
aggressive disposition, Mr. Fish seems, when aroused, to 
have had in him a strong infusion of that stubbornness 
so characteristic of the Dutch stock. He also was 
resentful of what he regarded as affronts ; and of 
anything of the nature of personal insult, he was un- 
forgiving. In view of past friendly relations he bore 
much from Sumner, as being Sumner's way, but, 
finally, the limit seems on some occasion to have been 
passed. Thereafter, the sense of personal exaspera- 
tion on the part of the Secretary of State was not less 

^ " Notable Letters from my Political Friends," by Justin S. Mor- 
rill, The Forum, vol. xxiv. p. 409 ; December, 1897. 



252 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

than that felt by the President ; and when Mr. Bout- 
well, the head of the Treasury, truthfully as well as 
charitably, suggested that Mr. Sumner was apt to for- 
get what he said, Mr. Fish sharply replied, — " Sum- 
ner is crazy. He is a monomaniac upon all matters 
relating to his own importance, and his relations to 
the President." Mr. Sumner and Roscoe Conkhng, 
then Senator from New York, were naturally antago- 
nistic. As Rufus Choate would have phrased it, they 
disliked each other, not for cause, but peremptorily. 
To Conkling, Mr. Fish now said, — " Sumner is par- 
tially crazy. Upon a certain class of questions, and 
wherever his own importance or influence are con- 
cerned, or anything relating to himself, or his own 
views, past or present, or his ambition, he loses the 
power of logical reasoning, and becomes contradictory, 
violent, and unreasoning. That is mental derange- 
ment." 

This evidence of such contemporaries as Mr. Dana 
and Mr. Fish, both during long periods warm per- 
sonal as well as close political friends of Mr. Sumner, 
is higlily suggestive. It affords indications of mental 
methods and characteristics which, explaining much, 
would in no wise be inferred from anything to be 
found in the elaborate biography of Mr. Pierce. Cer- 
tainly, neither General Grant nor Mr. Fish were 
considered among their contemporaries men difficult 
to get on with, or prone to take offence. They were 
both, at the outset, most solicitous of Sumner's friend- 
ship and support. They were anxious to conciliate 
him. Grant and Sumner never were on terms of 
personal intimacy. They had little in common. But 
the same is hardly less true of Grant and Fish. They 



APPENDIX G 253 

saw nothing of each other socially, in later years, when 
both were residents of the same city. Simply, they 
were not congenial natures. But, in the early months 
of his presidency, Grant was sincerely desirous of being 
on good terms with Sumner. Hence the appointment 
of Motley ; hence the unfortunate after-dinner visit in 
January, 1870. Yet, all this being unquestionably 
so as late as January, 1870, in January, 1871, — 
twelve months afterwards only, — neither President 
nor Secretary was on speaking terms with the Sena- 
tor. The differences had become personal and bitter. 
This was suggestive. 

The simple fact was that Mr. Fish, instinctively 
and unconsciously, knew how to deal with Grant, and 
how to accomplish results which depended on him. 
Mr. Sumner did not. He was essentially aggressive ; 
and General Grant resented aggressiveness. His 
friends, while greatly admiring his strong and brilliant 
qualities, could not but be conscious of his foibles ; they 
did not, however, state them in the somewhat direct 
language used by Mr. Fish. On the contrary, they 
indulged in much circumlocution. For instance. Sen- 
ator Hoar of Massachusetts, almost a disciple of Mr. 
Sumner's, once said of him : — "It has always seemed 
to me as if Mr. Sumner thought the Rebellion was put 
down by a few speeches he made in the Senate, and 
that he looked upon the battles fought as the noise of 
a fire-engine going by while he was talking." Mr. 
Schurz furnishes a curious illustration of this idio- 
syncrasy. The renomination of President Grant was, 
in 1872, a foregone conclusion. Mr. Sumner felt 
impelled to take ground against it in a speech. Mr. 
Schurz then says : — " When, shortly before the Na- 



254 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 

tional Kepublican Convention of 1872, he had deliv- 
ered in the Senate that fierce philippic for which he 
has been censured so much, he turned to me with the 
question, whether I did not think that the statement 
and arguments he had produced would certainly exer- 
cise a decisive influence on the action of that conven- 
tion. I replied that I thought it would not. He was 
greatly astonished — not as if he indidged in the delu- 
sion that his personal word would have such authorita- 
tive weight, but it seemed impossible to him that opin- 
ions which in him had risen to the full strength of 
overruling convictions . . . should fall powerless at 
the feet of a party which so long had followed inspira- 
tions kindred to his own. Such was the ingenuousness 
of his nature." 

Yet Mr. Sumner was essentially a man of large, 
kindly nature, and generous impulses. He felt slights 
keenly, and made personal issues; but he did not 
bear malice, nor was he small or vindictive. A curi- 
ous illustration of this occurred in the experience of 
George F. Edmunds of Vermont, whose first full term 
in the Senate coincided with Sumner's uncompleted 
last term. Mr. Edmunds, it will be remembered, was 
one of those in the confidence of Secretary Fish dur- 
ing the incipient negotiations which led up to the 
Treaty of Washington. Active in effecting the reor- 
ganization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, he 
had taken part adversely to Mr. Sumner in the debate 
on that subject. He subsequently, in a familiar letter, 
thus described what thereupon occurred: — "It is true 
that I was visited with Mr. Sumner's resentment of 
my connection with the change, for he absolutely cut 
my acquaintance ; which was not renewed until some 



APPENDIX G 255 

months afterwards, when, in vacation, we suddenly 
met in a New York omnibus, and he at the moment 
had forgotten my wickedness, and we cordiaUy shook 
hands ; and were on the friendliest terms for the rest 
01 his life. , 



Ill 

A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEARTS 

A TERRIBLE and tragic episode in our national life 
has burned itself into history since the last meeting 
of the Society, — the assassination of President Mc- 
Kinley. Twice before have we, in common with 
the whole land, been shocked by like occurrences.^ 
At the time of both, Mr. Winthrop occupied this 
chair ; ^ and, on each occasion, fitting resolutions, sub- 
mitted by him and unanimously adopted, were spread 
upon our records. From the precedents thus estab- 
lished I propose to deviate ; not that I have failed to 
sympathize in the outburst of feeling this truly terrible 
event has excited, or the expressions elicited by it ; 
but, on now reading the resolutions heretofore passed 
on similar occasions, they seem to me, though drawn 
with all Mr. Winthrop's accustomed felicity, unequal 
to the occasion, — in one word, almost of necessity, 
formal, conventional, perfunctory. I also feel that I 
could not express myself more adequately. Of Presi- 
dent McKinley all has in this way been said that can 
be said : — 



1 A paper read before the Massachusetts Historical Society, at its 
monthly meeting, October 10, 1901. 

2 April 20, 1S65, following the death of President Lincoln ; and 
October 13, 1881, following that of President Garfield. 

^ Robert C. Winthrop was President of the Massachusetts Histori- 
cal Society from 1855 to 1885. 



A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 257 

" Duncan is in his grave ; 
After life's fitful fever he sleeps well ; 
Treason has done his worst ; nor steel, nor poison, 
Malice domestic, foreign levy, nothing. 
Can touch him further." 

He cannot hear ; and, as to her for whom the latter 
years of the dead President's life were one long record 
of affectionate, self-sacrificing care, no formally set 
down words of mine could add one iota to the expres- 
sion of sympathy — deep and prolonged as sincere — 
which has already gone forth. This being so, silence 
seems best. 

Still, to one aspect of this awe-impelling tragedy I 
wish to call attention, for that aspect has to my mind 
an historic interest. Perhaps, already discussed, it is an 
old story ; if such is the case I can only excuse myself 
on the ground that, having been absent from the coun- 
try, and only just returned to it, I am less informed 
as to what has been said than I otherwise might have 
been. But, when some event like this last murder of 
a high official startles and shocks the whole civilized 
world, the first impulse always is to attribute its oc- 
currence to present conditions, — moral or material, — 
to some circumstance or teaching or appliance peculiar 
to the day, — and to ask in awe-struck tones, — To 
what are we coming ? Whither do tendencies lead ? 
In what will they result? So, as of genuine historical 
interest, in this connection, I want to call attention to 
the very noticeable fact that this murder of President 
McKinley by the wretched, half-witted Czolgosz has 
no significance whatever, as respects either cause or 
method, in connection with the times in which we live, 
its destructive appliances, or its moral instruction. 
This, somewhat curiously, is true not only of President 



258 A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 

McKinley's assassination, but of all the assassinations 
of a like nature, with two exceptions, which have oc- 
curred within the last half century. Of such, I easily 
recall eight : (1) The Orsini attempt on Napoleon III. 
in 1858, which resulted in numerous deaths, though 
the person aimed at escaped unharmed ; (2) the slay- 
ing of President Lincoln in 1865 ; (3) that of the 
Czar Alexander II. in 1881 ; (4) that of President 
Garfield three months later in the same year ; (5) that 
of President Carnot in 1894 ; (6) that of the Empress 
Elizabeth of Austria in 1898 ; and (7, 8) those of 
King Humbert in 1900, and, more recently, of Presi- 
dent McKinley. 

This is truly enough the age of advance, — scientific 
and intellectual. Strange doctrines are promulgated, 
and widely preached. There is a freedom given to 
utterances, at once wild and subversive, the like of 
which the world has not known before ; we do not be- 
lieve in the suppression of talk ; the press disseminates 
incendiary doctrines broadcast among the partially ed- 
ucated, and the haK, where not wholly, crazed. Then, 
in its turn, science has put the most deadly and de- 
structive of appliances within easy reach of the irra- 
tional or reckless. Yet, of all the attempts I have 
enumerated, two only have borne an earmark of this 
age. The Orsini conspiracy of 1858 and the death of 
the Czar Alexander in 1881 brought into play imple- 
ments of destruction unknown to former generations ; 
the other six cases out of the eight had no features in 
any respect different from similar crimes of the long 
past. The impulses, the methods, and the weapons of 
Booth and Guiteau, in 1865 and 1881, were identical 
in every way with those of Gerard and Ravaillac in 



A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 259 

1584 and 1610, three centuries before. They had in 
them nothing epochal, — nothing peculiar to the dy- 
namitic age. Consider, in the first j^lace, the aim of 
the assassin, the object of his animosity, — McKinley 
and Garfield were neither tyrants nor despots ; nor 
were William the Silent and Henry of Navarre. On 
the contrary, all those named were men of a merciful, 
not to say singularly genial disposition. Beneficent 
as rulers and magistrates, they were in the popular 
mind connected with no severities towards individuals. 
In not one of these cases had the assassin, directly or 
indirectly, immediately or remotely, suffered injury at 
the hands of his victim. It was the same with Lincoln 
and Carnot, Humbert and Elizabeth. In all these in- 
stances, moreover, the weapons used in killing, if not 
identical, were common to the earlier and the later 
period. Henry of Navarre in 1610, President Carnot 
in 1894, and Elizabeth of Austria in 1898, were mur- 
dered by thrusts of a poniard ; William of Orange in 
1584, King Humbert in 1900, and Presidents Lincoln, 
Garfield and McKinley, aU within forty years, met 
their deaths from pistol-shots. In no one of these 
tragedies did the modern high explosive play any part. 
They were aU ordinary shootings or stabbings of the 
old style. 

Nor was it otherwise as respects motive. The more 
recent instances developed nothing peculiar to any 
age or doctrines, except that in the earlier cases the 
crime originated in a morbid fanaticism born of reli- 
gious zeal ; whereas, in the later, social and anarchis- 
tic teachings had taken the place of theological. In 
the process of human development, or evolution as we 
call it, the same character of mind was set in action to 



L 



260 A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 

a like end by a common diseased impulse, only under ^ 
another name. There is no new factor at work ; 
merely the teaching of social rights now operates, in 
a certain order of brooding minds, as the teachings 
of theology once did on minds of the same temper. 
So far as these recent murders are concerned, the 
world and human nature have, therefore, undergone 
no change. The Czolgosz of 1901 is the Gerard of 
1584 reembodied, but actuated by the same impulse, 
and armed with his old weapon ! Luccheni is Ravail- 
lac. The three centuries between introduced no ele- 
ment of novelty. Indeed, the thought this recent 
murder has most forced on me has been one of sur- 
prise, on the whole, that such things so rarely happen. 
Here in America are now seventy millions of people, 
— gentle and simple, rich and poor, sane and insane, 
healthy and morbid ; of those seventy millions not a 
few are men who, like Macbeth' s hired assassin, might 
truthfully enough declare themselves of those 

" Whom the vile blows and buffets of the world 
Have so incensed that I am reckless what 
I do to spite the world ; " 

and, when thus thought of, it seems cause for genu- 
ine surprise that among those seventy millions there 
do not more frequently develop single individuals — 
some one person in the half million — who, seized in 
his brooding moments with the homicidal mania, 
asserts his equality and his hate by striking at the 
most shining mark. To my mind, contemplating 
mankind as an infinitely varied and well-nigh count- 
less mass, it is the rarity of these attempts in our day, 
not their occasional occurrence, which should excite 
our special wonder. 



A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 261 

At the time of the assassination of the President, 
I chanced to be in England, having left home on 
the 10th of August. It was a vacation trip ; and, 
in the course of it, I thus had some opportunity to 
witness that singular, and very suggestive, outburst 
of sympathy and fellow-feeling on the part of our kin 
beyond the sea, which was so marked a feature of 
that unhappy episode. On Thursday, September 19, 
I was in London, and present at the memorial ser- 
vices in Westminster Abbey. Certainly, they were 
most impressive. Seated in the choir, I was not in 
position to see the nave of the Abbey, except in part 
and by glimpses ; but, throughout the solemn obser- 
vances of that day and place, an atmosphere of genu- 
ine sympathy and deep feeling pervaded the great 
assembly. Every nook and corner was occupied ; a 
sense of awe was apparent. The day had been dull 
and obscure, — a September noon in London, — but, 
towards the close of the ceremonial, as the solemn 
tones of the great organ, intermingled with the re- 
sponses of the choir, rolled up through the arches of 
the vaulted roof, the clouds broke away without, and 
the sun shone down through the windows of stained 
glass on the vast congregation below. It was Mil- 
ton's " dim religious light ; " and the dusky atmos- 
phere seemed laden with the smoke of incense, as the 
chant of the choir died slowly away. 

To me personally, however, this outburst of English 
sentiment towards the United States and all things 
American — the demonstration of an undemonstra- 
tive people — contained within itself much food for 
thought. I freely acknowledge I have seen nothing 
like it. And, as my eyes witnessed the Present, 



262 A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 

memory called the Past to mind. What, I could not 
but ask myself, did it signify ? In what did it origi- 
nate ? Was it merely external ? Was it matter of 
policy ? Or did it indicate a true change of heart ? 
And if a change of heart, to what was that change 
due ? 

My thoughts then reverted to remote days and 
other experiences, now, in Great Britain, quite for- 
gotten, — memories still fresh with me, though a gen- 
eration has since passed on. I recalled my first 
experiences in England far back in the " sixties," — 
in the dark and trying days of our Civil War ; and 
again, more recently, during the commercial depres- 
sion, and contest over the free coinage of silver, in 
1896. Then, especially in the earlier period, nothing 
was too opprobrious — nothing too bitter and sting- 
ing — for English lips to utter of America, and men 
and tilings American. ^ We were, as the Times ^ echo- 
ing the utterances of the governing class, never wea- 
ried of telling us, a " dishonest " and a " degenerate " 
race, — our only worship was of the Almighty Dollar. 
A hearty dislike was openly expressed, in terms of 
contempt which a pretence of civility hardly feigned 
to veil. They openly exulted in our reverses ; our 
civilization was, they declared, a thin veneer ; demo- 
cracy, a bursted bubble. In true Pharisaic spirit they 
made broad their phylacteries, thanking God that 
they were not as we, nor we as they. All this I dis- 
tinctly recalled ; it was the atmosphere — frigid, con- 

1 See supra, pp. 74-70; also Life of C. F. Adams, American 
Statesmen Series, pp. 291-305; for a collection of pariiamentary 
utterances from the pag'es of Hansard, see Blaine : Twenty Years of 
Congress, vol. ii. pp. 478-481. 



A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 263 

temptuous, condescending — in which I had first lived 
and moved in London. And now what a change ! — 
and so very sudden I Nothing was too good or too 
complimentary to say of America. Our representa- 
tives were cheered to the echo. In the language of 
Lord Rosebery, at the King Alfred millenary celebra- 
tion at Winchester, on the day following the Mc- 
Kinley observances, the branches of the great Anglo- 
Saxon stock were clasping hands across the centuries 
and across the sea ; and the audience applauded him 
loudly as he spoke.^ 

The heartiness was all there. That at least admit- 
ted of no question. But what did it mean ? Why had 
this people so suddenly awakened to a kinship, in 
which formerly they had felt something in no way 
akin to pride ? It was over this I pondered. At last 
I evolved an explanation, mistaken, perhaps, — I may 
say probably mistaken, — but still plausible, and to me 
satisfactory. At the risk, perchance, of seeming un- 
gracious, — of appearing to respond somewhat unfeel- 
ingly to an outburst of genuine sympathy on the part 

1 Mr. E. L. Godkin, formerly editor of the Nation, called atten- 
tion to this great change of tone in the very last published communi- 
cation from his pen, dated Lyndhurst, England, July 31, 1901, printed 
in the New York Evening Post of the 10th of the following month. 
Mr. Godkin is peculiarly qualified to speak on this point. A Briton 
by birth, he has, after long residence in this country, been a frequent 
visitor in England during recent years, returning there recently in fail- 
ing health. " The American," he wrote in tlie letter referred to, " who 
in any profession enjoys ever so slight a distinction at home, has little 
idea what a great man he is until he comes to England. It is, how- 
ever, just as well for him in this respect that he comes now instead of 
ten years earlier. . . . At the present time American fortunes, and 
freedom in distributing them, and wide financial operations generally, 
have so captured the English imagination that they now hasten to 
embrace indiscriminately the cousins whom they snubbed for a cen- 
tury, and to pronounce them and their works good, one and all." 



264 A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 

of a kindred people, calling on us to forgive and for- 
get the ill-considered utterances and unwise policy of 
another time, I purpose here to put my much pon- 
dered explanation coldly on record. 

In the first place let me premise, and, in so doing, 
emphasize, my sense of the little worth of the judg- 
ment of an individual, and that individual an alien, 
on what may be the feeling of any community, taken 
in the aggregate, on a question which does not at once 
absorb and concentrate attention. Even in our own 
country, except when deeply stirred by some outburst 
of patriotism or sympathy, — a common impulse sweep- 
ing over the land, and bending minds as a strong 
gust inclines one way a field of ripening grain, — ex- 
cept on occasions such as this, we know how little real 
insight the average man has into what is passing in 
the minds of those among whom he has from his birth 
lived and moved. We all are conscious of that sense 
of weariness which almost daily comes over us when 
we read, in editorial parlance, what the American Peo- 
ple have made up their minds to do or not to do, — 
to have or not to have. On this point the average 
journalist is always fully advised. His insight is in- 
fallible. To his conclusions, knowing by long expe- 
rience their utter worthlessness, we pay no attention. 
Yet not an American goes to Europe for a vacation 
trip, but he comes home fully convinced that he knows 
more or less of the tendencies of foreign thought. 
Yet all the insight he has, has been picked up from 
newspapers and conversations in the railway carriage 
or the smoking-room. It is true that, in the case of 
Great Britain, descended from one parent stock, we 
speak the same language. None the less, an Amer- 



A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 265 

ican in Great Britain must almost of necessity draw 
his inferences as to Great Britain as a community 
from casual sources and a narrow range of observa- 
tion. He may read the Times and the Saturday 
Review^ or the Neics and the Spectator; he may 
have an introduction into English domestic and social 
life, passing as a guest from one great house to an- 
other ; he may mix in business or financial circles, and 
be familiar with " the city ; " he may belong to the 
church, and breathe the atmosphere of the close or 
the university ; he may be a non-conformist, and so 
frequent the conventicle : — and yet, when all is said 
and done, he is still a stranger in a strange land. In 
spite of himself, except it be as the result of a long 
and varied sojourn, he necessarily draws his conclu- 
sions largely from matters of accident, — chance con- 
versations overheard or participated in at hotels and 
in clubs, in waiting-rooms and in railway carriages, — 
unsigned communications in copies of papers he may 
pick up, — or even from talking with bagmen, waiters, 
cab-drivers, and casual travelling companions. In this 
way what may be called the general drift of public 
opinion, so far as it reaches him, finds its expression. 
Much undoubtedly in such cases depends, also, on the 
individual ; for, though every one is apt to generalize 
from his individual experience, not all men are either 
sympathetic or approachable. Yet, allowing for all 
these peculiarities of the individual, — these kaleido- 
scopic chances of travel, — certain large features stand 
forth and impress themselves ; some general infer- 
ences may at times not unsafely be drawn. 

I think I know the Englishman fairly well ; at any 
rate, I have known him through personal contact for 



266 A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 

over thirty years. I may add that I like him ; and, 
individually, I think he does not dislike me. We cer- 
tainly get on fairly well together. About him and 
her there is a downrightness, sometimes, it is true, bor- 
dering on brutality, which commands my respect. He 
does not conceal his feelings. He is not good at play- 
ing policy. But, high or low, gentle or simple, rich 
or poor, the Englishman and the Englishwoman re- 
spect and admire the wealthy, the successful, the mas- 
terful. This is natural, for the English themselves 
are essentially masterful. They are also a commercial 
people. Of late years the struggle for life in Great 
Britain, as elsewhere, has become more intense, — the 
cost of living higher, — the social scales more exact- 
ing. There, as in America, wealth, and the possession 
of wealth, has become a larger and larger factor in the 
common existence ; and the newspaper, with its elab- 
orate daily accounts of what is taking place among 
the rich and the fashionable, has distorted ideals. Now, 
of recent years, — since, we wiU say, the close of our 
Civil War, or 1870, — no people on earth have been 
comparably so successful as the Americans in the 
rapid accumulation of wealth, none have shown them- 
selves more masterful ; and, as he has more and more 
so shown himself, the Englishman has undergone a 
change of feeling towards him, — and this change is, 
I believe, real. Whether real or not, it certainly is 
sudden. The outward expression is of recent date ; 
but the influences which have gradually brought it 
about have been a good while at work. The change, 
as now witnessed, may, I think, be traced to one re- 
mote and several immediate causes. I will enumerate 
some of the more prominent. 



A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 267 

The first was the outcome of our gigantic, prolonged 
Civil War. At one stage of that struggle, America 
— loyal America, I mean — touched its lowest estate 
in the estimation of those called, and in Great Britain 
considered, the ruling class, — the aristocracy, the 
men of business and finance, the army and navy, the 
members of the learned professions.^ None the less, 
they then saw us accomplish what they had in every 
conceivable form of speech pronounced '^ impossible." 
"We put down the Rebellion with a strong hand ; and 
then, peacefully disbanding our victorious army, made 
good our every promise to pay. We accomplished 
our results in a way they could not understand, — a 
way for which experience yielded no precedent. None 
the less, the dislike, not unalloyed by contempt, was 
too deep-rooted to disappear at once, much more to 
be immediately transmuted into admiration and cor- 
diality. They waited. Then several striking events 
occurred in rapid succession, — all within ten years. 

I am no admirer of President Cleveland's Venezu- 
ela diplomacy. I do not like brutality in public any 
more than in private dealings. Good manners and 
courtesy can always be observed, even when firmness 
of bearing is desirable. None the less, bad for us as 
the precedent then established was, and yet will prove, 
there can be no question that, so far as Great Britain 
was concerned, the tone and attitude on that occasion 
adopted were productive of results at once profound 
and, in some ways, beneficial. The average English- 
man from the very bottom of his heart respects a man 
who asserts himself, — provided always he has the will, 
as well as the power, to make the self-assertion good. 
^ Supra, pp. 62, 63. 



268 A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 

This, as a result of our Civil War, they felt we had. 
We had done what they had most confidently pro- 
claimed we could not do, and what they, in their 
hearts, feel they have failed to do. Throughout our 
Rebellion they had insisted that, even if the conquest 
of the Confederacy was possible, — which they de- 
clared it manifestly was not, — the pacification of the 
Confederates was out of the question. They thought, 
also, they knew what they were talking about. Had 
they not for centuries had Ireland on their hands ? 
Was it not there now ? Were they not perpetually 
floundering in a bottomless bog of Hibernian discon- 
tent ? Would not our experience be the same, except 
on a laro^er scale and in more a^^oravated form ? The 
result worked out by us wholly belied their predic- 
tions. Not only was the rebellion suppressed, but 
the Confederates were quickly conciliated. The Brit- 
ish could not understand it ; in the case of the Trans- 
vaal they do not understand it now. They merely see 
that we actually did what they had been unable to do, 
and are still trying to do. The Spanish war showed 
that our work of domestic conciliation was as com- 
plete as had been that of conquest. 

Then came the commercial depression of 1893, and 
the silver issue. Again they predicted all possible 
disaster. I was in London in the summers of 1896 
and 1897, in close touch with financial circles. The 
tone and atmosphere at that time prevalent reminded 
me forcibly of the dark days of the Rebellion. Even 
as recently as four years back, nothing was too bad 
for the Englislmian " on 'Change " to say or to predict 
of America, or '' Americans," as our securities were 
called. Suddenly, and in our own way, we emerged 



A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 269 

from under the cloud, and, again erect and defiant, 
challenged British commercial supremacy. That they 
understood ; while they feared, in their hearts they 
admired. Then came our Spanish war ; and at 
Manila and Santiago they saw us crush a European 
navy, such as it was, much as the lion they have 
taken for their emblem might crush some captive 
jackal of the desert. This they understood best, and 
most admired. The rest naturally followed. We 
were unquestionably rich, unmistakably powerful; 
that we too were a masterful race was evident ; we 
fearlessly challenged supremacy ; we had a way of 
somehow accomplishing results which they had been 
at much pains vociferously to pronounce altogether 
out of the question. So they respected and feared 
us ; then they began, in a way, to feel proud of us. 
Were we, after all, not flesh of their flesh, — bone of 
their bone ? 

Finally came their own war in the Transvaal. 
Among the nations of Europe, Great Britain found 
itself in a state of extreme isolation. We ourselves 
know from recent experience to what this is due. 
Under some law of development as yet only partially 
understood, the leading nations of the earth have, 
especially within the last quarter of a century, been 
reaching out for dominion in every direction. In this 
process Great Britain, for reasons plain to every ob- 
server, took the lead. In so doing, she had a century's 
start ; but, none the less, she came in necessary but 
sharp contact with others, all bent on the same work. 
The result was logical. A few years ago we suddenly 
entered on the same path, — Imperialism, it is called. 
We all know what followed. We came in conflict 



270 A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 

with a nation belonging to Latin Europe. Immedi- 
ately, all the Latin communities were in sympathy 
with Spain, and looked loweringiy upon us. The 
English, at about the same time, came in conflict with 
an offshoot of the Germanic stock ; and instantly all 
those of German blood scowled upon her. France, 
she had offended in Africa ; Russia was traditionally 
a rival, and an enemy in Asia. It so chanced that a 
fellow feeling then brought the United States and 
Great Britain together. We were in a not dissimi- 
lar situation. As Mr. Richard Cobden observed long 
ago of his countrymen, — " We generally sympathize 
with everybody's rebels but our own." ^ This is not a 
peculiarly British characteristic. We, in America, 
were inclined to sympathize strongly with the rebels 
of South Africa ; but we now have rebels of our own. 
Rebels, therefore, are with us not in such high favor 
as they were, — temporarily, of course. Thus, in- 
stinctively and insensibly. Great Britain and the 
United States, each being to a degree isolated, drew 
to£:ether in face of the Germanic and the Latin races. 
Especially was this so with Great Britain ; for her 
isolation and consequent unpopularity were much the 
more pronounced of the two. It thus became, to a 
certain extent, those of the English-speaking race 
against the world. Blood, speech, descent, told ; and 
it told more plainly with them than with us. 

Thus, as I more and more reflected upon it, I be- 
gan to realize that the change in the English heart 
was not only real, but altogether human, as well as 
eminently characteristic. I saw, also, or thought I 
saw, just how it came about. The mass of the English 

1 Speeches, vol. ii. p. 88. 



A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 271 

people — the great wage-earning class, the toiling mil- 
lions — never had shared in the fear and dislike, so 
long and loudly proclaimed, of America and Demo- 
cracy. They, on the contrary, throughout the slave- 
holders' rebellion, and during our time of greatest 
stress, as a whole, sympathized with the national spirit 
and the Union cause. They instinctively felt that 
we somehow were fighting their battle with privilege 
and aristocracy. Their hearts, therefore, were true ; 
in them no change had to take place. The govern- 
ing or influential classes, on the other hand, though 
prejudiced, were quick, in their way, to learn. They 
now felt British isolation ; they feared for their trade ; 
they found themselves in trouble in Ireland and in 
Africa. So their hearts turned towards their kin 
beyond the sea; and they turned in good earnest. 
The new-born sympathy was real ; its expression gen- 
uine. They themselves did not analyze the motive. 
Perhaps it was as well they did not, for that adulation 
which goes forth to those whom success has crowned 
savors of the Pliilistine, rather than of the disciples of 
sweetness and light. None the less it is human ; and, 
moreover, there is much to urge in extenuation of it. 
But, in this case, the worship of success was but one 
of the factors which entered into the situation. We 
ourselves, it must not be forgotten, had, in the years 
that had passed and the bitter experiences through 
which we had gone, been largely transmuted. More 
I assured of our position, we had that increased confi- 
dence in ourselves which relieved us in a degree of 
self-consciousness. We had a record, and a future. 
The national crudeness, so conspicuous in the past, 
was largely of the past. It was no longer necessary 



272 A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 

to assert our equality, for our equality was no longer 
challenged. Thus the change was as much in our- 
selves as in the estimate held of us by others. 

All this we only partially appreciate. In my own 
case, remembering the situation of a generation back, 
while I saw how differently they regarded us, I could 
but be to some extent conscious of a failure to realize 
how different we had ourselves become. In reality it 
was much as if, from under the parental roof, a father 
had watched some rebellious, self-assertive youth, who 
had gone forth into the world to work out his destiny 
in his own way and on his own account, not over and 
above respectful, and setting all precept and expe- 
rience at defiance. At first, and for a good while, he 
would be looked at askance ; failure would be pro- 
nounced his predestined fate. Then, by degrees, as, 
always asserting his equality, he overcame difficulties, 
— as he acquired wealth, power, fame, — the father 
would begin to look with pride on the stalwart, broad- 
shouldered, big-boned youth, moving on from success 
to success, achieving victory after victory, ever accom- 
plishing results before pronounced impossible, by pro- 
cesses peculiarly his own working out a great destiny . 
in defiance of rule, but ever changing, developing, ' 
ripening as he did so. And gradually that father, 
however set in his ideas, would undergo a change of 
heart, not the less real because unconfessed, saying to 
himself : " This is my offspring, — bone of my bone, 
flesh of my flesh ! And what an extraordinary fellow 
he is, — and enormously rich withal ! " 

And this, unless I greatly err, is the process through 
which Great Britain has gone, — is going ; we have 
gone, and are going. In any event, I now submit it 



A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 21 S 

as a tentative explanation of an extremely noticeable 
recent something, — a manifestation no less unmis- 
takable than suggestive. As a change of demeanor, 
too, it was not otherwise than agreeable to some of 
us, as, last month, we sat in quiet reminiscent mood 
during the ringing plaudits. The " Old Home " had 
not always welcomed us back in just that way ; we 
probably were other than we had been ; they certainly 
looked upon us with more kindly eyes. 



IV 

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION » 

*' History is past Politics, and Politics are present History." — Ed- 
ward A. Freeman. 

" Politics are vulgar when they are not liberalized by history, and 
history fades into mere literature when it loses sight of its relation to 
practical politics." — Sir John Sbeley. 

Here are aphorisms from two writers, both justly 
distinguished in the field of modern historical research. 
Sententious utterances, they would probably, like most 
sententious utterances, go to pieces to a greater or less 
extent under the test of severe analysis. They will, 
however, now serve me sufficiently well as texts. 

That politics should find no place at its meetings 
is, I believe, the unwritten law of this Association ; 
and, by politics, I refer to the discussion of those ques- 
tions of public conduct and policy for the time being 
uppermost in the mind of the community. Taking 
into consideration the character and purpose of our 
body, and the broad basis on which its somewhat loose 
membership rests, the rule may be salutary. But 
there are not many general propositions not open to 
debate ; and so I propose on this occasion to call this 

1 Address as President of the American Historical Association, de- 
livered at the Annual Meeting of the Association, in Washington, 
December 27, 1901. Owing to its length, this address was compressed 
in delivery, occupying forty-five minutes only ; it was printed, in 
part, in the American Historical Beview for January, 1902, vol. vii. 
pp. 203-232. 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 275 

unwritten law of ours in question. While so doing, 
moreover, I shall distinctly impinge upon it. 

Let us come at once to the point. May it not be 
possible that the unwritten law, — perhaps it would 
be better to speak of it as the tacit understanding, — I 
have referred to, admits of limitations and exceptions 
both useful and desirable ? Is it, after all, necessary, 
or even, from a point of large view, well considered, 
thus to exclude from the list of topics to be discussed 
at meetings of historical associations, and especially of 
] this Association, the problems at the time uppermost 
in man's thoughts ? Do we not, indeed, by so doing 
abdicate a useful public function, — surrender an edu- 
cational office ; practically admitting by our act that 
\ we cannot trust ourselves to discuss political issues in 
a scholarly and historical spirit? In one word, are 
not those composing a body of this sort under a species 
* of obligation, in a community like ours, to contribute 
I their share, from the point of view they occupy, to 
the better understanding of the questions in active 
political debate ? This proposition, as I have said, I 
\ now propose to discuss ; and, in so doing, I shall, for 
i purposes of illustration, draw freely on present prac- 
] tical politics, — using as object lessons the issues now, 
I or very recently, agitating the minds of not a few of 
j those composing this audience, — indeed, I hope, of 
jail. 

I start from a fundamental proposition. The Amer- 
ican Historical Association, like all other associations, 
whether similar in character or not, either exists for 
a purpose, or it had better cease to be. That purpose 
is, presumably, to do the best and most effective work 
in its power in the historical field. I then further, 



276 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

and with mucli confidence, submit that the standard 
of American political discussion is not now so high as 
not to admit o£ elevation. On the contrary, while, 
comparatively speaking, it ranks well both in tone and 
conduct, yet its deficiencies are many and obvious. 
That, taken as a whole, it is of a lower grade now 
than formerly, I do not assert ; though I do assert, 
and propose presently to show, that in recent years it 
has been markedly lower than it was in some periods 
of the past, and periods within my own recollection. 
That, however, it is not so high as it should be, — 
that it is by no manner of means ideal, — all will, I 
think, admit. If so, that admission suffices for present 
purposes. 

My next contention is perhaps more open to dis- 
pute. It is a favorite theory now with a certain class 
of philosophers, somewhat inclined to the happy-go- 
lucky school, that in all things every community gets 
about what it asks for, and is qualified to appreciate. 
In political discussion — as in railroad or hotel ser- 
vice, and in literature or religion — the supply, as 
respects both quality and quantity, responds with suf- 
ficient closeness to the demand. There is, however, 
good reason for thinking that, with the American 
community which to-day is, or at least with some 
sections and elements thereof, this at best specious 
theory does not at the present time hold true. Our 
recent political debates have, I submit, been conducted 
on a level distinctly below the intelligence of the 
constituency ; the participants in the debate have not 
been equal to the occasion offered them. Evidence 
of this is found in the absence of response. I think I 
am justified in the assertion that no recent political 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 211 

utterance has produced a real echo, much less a re- 
verberation; and it would not probably be rash to 
challenge an immediate reference to a single speech, 
or pointed expression even, which during the last 
presidential campaign, for instance, impressed itself 
on the public memory. That campaign, seen through 
the vista of a twelve-month, was, on the contrary, from 
beginning to end, with a single exception, creditable 
neither to the parties conducting it, nor to the audi- 
ence to whose level it was presumably gauged. 

Recall, I pray you, its incidents; already almost 
forgotten, they come back, when revived by an effort 
of memory, with a remote, far away echo, as of mock- 
ery. In the first place, on neither side were the issues 
of 1900 clearly denned or well presented; indeed, the 
long indecision as to what should be accepted as the 
"paramount issue" was, not remotely, suggestive of 
a certain very memorable '' Hunting of the Snark." 
Ignoring the personal element which entered so largely 
into it, as it enters into all canvasses, the favorite 
argument with one set of orators was the post ergo 
propter, as illustrated in " the Full Dinner Pail ; " 
which argument those of the other side met by fierce 
denunciation of " Department Stores," and the mani- 
festly pertinent inquiry, addressed to the general audi- 
tory, as to what they proposed to do with their sons. 
The fate in store for their daughters, it was gloomily 
intimated, would admit of little question, should the 
opposing candidate be chosen. So far as what is 
known as " Labor " is concerned, one candidate posed 
as the prescriptive protector of American Industry, 
while the other warmly declared himself in favor of 
" The Man against the Dollar." The talk from the 



278 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

hustings under this head was irresistibly suggestive 
of the scene in Dickens's Old Curiosity Bhop^ — 
the adherents of both candidates stoutly maintained 
that Codlin was the Workingman's friend, not Short ; 
Short might be very well as far as he went, but the 
real friend was Codlin. 

But, apart from this, the one noticeable feature, 
possibly the single significant feature of the canvass, 
was that it distinctly deteriorated as it progressed. 
It was opened by Mr. Bryan, on the 8th of August, 
with a speech at Indianapolis which struck a lofty 
note, promising a high level of discussion. That 
speech fairly startled the reflecting portion of the 
community. It seemed for the moment as if the 
party in power would be forced to reckon seriously 
with the opposition throughout a sustained debate. 
How completely this promise failed of realization is 
fresh in memory. No subsequent utterance on either 
side made any impression on the public mind. Mr. 
Bryan, using his audience as a sounding-board, seemed 
thereafter to bid continually down ; and, finally, the 
contest degenerated into a mere trial of endurance 
between himself and the talking candidate of the other 
side, the telegraph day by day recording the number 
of speeches made by each. A less inspiring compe- 
tition could hardly be imagined ; and, as the papers 
in flaring, modern-time head-lines declared that Mr. 
Koosevelt had the previous day broken all records by 
making eighteen speeches, they went on gravely to an- 
nounce that Mr. Bryan had arranged a programme for 
the morrow under which he would "see " his opponent 
and " go him two better," orating to a square score of 
distinct audiences between 10 A. M. and midnight. 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 279 

But was this all the occasion called for ? Did our 
much vaunted American intelligence demand nothing 
better ? Credat Judceiis ! Not for a moment do I 
believe it. To that canvass, then, I propose presently 
to return, using it as an object lesson. I shall seek to 
revive the memory of its issues, — for already they 
are far advanced on the road to oblivion, — and I shall 
contrast what I have described as actually occurring 
with what was easily possible, had that same debate 
been actively participated in by organizations such 
as this of ours ; organizations whose representative 
spokesmen would have at least approached the dis- 
cussion, not in a partisan, but in a scientific spirit. 
For even active political issues, I contend, freed from 
the deflection always incident to party prejudice and 
personal feeling, may be viewed in the light of prin- 
ciple, precedent and experience. 

Perhaps, however, I can best illustrate what I have 
to say, — enforce the lesson I would fain this even- 
ing teach, — by approaching it through retrospect. 
So doing, also, if there is any skill in my treatment, 
cannot well be otherwise than interesting, for I shall 
deal with events almost all within the recollection 
of those yet in middle life. But while those events 
are sufficiently removed from us to admit of the neces- 
sary perspective, having assumed their true propor- 
tions to what preceded and has followed, they have 
an advantage over the occurrences of a year ago ; for 
the controversial embers of 1900 may still be glowing 
in 1901, — though, I must say, to me the ashes seem 
white and cold and dead enough. Still, I do not 
propose to go back to any very remote period, and I 
shall confine myself to my own recollection, speaking 



280 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

of that only of whicli I know, and in which I took 
part. My review will begin with the year 1856, 
— the year of my graduation, and that in which I 
cast my first vote ; also one in which a President 
was chosen, James Buchanan being the successful can- 
didate. 

Under the provisions of our Constitution, a great 
national debate is preordained for every fourth year. 
The whole policy of the government is thus at fixed 
periods challenged and reviewed. Whether, as the 
country has expanded and its population multiplied, 
while the questions involved in material interests of 
ever growing volume have become more complex and 
difficult of comprehension, this fixed Olympic period 
is wise, or, if wise, that assigned is not too short, are 
open questions. I think the period at any rate too 
short. Large bodies proverbially move slowly, and 
considerable stages of fixity are necessary to adjust- 
ment. In the case of so large and complex a body 
politic as the United States has now become, four 
years are manifestly insufficient for that purpose. 
Recent experience has shown such to be the case. 
But this is not now to be discussed. For our present 
purpose we must take things as they are ; and the 
fundamental law imposes on us a national political 
debate every fourth year, wholly irrespective of cir- 
cumstance. As 1856 was one of the years thus in 
advance assigned, I have now taken part in no less 
than twelve presidential canvasses. Approaching them 
in a spirit strictly historical, these I propose briefly to 
review. 

Yet it must be premised that each election does not 
represent a debate, — not infrequently it is merely a 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 281 

stage in a debate. It was so in 1856 ; it has been so 
several times since. Indeed, since 1840, — the famous 
" Log Cabin and Hard Cider " campaign of " Coon- 
Skin Caps," and ''Tippecanoe and Tyler, too," — 
probably the most humorous, not to say grotesque, 
episode in our whole national history, that in which 
the plane of discussion reached its lowest recorded 
level, — since 1840 there have been only six real de- 
bates ; the average period of a debate being, there- 
fore, ten years. These debates were (1) that over 
Slavery, from 1844 to 1864 ; (2) that over Kecon- 
struction, from 1868 to 1872; (3) Legal Tenders, or 
*' Fiat Money," and Resumption of Specie Payments 
were the issues in 1876 and 1880 ; (4) the issue of 
1888 and 1892 was over Protection and Free Trade; 
(5) the debate over Bimetallism and the Demoneti- 
zation of Silver occurred in 1896 ; and, finally, (6) 
Imperialism, as it is called, came to the front in 1900. 
Since 1856, therefore, the field of discussion has been 
wide and diversified, — presenting several issues of 
great moment. Of necessity, also, the debates have 
assumed many and diverse aspects, — ethical, ethnolo- 
gical, legal, military, economical, financial, historical. 
The last-named aspect is that which interests us. 

In every one of these debates, — and it goes almost 
without saying, — the historical aspect has been pro- 
minent, — it is, indeed, the one aspect which is all- 
pervasive. And this must be the case just so long as 
men, yielding respect to precedent, seek guidance from 
the experience of the past. My purpose is, briefly 
passing these debates in review, to measure the degree 
to which the trained historical element in the American 
community entered into them as an influencing factor, 



282 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

and to estimate the extent to which such an element 
might have entered into them, with results manifestly 
beneficial. I shall endeavor to show the great benefi^t, 
the elevating influence, which in aU these debates, 
though far more in some than in others, would have 
been derived from the active participation therein of 
such an organization as this, — an organization wholly- 
free from party lines, but divided in opinion, which 
would approach the questions at issue from a point of 
view distinctly scholarly and scientific. In doing this, 
let it be always borne in mind that, in scholarship 
and in science also, unanimity is not to be expected, 
scarcely to be desired. In the study of history, as 
in religion and in science, schools differ. The record 
is voliuninous and fuU of precedents from which very 
contradictory conclusions, all more or less plausible, 
may be drawn. In this field, as in others, the great 
desideratum is to have every side fully and vigorously 
presented, with a fuU assurance that the soundest con- 
clusions will survive as being, here also, always the 
most fit. 

The first of these debates, that involving the slavery 
issue, is now far removed. We can pass upon it his- 
torically ; for the young man who threw his maiden 
vote in 1860, when it came to its close, is now near- 
ing his grand climacteric. Of all the debates in our 
national history that was the longest, the most ele- 
vated, the most momentous and the best sustained. 
It looms up in memory ; it projects itself from history. 
As a whole, it was immensely creditable to the people, 
— the community at large, — for whose instruction it 
was conducted. It has left a literature of its own, — 
economical, legal, moral, political, imaginative. In 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 283 

fiction it produced Uncle Tom'' s Cabin^ still, if one 
can judge by the test of demand at the desks of our 
public libraries, one of the most popular books in the 
English tongue. In the law, it rose to the height of 
the Dred Scott decision; and, while the rulings in 
that case laid down have since been reversed, it will 
not be denied that the discussion of constitutional 
principles involved, whether at the bar, in the halls 
of legislatures, in the columns of the press or on the 
rostrum, was intelligent, of an order extraordinarily 
high, and of a very sustained interest. It was to the 
utmost degree educational. 

So far as the historical aspect of that great debate 
IS concerned, two things are to be specially noted. 
In the first place, the moral and economical aspects 
predominated ; and, in the second place, what may be 
called the historical element as an influencing factor 
was then in its infancy. Neither in this country nor 
in Europe had that factor been organized, as it now is. 
The slavery debate was so long and intense that all 
the forces then existing were drawn into it. The pul- 
pit, for instance, participated actively. The physiolo- 
gist was much concerned over ethnological problems, 
trying to decide whether the African was a human 
being or an animal ; and, if the latter, was he of the 
family of Cain. Thus, all contributed to the discus- 
sion ; and yet I am unable to point out any distinctly 
historical contribution of a high order ; though, on 
both sides, the issue was discussed historically with 
intelligence and research. Especially was this the 
case in the arguments made before the courts and in 
the scriptural dissertations ; while, on the political 
side, the speeches of Seward and Sumner, of Jefferson 



284 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

Davis and A. H. Stephens, leave little to be desired. 
The climax was, perhaps, reached in the memorable 
joint debate between Lincoln and Douglas, of which 
it is not too much to say the country was the auditory. 
The whole constituted a fit prologue to the great 
tragedy which ensued. 

Beginning, in its closing stage, in January, 1854, 
when the measure repealing the Missouri Compromise 
of 1820 was introduced into the Senate of the United 
States, and closing in December, 1860, with the pas- 
sage of its ordinance of secession by South Carolina, 
this debate was continuous for seven years, covering 
two presidential elections, those of 1856 and 1860. 
So far as I know, it was sui generis ; for it would, I 
fancy, be useless to look for anything with which to 
institute a comparison, except in the history of Great 
Britain. Even there, the discussion which preceded 
the passage of the Reform Bill of 1832, or that 
which led up to the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, 
or, finally, the Irish Home Rule agitation between 
1871 and 1893, — one and all sink into insignificance 
beside it. Of the great slavery debate it may then in 
fine be said that, while the study of history and the 
lessons to be deduced from history contributed not 
much to it, it made history, and on history has left a 
permanent mark. 

Of the canvass of 1864, from our point of view 
little need be said. There was in it no field fruitful 
for the historical investigator, the issue then presented 
to the people being of a character altogether excep- 
tional. The result depended less on argument than 
on the outcome of operations in the field. There was, 
I presume, during August and September of that 



^iV UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 285 

year, a wordy debate ; but the people were too intent 
on Sherman as he circumvented Atlanta, and on 
Sheridan as he sent Early whirling up the valley of the 
Shenandoah, to give much ear to it. Had this Asso- 
ciation then been in existence, and devoted all its 
energies to elucidating the questions at issue, I can- 
not pretend to think it would perceptibly have affected 
the result. 

Nor was it greatly otherwise in the canvass of 1868. 
The country was then stirred to its very depths over 
the questions growing out of the war. The shattered 
Union was to be reconstructed ; the slave system was 
to be eradicated. These were great political pro- 
blems ; problems as pressing as they were momentous. 
For their proper solution it was above all else neces- 
sary that they should be approached in a calm, 
scholarly spirit, observant of the teachings of history. 
Never was there a greater occasion ; rarely has one 
been so completely lost. The assassination of Lincoln 
silenced reason ; and to reason, and to reason only, 
does history make its appeal. The unfortunate per- 
sonality of Andrew Johnson now intruded itself ; and, 
almost at once, what should have been a calm debate 
degenerated into a furious wrangle. Looking back 
over the canvass of 1868, and excepting General 
Grant's singularly felicitous closing of his brief letter 
of acceptance, — " Let us have peace ! " — I think it 
would be difficult for any one to recall a single utter- 
ance of that campaign which produced any lasting 
impression. The name even of the candidate nomi- 
nated in opposition to Grant is not readily recalled. 
In that canvass, as in the preceding one, I should say 
there was no room for the economist, the philosopher, 



286 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

or the historian. The country had, for the time being, 
cut loose from both principle and precedent. 

The debate over Reconstruction, begun in 1865, 
did not wear itself out until 1876. In no respect will 
it bear comparison with that debate over slavery 
which preceded it. Sufficiently momentous, it was 
less sustained, less thorough, far less judicial. To- 
wards its close, moreover, as the country wearied, 
it was gravely complicated by a new issue ; for, in 
1867, began that currency discussion, destined to last 
in its various phases through the lifetime of a genera- 
tion. It thereafter entered, in greater or less degree, 
into no less than nine consecutive presidential elec- 
tions, two of which, those of 1876 and 1896, actually 
turned upon it. 

The currency debate presented three distinct 
phases ; first, the proposition, broached in 1867, 
known as the Greenback theory, under which the 
interest-bearing bonds of the United States, issued 
during the Rebellion, were to be paid at maturity in 
United States legal tender notes, bearing no interest 
at all. This somewhat amazing proposition was 
speedily disposed of ; for, early in 1869, an act was 
passed declaring the bonds payable " in coin." But, 
as was sure to be the case, the so-called " Fiat Money " 
delusion had obtained a firm lodgment in the minds 
of a large part of the community, and to drive it out 
was the work of time. It assumed, too, all sorts of 
aspects. Dispelled in one form, it reappeared in an- 
other. When, for instance, the act of 1869 settled 
the question as respects the redemption of the bonds, 
the financial crisis of 1873 reopened it by creating 
an almost irresistible popular demand for a govern- 



^iV^ UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 287 

ment paper currency as a permanent substitute for 
specie. Finally, when, seven years later, this issue was 
put to rest by a return to specie payments, the over- 
production of silver, as compared with gold, already 
foreshadowed the rise of one of the most serious and 
far-reaching questions which has perplexed modern 
times. Thus, as the ethical and legal issues, which 
were the staples of public discussion from 1844 to 
1872, were disposed of, or by degrees settled them- 
selves, a series of monetary questions arose, destined, 
even if at times in a somewhat languid way, to occupy 
public attention through thirty years. 

Yet there is, in connection with the canvasses of 
1876, 1880 and 1884, a suggestive reflection, which, 
if laid properly to heart, ought to bear fruit in future 
quadrennials. It is not now easy for those who took 
part — perhaps an eager and interested part — in 
those elections, to name off-hand the opposing candi- 
dates, much less to state the issues upon which the 
country then divided. It is very suggestive how 
much less momentous the average presidential choice 
becomes, the further we get away from it. Finally, 
we come to realize that, in world development, and 
even in national life, it would have been very much 
the same whichever candidate was chosen. Perhaps, 
after all, this lesson is that of not least historical 
value to be deduced from the study of well-nigh for- 
gotten presidential campaigns. 

It is difficult to say what the dividing issue of 
1876 really was. The country was then slowly re- 
covering from the business prostration which followed 
the collapse of 1873. The issues involved in recon- 
struction, if not disposed of, were clearly worn out. 



288 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

The country, weary of them, would not respond, turn- 
ing impatiently from further discussion. Those issues 
might now settle themselves, or go unsettled; and, 
though that conclusion was reached thirty years ago, 
they are not settled yet. The living debate was over 
material questions, — the cause of the prolonged busi- 
ness depression, and the remedy for it. The favorite 
specific was, at first, a recourse to paper money : the 
government printing-press was to set it in motion ; 
and even hard-money Democrats of the Jacksonian 
school united with radical Republicans of the Recon- 
struction period in guaranteeing a resultant prosper- 
ity. Again, the teachings of history were ignored. 
What, it was contemptuously exclaimed in the Senate, 
do we care for " abroad " ? From this calamity the 
country had been saved by the veto of President 
Grant in 1874 ; and, the following year, an act was 
passed looking to the resumption of specie payments 
on the 1st of January, 1879. Seventeen years of 
suspension were then to close. Over this measure, 
the parties nominally joined issue in 1876. The 
Republicans, nominating Governor Hayes of Ohio, 
demanded the fulfilment of the promise ; the Demo- 
crats, nominating Governor Tilden of New York, 
insisted on the repeal of the law. Yet it was well 
understood that the candidate of the Democracy 
favored the policy of which the law in debate was the 
concrete expression. The contest was thus in reality 
one between the " ins " and the " outs." We all 
remember how it resulted, and the terrible strain to 
which our machinery of government was in conse- 
quence subjected. In the wrangle which ensued, the 
material and business interests of the country recuper- 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 289 

ated in a natural way, just as had repeatedly been the 
case before, and more than once since ; and the United 
States then entered on a new era of increased pros- 
perity. This brought the paper money debate to a 
close. The issues presented had, in the course of 
events, settled themselves. 

But, not the less for that, in the canvass of 1876 a 
field of great political usefulness was opened up to the 
historical investigator ; a field which, I submit, he 
failed adequately to develop. A public duty was left 
unperformed. It was in connection with what John 
Stuart Mill has in one of his Dissertations and Discus- 
sions happily denominated " The Currency Juggle." 
From time immemorial, to tamper with the established 
measures of value has been the constant practice of 
men of restless and unstable mind, honest or dishonest, 
whether rulers or aspirants to rule. History is replete 
with instances. To cite them was the function of the 
historical investigator ; to marshal them, and bring 
them to bear on the sophistries of the day, was the 
business of the politician. A professorial discussion 
in a meeting of such an organization as this would 
then have been much to the point ; and yet, curiously 
enough, a new historical precedent was about to be 
worked out. That was then to be done which had 
never been done before, — a country which had gone 
to the length the United States had gone in the direc- 
tion of " fiat money " — two thirds of the way to 
repudiation — was actually to retrace its steps, and 
resume payments in specie at the former standards of 
value. History would have been searched in vain for 
a parallel experience. 

The administration of President Hayes was curi- 



290 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

ously epochal. During it the so-called " carpet-bag 
governments " disappeared from the southern states ; 
the country resumed payments in specie ; and, on the 
28th of February, 1878, Congress passed, over the 
veto of the President, an act renewing the coinage of 
silver dollars, the stoppage of which, five years before, 
constituted what was destined thereafter to be referred 
to as " the crime of 1873." This issue, however, 
matured slowly. Public men, having recourse to pal- 
liatives, temporized with it ; and, through four presi- 
dential elections it lay dormant, except in so far as 
parties pledged themselves to action calculated, in the 
well-nigh idiotic formula of politicians, to '' do some- 
thing for silver." The canvasses of 1880 and 1884 
are, therefore, devoid of historical interest. The 
first turned largely on the tariff ; and yet, curiously 
enough, the single utterance in that debate which has 
left a mark on the public memory was the wonderful 
dictum of General Hancock, the candidate of the 
defeated opposition, that the tariff was a local issue, 
which, a number of years before, had excited a good 
deal of interest in his native state of Pennsylvania. 
The gallant and picturesque soldier, metamorphosed 
into a political leader ^jro hac vice, simply harked 
back to the " Log Cabin " and " Coon-Skin " cam- 
paign of 1840, when, a youth of sixteen, he was on 
his way to West Point. 

Nor is the recollection of the debate of 1884 much 
more inspiring. It was a lively contest enough, under 
Grover Cleveland and James G. Blaine as opposing 
candidates ; — a struggle between the " outs " to get 
in, and the " ins " not to 2:0 out. But a sinoie for- 
mula connected with it comes echoing down the corri- 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 291 

dors of time, the alliterative "Rum, Romanism, and 
Rebellion " of the unfortunate Burchard. An inter- 
lude in the succession of great national debates, the 
canvass of 1884 called for no application of the les- 
sons of history. 

That of 1888, presenting at last an issue, rose to the 
dignity of debate. In his annual message of the pre- 
vious December, the President, in disregard of all 
precedent, had confined his attention not only to the 
tariff, but to a single feature in the tariff, the duty 
on wool. In so doing he had, as the well-understood 
candidate of his party for reelection, flung down the 
gauntlet ; for, only three years before, the Republi- 
can party, in its quadrennial declaration of articles of 
cardinal political faith, had laid heavy emphasis on 
"the importance of sheep industry," and " the danger 
threatening its future prosperity." The opposition 
had thus pledged itself to " do something " for wool, 
as well as for silver ; and the President now struck 
at wool as " the Tariff -arch Keystone." But, while in 
this debate the economist came to the front, there was 
no pronounced call and, indeed, small opportunity for 
the historian. The silver issue was in abeyance ; the 
pension list and civil service were not calculated to 
incite to investigation ; nor had history much to say 
on either topic. As to the " sheep industry," now so 
much in evidence, the British woolsack might afford 
a text suggestive of curious learning in connection with 
England's once greatest staple, — how, for instance, 
as a protective measure, it was by one Parliament 
solemnly ordained that the dead should be buried in 
woollens ; but it will readily be admitted that the his- 
toric spirit does not kindle over tariff schedules. The 



292 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

lessons of experience to be drawn from revenue tables 
appeal rather to the school of Adam Smith than to 
the disciples of Gibbon. 

Returning to the review of our national debates, in 
that of 1892 the shadow of coming events was plainly 
perceptible. The tariff issue had now lost its old sig- 
nificance ; for the infant industries had developed into 
trade and legislation-compelling trusts. These were 
suggestive of new and, as yet, inchoate problems ; but 
to them the constituency was not yet prepared intelli- 
gently to address itself. Popidism was rife, with its 
crude and restless theories ; a crisis in the history of 
the precious metals was clearly impending, with the 
outcome in doubt ; indiscriminate and unprecedented 
pension-giving had reduced an overflowing exchequer 
to the verge of bankruptcy. The debate of 1892 ac- 
cordingly dropped back to the politician's level, — that 
of 1876, 1880 and 1884. In it there was nothing of 
any educational value ; nothing that history will dwell 
upon. The "ins" pointed with pride; the "outs" 
sternly arraigned the " ins ; " while the student, 
whether of economics or history, there found small 
place and a listless audience. The memory of the can- 
vass which resulted in the second administration of 
Cleveland is quite obliterated by the issues, altogether 
unexpected, which the ensuing years precipitated. 

Of quite another character were the two canvasses 
of 1896 and 1900. Still fresh in memory, the echoes 
of these have indeed not yet ceased to reverberate ; — 
and I assert without hesitation that, not since 1856 
and 1860, has this people passed through two such 
wholesome and educational experiences. In 1896 and 
in 1900, as in the debates of forty years previous, there 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 293 

was a place, and a large place, for the student, whether 
investigator or philosopher. Great problems, — pro- 
blems of law, of economics and ethics, problems involv- 
ing peace and war, and the course of development m 
the oldest as in the newest civilizations, — had to be 
discussed, on the way to a solution. That the pro- 
longed debate running through those eight years was 
at all equal to the occasion, I do not think can be 
claimed. Even his most ardent admirers will hardly 
claim that Mr. Bryan in 1896 and 1900 rose to the 
level reached by Lincoln forty years before ; nor do 
the utterances of Mr. Koosevelt, Mr. Depew, or Mr. 
Hanna bear well a comparison with those of Seward, 
Trumbull and Sumner. And that this momentous, 
many-sided debate failed to rise to the proper height 
was due, I now unhesitatingly submit, to the predomi- 
nance in it of the political '' Boss," and the absence 
from it of the scholar. In it, those belonging to this 
association, and to other associations similar in char- 
acter to this, did not play their proper part, — they 
proved themselves unequal to the occasion. Indeed, 
in the whole wordy canvass of 1896, I now recall but 
two instances of the professor or philosopher distinc- 
tively taking the floor ; but both of those were mem- 
orable. They imparted an elevation of tone to discus- 
sion, immediately and distinctly perceptible, in the 
press and on the platform. I refer to the single utter- 
ance of Carl Schurz, before a small audience at Chi- 
cago, on the 5th of September, and to the subsequent 
publications of President Andrew D. White, in which, 
from his library at Ithaca, he drew freely on the stores 
of historical experience in crushing refutation of dem- 
agogical campaign sophistry. Amid the petulant chat- 



294 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

tering of the political magpies, it was refreshing to 
hear those clear-cut, incisive utterances, — calm, 
thoughtful, well-reasoned. I have been told that in 
its various forms of republication, no less than five 
millions, and some authorities say ten millions, of copies 
of that Chicago speech of Mr. Schurz were then put 
in circulation. It was indeed a masterly production, 
— a production in which a high keynote was struck, 
and sustained. But the suggestive and extremely en- 
couraging fact in connection with it was the response 
it elicited. Delivering himself at the highest level to 
which he could attain, Mr. Schurz was only on a level 
with his audience. To the political optimist that fact 
spoke volumes ; it revealed infinite possibilities. 

Twelve presidential canvasses and six great national 
debates have thus been passed in rapid review. It is 
as if, in the earlier history of the coimtry, we had run 
the gamut from Washington to Van Buren. Taken as 
a whole, — viewed in gross and perspective, the retro- 
spect leaves much to be desired. That the debates 
held in Ireland and France during the same time have 
been on a distinctly lower level, I at once concede. 
Those held in Great Britain and Germany have not 
been on a higher. Yet ours have at best been only rela- 
tively educational ; as a rule extremely partisan, they 
have been personal, often scurrilous, and more fre- 
quently still, I regret gi'eatly to find myself compelled 
to say, intentionally deceptive. A singular feature 
in them has been the noticeable fact that where, 
from time to time, the clergy have intervened, their 
so doing has not tended to elevate. They have been 
conspicuous neither for moderation nor for charity, 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 295 

while they actually seemed to revel in their igno- 
rance of the teachings of the past. One fact in the 
review is, however, salient. With the exception of 
the first, — that of 1856-60, — not one of the de- 
bates reviewed has left an utterance which, were it 
to die from human memory, would by posterity be 
accounted a loss. This, I am aware, is a sweeping 
allegation ; in itself almost an indictment. Yet, with 
some confidence, I challenge a denial. Those here are 
not, as a rule, in their first youth, and they have all 
of them been more or less students of history. Let 
each pass in rapid mental review the presidential can- 
vasses in which he has in any degree participated, and 
endeavor to recall a single utterance which has stood 
the test of time, as marking a distinct addition to man- 
kind's intellectual belongings, — the classics of the 
race. It has been at best a babel of the commonplace. 
I do not believe one utterance can be named for which 
a life of ten years will be predicted. Such a record 
undeniably admits of improvement. Two questions, 
then, naturally suggest themselves : — To what has 
this shortcoming been due ? — Wherein lies the 
remedy for it ? 

The shortcoming, I submit, is in greatest part due 
to the fact that the work of discussion has been left 
almost wholly to the journalist and the politician, — 
the professional journalist and the professional poli- 
tician. And in the case of both, there has in this 
country, during the last forty years, been, so far as 
grasp of principle is concerned, a marked tendency to 
deterioration. Nor, I fancy, is the cause of this far to 
seek. It is found in the growth, increased complexity, 
and irresistible power of organization as opposed to 



296 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

individuality, — in tlie parlance of the day, it is the 
all-potency of the machine over the man ; equally 
noticeable whether by that word, " machine," we refer 
to the political organization or to the newspaper. 
Let the last be considered first. The daily journal 

— the newspaper — is indisputably the one far-reach- 
ing organ of popular political education. Through its 
columns, as a medium, the teachings of those who think 
on all subjects — educational, religious, moral, political 

— percolate slowly, and, as a rule, in a very diluted 
form, finding thus at last lodgment and acceptance in 
the public thought. They are slowly assimilated. But 
the newspaper of to-day is altogether the product of 
the last century — almost of the last half of the cen- 
tury. Practically brought into being by James Gordon 
Bennett and Horace Greeley during " the forties," it 
then, and for nearly thirty years after, represented an 
editorial individuality, of which Greeley was the highest 
type. From 1841 to 1872, Horace Greeley was the 
New York Tribune ; and the New York T^nhune dur- 
ing those years was the greatest educational factor — 
economically and morally — this country has ever 
known. The protective tariff is its monument, cere 
perennius. The Tribune still exists ; but the Tribune 
of to-day is no longer the organ of one man. A news 
medium, owned by a syndicate, its utterances shaped 
by a business management — an editorial Aulic Coun- 
cil — are turned out by the yard by salaried ready 
writers, — quill-drivers of fortune, — whose necessary 
fate it is always to strive to reduce superficiality to a 
system. "By journalism," a modern writer of much 
acumen says, " is to be understood, I suppose, writing 
for pay on matters of which you are ignorant ; " ^ 

^ Leslie Stephen, Letters of John Richard Green, p. 66. 



I 

I 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 297 

and, as an evolution, tlie modern newspaper is the 
necessary outcome of existing conditions. A financial 
combination controls a most intricate, costly and in= 
fluential machine. Since 1872 the intense, widely 
pervasive personality of Horace Greeley has given 
place to the ordered and stereotyped utterances of the 
Tribune's editorial staff. 

Mutatis mutandis^ it is the same in politics. As 
Tennyson wrote two generations ago : — 

" The individual withers, and the world is more and more." 

The intricacy of modern political life, the magnitude 
of interests and expenditure, the cohesive power of 
plunder, the number of those who make of political 
life a bread winning trade, the size of the constituency, 

— all these concurring conditions have resulted in a 
state of affairs in which " the machine," of necessity, 
predominates. Among the qualities which go to con- 
stitute that natural aptitude calculated to win success 
in public life, — to secure office and retention in office, 

— grasp of principle, or a philosophical or statesman- 
like turn of mind, no longer find a place. What is 
needed is the faculty of managing men, combining 
interests, or conforming to tendencies. In a word, 
what is vulgarly but most expressively known as the 
" Boss " is, in our American public life, the logical out- 
come of the syndicate and machine principle applied 
to existing political conditions. The " Boss " is, in 
fact, to America what the Imperator was to Rome. 
It is the master mechanic with his hand on the lever ; 
but, as the machine responds to his touch, the indi- 
vidual is eliminated. 

This tendency of the day, few, I think, deny. In- 
deed, all must recognize the growth of combination. 



298 AX I'XDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

It can l3e studied everywhere, save in the highest forms 
of art and thouo:ht, Svndicates cannot turn out sreat 
poems, or noble statues, or attain to a deep insight. 
In letters, their power is confined to the profuse manu- 
facture of printed matter, — dictionaries, blue-books, 
cooperative histories, and the like. But we have now 
to do only with the political life, and the higher educa- 
tional forces there in action, or possible to bring into 
action in any emergency ; and the increased power 
of the machine in that field. I take to be one of the 
indications of the time, not less unmistakable than 
significant. ^laohine work always has a degenerating 
tendency. The more powerful the machine, the more 
it inclines to self-aggrandization and the perpetuation 
of abuse. A perfect machine is as nearly soulless as 
may be. Such a machine was the Church of Rome 
in the days of Voltaire and the Galas tragedy ; such 
a machine is the French army now, as exemplified in 
the Dreyfus affair, and the experience therein o^ Zola, 
The tendency from the individual towards the machine, 
in American joumaHsm and public life, cannot be 
denied. It distinctly does not promote a loftier, a more 
liberal and scholarly tone of discussion : on the con- 
trary, it works always in the opposite way. 

This being so, in what direction may we look for 
the corrective agency ? In a body politic, so full of 
vitality, so instinct with life, as that of ours, each evil 
works its own cure. The remedial action is apt to 
reveal itself in imexpected quarters, and in shapes not 
at once recognized ; but. unless the body poHtic is 
decadent, it is as sure to assert itself as it is in the case 
of disease in a physical organization not moribund. 

That those who philosophize and prescribe in this 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 299 

and kindred cases srenerallv reach wrons^ conclusions 
is quite indisputable ; it is safe, indeed, to say tliat 
they do so in more than nine cases out of ten. As 
Mr. Disraeli lonsr since sagrely observed, " It is the 
unexpected which is apt to occur.'' In the present 
case I wish, therefore, in advance, to acknowledge that 
I am probably quite wide of the mark in both my 
diagnosis of the disease and my forecast of the remedy. 
That remedy, moreover, when it comes, \s'ill, I am 
confident, not be in the nature of some ingenious dis- 
covery, — an invention which might admit of letters 
patent. On the contrary, it will be an evolution, — the 
natural development of internal heahng force assert iug 
itself to meet a pathological condition. Xot posing 
here, therefore, as a physician prescribing a sure cure 
of his own devising, but as an observer of conditions 
and symptoms, I propose to point out, so far as my 
observation and insight enable me so to do, the indica- 
tions of a self-curative process already asserting itself. 
The source of trouble being located in the tendency 
to excessive organization, it would seem natural that 
the coimteracting agency should be looked for in an 
exactly opposite direction ; that is, in the increased 
efficacy of individualism. Of this, I submit, it is not 
necessary to go far in search of indications. Take, for 
instance, the examples already referred to, of Mr. 
Schurz and President White, in the canvass of 189:3 ; 
and suppose, for a moment, efforts such as theirs then 
were, made more effective as resulting from the organ- 
ized action of an association like this. Our platform 
at once becomes a rostrum, — and a rostrum from 
which a speaker of reputation and character is insured 
a wide hearing. His audience, too, is present to listen 



800 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

and repeat. From such a rostrum, the observer, the 
professor, the student — be it of economy, of history, 
or of philosophy — might readily be brought into 
immediate contact with the issues of the day. So 
bringing him is but a step. He would appear, also, in 
his proper character and place, — the scholar having 
his say in politics ; but always as a scholar, not as an 
office-holder, nor an aspirant for office. His appeal 
would be to intelligence and judgment, not to passion 
or self-interest, or even to patriotism. The elements 
are all there ; the question is only as to a method of 
effective concentration. It must, I submit, be sought 
for here on the floor of the academy, and not in the 
confusion of the caucus. 

A due sense of political proportion might then 
become possible. Heretofore, the view customarily 
taken has been too narrow and too close. The con- 
tinuity of movement has been ignored, and the true 
relation of things intentionally distorted. The effort 
has uniformly been to give each contest, in so far as 
possible, a crucial aspect. All has been made to 
depend on that particular cast of the dice. The future 
of the race, one would suppose, rests on the outcome 
of some struggle, in which, in fact, those immediately 
participating are alone concerned. The retrospect I 
have just invited you to tells a very different story. 
Sixteen presidential elections, and only six national 
debates in sixty years ! The issues, moreover, involved 
in those debates have in most cases been settled, not 
on the hustings or in Congress, but by the course of 
events, — the logic of the philosopher, the scientist, or 
the economist. Illustrations of this, also, are not far 
to seek. In the journal of the day on which I am 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 301 

writing these words, I find, for instance, a confession 
of faith by a United States Senator, in which he 
indulges in this, for a politician, refreshing form of 
speech, — "In 1896 we had a campaign on the money 
question. Everything was depressed, — iflleness, dis- 
content, distrust and misery, everywhere. We were 
told that the salvation of the country depended upon 
the free coinage of silver. I believed then, and I 
believe now, that theoretically we were right ; but 
new and unforeseen forces came into play, and I have 
enough sense to recognize the fact that the restoration 
of confidence about which Mr. Cleveland talked, and 
about which I did not know enough at the time to 
understand, the discovery of gold in the Klondike, 
the influx of money seeking investment from abroad, 
and the increase of banking facilities, have, for the 
time being at least, settled the money question, and 
nobody but a fool would make a ' free silver ' speech 
now." What did the politicians have to do with the 
restoration of confidence ? It was the work of time, and 
of the producing and business community. What did 
they have to do with the discoveries in the Klondike ? 
or with the cyanide treatment of refractory ores? 
or with the increase of capital, seeking employment 
itself and giving employment to labor? Through- 
out that long and momentous debate, I submit, so far 
as the result was concerned and the record shows, our 
statesmen and journalists remind us only of Burke's 
famous metaphor of the dozen grasshoppers making 
the field ring with their importunate chink, while 
thousands of great cattle, chewing the cud, silently 
repose under the shadow of the British oak. Looking 
back over the whole period that is gone since that 



302 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

April day thirty-six years ago, when Grant and Lee, 
at Appomattox, brought the conflict in the field to a 
close, and sj)eahing in perfect moderation, I cannot 
point to one single beneficial result of a positive char- 
acter which can properly be classed as pohtical. As 
a species of safety-valve, political debate has, I admit, 
been of infinite service. Unending, and mostly idle 
in character, it has prevented ill-considered and pre- 
cipitate action, and given natural influences time in 
which to work out their results. Beyond this, what 
can be put to its credit? Take the debates in their 
order. The political Congressional reconstruction of 
the slaveholding and rebellious South has certainly 
failed to bear the test of time. What was then done 
has since been undone, and the section concerned is 
even now groping its way, painfully, and with no 
excess of intelligence and humanity, towards a more 
practical and better-considered solution. Thanks to 
a providential veto, the great currency debate ended 
in an absolutely do-nothing policy. Of the tariff 
debate I will not speak. Stretching through a whole 
century, it once brought the country to the verge of 
civil war, and its history is read in a vast literature 
of its own, — a veritable Serbonian bog of sophistry, 
saturated with bad rhetoric. The practical outcome, 
as studied in our last general tariff revision, has not 
been deemed specially creditable to American political 
disinterestedness or scientific fiscal thought. Our 
pension list is, indeed, a monument, but scarcely of 
public liberality judiciously exercised. Finally, the 
advocates of free-silver coinage, having erased from 
the statute-book that " Sherman-bill " which they 
themselves had inscribed there, confess that " a fool " 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 303 

only would be guilty of '' a silver speech " now. Con- 
gress has aU along been but a clumsy recording ma- 
chine of conclusions worked out in the laboratory and 
machine-shop ; and yet the idea is still deeply seated 
in the minds of men, otherwise intelligent, that, to 
effect political results, it is necessary to hold office, or 
at least to be a politician, and to be heard from the 
hustings. Is not the exact reverse more truly the 
case ? The situation may not be, indeed it certainly 
is not, as it should be ; it may be, I hold that it is, 
unfortunate that the scholar and investigator are find- 
ing themselves more and more excluded from public 
life by the professional with an aptitude for the 
machine : but the result is none the less patent. On 
all issues of real moment, — issues affecting anything 
more than a division of the spoils, or the concession 
of some privilege of exaction from the community, — 
it is the student, the man of affairs and the scientist 
who, to-day, in last resort, closes debate and shapes 
public policy. His, the last word. How to organize 
and develop his means of influence is the question. 

" Here 's what should strike, could one handle it cunuing-ly : 
Help the axe, give it a helve ! " 

So far as the historian is concerned, this association 
is, I submit, the helve to the axe. 

Of this the presidential election which closed just 
a year ago affords an apt illustration, ready at hand. 
No better could be asked for. What might then well 
have been ? The American Historical Association, as 
I have already said, is composed of those who have 
felt a call for the investigation and treatment of his- 
torical problems. Its members — largely instructors 



304 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

in our advanced education — feel that keen interest in 
the issues of the day, natural and proper in all good 
citizens, irresj)ective of calling. They want to con- 
tribute their share to discussion ; and, in that way, to 
influence results, so far as in them lies. From every 
conceivable point of view it is most desirable that they 
should have facilities for so doing. I hold, therefore, 
that, in the last presidential canvass, a special meeting 
of this association, called to discuss the issues then 
pending, might well have tended to the better general 
and popular comprehension of those issues, and to the 
elevation of that debate. Conducted on academic 
principles, and looking to no formal expression of 
results in any enunciated platform of principles, such 
a gathering would have exercised an influence, as 
perceptible as beneficial, in lifting the discussion up 
into the domain of philosophy and research. It would 
have brought to bear the lessons of the past on the 
questions of the day. In any event, it would certainly 
not have descended to that contemptible post ergo 
propter formula, which, on the one side or the other, 
has in every presidential canvass been the main staple 
of argument. 

What were the issues of the last presidential can- 
vass ? — on what questions did its debate turn ? Three 
in number, they were, I think, singularly inviting to 
those historically minded. To the reflecting man the 
matter first in importance was what is known as " Im- 
perialism," — the problem forced upon our considera- 
tion by the outcome of the war with Spain. Next I 
should place the questions of public policy involved 
in the rajjid agglomerations of capital, popularly de- 
nominated " Trusts." Finally, the silver issue still 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 305 

lingered at tlie front, a legacy from the canvass of 
four years previous. The debate of 1900 is a thing 
of the past. Each of those issues can now be dis- 
cussed, as it might well then have been discussed, in 
the pure historical spirit. Let us take them up in 
their inverse order. 

Historically speaking, I hold there were two dis- 
tinct sides to the silver question ; and, moreover, on 
the face of the record, the advocates of bimetallism, 
as it was called, had in 1896 the weight of the argu- 
ment wholly in their favor. In his very suggestive 
work entitled Democracy and Liberty^ Mr. Lecky 
referred to the discovery of America as producing, 
among other far-reaching effects, one which he con- 
siders most momentous of all. To quote his words : — 
" The produce of the American mines created, in the 
most extreme form ever known in Europe, the change 
which beyond all others affects most deeply and 
universally the material well-being of man : it revolu- 
tionized the value of the precious metals, and, in 
consequence, the price of all articles, the effects of all 
contracts, the burden of all debts." This was during 
the sixteenth century, — the years following the great 
event of 1492. Again, the world went through a simi- 
lar experience within our own memories, in conse- 
quence of the California and Australia gold-finds, be- 
tween 1848 and 1852. These revolutions were due 
to natural causes, and came about gradually. They 
were also of a stimulating character. From the be- 
ginning of modern commercial times, however, to the 
clo&e of the last century, the exchanges of all civilized 
communities had been based on the precious metals ; 
and silver had been quite as much as gold a precious 



306 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

metal for monetary purposes. Shortly after 1870 the 
policy of demonetizing silver was entered upon ; and, 
in 1873, the United States gave in its adhesion to 
that policy. Thereafter, in the great system of inter- 
national exchanges, silver ceased to be counted a part 
of that specie reserve on which draughts were made. 
Thenceforth, the drain, as among the financial centres, 
was to be on gold alone. In the whole history of man, 
no precedent for such a step was to be found. So far 
as the United States was concerned, the basis on which 
its complex and delicate financial fabric rested was 
weakened by one half ; and the cheaper and more 
accessible metal, that to which the debtor w^ould 
naturally have recourse in discharge of his obligations, 
was made unavailable. It could further be demon- 
strated that, without a complete readjustment of cur- 
rencies and values, the world's accumulated stock and 
annual production of gold could not, as a monetary 
basis, be made to suffice for its needs. A continually 
recurring contest for gold among the great financial 
centres was inevitable. A change which, in the 
language of Lecky, " beyond all others affects most 
deeply and universally the material well-being of 
man," had been unwittingly challenged. The only 
question was, — Would the unexpected occur ? — 
Then, if it did occur, what might be anticipated? 
Such was the silver issue, as it presented itself in 
1896. On the facts, the weight of argument was 
clearly with the advocates of the continued use of 
silver. 

Four years later, in 1900, the unexpected had 
occurred. As then resumed, the debate was replete 
with interest. The lessons of 1492 and 1848 had a 



I 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 807 

direct bearing on the present, and, in the light by 
them shed, the outcome could be forecast almost with 
certainty ; but it was a world-question. Japan, China, 
Hindostan entered into the problem, in which also 
both Americas were factors. It was a theme to in- 
spire Burke, stretching back, as it did, from this 
latter day light to the middle age darkness, and in- 
volving the whole circling globe. Rarely has any 
subject called for more intelligent and comprehen- 
sive investigation ; rarely has one been more confused 
and befogged by a denser misinformation. The dis- 
coverer and scientist, moving hand in hand, had, dur- 
ing the remission of the debate, been getting in their 
work, and, under the magic touch of their silent influ- 
ence, the world's gold production rose by leaps and 
bounds. Less than ten millions of ounces in 1896, in 
1899 it had nearly touched fifteen millions ; and, in 
money value, it alone then exceeded the combined 
value of the gold and silver production of the earlier 
period. What did this signify ? — History was only 
repeating itself. The experiences of the first half of 
the sixteenth century and the middle decennaries of 
the nineteenth century were to be emphasized on the 
threshold of the twentieth. 

So much for the silver question and its possible 
treatment. In the discussion of 1900, the last word 
in the debate of 1896 remained to be uttered. A 
page in history, both memorable and instructive, was 
to be turned. Next trusts, -^ those vast aggregations 
of capital in the hands of private combinations, con- 
stituting practical monopolies of whole branches of 
industry, and of commodities necessary to man. Was 
the world to be subject to taxation at the will of a 



308 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

moneyed syndicate ? The debate of a year ago over 
this issue, if debate it may be called, is still very 
recent. In it the lessons of history were effectually 
ignored ; and yet, if apj)lied, they would have been 
sufficiently suggestive. The historian was as conspic- 
uous for his absence as the demagogue was in evi- 
dence. 

The cry was against monopoly and the monopolist, 
— a cry which, as it has been ringing through all 
recorded times, suggests for the historical investigator 
a wide and fruitful field. Curiously enough, the first 
lesson to be derived from labor in that field is a para- 
dox. Practically, so far as extortion is concerned, 
there is almost nothing in common between the old- 
time monopoly and the modern trust. Of examples 
of the first, the record is monotonously full. Mere 
agents of the government, sometimes the favorites of 
the Crown, the whole machinery of the state has time 
out of mind been put at the service of monopolists to 
enable them to exact tribute from all. To the stu- 
dent of English history the names and misdeeds of Sir 
Richard Empson and Sir Giles Mompesson at once 
suggest themselves ; while others, more familiar with 
the drama, recall Sir Giles Overreach, or that power- 
ful scene in Ruy Bias in which the Spanish courtiers 
wrangle together, coming almost to blows, over a par- 
tition among themselves of the right to extort. The 
old system still survives. For example, in France 
to-day the manufacture and sale of salt is a govern- 
ment monopoly. A prime necessity of life, no person 
not specially authorized may engage in the production 
of salt, or import it into France. If a peasant 
woman, living on the sea-coast of Brittany or Nor- 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 309 

mandy, endeavors to procure salt for lier family by 
the slow process of evaporating a pailful of sea-water 
in the sun, she is engaged in an illicit trade, and 
becomes amenable to law. Her salt will certainly, if 
found, be confiscate. So of improved pocket matches. 
In France, their manufacture is a government revenue 
monopoly. They are notoriously bad. Those made 
and sold in Great Britain are, on the contrary, noted 
for excellence. If, however, passing from England to 
France, a box of British matches is found in the 
pocket of a traveller, it is taken from him and the 
contents are destroyed at once ; indeed, he is fortunate 
if he escapes the payment of a fine. This is mono- 
poly ; the whole strength of a government being put 
forth to exact an artificial profit on the sale of a com- 
modity in general use. There is a historical literature 
pertaining to the subject, — a lamentation, and an 
ancient tale of wrong. 

Into that literature I do not propose to enter. It 
is familiar ; and fuUy explains the deadly effect of the 
word " Monopoly " to-day, or of the opprobrious term 
" Monopolist," when flung as a missile from the hus- 
tings. It is an epithet suggestive of a branding-iron, 
and of the scars of burns, the recollection of which is 
imbedded in the popular mind. 

The curious feature in the present discussion — 
that which in the thought of the student of things 
as opposed to words imparts a special interest to it — 
is that, while the trust, or vast aggregation of capi- 
tal and machinery of production in the hands of indi- 
viduals designed to the end that competition may be 
brought under control, is in fact the modern form of 
monopoly, it is in its methods and results the direct 



310 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

opposite of the old-time monopoly ; for, whereas the 
purpose and practice of that was to extort from all 
purchasers an artificial price for an inferior article 
through the suppression of competitors, the first law 
of its existence for the modern trust is, through econ- 
omies and magnitude of production, to suj)ply to all 
buyers a better article at a price so low that other 
producers are driven from the market. The ground 
of popular complaint against the trust is, not that it 
exacts an inordinate profit on /what it sells, but that 
it sells so low that the small manufacturer or mer- 
chant is deprived of his trade. This distinction, with 
a difference, explains at once the wholly futile charac- 
ter of the politician's outcry against trusts. It is easy, 
for instance, to denounce from the platform the mag- 
nates of the Sugar Trust to a sympathizing audience ; 
and yet not one human being in that audience, his 
sympathies to the contrary notwithstanding, will the 
next morning pay a fraction of a cent more per pound 
for his sugar, that, by so doing, he may help to keep 
alive some struggling manufacturer, who advertises 
that his product does not bear the trust stamp. 

As to the outcome of conflicts of this character, his- 
tory is a monotony. They can have but one result, 
— an industrial readjustment. A single familiar 
illustration will suffice. Any one who chooses to 
turn back to it can read the story of the long con- 
flict between the spinning-wheel and the loom. For- 
merly, and not so very far back, the distaff and spin- 
ning-wheel were to be seen in every house ; homespun 
was the common wear. To-day, the average man or 
woman has never seen a distaff, nor heard the hum 
of a spinning-wheel. Ceasing long since to be a com- 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 311 

modity, homespun would be sought for in vain. Yet 
the struggle between the loom of the manufacturing 
trust and the old dame's spinning-wheel was, liter- 
ally, for the latter, a fight to the death ; for, in that 
case, the livelihood of the operator was at stake. 
Her time was worth absolutely nothing, except at 
the wheel. She must needs work for any wage ; on it 
depended her bread. A vast domestic, industrial re- 
adjustment was involved ; one implying untold human 
suffering. The result was, however, never for an in- 
stant in doubt. The trust of that day was left in un- 
disputed control of the field ; and it always must, and 
always will be, just so long as it supplies purchasers 
with a better article, at a lower price than they had 
to pay before. The process does not vary ; the only 
difference is that each succeeding readjustment is on 
a larger scale, and more far-reaching in its effects. 

Such, stripped of its verbiage and appeals to sym- 
pathy, is the trust proposition. But the popular ap- 
prehension always has been, as it now is, that this 
supply of the better article at a lower price will con- 
tinue only until the producer — the monopolist — has 
secured a complete mastery of the situation. Capital, 
it is argued, is selfish and greedy; corporations are 
proverbially soulless and insatiable ; and, as soon as 
competition is eliminated, nature will assert itself. 
Prices will then be raised so as to assure inordinate 
gains ; and when, in consequence of such profits, fresh 
competitors enter the field, they will either be crushed 
out of existence by a temporary reduction in price, or 
absorbed in the trust. 

All this has a plausible sound ; and of it, as a 
theory of practical outcome, the politician can be re- 



312 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

lied upon to make the most. On this head, however, 
what has the historical investigator to say? His will 
be the last word in that debate also ; his, the verdict 
which will be final. The lessons bearing on this con- 
tention to be drawn from the record cover a wide field 
of both time and space ; they also silence discussion. 
They tend indisputably to show that the dangers de- 
picted are imaginary. The subject must, of course, 
be approached in an unprejudiced spirit, and studied 
in a large, comprehensive way. Permanent tendencies 
are to be dealt with ; and exceptional cases must be in- 
stanced, classified, and allowed for. Attempts, more 
or less successful, at extortion, in a confidence of mas- 
tery, can unquestionably be pointed out ; but, in the 
history of economical development, it is no less un- 
questionable that, on the large scale and in the long 
run, every new concentration has been followed by a 
permanent reduction of price in the commodity af- 
fected thereby. The world's needs are continually 
supplied at a lower cost to the world. Again, the 
larger the concentration, the cheaper the product ; 
until now a new truth of the market-place has become 
established and obtained general acceptance, — a truth 
of the most far-reaching consequence, — the truth that 
the largest returns are found in quick sales at small 
profits. To manage successfully one of those great 
and complex industrial combinations calls for excep- 
tional administrative capacity in individuals, — for 
men of quick perception, and masterful tempers. 
These men must be able correctly to read the lessons 
of experience, and, accepting the facts of the situation, 
they must find out how most exactly to adapt them- 
selves to those facts. No theorist, be he politician or 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 313 

philosopher, appreciates so clearly as does the success- 
ful trust executive the fundamental laws of being of the 
interests he has in charge. Such have good cause to 
know that, under conditions now prevailing, compe- 
tition is the sure corollary of the attempted abuse of 
control ; and, moreover, that the largest ultimate re- 
turns on capital, as well as the only real security from 
competition, are found, not in the disposal of a small 
product at a large profit, but in a large output at 
prices which encourage consumption. Throwing ex- 
ceptional cases and temporary conditions out of con- 
sideration, as not affecting final results, the historical 
investigator will probably on this subject find himself 
much at variance with the political canvasser. That 
the last will get worsted in the argument hardly need 
be said. 

Does history furnish any instance of a financial, an 
industrial, or a commercial enterprise — a bank, a 
factory, or an importing company — ever having been 
powerful enough long to regulate the price of any 
commodity regardless of competition, except when act- 
ing in harmony with and supported by governmental 
power ? Is not the monopolist practically impotent, 
unless he has the constable at his call ? To answer 
this question absolutely would be to deduce a law of 
the first importance from the general experience of 
mankind. So doing would call for a far more care- 
ful examination than is now in my power to make, 
were it even within the scope of my ability ; but, if 
my supposition prove correct, the corollary to be 
drawn therefrom is to us as a body politic, and at 
just this juncture, one of the first and most far-reach- 
ing import. In such case, the modern American trust, 



814 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

also, so far as it enjoys any power as a monopoly, 
or admits of abuse as such, must depend for that 
power, and the opportunity of abuse, solely on govern- 
mental support and cooperation. Its citadel is then 
the custom-house. The moment the aid of the United 
States revenue officer is withheld, the American mono- 
polist would cease to monopolize except in so far as 
he could defy competition by always supplying a bet- 
ter article at a price lower than any other producer 
in the whole world. And here, having deduced and 
formulated this law, the purely historical investigator 
would find himself trenching on the province of the 
economist. The so-called protective system would 
now be in question. Thus again, as so often before, 
the tariff would become the paramount issue. But the 
tariff would no longer stand in the popular mind as 
the beneficent protector of domestic enterprise ; it 
would on the contrary be there closely associated with 
the idea of monopoly, it would be assailed as the 
stronghold of the trust. From the historical and 
economical point of view, however, the debate would 
not because of that undergo any diminution of interest. 
Whatever the politician might in the course of that 
debate assert, or the opportunist incorporate into 
legislation, we may rest assured that this issue will 
ultimately settle itself in accordance with those irre- 
sistible underlying influences which result in what we 
know as natural evolution. History is but the record 
of the adjustment of mankind in the past to the out- 
come of those influences ; and, in this respect, when 
all is said and done, it is tolerably safe to predict that 
the future will present no features of novelty. If, 
then, we can measure correctly the nature of the in- 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 815 

fluences at work, the character, as well as the extent, 
of the impeDding readjustraent may be surmised. For 
such a diagnosis the historian and economist must fur- 
nish the data. 

It remains to pass on to the third and last of the 
matters in debate during 1900 — that known as Im- 
perialism. This was the really great issue before the 
American people then, and, I submit, it is the really 
great issue before them now. That issue, moreover, 
I with confidence submit, can be intelligently consid- 
ered only from the historical standpoint. Indeed, 
unless approached through the avenues of human 
experience, it is not even at once apparent how the 
question, as it now confronts us, arose, and injected 
itself into our political action ; and, accordingly, it is 
in some quarters even currently assumed that it is 
there only fortuitously, — a feature in the great chap- 
ter of accidents, — a passing incident, which may well 
disappear as mysteriously and as suddenly as it came. 
Studied historically, I do not think this view of the 
situation will bear examination. On the contrary, I 
fancy even the most superficial investigator, if actu- 
ated in his inquiry by the true historical spirit, would 
soon reach the conclusion that the issue so recently 
forced upon us had been long in preparation, was 
logical and inevitable, and, for our good or our evil, 
must be decided, rightly or wrongly, on a large view 
of great and complex conditions. In other words, 
there may be reason to conclude that an inscrutable 
law of nature, at last involving us, has long been, and 
now is, evolving results. It is one more phase of nat- 
ural evolution, v/orking itself out, as in the case of 
Kome twenty-five centuries ago, through the survival 
and supremacy of the fittest. 



316 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

I need hardly say, I feel myself now venturing on 
a dangerous generalization ; and yet I do not see how 
the American investigator, who endeavors to draw his 
conclusions from history, can recoil from the venture. 
His deductions will probably be erroneous, — indeed, 
they are sure to be so to some extent ; — and, in making 
them, he is more than likely to make a not inconsider- 
able display of superficial knowledge. None the less, 
even if it be of small value, he is bound to offer what 
he has. If the seed that sower sows bears no fruit, it 
can do small harm. 

Mr. Leslie Stephen, in one of his essays, tridy 
enough says, " The Catholic and the Protestant, the 
Conservative and the Radical, the Individualist and 
the Socialist, have equal facility in proving their own 
doctrines with arguments, which habitually begin, 
'AH history shows.' Printers should be instructed 
always to strike out that phrase as an erratum; and 
to substitute, ' I choose to take for granted.' " And 
elsewhere the same writer lays it down as a general 
proposition that " Arguments beginning ' All his- 
tory shows ' are always sophistical." ^ What is by 
some known as the doctrine of Manifest Destiny is, 
I take it, identical with what others, more piously 
minded, refer to as the WiU, or Call, of God. The 
Mohammedan and the modern Christian gospel-mon- 
ger say, " God clearly calls us " to this or that work ; 
and with a conscience perfectly clear, they then pro- 
ceed to rob, oppress and slay. In like manner, the 
political buccaneer and land-pirate proclaims that the 
possession of his neighbor's territory is rightfully his 

1 Social Rights and Duties, vol. i. p. 129 ; An Agnostic's Apo- 
logy, p. 260. 



^A' UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 317 

^» by Manifest Destiny. The pliilosopliical politician 
next drugs the conscience of his fellow men 'by de- 
claring solemnly that " all history shows " that might 
is right ; and with time, the court of last appeal, it 
must be admitted possession is nine points in the law's 
ten. It cannot be denied, also, that quite as many 
crimes have been perpetrated in the name of God and 
of Manifest Destiny as in that of Liberty ; and that, 
at least, " all history shows ; " but, all the same, just 
as Liberty is a good and desirable thing, so God does 
live, and there is something in Manifest Destiny. 
As applied to the development of the races inhabiting 
the earth, it is, I take it, merely an unscientific form of 
speech, — the word now in vogue is evolution, — the 
phrase " survival of the fittest." When all is said 
and done, that unreasoning instinct of a people which 
carries it forward in spite of and over theories to its 
Manifest Destiny, amid the despairing outcries and 
long-drawn protestations of theorists and ethical phi- 
losophers, is a very considerable factor in making his- 
tory ; and, consequently, one to be reckoned with. 

In plain words, then, and Mr. Stephen to the con- 
trary notwithstanding, "all history shows " that every 
great, aggressive and masterful race tends at times 
irresistibly towards the practical assertion of its 
supremacy, usually at the cost of those not so well 
adapted to existing conditions. In his great work, 
Mommsen formulates the law with a brutal directness 
distinctly Germanic. " By virtue of the law, that a 
people which has grown into a state absorbs its neigh- 
bors who are in political nonage, and a civilized people 
absorbs its neighbors who are in intellectual nonage, 
— by virtue of this law, which is as universally valid 



318 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

and as much a law of nature as the law of gravity, — 
the Italian nation (the only one in antiquity which was 
able to combine a superior political development and 
a superior civilization, though it presented the latter 
only in an imperfect and external manner) was en- 
titled to reduce to subjection the Greek states of the 
East which were ripe for destruction, and to dispossess 
the peoples of lower grades of culture in the West — 
Libyans, Iberians, Celts, Germans — by means of its 
settlers ; just as England, with equal right, has in Asia 
reduced to subjection a civilization of rival standing, 
but politically impotent, and in America and Austra- 
lia has marked and ennobled, and still continues to 
mark and ennoble, extensive barbarian countries with 
the impress of its nationality." i Professor von Hoist 
again states a corollary from the law thus laid down 
in terms scarcely less explicit, in connection with a 
well-known and much discussed act of foreign spolia- 
tion in our own comparatively recent history. "It is 
as easy to bid a baU that has flown from the mouth of 
the gun to stop in its flight, and return on its path, as 
to terminate a successful war of conquest by a volun- 
tary surrender of all conquests, because it has been 
found out that the spoil will be a source of dissension 
at home." ^ And then von Hoist quotes a very signifi- 
cant as weU as philosophical utterance of William H. 
Seward's, which a portion of our earnest protestants of 
to-day would do weU to ponder. " I abhor war, as I 
detest slavery. I would not give one hiunan life for 
all the continent that remains to be annexed. But I 
cannot exclude the conviction that the popular passion 

^ History of Rome, Book v. chap. 7. 

2 History of the United States, vol. iii. p. 304. 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 319 

for territorial aggrandizement is irresistible. Pru- 
dence, justice, cowardice, may check it for a season, 
but it will gain strength by itg subjugation. ... It 
behooves us then to qualify ourselves for our mission. 
We must dare our destiny." ^ One more, and I have 
done with quotations. The last I just now commended 
to the thoughtful consideration of those classified in 
the political nomenclature of the day as Anti-Imperial- 
ists. A most conscientious and high-minded class, — 
possessed with the full courage of their convictions, 
— the efforts of the Anti-Imperialists will not fail, 
we and they may rest assured, to make themselves felt 
as they enter into the grand result. Nevertheless, for 
them also there is food for thought, perhaps for con- 
solation, in this other general law, laid down in 1862 
by Richard Cobden, than whose, in my judgment, the 
utterances of no English-speaking man in the nine- 
teenth century were more replete with shrewd sense 
expressed in plain, terse English : " From the moment 
the first shot is fired, or the first blow is struck, in 
a dispute, then fareweU to all reason and argument ; 
you might as well attempt to reason with mad dogs as 
with men when they have begun to spill each other's 
blood in mortal conlbat. I was so convinced of the 
fact during the Crimean war, which, you know, I op- 
posed, — I was so convinced of the utter uselessness 
of raising one's voice in opposition to war when it has 
once begun, that I made up my mind that as long as 
I was in political life, should a war again break out 
between England and a great Power, I would never 
open my mouth upon the subject from the time the 
first gun was fired until the peace was made, because, 

1 Works, vol. iii. p, 409. 



320 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

when a war is once commenced, it will only be by 
the exhaustion of one party that a termination will be 
arrived at. If you l(^ok back at our history, what 
did eloquence, in the persons of Chatham or Burke, do 
to prevent a war with our first American colonies? 
What did eloquence, in the persons of Fox and his 
friends, do to prevent the French Revolution, or bring 
it to a close ? And there was a man who, at the com- 
mencement of the Crimean war, in terms of eloquence, 
in power, and pathos, and argument equal — in terms, 
I believe, fit to compare with anything that fell from 
the lips of Chatham and Burke — I mean your distin- 
guished townsman, my friend Mr. Bright — and what 
was his success ? Why, they burnt him in effigy for 
his pains." ^ 

Turning from the authorities, and the lessons by 
them deduced from the record called History, let us 
now consider the problem precipitated on the Ameri- 
can people by the Spanish war of 1898. There has 
of late been much talk of the sudden development of 
the United States as a " World Power," and of the 
new and prominent part it henceforth has to play, — 
talk, as I hold it, empty, idle and wearisome, — closely 
bordering on cant. The United States without ques- 
tion is a world power ; but, that it has been such a 
power hard upon a century, I hold not more open to 
denial. The United States became a world power in 
the eyes of all nations between five minutes after 6 
o'clock p. M. of the 19th of August, 1812, and the 
following half hour ; the frigate Constitution, within 
those twenty-five minutes, having by her broadsides 
put the frigate Guerriere in such a position that the 

1 Speeches, vol. ii. p. 314. 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 321 

British flag had to come down. Since the hands of 
the Constitution's chronometer marked the half hour 
after 6 o'clock of that eventful afternoon, there has 
been, I hold, no room for debate as to the United 
States as a world power. 

For more than eighty years afterwards, the efforts 
of that power at supremacy were, in obedience to the 
law of its being and subject to the conditions of its 
environment, confined to filling up the waste spaces 
in its immediate neighborhood or to aggressive atti- 
tude, sometimes resulting in action, towards the less 
well adapted who chanced to find themselves in its 
path. But, as the world's solidarity increased, and 
trade and intercourse, assuming new forms, forced 
their way into fresh fields, it became inevitable, as 
the prescriptive barriers, one by one, gave way, that a 
new and larger policy would evolve itself for the 
United States also. That policy, moreover, would not 
fail to find expression soon or late in some assertion 
of supremacy. It was only a question of place, time 
and degree. 

We all know how it came about. It is needless for 
me here and now to refer in detail to the war with 
Spain, and the fight in Manila Bay. Suffice it to 
say that, if human experience goes for anything in 
such cases, what has since resulted was in its larger 
scope inevitable, — in the nature of a logical outcome. 
Nor in thus stating a conclusion do I imply a spirit 
of fatalism, or say anything calculated to disparage 
opposition at the beginning, or discourage discussion 
now. On the contrary, " all history shows " — and 
this time, I submit, shows indisputably and conclu- 
sively — that final results are the outcome, not of 



322 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

some of tlie antecedent influences, or even of those 
among them most preponderating, but of all of them, 
combined and forever interacting. Every ingredient 
goes into the grand total, there making its presence 
felt. Tliis being premised, it must next be admitted 
that there are few things which, when they first con- 
front perplexed mankind, call more emphatically for 
challenge than the apparitions of manifest destiny. 
Such invariably come in questionable shapes. As our 
own experience teaches, — " as all history shows," — 
not one time in ten that manifest destiny is heralded 
does the thing so confidently pronounced as destined 
come to pass. How many times within our owti mem- 
ories it has been appealed to, and in behalf of what 
causes, — Ostend manifestoes, Fenian raids, servile 
insurrections, "Naboth's vineyard," miscegenation, 
and the like, — the record indicates. It cannot, there- 
fore, and should not even for an instant be assumed 
that the appeal to God's Will, or Manifest Destiny, 
is entitled to consideration until it has so proved itself 
by actually overcoming the most strenuous opposition. 
That puts its reality to the test. Nor, when, in the 
matter of so-called expansion, the given manifestation 
has in the outcome proved itself genuine, and remains 
an established fact, — as, citing our own ex23erien6e, 
in the cases of Texas, California, Alaska, Porto Rico 
and Hawaii, — a condition, and no longer a theory, 
— not then even is the struggle necessarily over. 
The details remain to be settled ; and the details, in- 
cluding all questions of form, involve the whole final 
character of the development. It is then to be decided 
whether the inevitable is to assume shape in harmony 
with our traditions, or in defiance of them. This is 






AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 323 

the final outcome of conflicting views and opposing 
forces. In the case now under discussion, therefore, 
wliile the battle of Manila Bay and the Treaty of 
Paris did, as is now apparent, settle the main issue, 
and finally committed the United States to a new 
phase and sphere of expansion, — a peopled, trans- 
Pacific acquisition, — to that expansion a shape was, 
and is yet to be given. It was in debate during the 
last presidential canvass ; it is in debate now. 

That question — the burning political issue of the 
hour — I propose here and now to discuss. I propose 
to discuss it, however, from the purely historical stand- 
point, and not at all in its moral or economical aspects. 
So far, then, as this question is concerned, the last pre- 
sidential vote — that of 1900 — settled nothing, except 
that the policy which had assumed a certain degree of 
form in the Treaty of Paris should not be reversed. 
All else was left for debate and ulterior settlement. 
Certain lessons, calculated greatly to influence the 
character of that settlement, can, I submit, now be 
most advantageously drawn from history. At formu- 
lating those lessons, I propose here to try my hand. 

The first and most important lesson is one which, 
in theory at least, is undisputed ; though to live up 
to it practically calls for a courage of conviction not 
yet in evidence. That a dependency is not merely a 
possession, but a trust — a trust for the future, for 
itself and for humanity — is accepted ; — accordingly 
it is in no wise to be exploited for the general benefit 
of the alien owner, or that of individual components 
of that owner, but it is to be dealt with in a large 
and altruistic spirit, with an unselfish view to its own 
utmost development, materially, morally, and politi- 



324 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

cally. And, through a process of negatives, " all his- 
tory shows " that only when this course is hereafter 
wisely and consecutively pursued — should that blessed 
consummation ever be attained — will the dominating^ 
power itself derive the largest and truest benefit from 
its possession. 

As yet no American of any character, much less of 
authority, has come forward to controvert this propo- 
sition. That it will be controverted, and attempts 
made by interested parties to sophisticate it away 
through the cunningly arranged display of exceptional 
circumstances, can with safety be predicted. In this 
respect, to use a cant phrase, " we know how it is our- 
selves." We all remember, for instance, the unspeak- 
able code of factitious morals and deceptive philosophy 
manufactured to order in these United States as a 
" Gospel of Niggerdom " less than half a century ago. 
Coming down to more recent times, we can, none of 
us, yet have forgotten the wretched sophistry igno- 
rantly resurrected from French Revolution and assignat 
days in glorification of " Fiat Money," and a business 
world emancipated at last from any heretofore accepted 
measures of value. The leopard, rest assured, has not 
changed its spots since either 1860 or 1876. The 
New Gospel phase of the debate now on is, however, 
yet to develop itself. But, assuming the correctness 
of the proposition I have just formulated, a corollary 
follows from it. A formidable proposition, I state it 
without limitations, meaning to challenge contradic- 
tion. I submit that there is not an instance in all 
recorded history, from the earliest precedent to that 
now making, where a so-called inferior race or com- 
munity has been elevated in its character, or made 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 325 

self-sustaining and self-governing, — or even put on 
the way to that result, — through a condition of 
dependency or tutelage. I say " inferior race ; " but, 
I fancy, I might state the proposition even more 
broadly. I might, without much danger, assert that 
the condition of dependency, even for communities of 
the same race and blood, always exercises an emascu- 
lating and deteriorating influence. I would undertake, 
if called upon, to show also that the rule is invariable, 
— that, from the inherent and fundamental conditions 
of human nature it has known, and can know, no 
exceptions. Of this history affords well-nigh innum- 
erable examples, — ourselves among them. In our 
case, it required a century to do away in our minds 
and hearts with our colonial traditions. The Civil 
War, and not what we call the Revolution, was our 
real war of Independence. And yet in our depend- 
ency days you will remember we were not emasculated 
into a resigned and even cheerful self-incapacity as 
the natural result of a kindly, paternal and protec- 
tive policy ; but, as Burke, with profound insight, 
expressed it, with us the spirit of independence and 
self-support was fostered " through a wise and salutary 
neglect." But, for present purposes, all this is unne- 
cessary, and could lead but to a poor display of common- 
place learning. The problem to-day engaging the 
attention of the American people is more limited. It 
relates solely to what are called " inferior races ; " 
those of the same race, or of cognate races, we as yet 
do not propose to hold in a condition of permanent 
dependency ; those we absorb, or assimilate. Only 
those of " inferior race " — the less developed or deca- 
dent — do we propose to hold in subjection, — dealiag 



326 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

with tliem, in theory at least, as a guardian deals with 
a family of wards. 

My proposition then broadens. If history teaches 
anything in this regard, it is that race elevation, the 
capacity in a word of political self-support, cannot be 
imparted through tutelage. Moreover, the milder, 
the more paternal, kindly and protective the guardian- 
ship, the more emasculating it will prove. A " wise 
and salutary neglect " is in the end the more benefi- 
cent policy ; for, with races as with individuals, a 
state of dependency breeds the spirit of dependency. 
Take Great Britain, for instance. That people, — 
working at it now consecutively through three whole 
centuries, — after well-nigh innumerable ex23eriences 
and as many costly blunders, — Great Britain has, I 
say, developed a genius for dealing with dependencies, 
— for the government of " inferior races ; " — a genius 
far in advance of anything the world has seen before. 
Yet my contention is that, to-day, after three rounded 
centuries of British rule, the Hindostanese, — the 
natives of India, — in spite of all material, industrial 
and educational improvements, — roads, schools, jus- 
tice and peace, — are in 1900 less capable of inde- 
pendent and ordered self-government than they were 
in the year 1600, — the year when the East India 
Company was incorporated under a patent of Eliza- 
beth. The native Indian djmasties — those natural 
to the Hindoos — have disappeared ; accustomed to 
foreign rule, the people have no rulers of their own, 
nor could they rule themselves. The rule of aliens 
has with Hindostan thus become a domestic necessity. 
Remove it, — and the highest and most recent authori- 
ties declare it surely wiU some day be removed, — 






AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 327 

chaos would inevitably ensue. What is true of India 
is true of Egyj^t. That, under British rule, Egypt is 
to-day in better material and political case than ever 
before in its history — modern, biblical, hieroglyphic 
or legendary — scarcely admits of dispute. Schools, 
roads, irrigation, law and order, and protection from 
attack, she has them all ; — 

" But what avail the plough or sail, 
Or land or life, if freedom fail ? " 

The capacity for self-government is not acquired in 
that school. 

This fact is to-day more than ever before forcing 
itself on the attention and engaging the anxious thought 
of those Englishmen most familiar with the imperial 
system. " As yet there is no sign that the British are 
accomplishing [in Hindostan] more than the Romans 
accomplished in Britain, that they will spread any 
permanently successful ideas, or that they will found 
anything whatever. It is still true that if they de- 
parted, or were driven out, they would leave behind 
them, as the Romans did in Britain, splendid roads, 
many useless buildings, an increased weakness in the 
subject people, and a memory which in a century of 
new events would be extinct. ... So far as one can 
see, not a European idea, not a European habit, not 
a distinctively European branch of knowledge, ever 
penetrated into Asia. . . . We are told every day how 
Europe has influenced Japan, and forget that the 
change in those islands was entirely self-generated, 
that Europeans did not teach Japan, but that Japan of 
herself chose to learn from Europe methods of organi- 
zation, civil and mihtary, which have so far proved 
successful." ^ 

1 Meredith Townsend : Asia and Europe, pp. 25, 27, 28. 



328 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

Such is the recent testimony of one closely observing 
Englishman, the larger portion of whose life has been 
passed in Asia. Another says, to the same effect, 
" The very peace and security which a great Empire 
establishes may prove a deadening influence. ... In 
India peace reigns to-day, and order, but there is cer- 
tainly less scope for the Eastern patriotism of race 
and class, less romance and food for poetry, less 
motive for heroic self-sacrifice, less to stir the heart 
and imagination of Rajput and Sikh, of Mahratta and 
Pathan, than there was in those years of glorious 
turbulence in the breaking up of the Mogul empire. 
British rule tends to destroy native originality, vigor 
and initiative. How to replace that which our rule 
takes away is the great Indian problem." ^ Evidence 
on this head might be accumulated to any desired 
extent ; and yet to-day a vague idea, almost an aspi- 
ration, is floating through our American popular mind 
that a single generation of our beneficent rule will 
suffice to convert Malays into self-governing commu- 
nities of the Anglo-Saxon type. 

But England, in its own two thousand years of his- 
tory, furnishes an example of what I have been assert- 
ing, — an example well-nigh forgotten. In funda- 
mentals human nature is much the same now as twenty 
centuries back. During the first century of the pre- 
sent era, the Romans, acting in obedience to the law 
laid down by Mommsen, — the law quoted by me in 
full, and of which Thomas Carlyle is the latest and 
most eloquent exponent, — the law known as the 
Divine Right of the most Masterful, — acting in obe- 
dience to that law, the Romans in the year of Grace 

^ Bernard Holland : Imperium et Libertas, p. 12. 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 329 

43 crossed the British Channel, overthrew the Celts 
and Gauls gathered in defence of what they mistakenly 
deemed their own, and, after reducing them to sub- 
jection, permanently occupied the land. They remained 
there four centuries — a hundred years longer than 
the English have been in Calcutta. During that 
period they introduced civilization, established Chris- 
tianity, constructed roads, dwellings and fortifications. 
Materially, the condition of the country vastly im- 
proved. The Romans protected the inhabitants against 
their enemies ; also against themselves. During four 
hundred years they benevolently assimilated them. 
Doubtless, on the banks of the Tiber, the inhabitants 
of what is now England were deemed incapable of 
self-government. Probably they were ; unquestionably 
they became so. When the legions were at last with- 
drawn, the results of a kindly paternalism, secure 
protection and intelligent tutelage became apparent. 
The race was wholly emasculate. It cursed its inde- 
pendence; it deplored its lost dependency. As the 
English historian now records the result, " crushing all 
local independence, crushed all local vigor. Men for- 
got how to fight for their country when they forgot 
how to govern it." ^ 

There is a familiar saying to the effect that, while 
Man is always in a hurry, God never is. Certainly, 
Nature works with a discouraging indifference to time. 
Each passing generation of reformers does love to 
witness some results of its efforts ; but, in the case of 
England, in consequence of the emasculation incident 
to tutelage, and dependency on a powerful, a bene- 
volent and beneficent foreign rule, after that rule 

^ Green : Short History of the English People, vol. i. p. 9. 



330 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

ended, — as soon or late such rule always must end, 

— throughout the lives of eighteen successive genera- 
tions emasculated England was overrun. At last, 
with some half dozen intermediate rulers, the Nor- 
mans succeeded the Romans. They were conquering 
masters ; but they domesticated themselves in the 
British Islands, and in time assimilated the inhabit- 
ants thereof, — Saxons, Picts and Celts, — bene- 
volently, or otherwise. But, as nearly as the historian 
can fix it, it required eight centuries of direst tribu- 
lation to educate the people of England out of that 
spirit of self-distrust and dependency into which they 
had been reduced by four centuries of paternalism, 
at once Koman and temporarily beneficent. Twelve 
centuries is certainly a discouraging term to which to 
look forward. But steam and electricity have since 
then been developed to a manifest quickening of re- 
sults. Even the pace of Nature was in the nine- 
teenth century vastly accelerated. 

Briefly stated, then, the historical deduction would 
seem to be somewhat as follows : Where a race has 
in itself, whether implanted there by nature or as the 
result of education, the elevating instinct and energy, 

— the capacity of mastership, — a state of dependency 
will tend to educate that capacity out of existence ; 
and the more beneficent, paternal and protecting the 
guardian power is, the more pernicious its influence 
becomes. In such cases, the course most beneficial 
in the end to the dependency, now as a century ago, 
would be that characterized by " a wise and salu- 
tary neglect." Where, however, a race is for any 
cause not possessed of the self-innate saving capacity, 

— being stationary or decadent, — a state of depend- 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 331 

ency, while it may improve material conditions, tends 
yet further to deteriorate the spirit and to diminish 
the capacity of self-government : if severe, it brutal- 
izes ; if kindly, it enervates. History records no in- 
stance in which it develops and strengthens. 

Following yet further the teachings of experience, 
we are thus brought to a parting of the ways, — 
a parting distinct, unmistakable. Heretofore the pol- 
icy of the United States, as a nationality, has, so far 
as the so-called inferior races are concerned, been 
confined in its operation to the North American con- 
tinent ; but, as a whole and in its large aspects, it has 
been well defined and consistent. We have proceeded 
on the theory that all government should in the end 
rest on the consent of the governed ; that any given 
people is competent to govern itself in some fashion ; 
and that, in the long run, any fashion of self-imposed 
government works better results than will probably 
be worked by a government imposed from without. 
In other words, the American theory has been that, 
in the process of Nature and looking to ultimate, per- 
haps remote, conditions, any given people, not admit- 
ting of assimilation, will best work out its destiny 
when left free to work it out in its own way. More- 
over, so far as outside influence is concerned, it could, 
in the grand result, be more effectively exercised 
through example than by means of active interven- 
tion. Where we have not therefore forcibly absorbed 
into our system foreign and inferior races alien in 
character and more or less completely assimilated 
them, we have, up to very recently, adopted and ap- 
plied what may perhaps in homely speech best be de- 
scribed as a " Hauds-off and Walk-alone " doctrine, 



332 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

relying in our policy toward others on the theory 
practised at our private firesides, — the theory that 
self-government results from example, and is self- 
taught. 

I have abeady quoted Richard Cobden in this con- 
nection ; I will quote him again. Referring, in 1864, 
to the British foreign policy, then by him as by us 
denounced, though by us now imitated, Cobden said, 
— "I maintain that a man is best doing his duty at 
home in striving to extend the sphere of liberty — 
commercial, literary, political, rehgious, and in all 
directions ; for if he is working for liberty at home, 
he is working for the advancement of the principles of 
liberty all over the world." ^ 

Mexico and Hayti afford striking illustrations of a 
long and rigid adherence to this policy on our part, 
and of the results of that adherence. Conquering and 
dismembering Mexico in 1847, we, in 1848, left it 
to its own devices. So completely had the work of 
subjugation been done that our representatives had 
actually to call into being a Mexican government with 
which to arrange terms of peace. With that simula- 
crum of a national authority we made a solemn treaty, 
and, after so doing, left the A^tec land to work out 
its destiny, if it could, as it could. ^ In spite of numer- 
ous domestic convulsions and much internal anarchy, 
from that day to this we have neither ourselves inter- 
vened in the internal affairs of our southern conti- 
nental neighbor, nor long permitted such interference 
by others. To Mexico, we have said, " Walk alone ; " 

1 Speeches, vol. ii. p. 353. 

2 See the very sug-gestive paper entitled " The Proposed Absorp- 
tion of Mexico in 1847-1848," by Professor E. G. Bourne : Essays in 
Historical Criticism, pp. 227-242. 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 333 

to France, " Hands off." The result we all know. It 
has gone far to justify our theory of the true path of 
human advancement. Forty years is, in matters of 
race development, a short time. A period much too 
short to admit of drawing positive, or final, infer- 
ences. Dr. Holmes was once asked by an anxious 
mother when the education of a child should begin ; 
his prompt, if perhaps unexpected, reply was, — " Not 
less than two hundred and fifty years before it is 
born." To-day, and under existing conditions, Mexico, 
though republican in name and form only, is self-gov- 
erning in reality. It is manifestly working its pro- 
blem out in its own way. The statement carries with 
it implications hardly consistent with the Might-is- 
Right, latter-day dispensation voiced by Mommsen 
and Carlyle. 

Hayti presents another case in point, with results 
far more trying to our theory. We have toward 
Hayti pursued exactly the policy pursued by us with 
Mexico. Not interfering ourselves in the internal 
affairs of the island, we have not permitted interfer- 
ence by others. Occupied by an inferior race, appar- 
ently lapsing steadily toward barbarism, for the con- 
dition of affairs prevailing in Hayti the United States 
is morally responsible. Acting on the law laid down 
in the extract I have given from the pages of Momm- 
sen, we might at any time during the last quarter of 
a century have intervened in the name of humanity, 
and to the ^reat temporary advantage of the inhabit- 
ants of the one region " Where Black rules White." 
The United States, in pursuance of its theories, has 
abstained from so doing. It has abstained in the be- 
lief that, in the long run and grand result, the inhabit- 



334 ^iV^ UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

ants of Hayti will best work out their problem, if left 
to work it out themselves. In any event, however, 
exceptional cases are the rocks on which sound prin- 
ciples come to wreck ; and, so far as the race of man 
on earth is concerned, it is better that Hayti should 
suffer self -caused misfortune for centuries, as did Eng- 
land before, than that a precedent should be created 
for the frequent violation of a great principle of nat- 
ural development. Yet the case of Hayti is crucial. 
Persistently to apply our policy there evinces, it must 
be admitted, a robust faith in the wisdom of its uni- 
versal application. The logical inference, so far as 
the Philippine Islands are concerned, is obvious. 

The rule guiding, or that should guide, the United 
States in its dealings with alien races, probably in- 
ferior, as being either as yet undeveloped or else in a 
state of arrested development, is simple. The capacity 
for self-government, and, consequently, the consent of 
the governed, should be assumed, until, as the result 
of experience, a negative is proved ; the interference 
should then be the least necessary to arrest decay or 
secure stability. The assumption should ever be in 
favor of a tendency to progressive self-development. 
The British rule is the reverse. Incapacity is assumed, 
until capacity is proved. 

Historically speaking, those now referred to are the 
only two theories of a national policy to be pursued in 
dealing with practical dependencies, which challenge 
consideration, — the American and the British. The 
others, whether ancient and abandoned, or modern 
and in use, — Phoenician, Roman, Spanish, French, 
Dutch, German, or Russian, — may be dismissed from 
the discussion. They none of them ever did, nor do 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 335 

any of them now, look to an altruistic result. In all, 
the dependency is confessedly exploited on business 
principles, with an eye to the trade development of 
the alien proprietor. Setting these aside, there re- 
main only the American, or " Walk-alone and Hands- 
off " theory ; and the British, or " Ward-in-Chancery " 
theory. The first is exemplified in Mexico and Hayti ; 
the last in Hindostan and Egypt. The question now 
in debate for the United States may, therefore, be 
concisely stated, thus : Taking the Philippine Islands 
as a subject for treatment, and the ultimate elevation 
of the inhabitants of those islands to self-government 
as the end in view, which is the policy best calculated 
to lead to the result desired, — the traditional and 
distinctively American system, as exemplified in 
the cases of Mexico and Hayti, or the modern and 
improved British system, to be studied in Hindostan 
( and Egypt? 



Subject to limitations of time and space I have now 
passed in review the great political debates which have 
occupied the attention of the American public during 
the last half century. I have endeavored to call at- 
tention to the plane on which those debates have been 
conducted, and to the noticeable absence from them 
of a scholarly spirit. The judicial temper and the 
patience necessary to any thorough investigation have 
in them, I submit, been conspicuously lacking. Then, 
starting from the point of view peculiar to this Asso- 
ciation, I have examined the issues presented to the 
country in the last presidential canvass, and, for pur- 
poses of illustration, I have discussed them, always in 
a purely historical temper. 



336 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

While the result of my experiment is for others to 
pass upon, my own judgment is clear and decided. I 
hold that the time has now come when organizations 
such as this of ours, instead of, as heretofore, scrupu- 
lously standing aloof from the political debate, are 
under obligation to participate in it. As citizens, we 
most assuredly should, in so far as we may properly 
so do, contribute to results, whether immediate, or 
more or less remote. As scholars and students, the 
conclusions we have to present should be deserving of 
thoughtful consideration. The historical point of view, 
moreover, is, politically, an important point of view ; 
for only when approached historically — by one look- 
ing before, as well as after — can any issue be under- 
stood in its manifold relations with a complex civili- 
zation. Indeed, the moral point of view can in its 
importance alone compare with tlie historical. The 
economical, vital as it unquestionably often is, comes 
much lower in the scale ; for, while an approach 
through both these avenues is not infrequently neces- 
sary to the intelligent comprehension of questions of 
a certain class, — such, for instance, as the tariff or 
currency, — it is very noticeable that, though many 
issues present themselves, — slavery or imperialism, 
for example, — into which economical considerations 
do not enter as controlling factors, there is scarcely 
any matter of political debate which does not to some 
extent at least have to be discussed historically. Still, 
though our retrospect has proven this to be the case, 
the scarcely less significant fact also appears that not 
more than one presidential canvass in two involves 
any real issue at all, — moral or economical. Of the 
last twelve elections, covering the half century, — six 



AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 337 

were mere struggles for political control ; and so far as 
can now be seen, the course of subsequent events would 
have been in no material respect other than it was, 
whichever party prevailed. Judging by experience, 
therefore, in only one future canvass out of two will 
any occasion arise for a careful historical presentation 
of facts. The investigator will not be called upon ; 
and, if he rises to take part in the discussion, he will 
do no harm, for the excellent reason that no one will 
listen to him. In the other of each two canvasses it 
is not so. There is then apt to be a real debate over 
a paramount issue ; and, in all such, the strong search- 
light of experience should be thrown, clearly and fully, 
over the road we are called upon to traverse. In 
every such case, the presentation, provided always it 
be made in the true historical spirit, should by no 
means be of one side only. On the contrary, every 
phase of the record should have its advocate ; every 
plausible lesson should be drawn. The facts are 
many, comphcated and open to a varied construction ; 
and it is only through the clash of opposing views that 
they can be reduced to comparative system, and com- 
pelled to yield their lessons for guidance. 

As I have also, more than once alread}^ observed, 
this Association is largely made up of those occupying 
the chairs of instruction in our seminaries of the 
higher education. From their lecture-rooms the dis- 
cussion of current political issues is of necessity ex- 
cluded. There it is manifestly out of place. Others 
here are scholars, for whom no place exists on the 
political platform. Still others are historical inves- 
tigators and writers, interested only incidentally in 
political discussion. Finally, some are merely public- 



338 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 

spirited citizens, on whom the oratory of the stump 
palls. They crave discussion of another order. They 
are the men whose faces are seen only at those gather- 
ings which some one eminent for thought or in char- 
acter is invited to address. To all these, the suggestion 
I now make cannot but be grateful. It is that, in 
future, this Association, as such, shall so arrange its 
meetings that one at least shall be held in the month 
of July preceding each presidential election. The 
issues of that election will then have been presented, 
and the opposing candidates named. It should be 
understood that the meeting is held for the purpose of 
discussing those issues from the historical point of 
view, and in their historical connection. Absolute 
freedom of debate should be insisted on, and the par- 
ticipation of those best qualified to deal with the 
particular class of problems under discussion should 
be solicited. Such authorities, speaking from so lofty 
a rostrum to a select audience of appreciative men and 
women, could, I confidently submit, hardly fail to 
elevate the standard of discussion, bringing the calm 
lessons of history to bear on the angry wrangles and 
distorted presentations of those whose chief, if not 
only, aim is a mere party supremacy. 



A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY i 

I AM to contribute to this occasion a paper under 
the title of " A Plea for Military History." To this 
subject I have already — more than six months ago — 
elsewhere alluded, — in the course of an address to the 
Massachusetts Historical Society, on taking for the 
fifth time the chair as its president. 

" It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that there 
are not many considerable branches of human know- 
ledge concerning which the historian of the future must 
not in some degree inform himself. Somewhere and 
somehow his researches will touch upon them, remotely, 
perhaps, but still as factors in his problem. . . . 
Formerly all necessary information, it was supposed, 
could be acquired from books ; manuscripts were bet- 
ter yet, for those were, without any question, what are 
termed ' original sources.' But the old-fashioned his- 
torian, rarely, if ever, hesitating, flies boldly at every 
kind of game — all are fish that come to his net. For 
instance, history is largely made up of accounts of 
operations and battles on land and on sea. Weary 
of threading his way through a long period of most 
unpicturesque peace, trying to make that interesting 

1 A paper read, in part, at the Annual Meeting- of the American 
Historical Association, held in Boston, December 28, 1899. Printed 
in the Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1900, 
vol. i. pp. 193-218. Revised and corrected. 



340 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 

which was at best commonplace, the historian draws a 
breath of relief when at length he comes to a tumult 
of war. Here are pride, pomp, and circumstance, — 
a chance for descriptive power. 

" The historian of the future seems now likely to 
pursue a different method. Recognizing the fact that 
he probably is not at once a litterateur, a soldier, a 
statesman, a lawyer, a theologian, a physician, and a 
biologist ; that he certainly will not live forever ; that 
he has not the cosmogony at his fingers' ends, and 
that to ransack every repository of information on all 
possible subjects transcends the powers of even the 
most industrious ; recognizing in this degree the limits 
of possibility, he will be content to avail himself of 
the labors of others, better advised on many subjects 
than liimself, and, becoming the student of mono- 
graphs, derive the great body of his information, not, 
as the expression now goes, from ' original sources,' or 
even from personal observation, but, as we all in the 
end must, at secondhand. His insight will be largely 
into the knowledge and judgment of others, and the 
degree of reliance to be placed in them. 

" I know of but one writer who has described mili- 
tary operations and battles, — those intricate move- 
ments of human pawns on a chessboard of much topo- 
graphical uncertainty, and those scientific melees in 
which skill, luck, preparation, superiority of weapons, 
human endurance, and racial characteristics decide the 
question of mastery as between two marshalled mobs, 
— I know, I was saying, of but one writer who has 
described battles and military operations in that real- 
istic way which impresses me with a sense of both 
personal experience and literary skill. That one is 



A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 341 

Tolstoi, the Russian philosopher and novelist. His 
Austerlitz and Russian campaigns of Napoleon and 
his Sebastopol are masterpieces. A man of imagina- 
tion and consummate literary capacity, he had him- 
self served ; and, curiously enough, in the same way, 
his compatriot, Verestchagin, has put upon canvas the 
sickening realism of war with a degree of force which 
could come only from famiharity with the cumbered 
field, and could by no possibility be worked up in the 
studio through the study of photographs, no matter 
how numerous, or the perusal of the accounts ' from 
our special correspondent,' no matter how graphic and 
detailed. 

" I once, in a very subordinate capacity, though for 
a considerable period of time, was brought into close 
contact with warfare and saw much of military opera- 
tions from within, or, as I may say, on the seamy 
side. Since then I have read in books of history, and 
other works more avowedly of fiction, many accounts 
of campaigns and battles ; and in so doing I have 
been most deeply impressed with the audacity, not of 
soldiers, but of authors. Usually, bookish men who 
had passed their lives in libraries, often clergymen — 
knowing absolutely nothing of the principles of strategy 
or of the details of camp life and military organiza- 
tion, never having seen a column on the march, or a 
regiment in line, or heard a hostile shot, — not taking 
the trouble even to visit the scene of operations or to 
study its topography, wholly unacquainted with the 
national characteristics of the combatants, — these 
* bookish theoricks ' substitute their imaginings for 
realities, and in the result display much the same real 
acquaintance with the subject which would be expected 



842 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 

from a physician or an artist who undertook to treat 
of difficult problems in astronomy or mechanics. They 
are strongly suggestive of the good Dr. Goldsmith 
and his ' Animated Nature.' Once or twice I have 
had occasion to follow these authorities, — authors of 
standard historical works, — and in so doing have 
familiarized myself with the topography of the scenes 
they described, and worked down, as best I could, into 
the characters of those in command, and what are 
known as the ' original sources ' of information as to 
their plans and the course of operations. The result 
has uniformly been a distinct accession of historical 
scepticism." ^ 

I come now to the true occasion of my being here 
to-day. Having a year ago passed this general cen- 
sure upon " bookish theoricks," I happily bethought 
me of a friend of a lifetime to whom it was possible 
what I had said might be assumed to apply. I refer 
to the late John Codman Ropes. I therefore added 
this qualifying sentence, and I now greatly rejoice 
that it occurred to me so to do ; for Mr. Ropes was 
present when I spoke the words I have quoted, having 
done me the compliment that day to leave his office 
that he might listen to me. The qualifying sentence 
was as follows : — 

" That among men of the closet and the historical 
laboratory are to be found military students of pro- 
found, detailed knowledge and great critical acumen, 
no one would dispute ; least of all we, with at least 
one brilliant and recognized exemplar in our own 

1 " Historians and Historical Societies,''^ Proceedings of the Massa~ 
chusetts Historical Society (April, 1899), Second Series, vol. xiii. pp. 
81-119. 



A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 343 

ranks, — a man who never saw an army in movement 
or a stricken fiekl, and yet whom I once heard referred 
to by one who had borne a part in fifty fights, the 
general then commanding our army, as the first among 
living military critics." 

The hearty applause with which the audience re- 
ceived these words showed that the allusion was under- 
stood, and Mr. Ropes did not fail, later on, to express 
the gratification the incident afforded him. Not yet 
a month ago, at midnight on the 29th-30th of No- 
vember last, he died. As I have already said, the 
friendship which existed between us was almost life- 
long. Nearly fifty years ago we were students to- 
gether at Harvard, though not classmates, and my 
intimacy with him and my feeling of high regard for 
him had increased with each passing year. In my 
existence his death has left a void not to be filled. 
That is a small matter and personal only ; but, 
so far as the study of military history is concerned, 
especially in connection with our Civil War, the loss 
occasioned by his death is scarcely less great. The 
work Mr. Ropes was engaged on must remain un- 
finished ; for the second of his four volumes was pub- 
lished less than a year ago, and of the third volume 
the beginning only had been prepared. He had 
brought down his narrative to the battle of Fredericks- 
burg on one side and that of Murfreesboro on the 
other, following, as he did, the large strategic lines of 
the conflict only, and paying little attention to those 
minor operations, almost innumerable, which did not 
greatly affect the grand result. It was General Scho- 
field, then commanding the armies of the United 
States, who, in a conversation I had with him more 



844 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 

than ten years ago, referred to Mr. Eopes in the Ian- 
giiage I have quoted, as the first of living military 
critics. And now, standing here among historical 
writers, scholars and investigators, speaking over the 
scarcely closed grave of the man, the student and the 
friend, I bear such witness as I may to the fact that 
in my judgment General Schofield in this remark was 
not guilty of exaggeration. And further let me add 
that, in my judgment also, so far as the history of the 
great struggle hereafter to be known as the American 
Confederate Rebellion is concerned, the death of Mr. 
Ropes, leaving his work unfinished, is to the highest 
class of liistorical research an irreparable loss. As a 
student of military historical problems he was, so far 
as my knowledge of such goes, almost unique. Com- 
bined with a sufficient literary skill, he had a grasp of 
the great principles of strategy which could hardly be 
bettered. His knowledge of tactics, and of the details 
of the march and of the battlefield, was of course 
defective. He, too, had never seen a column on the 
road or a battery in action. Accordingly, when it 
came to this portion of his subject he could not speak 
as a man can speak who has himself shared in the 
prolonged weariness of the march or the sharp stress 
of conflict. He knew as little of campaign variety as 
he did of camp tedium. As respects all these elements 
of warfare — and they have much to do with the evo- 
lution of military results ; far more than most writers 
are apt to realize — he was obliged to have recourse 
to his imagination ; and, while imagination is in good 
historical writing a most important factor, yet when 
imagination deals with topics of which the writer has 
had no practical experience, it is a dangerous guide. 



A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 345 

Nevertheless, allowing for these limitations under 
which Mr. Ropes necessarily labored, I am free to 
say that, in my estimation, he has contributed more 
than any other one writer has done, or any other one 
writer is likely to do, to a correct historical under- 
standing of the great military operations and strategic 
results of the first two years of the Rebellion. I felt, 
therefore, that it would not have been well had this 
meeting of the American Historical Association gone 
by, the first held since his death, without bearing in 
its record something indicative of the high appreciation 
in which he and his work are by us held. But for 
that feeling I should not trespass on your patience to- 
day. I am well aware that our president has already 
fittingly forestalled me in this gi'ateful task, and that 
mine is but a concurrent testimony on a subject con- 
cerning which little new remains to be said. That 
little, however, is very appropriate to my theme, for it 
would not be possible on this occasion to enter " A 
Plea for Military History," and not to feel that in 
doing so the name and thought of our best exponent 
of " military history " — he who, in fact, had with us 
identified himself with it — at once suggested them- 
selves. In all that our president has said of Mr. Ropes 
I concur, and to it I have sought to add what I might. 
Having thus rendered my tribute, I recur to my 
allotted theme, and I propose to illustrate the criti- 
cism I last spring ventured upon by references to a few 
of the great military operations which have left dis- 
tinct marks upon American history ; and, in so doing, 
I shall endeavor to point out how inadequately they 
have been treated, having, as a rule, been treated by 
investigators who failed to combine technical know- 



346 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 

ledge and a professional experience with literary skill. 
Indeed, among writers who have undertaken to deal 
with problems of this class we number in the whole 
record of the United States, so far as I know, but 
one striking instance to whom this criticism plainly 
fails to apply, and that exceptional instance is outside 
the field of military operations. Captain Mahan has 
recently shown us what naval history becomes when 
handled by one who had himself sailed the ocean and 
had thoroughly familiarized himself with maritime 
conditions. In this I think all will agree. His work 
constitutes, indeed, a veritable addition to naval his- 
torical lore. It marks a new departure ; and it does 
so for the simple reason that he did combine the two 
quahties I have referred to, — literary skill with pro- 
fessional knowledge. I think it hardly less safe to 
say that, so far as strictly military operations are con- 
cerned, no similar American writer has yet come for- 
ward. These operations, past and present, recent and 
remote, have been very copiously described and almost 
lovingly, as altogether too patriotically, dwelt upon ; 
they have been analyzed on paper, and fought over in 
print more than enough, but it has been either by 
military men who failed to possess Captain Mahan's 
literary gift, or by literary men who had not shared in 
his professional work. The result, except in the case 
of Mr. Ropes, has been an inadequate and more or 
less unsatisfactory treatment, and even his conclusions 
are to a degree affected by his lack of that personal 
observation and familiarity bred of contact which was 
an essential element in the success of Captain Mahan. 
As Gibbon, referring to his own experience, observed 
in a well-remembered passage of his autobiography, 



A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 347 

" The captain of tlie Hampshire Grenadiers has not 
been useless to the historian of the Roman Empire." 

Coming to my first illustration, I propose to sub- 
mit a few words concerning what was the most memo- 
rable incident in American military annals prior to 
the struggle we know as the Revolution, more pro- 
perly called the War of American Independence. I 
refer, of course, to Wolfe's capture of Quebec. It is 
not too much to say that the fall of Quebec led to 
results which have affected the whole subsequent 
history of the American continent and of civilization. 
Though not included in his selection by Professor 
Creasey, the short struggle on the Plains of Abraham 
must, therefore, unquestionably be classed among the 
decisive battles of the world. 

In common wdth every boy who was taught in an 
American school during the first half of the century, 
the story of Wolfe's victory and death had been 
familiar to me from childhood. None the less, though 
I believe I have been in every other considerable city 
on the North American continent, with the exception, 
possibly, of Vera Cruz, Quebec had until last summer 
unaccountably escaped me. Putting a copy of Park- 
man's Ifontcalm and Wolfe in my bag, I went 
there in September last ; and, while there, of course 
examined with no little interest the scene of the gi'eat 
exploit in that work described. The defects in Park- 
man's narrative, when studied on the spot, became at 
once apparent. Written by a scholar who spared no 
pains in preparation, the result yet showed on its 
face that it was the work of one who had never him- 
self participated in military operations. It was defi- 
cient in precision ; inferences were not drawn ; tech- 



348 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 

nical expressions were incorrectly used ; it lacked 
firmness of toucli. 

I was, in the first place, much surprised on examin- 
ing the ground over which Wolfe's force reached the 
Plains of Abraham. All my preconceptions, derived 
from tradition and confirmed by Parkman's narrative, 
were at variance with the actual topography. From 
the descriptions, I had assumed that the path by which 
Wolfe's forces made their ascent was narrow and very 
steep, winding along the face of the cliff, and one by 
which men could go up only in single file, or at most 
by twos ; or, as I have seen it described within a few 
days in the report of a discourse delivered here in 
Boston, it was an " ascent up precipitous cliffs, by 
means of overhanging boughs and projecting crags." ^ 
On examination, I found it quite another thing. In 
1759 the legendary "narrow path" must have been, 

1 " He [Wolfe] was the first to leap on shore and to scale the narrow 
path where no two men could go abreast. His men followed, pulling' 
themselves to the top by the help of bushes and the crags." (Green : 
A Short History of the English People, -vol. iii. p. 1655.) There has 
been no more careful and contained British historian than J. R. Green. 
His name can never be mentioned otherwise than with respect. But 
Green had no military experience, and this quotation from his work 
illustrates the difficulties under which merely bookish men write. 
There is no reason to suppose that Wolfe " was the first to leap 
ashore." In practical warfare, the General in command does not act 
as a boatman holding a painter, or fending off with an oar. He was 
not the first "to scale the narrow path." There was no "narrow 
path," and he, very properly and in accordance with the necessities 
of actual field service, immediately sent a reconnoitring party up the 
gorge to secure the outlet at its summit. He followed, in his proper 
place, with the main command. The men of the main command did 
not " pull themselves to the top by the help of bushes and the crags," 
but tramped up in tolerably solid column, and deployed in the regu- 
lar way when they debouched at the summit. The accounts given by 
Lord Mahon and in Knight's Popular History of England are open to 
similar criticisms. 



A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 349 

as it now is, up an acclivity, steep, it is true, but 
not difficult, and nowhere narrow. A somewhat pre- 
cipitous gorge, it then was, as it still is, wide and well 
wooded, — a bit of rough hillside breaking a palisade, 
up which any group of atliletic young men could in 
ten minutes easily clamber. Especially would this be 
true of Scotch Highlanders, of whom Wolfe's command 
was largely made up. 

It is here, and in connection with this legendary 
scaling of the heights, that the technical deficiencies 
of Parlonan's narrative become apparent. Though he 
had himself, unquestionably, time and again gone over 
the ground, yet his account fails, as that of no trained 
military historian would have failed, to give the exact 
time of the ascent. His narrative is indeed on this 
important point exasperatingly vague. He says : 
" Towards two o'clock the boats cast off and fell down 
with the current." He then adds that " for full two 
hours the procession of boats steered silently down the 
St. Lawrence." It must, therefore, have been four 
o'clock in the morning when the landing was effected, 
and a small scaling party climbed the heights, " closely 
followed by a much larger party." Meeting with no 
resistance, those in the advance, the escaladers, sur- 
prised, and captured or routed, a small French out- 
post at the head of the ravine. Its commanding 
officer was in bed, and, wounded while trying to es- 
cape, was taken prisoner. The shots and shouts of 
those composing the scaling party notified their com- 
rades below of their success, and the advance of the 
main body was at once ordered. Apparently this 
could not have really begun until 4.30 at least; and 
yet before 6 o'clock 5000 men were in line of battle 



850 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 

on tlie Plains of Abraham. Before 9 o'clock, more- 
over, they had also hauled up by hand at least two 
pieces of artillery, besides more or less camp equipage. 
These facts S23eak for themselves. Any one who has 
ever participated in military movements knows that 
for 5000 men, carrying their arms, ammunition, knap- 
sacks and rations, to scale a steep ascent of at least 
half a mile in the short space of ninety minutes, 
they must have been able to swarm up, not in file, 
nor by twos and threes, but in a tolerably solid mass. 
No one, viewing the locality, would seek to detract 
from Wolfe's achievement, — daring in conception, it 
was firmly executed. Throughout, it showed the hand 
of a true soldier.^ But that is not in question. The 
point is that it was a boldly desperate, rather than a 
physically difficult, undertaking. Like the night as- 
sault of any place rendered by nature or art hard of 
access, the success of the attempt was purely a matter 
of surprise and defence ; and at Quebec, the surprise 

1 The last word in tlie Quebec campaigii of 1759 is to be found in 
the recently published volume of Colonel Townshend, The Military 
Life of Field-Marshal George, First Marquess Townshend, 1724-1807 
(pp. 142-251). From this it appears that the famous operation, which 
resulted in the fall of Quebec, was not designed by Wolfe, but was 
adopted by him, contrary to his own judgment, on the formal recom- 
mendation of his subordinates in command. From a purely military 
point of view, this should not detract from Wolfe's fame. He was 
then a very sick man, probably dying ; a physical wreck, in conse- 
quence of the fatigues and anxieties he had undergone. None the 
less, so to speak, game to the last, he, by adoption, made the plan his 
own, and carried it out with spirit and determination. He then had 
the great good fortune to be killed in the hour of victory. The pro- 
blem of the Quebec campaign was, on a very small scale, the same as 
that which confronted Grant in his Vicksburg campaign, more than 
a century later. Jt was solved by precisely the same strategic move- 
ment. Grant's campaign was, however, of a far higher and more 
di£Gicult strategic order than Wolfe's venturesome escalade. 



A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 351 

of the defenders being perfect, the ascent presented 
no great obstacle. It was neither narrow nor pre- 
cipitous, as was proved by the fact that within two 
hours artillery and munitions were dragged up, fol- 
lowing 5000 men. Provided, therefore, the much- 
discussed gorge was undefended, as was the case, 
Wolfe's famous escalade was a by no means unprece- 
dented military operation. Even had the gorge been 
defended, and by a fairly adequate force, the very 
steepness of the ascent, as any experienced military 
authority would appreciate, and as we repeatedly 
found in our Civil War, woidd have enabled those 
composing the attacking party to scale the cliff with no 
great degree of personal danger. The enemy from 
far above would almost inevitably have fired over the 
heads of their assailants. In such case, the resistance 
to be effective must be determined and by an ade- 
quate force ; a force, moreover, which does not await 
attack at the summit, but stubbornly contests every 
foot of ground from bottom to top. 

Having now got Wolfe, with 5000 men in battle 
array, upon the Plains of Abraham, only^ ninety 
minutes after leaving their boats, the thing which 
next bewildered me was why Montcalm played into 
his opponent's hands as he did, by hastily attacking 
him the next morning, — risking the fate of Quebec 
and of Canada, not upon the result of protracted mil- 
itary operations, but on the cast of sudden battle. 
What in Montcalm's mind led to this decision ? 
Here again the judgment of the skilful military his- 
torian would be of grea't value. On the face of things, 
I was unable, as I stood on the Plains of Abraham, to 
see how Wolfe had greatly bettered his situation by 



352 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 

getting there instead of remaining in his camp on the 
other side of the river, provided always his opponent 
availed himself to the uttermost of his advantages. 
The escalade was effected on the morning of Septem- 
ber 13. Three days before, on the 10th, the uneasy 
British naval commanders had held a council, and 
decided that the lateness of the season required the 
fleet to leave the St. Lawrence without delay. Among 
the experienced French authorities some would hardly 
allow their opponents a week longer of campaigning 
weather, while Montcalm conceded them only a month. 
It was merely a question of a few days more or a few 
days less, and the French could count on the Cana- 
dian winter as a grim and irresistible ally, just as 
surely as did the Eussians half a century later. As 
a matter of fact, the British fleet, delaying to the last 
moment in view of the success of Wolfe's operations, 
did not leave Quebec until " it was past the middle of 
October," as Parkman again expresses it, about five 
weeks after the escalade. It was, therefore, a ques- 
tion of prolonging the defence that amount of time 
only. 

When the breaking of an equinoctial day revealed 
Wolfe securely planted on the heights west of Quebec, 
the outlook for him was, consequently, far from clear. 
It is true he had with him a force of 5000 very reli- 
able troops, drawn up within striking distance of the 
land-side defences of Quebec ; but, on the other hand, 
provided he was not attacked by the covering army, 
the lateness of the season left one course, and one only, 
open to him. He must endeavor to storm those de- 
fences. And not only must he endeavor to storm for- 
tifications in his front, but, in so doing, he must prepare 



A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 353 

to be attacked botli on his flank and rear by an enemy 
who, when his detachments were all concentrated, num- 
bered nearly double his own force, though greatly in- 
ferior to it in fighting qualities on an open field. Thus, 
without any sufficient artillery, Wolfe was confronted 
with the difficult problem of immediately capturing a 
stronghold, while subject to attack by a numerous 
covering force, much better supplied than he with 
artillery. So far as I can yet see, the only thing his 
opponent had to do was to wait until Wolfe began his 
necessary assault. It would have involved for him 
great risk. 

Under these circumstances, why did Montcalm decide 
to take the immediate initiative ? Without artillery, 
without even waiting until his entire force had been 
concentrated, he made a noisy, futile rush at the Brit- 
ish, as if for him there was no other course open. Yet 
his so doing was exactly what Wolfe must most have 
hoped for. The result we all know. On this most 
interesting point, however, Parkman is curiously vague. 
He is even contradictory ; thus betraying the lack of 
professional insight. At first he says of Montcalm, 
when the French commander saw the English army in 
line of battle behind Quebec, — " He could not choose. 
Fight he must, for Wolfe was now in position to cut 
off all his supplies " (p. 293). Leaving the immi- 
nence of winter out of consideration, this is, in a way, 
plausible ; but a little farther on Parkman says of 
Montcalm's immediate successor in command of the 
beaten Canadian army : — " There was no need to 
fight at once. ... By a march of a few miles he could 
have [concentrated the covering force], and by then 
intrenching himself he would have placed a greatly 



354 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 

superior force in the English rear, where his position 
might have been made impregnable. Here he might 
be easily furnished with provisions, and from hence 
he could readily throw men and supplies into Quebec, 
which the English were too few to invest" (p. 306). 
If this was the situation the day after Montcalm suf- 
fered defeat, why was it that officer had " no choice " 
but to fight at once, thirty-six hours before ? 

Parkman fails to tell us. 

To supply the tantalizing omission, even were I com- 
petent so to do, is no part of my present plan. The 
omission amounts, none the less, in itself, to a " Plea 
for Military History ; " for I submit that a trained 
military historian, after a careful examination of the 
locality and every record of the battle, could form 
a presumably correct estimate of the considerations 
which acted on Montcalm, and thus caused France 
the loss of the key to a continent. 

Coming now to a later period and events nearer 
home, I propose to illustrate my thesis by a brief refer- 
ence to four battles in our own history, two from the 
War of Independence and two from that of 1812-15, 
— the engagements at Bunker Hill and Long Island 
in the one case, and those of Blaclensburg and New 
Orleans m the other. None of these incidents in our 
history have, so far as I know, been treated by any 
writer competent to handle them from a distinctive!}^ 
military point of view, as, for instance, Captain Mahan 
has handled the naval operations of Nelson. 

Kecurring to Bunker Hill, the mistakes and con- 
troversies which have arisen among historians and 
critics in regard to that engagement have well-nigh 
partaken of the ludicrous. There has, in the first 



A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 355 

place, been an almost endless discussion as to who was 
in command, — a discussion whicli would have caused 
no man of military training a moment's pause. It has 
been elaborately contended that General Putnam must 
have been in command, because he was the officer of 
the highest grade upon the ground, obviously outrank- 
ing Colonel Prescott. The proposition is simply absurd, 
as being contrary to the first and elementary principles 
of military subordination. General Putnam was, it is 
true, on the ground ; but he was on the ground as an 
officer having a Connecticut commission only, and in 
command of a detachment from that province. He 
held no commission from Massachusetts, much less any 
Continental commission. Colonel Prescott, command- 
ing a Massachusetts regiment, had received his orders 
from his military superior, Major-Gene ral Ward, 
an officer also in the Massachusetts service. Ward 
thus was Prescott's superior officer ; Putnam was not. 
During the operations which ensued, it was open for 
Putnam to make to Prescott any suggestion he saw 
fit ; and Prescott, acting always on his own responsi- 
bility, might give to such suggestions the degree of 
weight he deemed proper ; but he could report only 
to his superior in the same service as himself, — his 
military commander. Prescott, therefore, showed per- 
fectly well that he knew what he was about when he 
offered the command to Warren, who had been com- 
missioned by the Massachusetts authorities as a major- 
general, when Warren appeared upon the field. War- 
ren, very properly, declined the command, remaining 
purely as a volunteer. But, so far as Putnam was 
concerned, he was in command merely of such Connect- 
icut troops as were cooperating with the Massachusetts 



356 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 

detachment ; and for a Massachusetts officer to have 
received an order as such from him would have sub- 
jected that officer to a court-martial. All this is ele- 
mentary, — the very alphabet of the military organiza- 
tion, — and yet the lay historians who have written 
upon that battle have contended over the question for 
years. 

The extraordinarily bad tactics of both sides in the 
affair of Bunker HiU I have dealt with elsewhere,^ — 
the opportunity which the British lost, the accidental 
advantage which the Americans gained. Luck, com- 
bined with good marksmanship, on the one side, and 
blundering, bull-headed persistence on the other, were 
the predominating elements of the occasion ; and to 
those features of it the historians have given scant 
consideration. The cause of American independence 
owed much that day to Yankee pluck and straight 
shooting; but more yet to genuine British bulldog 
stupidity. The race learns slowly. Its representa- 
tives then did just what they have recently attempted 
in South Africa. 

Nevertheless, the effect of the battle of Bunker Hill 
upon that on Long Island fourteen months later is, 
from a military point of view, interesting and very 
worthy of study. It is not too much to say that the 
experience of the earlier absolutely changed the fate 
of the subsequent day ; and, on the 17th of June, 1775, 
Colonel Prescott not only saved from destruction Gen- 
eral Washington and the American army on the 27th 
of August, 1776, but he saved the cause of American 
independence itself. Sir William Howe commanded 
at Bunker Plill ; he also commanded at Long Island. 
1 American Historical Review, vol. i. pp. 401-413 ; April, 1896. 



'ii 



A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 357 

Upon the latter field of operations his movements, 
though slow, were skilfully planned and well carried 
out. For a wonder, he had recourse to a flanking 
movement, which was successfully executed by Clin- 
ton; and, as the result of it, Howe found himself in 
the early hours of that August day in an admirable 
position to deliver an assault, with the chances at 
least four out of five in his favor. But the bloody 
experience at Bunker Hill was fresh in his mind ; 
and so, having his enemy completely in his grasp, he 
hesitated. He allowed his opponent to elude him; 
and that opponent chanced to be Washington. 

When, some years ago, I had occasion to make a 
study of operations about New York in August, 1776, 
I was amazed at the mistakes, from a military point 
of view, of which Washington was then guilty. Even 
more amazing, however, was the partisanship of the 
American historians. In their unwillingness to see any 
blemish in the career of Washington, their narratives 
amounted to little less than a falsification of history, 
— a literary misdemeanor, not to say crime, for which 
the only plea in justification possible for them to enter 
would be lack of technical knowledge. Suppressing 
incontrovertible facts, they gave credence to absurd 
stories. So much was I at the time surprised at the 
conclusions to which I found myself compelled that I 
took my narrative in the manuscript to Mr. Ropes, told 
him of my perplexity, and asked him to read my paper 
and give me the benefit of an outspoken criticism. I 
found him singularly well informed on the subject in 
a general way, and he readily assumed the task. A 
few days later he returned me my manuscript with 
an emphatic written indorsement of the conclusions I 



858 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 

had reached. Subsequently the paper was printed in 
the American HistoHcal Review^ and may there be 
consulted. 

Time and space do not permit of my now entering 
again upon this subject, nor would it be worth your 
or my while were I so to do. Suffice it to say that 
during the latter part of August, 1776, Washington 
appears to have disregarded almost every known prin- 
ciple of strategy or rule of tactics, some of them in a 
way almost grotesque. For instance, while lying on 
Long and Manhattan islands awaiting the sluggish 
movements of Howe, a body of Connecticut cavalry 
appeared, volunteering their services. Substantial, 
well-mounted men, they were some 400 in num- 
ber. Washington declined to accept their services 
as mounted men, on the extraordinary ground that 
operations being then conducted on islands, there 
could be no occasion for cavalry. Men, however, 
were greatly needed, and he suggested that members 
of the troop should send back their horses, and agree 
to serve as infantry. When they declined so to do, 
he roughly dismissed them. In reaching this decision 
it is not too much to say that Washington betrayed a 
truly singular ignorance of what cannot be regarded 
otherwise than as the elementary principles of military 
movements. It was true the operations then in hand 
were necessarily conducted on islands ; but, as it sub- 
sequently appeared, the American army did not have 
the necessary mounted men to do orderly and courier 
duty. More than that, the disaster of the 27th of 
August on Long' Island, involving, as it did, the need- 
less destruction of the very flower of the American 
1 Vol. i. pp. 650-670; July, 1896. 



A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 859 

army, was wholly due to the lack of a small mounted 
force. There were on that occasion three roads which 
led from Gravesend, whence the British began their 
movement, to Brooklyn, where Washington was in- 
trenched. We will call these the eastern, the middle, 
and the western roads. Of these three roads, two, the 
western and the middle, the Americans had occupied 
in force. The eastern road they wholly neglected. 
It was assumed, apparently, that the enemy would 
never go so far out of the direct way. There is 
unquestionably a well-developed propensity in British 
commanders to butt their own heads and those of 
their soldiers directly against any obstacle their ene- 
mies may see fit to put in their front. They can 
generally be counted on so to do. Unfortunately for 
the American army, it so chanced, as I have already 
said, that for once a flanking movement suggested 
itself to some one in the British army at Gravesend, 
probably not Sir William Howe. Accordingly, hav- 
ing reconnoitred their front, a British division, under 
the command of Clinton, made a night move on Brook- 
lyn by the easternmost of the three roads. That road, 
under any known rules of warfare, even the most 
elementary, should have been picketed, and watched 
by a mounted patrol. Twenty-five men would have 
sufficed ; fifty would have been ample. Four hundred 
men could have picketed the whole of Washington's 
front, and, holding the enemy in check, have given 
ample notice of his approach. To neglect such an 
obvious precaution was so unpardonable as not to 
admit of explanation. As a matter of fact, the road 
in question was left not only uncovered, but it was 
not even observed. The American army had no cav- 



360 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 

airy, its commander having sent the mounted men 
offered him home on the curiously suggestive ground 
that they could be of no possible service, as on islands 
" horses cannot be brought into action." By this 
unconsciously innocent remark the trained military 
expert learns that, at the time it was made, Washing- 
ton had no conception of the duties and functions of 
a mounted force in connection with any extended 
military operations ; and, accordingly, the fact, not 
otherwise comprehensible, is explained that during the 
short summer night of August 26-27, 1776, Clinton 
moved forward not only unopposed but actually un- 
observed, until, in the early morning, he had got him- 
self between the defences at Brooklyn and the right 
wing of Washington's army under Stirling and Sulli- 
van, thrown forward to cover the western and the 
middle roads. As a result, that whole wing of the 
army, its flower, was crushed between Howe, ad- 
vancing directly from Gravesend, and Clinton, who, 
by a slightly circuitous night march to the eastward, 
had got in its rear. The disaster was, as I have said, 
wholly due to the lack of cavalry on Long Island, and 
a consequent defective outpost service. Yet these 
facts, so pregnant with both inferences and conse- 
quences, are not even alluded to by any general his- 
torian of the operations. The writers of so-called 
history did not in their turn realize the functions of 
cavalry in warfare, or observe that the American army 
in and before New York had no mounted service, 
or why it had none. The disaster of August 27 on 
Long Island just failed to bring irretrievable ruin on 
the cause of American independence. Even as it was, 
gravely compromising Washington, its influence was 



A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 361 

perceptible on the whole course of military operations 
during the succeeding three years. To Washington 
it was a lesson from which he learned much. Thence- 
forth he adopted Fabian tactics. 

Turning now to the war of 1812-15, the influence 
of the battle of Bladensburg, and the consequent cap- 
ture of the city of Washington, is not less apparent in 
the operations which resulted in the defeat of Paken- 
ham before New Orleans and the failure of the British 
expedition against Louisiana than was the sharp lesson 
of Bunker Hill in Howe's cautious movement against 
the American lines at Brooklyn. The affair at Bla- 
densburg occurred on the 24th of August ; the assault 
on Jackson's lines before New Orleans was delivered 
on the 8th of January following. Those engagements, 
and the tactics pursued in them, are, moreover, of 
peculiar interest just at this time in connection with 
what is taking place in South Africa. A recurrence 
to the events of eighty-five years ago will show how 
very tenacious are military traditions, with the British 
at least, and how racial characteristics assert them- 
selves, no matter how much conditions change, and in 
spite of experience. It also, if taken in connection 
with the other and earlier operations I have referred 
to, illustrates very curiously the slight degree of reli- 
ance which can be placed on the fundamental rules of 
strategy when it comes to their practical application. 
They are, in fact, about as dangerous to apj^ly as they 
are to disregard ; for, when all is done and written, 
in warfare almost everything depends on the character 
of the man at the head — on his insight into the real 
facts of the situation, including the topography of the 
country, and the quality of the material at liis com- 



362 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 

maud and of that opposed to hiin. The really great 
military commander, as in the case of Napoleon in his 
earlier days, effects his results quite as much by ig- 
noring all recognized rules and principles as by acting 
in obedience to them. New Orleans was a case in 
point. At New Orleans, Jackson had no right to 
succeed ; Pakenham had no excuse for failure. The 
last brought defeat on his army, and lost his own 
life, while proceeding in the way of tradition and in 
obedience to accepted principles of strategy ; the for- 
mer achieved a brilliant success by taking risks from 
which any reasonably cautious commander would have 
recoiled. 

In the first place, however, to understand the why 
and the wherefore of what took place at New Orleans 
eighty-five years ago in January, it is necessary to 
recall to mind what occurred at Bladen sburg and in 
Washington eighty-five j^ears ago last August. The 
general in command of the British army had been 
changed, for Ross was killed before Baltimore, and 
Pakenham, fresh from the battlefields of the Penin- 
sula, had succeeded him ; but the regiments which 
had simply, with a volley, a shout and a rush, walked 
over the American line at Bladensburg, all took part 
in the attempt to walk over a similar line before New 
Orleans. The tactics, if such they deserve to be called, 
were the same in each case — those of the football 
field. In other words, at Bladensburg the British 
officers, proceeding in conformity with their simple 
traditions and good old rules, endeavored to do, and 
succeeded in doing, exactly what they intended to do 
and failed in doing at Banker Hill; that is, they 
marched directly up in front of the defending force, 



i' 



A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 363 

carried the position with little loss, routed their oppo- 
nents, and then, as a matter of course in the case o£ 
Washington, captured the city those opponents were 
there to cover. The proceeding was perfectly simple, 

— very much, in fact, what we have seen recently in 
the Philippines, — a body of superior troops carrying 
by front assault weakly defended defensive points, and 
this with insignificant loss to themselves. At both 
Bladensburg and New Orleans the attempt indicated 
an overweening self-confidence in the attacking party, 
due to a dangerous contempt for their opponents. 
The veterans of Wellington's Peninsular campaigns 
had to do with raw American levies. They regarded 
them very much as our own volunteers have recently 
regarded the Filipinos. 

Thus New Orleans was the sequel of Bladensburg ; 
it goes far also to explain the recent battle on the 
Tugela. Thirty-four years after New Orleans, Charles 
James Napier, brother of the historian of the Penin- 
sular war, writing in a reminiscent mood of the Span- 
ish battle of Busaco, said of Pakenham, — and he 
and Pakenham had both been wounded at Busaco, 

— " Poor fellow ! He was a heroic man, that Edward 
Pakenham, and it was a thousand pities he died in 
defeat ; it was not his fault, that defeat." This 
may possibly be, and Napier was unquestionably a 
high authority on such a point. None the less there 
is a large class of military commanders commonly 
known in camp parlance as ''butt-heads," and it is 
not at once apparent why Major-General Sir Edward 
Pakenham should not be included therein.^ James 

1 See, also, Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society^ 
Second Series, vol. xiii. pp. 412-423. 



364 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 

Parton was, by birth, English, and in his life of Jack- 
son — one of the most picturesque and vivid biogra- 
phies, be it said, in the language — Parton speaks 
thus of Pakenham, using forty years ago language 
curiously applicable to operations in South Africa 
eighty-five years after those I am criticising : " The 
British service seems to develop every high and noble 
quality of man and soldier except generalship. Up to 
the hour when the British soldier holds an independ- 
ent command, he is the most assured and competent 
of men. Give him a plain, unconditional order, — 
' Go and do that ! ' — and he will go and do it with 
a cool, self-forgetting pertinacity of daring that can 
scarcely be too much admired. All of the man below 
the eyebrows is perfect. The stout heart, the high 
purpose, the dextrous hand, the enduring frame, are 
his. But the work of a general in command demands 
head ^ a cool, calculating head, fertile in expedients ; 
a head that is the controlling power of the man. And 
this article of head, which is the rarest production of 
nature everywhere, is one which the brave British 
soldier is apt to be signally wanting in ; and never so 
much so as when responsibility rests upon him." For 
the intelligent student of military operations it is not 
any easier now than it was for Parton half a century 
ago to advance any sufficient reasons for the tactics 
pursued by the British commander when, on the 8th 
of January, 1815, he went to his own death while 
thrusting his storming columns against breastworks 
bristling with artillery and swarming with riflemen. 
It was simply the wanton throwing away of life to 
accomplish a result which could have been accom- 
plished in another and more scientific way absolutely 



A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 365 

without loss ; for New Orleans was then within the 
easy grasp of the British. 

Had Pakenham, as he perfectly well could have 
done, passed a division of his army over to the west- 
ern bank of the Mississippi, and then threatened New 
Orleans from that side of the river, operating upon 
Jackson's flank and rear, Jackson would have had no 
choice but to vacate his lines and allow New Orleans 
to fall. This, when too late, Jackson himself perfectly 
appreciated ; but the British commander preferred the 
desperate chance of an assault. The recollection of 
Bladensburg lured him to destruction. 

In reading the literature of that campaign, it is curi- 
ous to come across the footprints of this fact. Paken- 
ham joined the army before New Orleans on the morn- 
ing of Christmas-day, 1814, only two weeks before 
the battle. The English had then already met with 
much stiffer resistance than they had anticipated, and 
those whom Pakenham relieved of command recog- 
nized the difficulty of the problem before them to solve. 
Nevertheless, as the reinforcements the new com- 
mander-in-chief brought with him stepped on shore, 
not a few of them expressed their fears lest they 
should be too late to take part in the advance, as 
they thought New Orleans would be captured before 
they could get into line. On the 7th of January, the 
day before the fight, as one of the Bladensburg regi- 
ments was somewhat sulkily moving to the rear for 
the less valued service across the river, several of its 
officers grumbled in passing, a new arrival wrote, that 
"it would be now our turn to get into New Or- 
leans, as they had done at Washington." Among 
those who had been at Washington, not one had been 



366 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 

more conspicuous than Admiral Cochrane, as, a naval 
officer, mounted on a brood mare, white, uncurried, 
with a black foal trotting by her side, he rode around 
personally superintending the work of destruction. 
And now, when the brave and unfortunate Pakenham 
hesitated in face of the obstacles in front of him, 
Cochrane, so the story goes, egged him on with a 
taunt, telling him, with Bladensburg fresh in mind, 
that " if the army could not take those mud-banks, 
defended by ragged militia, he would do it with 2000 
sailors, armed only with cutlasses and pistols." 

On the other hand, Jackson on this occasion evinced 
one of the highest and rarest attributes of a great 
commander ; he read correctly the mind of his 023po- 
nent — divined his course of action. The British com- 
mander, not wholly impervious to reason, had planned 
a diversion to the west bank of the river, with a view 
to enfilading Jackson's lines, and so aiding the pro- 
posed assault in front. As this movement assumed 
shape, it naturally caused Jackson much anxiety. All 
depended on its magnitude. If it was the operation 
in chief of the British army. New Orleans could hardly 
be saved. Enfiladed, and threatened in his rear, Jack- 
son must fall back. If, however, it was only a diver- 
sion in favor of a main assault planned on his front, 
the movement across the river might be checked, or 
prove immaterial. As the thing developed during 
the night preceding the battle. Commodore Patterson, 
who commanded the American naval contingent on 
the river, became alarmed, and hurried a desj^atch 
across to Jackson, advising him of what was taking 
place, and begging immediate reinforcement. At one 
o'clock in the morning the messenger roused Jackson 



A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 367 

from sleep, stating his errand. Jackson listened to tlie 
despatch, and at once said : — " Hurry back and tell 
Commodore Patterson that he is mistaken. The main 
attack will be on this side, and I have no men to spare. 
General Morgan must maintain his position at all haz- 
ards." To use a vernacular but expressive term, Jack- 
son had "sized" Pakenham correctly, — the British 
commander could be depended on not to do what a 
true insight would have dictated, and the occasion 
called for. He would not throw the main body of his 
army across the river and move on his objective point 
by a practically undefended road, merely holding his 
enemy in check on the east bank. Had he done so, 
he would have acted in disregard of that first princi- 
ple both of tactics and strategy which forbids the 
division of a force in presence of an enemy in such a 
way that the two parts are not in position to support 
each other ; but, not the less for that, he would have 
taken New Orleans. An attack in front was, on the 
contrary, in accordance with British military tradi- 
tions, and the recent experience of Bladensburg. He 
acted, accordingly, as Jackson was satisfied he would 
act. In his main assault he sacrificed his army and. 
lost his own life, sustaining an almost unexamjiled 
defeat ; while his partial movement across the river 
was completely successful, so far as it was pressed, 
opening wide the road to New Orleans. A mere 
diversion, or auxiliary operation, it was not persisted 
in, the principal attack having failed. 

Possibly it might by some now be argued that, had 
Pakenham thus weakened his force on the east side of 
the river by operating, in the way suggested, on New 
Orleans and Jackson's flank and rear on its west side, 



368 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 

a vigorous, fighting opponent, such as Jackson unques- 
tionably was, might have turned the tables on him 
for thus violating an elementary rule of warfare — 
the very rule, by the way, so dangerously ignored by 
Washington at Brookl^ai. Leaving his lines and 
boldly taking the aggressive, Jackson, it will then be 
argued, might have overwhelmed the British force in 
his front, thus cutting the column operating west of 
the river from the fleet and its base of supplies — in 
fact, destroying the expedition. Not improbably 
Pakenham argued in this way ; if he did, however, he 
simply demonstrated his incompetence for high com- 
mand. Failing to grasp the situation, he put a wrong 
estimate on its conditions. It is the part of a skilful 
commander to know when to secure results by making 
exceptions to even the most general and the soundest 
rules. Pakenham at New Orleans had under his com- 
mand a force much larger, in fact nearly double that 
confronting him. While, moreover, his soldiers were 
veterans, the Americans were hardly more than raw 
recruits ; but, like the Boers of to-day, they had in 
them good material, and were individually accustomed 
to handling rifles. As one of the best of Jackson's 
brigadiers. General Adair, afterwards expressed it, — 
" Our men were militia without discipline, and if once 
beaten, they could not be relied on again." They 
were, in fact, of exactly the same temper and stuff as 
those who were stampeded by a volley and a shout at 
Bladensburg; and the principle of military morale 
thus stated by General Adair was that learned by 
Washington on Long Island. Troops of a certain 
class, when once beaten, cannot be relied on again. 
They are not seasoned soldiers. The force Pakenham 



A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 369 

had under his command before New Orleans was, 
on the other hand, composed of seasoned soldiers of 
the best class. In the open field, and on anything 
approaching equality of position, he had absolutely 
nothing to fear. He might safely provoke attack ; in- 
deed, all he ought to have asked was to tempt Jackson 
out from behind his breastworks on almost any terms. 
So fully, moreover, did he realize all this that it in- 
spired him to his assault. It is useless, therefore, to 
suggest that he hesitated to divide his command, over- 
estimating Jackson's numbers and aggressive capacity. 
Had he done so, he would hardly have ventured to 
assail Jackson in front. On the contrary, Pakenham's 
trouble lay not in overestimating, but in underesti- 
mating Ms adversary. He failed to operate on what 
were correct principles for the conditions which con- 
fronted him, not because he was afraid so to do, but 
because he did not grasp the situation. 

In case, then, dividing his command, Pakenham had 
thrown one half of it across the river to assail New 
Orleans in force, so turning Jackson's rear, and then 
with the other half held his position on the east bank, 
keeping open his communications with the British fleet, 
the only possible way in which Jackson could have 
taken advantage of the situation would have been by 
leaving his lines, and attacking. 

Now, it so happens that resisting attack under just 
such circumstances is the position in which the British 
soldier has always developed his best staying qualities. 
Quebec was a case directly in point. Again, the men 
under Pakenham before New Orleans were even more 
reliable than those who only five months later at 
Waterloo, after the auxiliary troops had been swept 



370 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 

from the field by the fury of the French attack, held 
their position from noon to a June sunset against an 
assaulting force of nearly twice their number com- 
manded by the Emperor himself. Indeed, the tena- 
city of the English infantry under such circumstances 
is well known, — it is even now receiving new illustra- 
tion. But concerning it there is a statement of the 
French marshal Bugeaud which is so curious, and 
which bears upon its face such evidence that it was 
written by a military man of practical experience, that 
I cannot refrain from quoting it. It is not the utter- 
ance of a " bookish theorick," but of one who knew of 
that whereof he spoke. Marshal Bugeaud, in making 
this statement, referred not to Waterloo, but to the 
operations in the Peninsular war, — that school in 
which the soldiers under Pakenham had learned their 
business. What he says reveals, moreover, a curious 
insight into the characteristics of the French and Eng- 
hsh infantry : — 

" The English generally occupied weU-chosen defen- 
sive positions, having a certain command, and they 
showed only a portion of their force. The usual artil- 
lery action first took place. Soon, in great haste, 
without stud3ang the position, without taking time to 
examine if there were means to make a flank attack, 
we marched straight on, taking the bull by the horns. 
About one thousand yards from the English line the 
men became excited, spoke to one another, and hurried 
their march ; the column began to be a little confused. 

" The English remained quite silent, with ordered 
arms, and from their steadiness appeared to be a long 
red wall. This steadiness invariably produced an 
effect on the young soldiers. 



A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 371 

" Yery soon we got nearer, shouting, ' Vive I'Em- 
pereur, en avant ! a la bayonette ! ' Sliakos were 
raised on tlie muzzles of the muskets ; the column 
began to double, the ranks got into confusion, the 
agitation produced a tumult ; shots were fired as we 
advanced. 

" The English line remained still, silent and im- 
movable, with ordered arms, even when we were only 
three hundred paces distant, and it appeared to ignore 
the storm about to break. 

" The contrast was striking ; in our inmost thoughts 
each felt that the enemy was a long time in firiug, 
and that this fire, reserved for so long, would be very 
unpleasant when it did come. Our ardor cooled. 
The moral power of steadiness, which nothing shakes 
(even if it be only in appearance) over disorder which 
stupefies itself with noise, overcame our minds. At 
this moment of intense excitement the English wall 
shouldered arms, an indescribable feeling rooted many 
of our men to the ground — they began to fire. The 
enemy's steady concentrated volleys swept our ranks ; 
decimated, we turned round, seeking to recover our 
equilibrium ; then three deafening cheers broke the 
silence of our opponents ; at the third they were on 
us, pushing our disorganized flight. But, to our great 
surprise, they did not push their advantage beyond a 
hundred yards, retiring calmly to their lines to await 
a second attack." 

Those thus vividly described by an hereditary race 
opponent, who had himself confronted them, were the 
identical men Jackson would have had to attack on 
their own ground had he fomid himself compelled on 
the 8th of January to leave his lines and assume the 



872 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 

aggressive, as the only possible alternative to a pre- 
cipitate retreat and the abandonment of New Orleans. 
Certainly, that day Andrew Jackson was under gi^eat 
obligations to Edward Pakenhain. 

I have referred to Washington's operations on 
Long Island and the short Bladensburg campaign as 
interesting military studies in connection with New 
Orleans, or as directly influencing the course of events 
there. But there is another and far more memorable 
and momentous American campaign which is deserv- 
ing of mention in the same connection. I refer to 
our own army movements on the Mississippi nearly 
half a century later. I have in this paper contended 
that at New Orleans one half of the British force 
there assembled would have been fully equal to hold- 
ing its own against an assault in front from any force 
Jackson could have brought against it. Pakenham's 
flank operations in front of New Orleans could, there- 
fore, in 1815 have been conducted with quite as much 
safety as were those of Grant before Vicksburg in 
May and June, 1863. In fact, the positions in the 
two cases were much the same. Like Pakenham at 
New Orleans, Sherman, it will be remembered, before 
Grant's flanking operations began, assailed the works 
at Vicksburg in front, meeting with a disastrous re- 
pulse. Subsequently, Grant devised his brilliant, sci- 
entific movement by Grand Gulf and the Big Black, 
crossing the Mississippi twice and taking his oppo- 
nents in the rear, exactly as Pakenham could have 
done from below New Orleans, though on a much 
larger scale and incurring far greater risks. He thus 
forced Pemberton to come out from behind his works, 
to take the chance of even battle, in order to pre- 



A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 373 

serve his line of communication. He then whij)ped 
him. 

And this brings vis face to face with what is, after 
all, the fundamental condition behind all principles 
and theories of warfare, the individuality and tactical 
or strategic aptitudes — for they are very different 
things — of commanders. It was the Confederate 
general Forrest, I believe, one of the born fighters 
developed in our Civil War, who defined strategy as 
the art in warfare of " getting there first with most 
men." The definition is rather general ; but in it 
there is much native shrewdness, and, moreover, it 
smacks strongly of practical experience. Grant illus- 
trated its truth in one way in 1863, just as poor Pak- 
enham illustrated its obverse in 1815. The trouble, 
however, with most books of so-called history is that 
the industrious, but, as a rule, quite inexperienced, 
writers thereof, fail conspicuously to get at what may 
be called, for want of a better term, the true inward- 
ness of any given situation. They tell of what oc- 
curred, after a fashion ; they fail to show why it 
occurred. The sequence is not revealed. So, where 
such are not written with a distinct bias of patriotism 
or hero worship, they are apt to repeat in a stereotyped 
sort of way accepted traditions or conventional theories; 
and when, with this, is combined a lack of familiarity 
and practical experience, the result is apt to be what 
we are very familiar with when a clergyman sets out 
to explain difficult problems of constitutional law, or 
some excellent man of affairs feels impelled to impart 
in some public way his views upon art. 

As I have sought to show, Wolfe at Quebec, Wash- 
ington on Long Island, Jackson at New Orleans, are 



374 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 

all still interesting studies, studies than wliicli few- 
are more interesting. But as chance and occasion 
have led me to look into them, the result has been, in 
the first place, as I stated when I began, a distinct 
access of historical scepticism, followed by grave 
doubts as to the real value of what are known as gen- 
eral histories, written on the plan heretofore in vogue. 
They fail to bear the test of rigid special analysis. 
Accordingly, I cannot help fancying that in some 
future, not now very remote, a new historical method 
must be developed, a method the general character of 
which I have this evening illustrated from a special 
point of view. Pursuing in other fields of knowledge 
the line of thought I have tried to develop in connec- 
tion with a few familiar military episodes, the general 
historian on a large scale will seek to draw his narra- 
tive not from his inner consciousness, or his assumed 
personal knowledge of military operations as of every- 
thing else, or from any supposed natural aptitudes 
which he may infer exist in himself. On the contrary, 
he will turn to others, and, like some good occupant 
of the judicial chair, he will bring his judgment to 
bear, not upon the problems themselves, but upon the 
degree of reliability to be placed on the conclusions 
reached by those specially qualified for the task, wdio 
have undertaken to speak on the problems, — the 
laborious writers of scientific monographs. In mili- 
tary affairs as in others, the- day of the historian of 
the Oliver Goldsmith type, — the facile writer who 
knows it all, who is at once a statesman, a diplomat, a 
parliamentarian, a lawyer, a theologian, a physician, 
a biologist, a mechanician, an architect, a linguist, and, 
though neither last nor least, a military and naval 



A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 375 

strategist, — tlie day of the historian of this class is 
practically a thing of the past ; for even historical 
writers begin to realize that no man can be a specialist 
in everything ; neither is it any longer given to one of 
finite powers to take all knowledge for his province, 
and to be a generalizer besides. 



INDEX 



Adams, C. F., American Minister at 
London, protests against the con- 
struction of the Alabama, 49, pre- 
sents demand for reparation, 80, 
81; on Russell's proposal of a 
joint commission, 87 ; on reaction 
of English policy, 87, 90 ; interview 
with Clarendon, 88 ; with Forster, 
89; with Oliphant, 90; on recog- 
nition of Southern belligerency, 
92, 97 ; on rejection of the John- 
son-Clarendon Convention, 103 ; on 
Motley, 139 ; on the indirect 
claims, 192. 

Alabama, keel laid, 39; purpose 
patent, 45 ; preparation of equip- 
ment, 46 ; evasion, 50 ; responsibil- 
ity for the evasion, 50 n.; equipped, 
50; purified of evasion, 51; rav- 
ages, 60 ; received in British ports, 
62 ; destruction, 78 ; Great Britain 
disclaims responsibility, 80 ; sta- 
tus, 197. See also Alabama claims. 

Alabama claims. Great Britain re- 
fuses to consider, 80, 81 ; Great 
Britain neglects a favorable op- 
portunity to settle, 82-87 ; Derby 
favors a settlement, 91 ; Sumner 
on greatness of the controversy, 
95 ; and British withdrawal from 
America, 104, 147, 156, 159, 162, 177, 
209, 210, 241 ; retroactive effect on 
English belligerency proclama- 
tion, 115, 207, 209, 211 ; Fish on 
basis of settlement, 125, 162 ; in- 
fluence of Franco-Prussian War, 
130, 133, 135 ; Grant's message of 
1870 on, 134; British comment, 
134 ; Grant's proposals, 161 ; Great 



Britain ready to negotiate, 163, 
177. See also Indirect claims, 
Johnson-Clarendon Convention, 
Treaty of Washington. 

Alexander II. of Russia, assassina- 
tion, 258. 

Alexander, E. P., Confederate gene- 
ral, retentive memory, 9; consulta- 
tion with Lee after Sailor's Creek, 
10, 20, 22; advises dispersion of 
Lee's army, 11, 22-24 ; account of 
Lee at Appomattox, 20-30. 

Alexandra trial, 60. 

Ameiican Historical Association, 
tabooes political discussions, 274 ; 
political duty, 275, 282, 293, 299, 
303, 336-338 ; purpose, 275. 

Americans, English opinion during 
the Civil War, 35, 61-66, 74-78, 267 ; 
change in English opinion of, 261- 
264, 266-273 ; insight into English 
feelings, 264 ; wealth and master- 
fulness, 266, 269, 272 ; transmuta- 
tion of national character, 271, 
272. See also United States. 

Annexation, Grant's policy, 109, 113. 
See also Canada, Imperialism, 
Manifest Destiny. 

Appomattox, Confederate army 
blocked at, 10, 21 ; condition of 
Confederate army at, 22, 29 ; tem- 
porary Confederate success, 26; 
Custer's demands, 27; the apple 
tree, 28, meeting of Lee and Grant, 
28. See also Lee, R. E. 

Arbitration of Alabama claims, 
Russell on, 86 ; Stanley friendly 
to, 92. 

Assassination, of McKinley, 256, 



378 



INDEX 



259 ; of rulers, lack of contempo- 
rary signilicaiice in recent, 257- 
259 ; motive, 259. 

Babcock, O. E., treaty of annexa- 
tion vvitli San Domingo, 130-132 ; 
Grant's faith in, 218. 

Baring, Sir T., on reaction of Eng- 
lisli policy, 70-72. 

Belligerency, English recognition 
of Confederate, Seward on, 92, 97, 
100, 101, 202, 203-205; Stanley on, 
92 ; checks negotiations, 92 ; John- 
son-Clarendon Convention ig- 
nores, 94 ; undue haste, 96, 202 ; no 
unfriendly intent, 97; supported 
by international law, 98 ; favor- 
able to the United States, 99, 202 ; 
necessary, 100, 202; Sumner's ar- 
raignment, 101-103, 11-1; and 
Grant's policy in Cuba, 108, 114; 
retroactive effect of Alabama 
claims on, 115, 207, 209, 211 ; Fish 
on. 111, 115, 206-208; Grant on, 
122 n. ; and the blockade, 199-201 ; 
Palmerston on, 199 ; Cockburn on, 
200 ; issue of the proclamation, 
201 ; Fessenden on, 209 ; Edmunds 
on, 211. 

Bentinck, G. W. P„on English sym- 
pathy for the South, 63 ; on North- 
ern conduct of the war, 63 n. 

Bernard, Montague, on the Ala- 
bama, 52 n. 

Bigelow, Poultney, on former esti- 
mation of colonies, 149. 

Bimetallism, and English opinion 
of the United States, 268 ; period 
of national debate, 281 ; question 
solved by course of events, 301 ; 
issue considered historically, 305- 
307. See also Currency. 

Bladensburg, battle of, effect on 
New Orleans, 301-303, 365. 

Blockade, and belligerency, 98, 199- 
201, 207 ; proclamation, 201. 

Boss and the machine, 297. 

Boutwell, G. S., Secretary of the 
Treasury, and the San Domingo 
treaty, 142, 222 ; at interview of 
Sumner and Fish, 145 n. ; on dis- 
placement of Sumner, 237. 



Bryan, W. J., character of his po- 
litical campaigns, 278, 293. 

Bugeaud, Marshal, on English in- 
fantry, 370. 

Bulloch, J. D., on importance of 
Confederate naval operations, 36 ; 
sent to England as Confederate 
agent, 38 ; activity, 39 ; on con- 
struction of the Florida, ii; and 
the Alabama, i^ ; on English sym- 
patliy for the South, 63. 

Bunker Hill, battle of, controver- 
sies, 354 ; question of command, 
355, elements, 356 ; effect on Long 
Island, 356. 

Burchard, S. D., apothegm, 291. 

Butler, B. F,, suggests Sumner as 
Minister to Great Britain, 137 ; sug- 
gests Phillips, 162 ; opposes the 
Treaty of Washington, 186. 

Cameron, Simon, suggests Sumner 
as Minister to Great Britain, 
137. 

Campaigns. See Political discus- 
sions. 

Canada, Alabama claims and Eng- 
lish withdrawal from, 104, 147, 156, 
159, 162, 177, 209, 210, 241 ; Chandler 
on annexation, 104, 152; Grant's 
policy, 109, 113, 153 n. ; Sumner on 
annexation, 147, 150-156; English 
views on annexation, 155, 157, 159 ; 
Schurz on annexation, 209, 210. 

Carnot, M. F. S., President of 
France, assassination, 258. 

Chamberlain, D. H., on displace- 
ment of Sumner, 236. 

Chandler, Zachariah,on annexation 
of Canada, 104, 152. 

Character of the present age, 258 ; 
and assassination of rulers, 258- 
260. 

Civil "War, and the South African 
War, 2-4, 14, 15, 17, 33-30, 63 n., 195 ; 
European attitude during, 34 ; 
English attitude, 35, 61-65, 74-78, 
208 ; magnitude, 100, 202 ; world 
results, 197 ; contemporary mis- 
understanding of, 204; effect of 
success of, on English opinion of 
America, 267, 268. See also Bel- 



INDEX 



379 



ligerency, Confederate States, 
Great Britain, Lee. 

Clarendon, Lord, English Foreign 
Secretary, denies liability for Ala- 
bama depredations, 81, 88 ; sug- 
gests a joint commission, 88 ; con- 
vention with Johnson, 93. See 
also Johnson-Clarendon Conven- 
tion. 

Cleveland, Grover, on the Senate's 
exercise of treaty power, 185 ; 
Venezuelan diplomacy, 267; mes- 
sage on the tariff, 291. 

Cobden, Richard, on exclusion of 
belligerent vessels violating neu- 
tral rights, 49 ; on right of neutrals 
to build belligerent vessels, 54 n. ; 
on Seward, 55 n. ; on sympathy for 
other people's rebels, 62, 270 ; on 
Canadian independence, 150 ; on 
the spirit of war, 319 ; on duty 
towaid liberty, 332. 

Cochrane, Admiral Sir Alexander, 
at "Washington, 366 ; at attack on 
New Orleans, 366. 

Cockburn, Sir A. J. E., Lord Chief 
Justice, on right to exclude bel- 
ligerents from neutral ports, 49 ; 
on recognition of belligerency, 
200, 

Colonies, change in opinion of 
value, 149; as a trust, 323, 324. 
See also Inferior races. 

Commercial depression of 1893 and 
English opinion of America, 208. 

Confederate States, condition in 
April, 1865, 2 ; believed uncon- 
querable, 3, 13 n. ; Davis for con- 
tinued resistance, 3, 12 ; decision 
of further resistance in Lee's 
hands, 4, 8 ; general surrender of 
armies, 13; conditions implied in 
the surrender, 15; joy over Lin- 
coln's death, 16 ; probable result 
of further resistance, 17 ; lack of 
essentials of maritime warfare, 
37 ; make Great Britain a naval 
base, .37, 39, 53; naval policy 
checked, 69 ; faith in cotton, 99, 
100 n. ; self-reliance, 100. See also 
Belligerency, Civil War, Great 
Britain, Lee, R. E. 



Congress as a recording machine, 
303. See also Legislative, Sen- 
ate. 

Conkling, Roscoe, and Sumner, 252. 

Consequential damages. See In- 
direct claims. 

Cotton, Southern reliance on, 99, 
100 n. 

Cuban insurrection, and English 
recognition of Confederate belli- 
gerency, 108, 114, 117 ; Grant's pol- 
icy, 109 ; Fish's policy, 118, 216 ; 
Grant's proclamation of bellige- 
rency, 118 ; detained by Fish, 119- 
121 ; Grant's message, 119 n., 217^ 
219. 

Currency debate, period of national, 
281 ; phases, 286 ; in 1876, 288 ; neg. 
lected historical aspect, 289 ; dor- 
mant, 290 ; importance, 302. See 
also Bimetallism. 

Curtis, G. W., on Sumner, 110 n., 
175 n. 

Cushing, Caleb, and Fish, 114 ; char- 
acter, 114 ; and Rose, 123 ; on the 
Senate's share in foreign affairs, 
123 n. 

Custer, G. A. at Appomattox, 27. 

Dana, R. H., on Sumner, 174. 

Davis, Jefferson, Danville mani- 
festo, 2 ; bent on further resist- 
ance, 3, 12 : conference with John- 
ston, 12. 

Davis, J. C. B., on Sumner, 175 n. ; 
and the indirect claims, 187. 

D'Ttajuba. Viscount, on seizure of 
belligerent vessels violating neu- 
tral rights, 48 n. 

DeLeon, T. C, on Lee's return to 
Richmond, 18. 

Dependencies. See Colonies, Infe- 
rior races. 

Derby, Lord, Prime Minister, and 
the Alabama claims, 91. 

Dred Scott decision, educational 
value, 283. 

Edmunds, G. F., reference to Sum- 
ner's memorandum, 179 ; on re- 
jection of Johnson-Clarendon Con- 
vention, 210; on displacement of 



380 



INDEX 



Sumner, 238 ; on Sumner's charac- 
ter, 254. 

Edwards, S. P., collector of the port 
of Liverpool, and the evasion of 
the Alabama, 50 n. 

Egypt, effect of British rule, 327. 

Elizabeth, Empress of Austria, as- 
sassination, 258, 259. 

English, sympathy during the Civil 
War, 35, 61-65, 74-78; tribute to 
McKinley, 261 ; change in attitude 
toward Americans, 262-264, 266- 
273; American insight into their 
feelings, 264 ; character, 266, 267 ; 
attitude of lower classes toward 
United States, 270 ; military 
methods, 356, 359, 381, 362,364,367, 
369-371. See also Great Britain. 

Evolution and Imperialism, 315-317. 

Executive department, relation to 
the legislative, 166, 226, 227, 235. 

Expansion. See Imperialism. 

Fenianism and the negotiation of 
the Alabama claims, 147, 159, 179, 
186. 

Fessenden, W. P., on Sumner's 
speech, 208 ; on English bellige- 
rency proclamation, 209. 

Fish, Hamilton, Secretary of State, 
and the Treaty of Washington, 31 ; 
author not personally acquainted 
with, 95 ; early relations with 
Sumner, 106, 112, 113, 156, 245, 246 ; 
instructions to Motley, 108, 114- 
116 ; character, 110 ; and the Eng- 
lish belligerency proclamation, 

111, 114, 206-208 ; relation to Grant, 

112, 113, 119 n., 143, 144, 247, 252, 
253; and Gushing, 114; and Cu- 
ban belligerency, 118, 119, 121, 216, 
217, 219, 223; unofficial interview 
with Rose, 124 ; on basis of settle- 
ment of Alabama claims, 125, 162 ; 
ambition, 125, 135 ; correspond- 
ence with Rose on Motley's di- 
plomacy, 126-129 ; favors negotia- 
tions in Washington, 129; mina- 
tory paragraph on England's re- 
luctance to negotiate, 134; and 
Rose open negotiations, 135 ; dis- 
satisfied with official life, 135, 140, 



220-223; conditions favjring his 
negotiations, 136, 144 ; and the re- 
call of Motley, 136, 140; confers 
with Senators on the proposed 
negotiations, 144, 146 n., 172, 234 ; 
interviews Sumner on Rose's pro- 
posal, 144, 145; on the interview, 
145 n., 146 n. ; and annexation of 
Canada, 155, 156, 158, 160, 161, 162, 
176 ; and Sumner's memorandum, 
163, 182, 232 ; break with Sumner, 
171, 172, 187, 229, 243, 251 ; antici- 
pates Sumner's opposition, 176, 
182, 233 ; and the indirect claims, 
180, 187, 189 n., 190 n., 194; diary, 
215; and Hoar, 219, 221, 248; on 
Sumner's character, 248-251. 

Fisheries and San Juan question, 
145 n. 

Fisk, James, Jr., "Gold Corner," 
120. 

Florida, Confederate cruiser, con- 
tracted for, 39 ; inspected by Eng- 
lish officials, 43, 44 ; seized and 
released at Nassau, 44; status, 
197. 

Foreign Enlistment Act, British, 
original object, 40; and interna- 
tional obligations, 40, 42, 55-57 ; 
character, 41 ; interpreted, 41, 60 ; 
and the construction of the 
cruisers, 44-46 ; considered effect- 
ual, 59 ; dissenting interpretation, 
66 ; made stringent, 79. 

Forster, W. E., interview with 
Adams, 89 ; on recognition of 
Confederate belligerency, 98 ; rise, 
124 ; friend of the United States, 
124 ; advocates settlement of Ala- 
bama claims, 125 ; and the in- 
direct claims, 191-194. 

Franco-Prussian War, influence on 
Alabama controversy, 130, 133, 
135. 

Freeman, E. A., on politics and his- 
tory, 274. 

Garfield, J. A., assassination, 258, 
259. 

Geneva Arbitration, caution on its 
official papers, 39 n. ; settles the 
indirect claims question, 194. 



INDEX 



S81 



Gladstone, W. E., on Southern suc- 
cess, G4; on relations with United 
States in 1869, 128, 212-214; on 
municipal law and international 
obligations, 214. 

Gould, Jay, " Gold Corner," 120. 

Godkin, E. L., on change in Eng- 
lish sentiment toward America, 
263 n. 

Grant, U. S., Southern opinion, 17 ; 
Alexander on, 21, 23 ; terms to 
Lee, 25; meeting with Lee, 28; 
attitude as President on the Ala- 
bama claims, 104, 126, 134, 161, 188, 
189 n. ; character compared with 
Sumner's, 109; attitude toward 
the Cuban insurrection and Eng- 
lish recognition of Confederate 
belligerency, 108, 109, 114, 117-121, 
122 n. ; as an expansionist, 109, 113, 
130, 153 n, 156, 161, 218 ; and Fish, 
112, 113, 119 n., 143, 144; and Mot- 
ley, 116, 117, 121, 137, 140, 168 ; un- 
official advisers, 117 ; and the 
" Gold Corner," 120 ; and the San 
Domingo annexation treaty, 131, 
218, 222 ; seeks Sumner's aid for it, 
132 ; rupture with Sumner, 133, 136, 
140, 159, 228, 253 ; ou party loyalty 
to the administration, 142, 166,218 ; 
military methods of his adminis- 
tration, 142-144, 168 ; reason for 
supporting P'ish's negotiations, 
144, 164, 169, 180 ; on European 
abandonment of America, 160 n. : 
Sumner's opposition to the admin- 
istration, 166-169 ; Sumner at- 
tacks, in debate, 170 ; determines 
to have Sumner deposed, 172, 181 ; 
on troubles of official life, 223; 
apothegm, 285 ; and Wolfe, 350 n. ; 
before Vicksburg, 372. 

Great Britain, made a Confederate 
naval base, 37, 39 ; interests as an 
ocean carrier, 42 ; divided inter- 
ests in 1861, 43, 54, 56 ; proper 
course toward Confederate cruis- 
ers, 47-49 ; government ignores 
the construction of the cruisers, 
49, 53 n. ; professed impotency, 51, 
52 n. ; dereliction, 51 ; reaction of 
its policy during the Civil War, 36, 



69-74, 79, 82, 87-92, 130, 158 ; inter- 
national obligations governed by 
municipal law, £5-58 ; policy based 
on prediction of Southern success, 
65 ; the Laird rams detained, 68 ; 
primacy of international obliga- 
tions acknowledged, 68 ; ceases to 
be Confederate naval base, 69 ; 
denies responsibility for cruiser 
depredations, 80, 81 ; favorable 
opportunity for settlement neg- 
lected, 82-87 ; Derby ministry, 91 ; 
change in opinion of value of col- 
onies, 149 ; ready to negotiate, 163, 
177 ; and the indirect claims, 191- 
194; present influence of Ameri- 
can Kevolution on, 195 ; resume of 
her policy during the Civil War, 
195 ; Gladstone on relations with 
United States in 1869, 212-214; 
modern social and economic con- 
ditions, 266 ; expansion, 269 ; iso- 
lation, 269, 270; result of policy 
toward inferior races, 326-328, 334 ; 
effect of Koman occupation, 328- 
330. See also Alabama chiims, 
Belligerency, Canada, English, 
Foreign Enlistment Act, Treaty 
of Washington, 

Greeley, Horace, power, 296. 

Green, J. R., on effect of Roman oc- 
cupation of England, 329 ; defects 
in his narrative of Wolfe at Que- 
bec, 348 n. 

Hammond, J. H., on political power 
of cotton, 100 n. 

Hancock, W. S., dictum on the 
tariff, 290. 

Harcourt, W. V., on seizure of belli- 
gerent cruisers violating neutral 
rights, 48. 

Haskell, J. C, Confederate colonel, 
at Appomattox, 26. 

Hayes, R. B., candidate for Presi- 
dent, 288 ; character of his admin- 
istration, 289. 

Hayti, policy of United States to- 
ward, 333. See also San Domingo. 

History, and politics, 274, 336 ; as an 
aspect in great national debates, 
281; in the slavery debate, 283, 



382 



INDEX 



284 ; in the currency debate, 288, 
289 ; in the tariff debate, 291 ; and 
the issues of tlie campaign of 
1900, 304-335 ; field, 339 ; change In 
method of writing, 339, 340, 374. 
See also Military History. 

Hoar, E. R., Attorney-General, and 
the San Domingo treaty, 142 ; re- 
signation, 142, 219, 221; on Sum- 
ner's denunciation of Grant, 247 ; 
and Fish, 248. 

Hoar, G. F., on Sumner's self-con- 
sciousness, 253. 

Holland, Bernard, on British rule in 
India. 328. 

Hoist, Hermann von, on Imperial- 
ism, 318. 

Howe, Sir William, at Long Island, 
356. 

Humbert, King of Italy, assassina- 
tion, 258, 259. 

Imperialism, impulse, 269, 315-329 ; 
period of national debate, 281; 
issue considered historically, 315- 
320, 323-335. See also Manifest 
Destiny. 

Index, Cenfederate organ in Lon- 
don, foretells continued resist- 
ance, 13 ; despair, 14 ; on result 
of further resistance, 17 n. 

India, effect of British rule, 326-328. 

Indirect claims, Sumner on, 101-103, 
114, 151, 182, 191 ; Adams on, 103, 
192 ; Morton on, 146 n. ; presented, 
146 n., 180, 187-190, 190 n. ; disal- 
lowed, 146 n., 194 ; Grant on, 188, 
189 n.; Fish on 189 n., 190 n.; 
effect in Great Britain, 191-194. 
See also Belligerency, Canada. 

Individual opinion, value of, on 
national thought, 264. 

Individualism as corrective of ma- 
chine politics, 299. 

Inferior races, self-dependency ne- 
cessary to advancement, 324-320, 
330 ; British policy, 326-328, 334, 
335 ; policy of the United States, 
331-335 ; Other policies, 334. 

International law, influence of 
Treaty of Washington, 33, 198; 
seizure of belligerent ships vio- 



lating neutral rights, 47 ; and mu- 
nicipal law, 55-59, 68, 217; status 
of ships commissioned on the high 
seas, 72. See also Belligerency, 
Great Britain. 
Ireland, English experience in, 268. 
See also Fenianism. 

Jackson, Andrew, reason for suc- 
cess at New Orleans, 362, 366, 367. 

Japan, reason of advancement, 327. 

Johnson, Bushrod, Confederate 
general, Wise denounces, 7. 

Johnson-Clarendon Convention, 93, 
96; silent on belligerency ques- 
tion, 94, 101 ; rejected by the Sen- 
ate, 95, 208-211 ; Sumner's speech 
against, 101-103; effect of rejec- 
tion, 105 ; rejection as a step to- 
ward annexation of Canada, 104, 
209, 210. 

Johnson, Ileverdy, American Minis- 
ter at London, 92; convention, 93, 
96. See also next title. 

Johnston, J. E., Confederate Gen- 
eral, council with Davis, 12 ; 
against further resistance, 13; 
his surrender politically uncon- 
ditional, 15. 

Joint commission, Kussell suggests, 
85. 

Laird rams, object, 67 ; price, 67 n. ; 
detained, 68. 

Lecky, W. E. H., on influence of 
early American output of pre- 
cious metals, 305. 

Lee, Fitzhugh, at Appomattox, 26, 
27. 

Lee, R. E., national obligation to, 2, 
18 ; decision of further resistance 
rested with, 4, 8; after Sailor's 
Creek, 5; condition of his army, 
6, 7, 22, 29 ; interview with Wise, 
6-8 ; advised to surrender, 7, 10 ; 
devotion of bis army, 8, 23, 29 ; 
resents advice to surrender, 10; 
blocked at Appomattox, 10,21 ; ad- 
vised to disperse his army, 10, 22- 
24 ; considers surrender the only 
coxu-se, 11, 24-26; his course influ- 
ences other Confederate com- 



INDEX 



383 



manders, 12, 13 ; surrender poli- 
tically unconditional, 1-i ; return 
to Richmond, 18; meeting with 
Grant, 26-28; advice to his sur- 
rendered army, 30. 

Legislative department, relation to 
the executive, 166, 226, 227, 235. 
See also Senate. 

Lincoln, Abraham, Southern joy at 
his death, 16 ; Nicolay and Hay's 
biography, 147 ; blockade procla- 
mation, 201 ; assassination, 258, 
259,285. 

Long Island, battle of, influence of 
Bunker Hill, 356 ; effect of Wash- 
ington's mistake, 358-361. 

Longstreet, James, at Appomattox, 
26, 28. 

McKinley, "William, assassination, 
256, 259 ; lack of contemporary sig- 
nificance, 257 ; English tribute, 
261. 

McLean, Wilmer, at Bull Run and 
Appomattox, 28 n. 

Machine, political, modern predom- 
inance, 297 ; effect, 298 ; corrective 
agency, 298-300, 303. 

Mahan, A. T., as a writer of naval 
history, 346. 

Manifest Destiny, Sumner's views, 
150; and evolution, 316; appeals 
to, 322; test of reality and devel- 
opment, 321-323. See also Im- 
perialism. 

Manila Bay, battle of, effect, 321, 
323, 

Matches, government monopoly in 
France, 309. 

Mexico, policy of United States to- 
ward, 332 ; result, 3.33. 

Military commander, importance of 
his ability, .361. 373. 

Military history, Tolstoi as a writer 
of, 340 ; usual defects, 341, 345, 
373 ; Ropes as a writer of, 342- 
345. 

Mommsen, Theodor, on Imperial- 
ism, 317. 

Monopolies, and modern trusts, 308- 
310; dependent on governmental 
support, 313. 



Monroe doctrine, Sumner's view, 
150. 

]\Tontcalm. See Quebec. 

Morning Post, London, on Great 
Britain as a Confederate naval 
base, 65 ; on reaction of English 
policy, 73 ; on the North, 76, 77 n, 

Morrill, Justin, advice to Sumner, 
251, 

Morton, O, P,, Fish consults on 
Rose's proposals, 146 n. ; offered 
ministry to Great Britain, 161. 

Motley, J. L., Minister to Great 
Britain, Sumner's appointee, 107 ; 
memoir of instructions, 107 ; Fish's 
instructions, 108, 114-116 ; reflects 
Sumner's opinions, 116, 128, 137- 
139, 246 ; ignores his instructions, 
116, 121, 122 n. ; relieved of further 
negotiation, 121, 122; Rose on his 
diplomacy, 127 ; Fish on, 129 ; re- 
signation requested, 136-140; un- 
qualified for political hfe, 138 ; re- 
called, 140. 

Municipal law and international ob- 
ligation, 40, 42, 55-59, 68, 214. 

Napier, C. J., on Pakenham, 363. 

Napoleon III., attempted assassi- 
nation, 258. 

Nassau, Florida seized and re- 
leased at, 44. 

Nation, New York, on demand for 
British withdrawal from Amer- 
ica, 241 ; on displacement of Sum- 
ner, 242 ; on the Fish-Sumner quar- 
rel, 243. 

Naval history, Mahan as a writer 
of, 346. 

Neutrality. See Belligerency, For- 
eign Enlistment Act, Great Brit- 
ain, International law. 

New Orleans, battle of, influence of 
Bladensburg, 361-363,365 ; English 
blunder, 364, 367 ; probable result 
of a flank movement, 365-369,371 ; 
opposing forces compared, 368- 
372 ; and the Vicksburg cam- 
paign, 372. 

Newspaper, political influence, 296 ; 
as an organ, 296 ; present aspect, 
296. 



384 



INDEX 



North British Eevieiv on degener- 
acy of Americans, 75 n. 

Northcote, Sir Stafford, English 
commissioner, on Sumner, 184. 

Oliphant, Laurence, on English 

policy during the Civil War, 90. 
Oreto. See Florida. 

Pakenham, Sir Edward, errors at 
New Orleans, 362-372. 

Palmer, Sir Roundell, English At- 
torney-General, on exclusion of 
belligerent ships violating neutral 
rights, 47, 48 n. ; on municipal law 
and international obligations, 
57 n. ; on ships commissioned on 
the high seas, 73 ; on the British 
and American " Cases," 190 n. 

Palmerston, Lord, Prime Minister, 
on right of neutrals to build bel- 
ligerent ships, 54 ; on the Foreign 
Enlistment Act, 59 ; on recogni- 
tion of Confederate belligerency, 
199. 

Parkman, Francis, defects in narra- 
tive of capture of Quebec, 347- 
354. 

Parton, James, on the English sol- 
dier and commander, 364. 

Peabody, George, Gladstone's trib- 
ute, 213. 

Pendleton, W. N., advises Lee to 
surrender, 10. 

Phillips, Wendell, proposed as Min- 
ister to Great Britain, 162. 

Philippine Islands, choice of policy 
toward, 335. 

Pierce, E. L., biography of Sumner, 
147. 

Piracy and the Confederate cruis- 
ers, 40, 72. 

Political discussions, and the Ameri- 
can Historical Association, 274, 
275, 282, 293, 303, 336-338 ; charac- 
ter of, in 1900, 277-279, 293-295; 
quadrennial national debate, 280 ; 
character of, in 1840, 281 ; periods 
of great debates, 281 ; slavery de- 
bate, 282-284; character of, in 
1864, 284 : in 1868, 285 ; reconstruc- 
tion debate, 285, 286; currency 



debate, 286-290 ; transient influ- 
ence of campaigns of 1876-1884, 
and 1892, 287, 290, 292 ; character 
of, in 1876, 288 ; tariff debate, 291 ; 
importance of campaigns of 1896 
and 1900, 292; character of, in 
1896, 292-294 ; standard of recent 
294 ; lack of pregnant utterances, 
295 ; cause of low standard, 295 ; 
influence of the newspaper, 296 ; 
lack of influence on results of pro- 
fessional, 300-303 ; issues in 1900 
considered, 304-335. See also Ma- 
chine, Politics. 

Politics, and history, 274 ; use of the 
term, 274 ; character of Hayes 
administration, 289 ; decisive ele- 
ment in, 303. See also Machine, 
Political discussions. 

Prescott, William, in command at 
Bunker Hill, 355. 

President, term too short, 280 ; influ- 
ence of personal element, 287. 
See also Executive. 

Price and competion in relation to 
trusts, 311-314. 

Putnam, Israel, and the command 
at Bunker Hill, 355. 

Quebec, capture of, effect, 347 ; de- 
fects in Parkman's narrative, 
347 ; ascent to the Plains of Abra- 
ham, 348-351 ; mystery of Mont- 
calm's attack, 351, 353 ; ques- 
tionable advantage of English 
position, 351-353. 

Rawlins, J. A., Secretary of War, 
117 ; interest in Cuban insurrec- 
tion, 118 ; death, 121. 

Rebels, tendency to sympathize 
with other people's, 62, 270. 

Reconstruction debate, period of 
national, 281 ; character, 285, 286 ; 
unsettled, 288 ; failure, .302. 

Revolution, American, present in- 
fluence on Great Britain, 195. 

Richmond, Va., evacuated, 2. 

Rome, effect of occupation of Eng- 
land, 328-330. 

Roosevelt, Theodore, character of 
his campaign in 1900, 278, 293. 



INDEX 



;85 



Ropes, J. C, as an expounder of 
military history, 342-345. 

Rose, Sir John, career, 122 ; unoffi- 
cial negotiations on Alabama 
claims, 123, 126; return to Eng- 
land, 124 ; on Motley's diplomacy, 
127 ; opens negotiations with Fish, 
135 ; proposals accepted, 169, 177. 

Rosebery, Lord, on Ango-Saxon 
solidarity, 263. 

Russell, Earl, Foreign Secretary, 
fully advised of construction of 
the Alabama, 46 ; on the evasion 
of the Alabama, 50 n., 51 ; pro- 
poses detention of Alabama in 
colonial ports, 53 n. ; on right of 
neutrals to build belligerent 
ships, 55 ; on municipal law and 
international obligations, 55-59 ; 
sympathy for the South, 64; de- 
clares Foreign Enlistment Act 
defective, 66 n., reahzes naval 
policy of the Confederacy, 68; 
fears reaction of his policy, 69 ; 
answer to demand for reparation, 
80 ; neglects a favorable chance 
for settlement, 82-85 ; suggests a 
joint commission, 85-87 ; and arbi- 
tration, 86 ; Prime Minister, 87. 

Salisbury, Marquis of, on right of 
neutrals to build beUigerent ships, 
54 n. 

Salt, government monopoly in 
France, 308. 

San Domingo, Babcock's treaty of 
annexation, 130 ; reception by the 
Cabinet, 131, 142; Grant's desire 
for, 132, 218, 222 ; treaty rejected, 
144, 168. See also Hayti. 

San Juan question and the fisher- 
ies, 145 n. 

Schofleld, J. M. tribute to Ropes, 
343. 

Scholars, absence from political 
discussions, 293, 295; political 
duty, 300, 304, 336-338 ; political in- 
tiuence, 303. See also American 
Historical Association. 

Schurz, Carl, on Sumner, 176 n. ; on 
settlement with Great Britain, 
209; on instructions to Motley, 



210 ; on Sumner's self-conscious- 
ness, 253 ; Influence on campaign 
of 1896, 293. 

Selborne, Lord. See Palmer. 

Seeley, Sir John, on politics and 
history, 274. 

Self-government, development of ca- 
pacity for, 324-331 ; policy of the 
United States, 331-334. 

Semmes, Raphael, considers subju- 
gation of South impossible, 13 n. 

Senate, rejects the Johnson-Claren- 
don Convention, 95, 208-211 ; Cush- 
Ing on its treaty power, 123 n.; 
rejects the San Domingo treaty, 
144, 168 ; " courtesy," 167, 236 ; 
Cleveland on its exercise of treaty 
power, 185 ; status, 226, 235 ; re- 
vision of committees, 226, 234, 239. 
See also Legislative, and next 
title. 

Senate Committe on Foreign Rela- 
tions, Sumner chairman, 94, 106 ; 
power of its chairman, 94, 132; 
reports unfavorably on the John- 
son-Clarendon Convention, 95 ; po- 
sition of its chairman, 166, 181, 
229; attempt to reorganize, 169; 
Sumner removed from chairman- 
ship, 181, 183; removal justified, 
181-183, 225-244 ; reports favorably 
on Treaty of Washington, 183. 

Seward, W. H., Cobden on, 55 n. ; 
on English recognition of Confed- 
erate belligerency, 92, 97, 100, 
101, 202-205 ; ambitious to end the 
controversy, 93, accepts English 
contention on belligerency, 93; 
and Sumner, 106, 175 ; on Imperial- 
ism, 318. 

Shenandoah, Confederate cruiser, 
departure from London, 80; sta- 
tus, 197. 

Sherman, John, on displacement of 
Sumner, 239, 240. 

Sherman, W. T., Southern opinion 
of, 17 ; attack on Vicksburg, 372. 

Slavery debate, period of national, 
281 ; greatness, 282 ; literature, 
282; historical aspect, 283, 284; 
uniqueness, 284. 

South African War, conditions, 1 ; 



386 



INDEX 



and the Civil War, 2-4, 14, 15, 17, 
33-36, 63 n., 195 ; effect of, on Eng- 
lish feeling toward the United 
States, 270. 

Spanish-American War, effect of, 
on English opinion of America, 
269, 270. 

Spectator, London, on the North, 
76. 

Stanley, Lord, Foreign Secretary, 
on recognition of Confederate 
belligerency, 92; on arbitration 
of the Alabama claims, 92. 

Stephen, Leslie, on the Times dur- 
ing the Civil War, 75 n,; on 
journalism, 296; on historical 
sophistry, 316. 

Strategy, English methods, 356, 359, 
361, 362, 367 ; danger in rules, 361, 
367. 

Sumner, Charles, on status of neu- 
tral built belligerent ships, 72 ; 
chairman of Senate Committee on 
Foreign Kelations, 94, 106; on 
greatness of the Alabama contro- 
versy, 95 ; opposition to the John- 
son-Clarendon Convention, 95, 101 ; 
on English recognition of Confed- 
erate belligerency and consequen- 
tial damages, 101-103, 114, 151, 180, 
182, 188, 191, 205 ; and Seward, 106, 
175 ; early relations with Fish, 106, 
112, 113, 156, 245, 246 ; Motley his re- 
presentative, 107, 116, 128, 137-139, 
155, 165, 246 ; character, 109, 173-176, 
187, 248-255 ; opposed to tropical 
annexation, 113; objects to Mot- 

" ley's instructions, 115, 245 ; know- 
ledge of international law, 122 n. ; 
influence, 123 n., 128, 129, 139, 144, 
166, 179, 183-186; disregards a 
hint on Motley's diplomacy, 128 ; 
and Thornton, 128, 129 ; Grant 
seeks his favor on the San Do- 
mingo treaty, 132, 228 ; rupture 
with Grant, 133, 136-140, 159, 
228, 253 ; suggested for minis- 
try to Great Britain, 137 ; inter- 
view with Fish on Rose's propo- 
sals. 144, 145, 231 ; memorandum 
on the proposals, 146-149, 165; 
policy of British withdrawal from 



America and annexation of Can- 

ada, 147, 150-156, 163, 165, 186, 241 ; 
Pierce's biography, 147 ; views on 
Manifest Destiny, 150; effect of 
the memorandum on Fish, 163 ; 
and on Grant, 164, 169 ; in opposi- 
tion, 166-169, 236 ; attempt to re- 
strict his influence, 170, 172 ; at- 
tacks Grant in debate, 170 ; break 
with Fish, 171, 172, 187, 229, 243, 
251; Grant determined to have 
him displaced, 172, 181 ; his oppo- 
sition to the negotiations antici- 
pated, 173, 176, 182, 233 ; influence 
and publicity of his memorandum, 
178-180; displaced from chair- 
manship, 181, 183 ; displacement 
justified, 181-183, 225-244; impor- 
tance of his attitude on the treaty, 
183-187; disappearance of his 
policy, 197 ; contemporary opinion 
on his displacement, 237-243 ; de- 
nunciations of Grant, 247, 251; 
Fish on his character, 248-252 ; 
and Conkhng, 252. 

Supply and demand as applied to 
political discussions, 276. 

Syndicates as an element in modern 
life, 296-298, 

Tariff, period of national debate, 
281 ; debate in 1880, 290 ; in 1888, 
291 ; outcome, 302 ; and trusts, 313. 

Thiers, L. A., President of France, 
asks good offices of Great Britain, 
133. 

Thornton, Edward, British Minister 
at Washington, and Sumner, 128, 
129; on England and Canada, 
155, 157, 159, 160 ; on reaction of 
British policy, 196. 

Times, London, on subjugation of 
the Confederacy,. 14 n. ; on the 
North, 75 ; course during the Civil 
War, 75 n. ; on Russell's sugges- 
tion of a joint commission, 86 ; on 
Russell's policy, 91 ; on England 
and Canada, 157, 158. 

Tolstoi, Count Leo, as a writer of 
military history, 340, 

Townsend, Meredith, on British 
rule in India, 327. 



INDEX 



387 



Transvaal. 5ee South African War. 

Treaty of Washington, importance, 
31-33, 196, 198 ; influencing per- 
sonal factors, 105, 113 ; first un- 
official step, 123, 125 ; Eose opens 
negotiations, 135; Great Britain 
ready to negotiate, 163, 177 ; com- 
missioners appointed, 178 ; nego- 
tiated, 178, 180 ; sent to the Sen- 
ate, 180 ; favorably reported, 183 ; 
question of indirect claims, 187- 
194. See also Fish, Grant, Sum- 
ner. 

Tribune, New York, former influ- 
ence, 296 ; present condition, 297, 

Trusts, as an inchoate political 
issue, 292; issue considered his- 
torically, 307-315 ; compared with 
former monopolies, 307-310 ; and 
industrial evolution, 310; price 
and competition in relation to, 
311-314 ; and the tariff, 313. 

" 290." See Alabama. 

Uncle Tom's Cabin, popularity, 283. 

United States, obligation to Lee, 2, 
18 ; retaliation on pohcy of Great 
Britain, 79 ; lingering spirit of de- 
pendency, 205, 325 ; polity, 226 ; as 
a world power, 320 ; direction of 
the efforts as such, 321 ; policy to- 
ward inferior races, 331-334. See 
also Americans, Belligerency, 
Civil War, Confederate States. 



Venezuelan boundary dispute, ef- 
fect of, on Enghsli opinion of the 
United States, 267. 

Verestchagin, Vasili, as a painter 
of military scenes, 341. 

Vicksburg campaign and battle of 
New Orleans, 372. 

War, irresistibleness of its spirit, 
319. See also Civil War, South 
African War. 

Washington, George, blunders at 
Long Island, 357-361, 

West Indies, Grant's annexation 
policy, 130. See also Cuba, Hayti, 
San Domingo. 

White, A. D., influence on campaign 
of 1896, 293. 

Wilkinson, Spenser, on the Civil 
War and South African War, 33. 

Wise, H. A., Confederate general, 
character and career, 5 ; despairs 
of further resistance, 6 ; advises 
Lee to surrender, 7, 8. 

Wise, J. S., The End of an Era, 4 ; 
interview with Lee, 4 ; on condi- 
tion of Lee's army after Sailor's 
Creek, 6 ; on interview between 
his father and Lee, 6-8 ; on Con- 
federate joy over Lincoln's death, 
16. 

Wolfe, James, credit for fall of Que- 
bec, 350 n. ; and Grant, 350 n. See 
also Quebec. 






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